CARPATHIAN UKRAINE
IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL CRISIS ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II
(1938-1939)

Collective monograph
Reviewers:

Prof. nadzw., dr hab. Stanisław Kunikowski, Rektor of Cuiavian University in Wloclawek (Republic of Poland);

Prof. dr hab. Joanna Marszalek-Kawa, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu / Nicolaus Copernicus University (Republic of Poland).


ISBN 978-966-397-212-1

The monograph reveals the multifaceted and multidimensional process of democratic transit. The specific sections focus on the priority problems of modern democracy.

Creating a secure space for the existence and development of states is analyzed as a guarantee of the success of democratic transformations.

The essence of security in the context of the hybrid nature of political processes is characterized. The specifics of conflicts in the modern world are highlighted. The peculiarities inherent in the legal, political, cultural, ethno-national dimensions of democratic transit are investigated. The basic signs of democratization on the examples of Ukraine and some foreign countries are clarified.

Liha-Pres is an international publishing house which belongs to the category „C” according to the classification of Research School for Socio-Economic and Natural Sciences of the Environment (SENSE) [isn: 3943, 1705, 1704, 1703, 1702, 1701; prefixMetCode: 978966397]. Official website – www.sense.nl.

CONTENTS

Information about the authors ...........................................................................1

Introduction ...........................................................................................................2

Part 1. Carpathian Ukraine: from autonomy to independence ..............5

Part 2. Carpathian Ukraine in the international relations: from the Munich Conference to the Vienna Arbitration .................31

Part 3. Hungarian and Polish terrorists in Carpathian Ukraine ............57

Part 4. Activity of the Hungarian agents in Carpathian Ukraine ........81

Part 5. Illegal crossings of the Polish-Czechoslovak border and Carpathian Ukraine .........................................................107

Part 6. International support of Carpathian Ukraine by the organizations of Ukrainian emigration .............................................136

Part 7. Tragedy of Czechoslovakia and Carpathian Ukraine ............161

Conclusions ........................................................................................................179

References ........................................................................................................183
INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Vehesh Mykola Mykolayovych – Head of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Uzhgorod National University, Doctor of History, Professor (introduction, Part 1, conclusions).

Palinchak Mykola Mykhailovych – Dean of the Faculty of International Economic Relations, Uzhgorod National University, Doctor of Political Science, Professor (Part 2).

Marchuk Vasyl Vasyliovych – Head of the Department of Political Institutes and Processes, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Doctor of History, Professor (Part 3).

Kontsur-Karabinovych Natalia Mykolaivna – PhD in History, Associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences, Ivano-Frankivsk National Technical University of Oil and Gas (Part 4).

Korolko Andriy Zinovijovych – PhD in History, Associate Professor of the Department of History of Ukraine, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University (Part 5).

Vehesh Ihor Mykolayovych – PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Uzhgorod National University (Part 6).

Marchuk Natalia Vasylivna – Director of the EU Information Center, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor of the Department of Journalism, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University (Part 7).
INTRODUCTION

The formation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state was the result of many years of activity of the Ukrainian patriotic forces in all spheres of social and political life. However, we should mention that the short-lived existence of an autonomous, and subsequently independent Transcarpathian region (Subcarpathian Rus’, Carpathian Ukraine) coincided with the acute political crisis in Central Europe that took place on the eve of World War II. It is natural that the international factor made its mark on the socio-political processes that took place in Europe in general, and in Czechoslovakia and Transcarpathia, as an integral part of it, in particular. Despite the complexity of the international situation at that time, Transcarpathia won the autonomous rights and built its statehood in alliance with the Czechs and Slovaks.

Clarification of these and some other problems, an objective and comprehensive study of the place and role of Carpathian Ukraine in the context of the Central European political crisis before the Second World War deserves a special research. The situation of Carpathian Ukraine in the late 1930s should be considered in two respects: as a subject of political processes that took place in Central Europe on the eve of World War II, and as one of the stages of the struggle of Ukrainian people for the restoration of their statehood, taking into account such fact that here we can talk only about a separate part of the Ukrainian lands.

Twenty years of being a part of the democratic Czechoslovak Republic has created optimal conditions for the diverse national and cultural development of Transcarpathia, though it is not necessary to idealize it. Owing to the active work of the Ukrainian parties, societies and individual socio-cultural figures, the national consciousness of the people in Transcarpathia grew up, the people who, in fact, underwent a peculiar evolution from the Hungarian Ruthenians to the Transcarpathian Ukrainians, to the self-awareness of their identity, to the idea of political unity with all Carpathian people.
Czechoslovakia’s attitude to Transcarpathia and to the Ukrainian problem in general differed significantly from the policy on the Ukrainian idea of other European countries, especially Poland. This fact undoubtedly contributed to A. Voloshyn’s clear Ukrainian course, albeit with a focus on German patronage, and the Transcarpathian autonomous governments received comprehensive support from Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, European countries, the United States and Canada, who saw in that autonomous state the embryo of united Ukraine. Researching of this problem has got an indisputably scientific meaning. The small branch of the Ukrainian people, having received material and moral support from the Ukrainian emigration, causing wonder in all over the world, became able to carry out to some extent their own internal and foreign policy, which resulted in an attempt to form a Ukrainian statehood. This was not possible for the Ukrainians who were under totalitarian regime in the USSR, who were in Poland and Romania.

The relevance of this study is also determined by the need to debunk the claims of modern neo-Ruthenian theorists who question the region’s belonging to Ukraine. They deny in every way the regularity of the political processes that took place here in 1918-1919 and, especially in the late 1930s, they attempt to prove that the idea of independence of Carpathian Ukraine was brought to Transcarpathia from outside, in particular from Galicia. The sources from a number of national and foreign archives have arguably proved all the baselessness and pseudoscience character of such separatist interpretations. On the contrary, these sources convince that Carpathian Ukraine was a creation of local factors, although it was influenced by a number of international and internal factors.

The chronological boundaries of the research cover the period from September-October 1938, when the political forces of Transcarpathia intensified their activity in the struggle for autonomous rights and soon acquired them, until the end of March 1939 – the proclamation of independence of Carpathian Ukraine and the initial period of occupation of the land by the troops of the
Horthy’s Hungary. In order to trace the regularity and systematic nature of certain processes (the activities of the Hungarian irredentism in Transcarpathia), an excursion into the past is made. In 1938-1939, the Ukrainian people of Transcarpathia once again became convinced that only an independent Ukraine could guarantee the security of the region. On this basis, it will be undisputed that the existence of Carpathian Ukraine as an autonomous, and subsequently independent state has accelerated the process of reunification of all Ukrainian lands in a single state mechanism.

An attempt to answer the above-mentioned problematic questions gives an opportunity to fill a significant gap in the history of Ukraine, allows us to approach in a new way a number of problems of national history.
PART 1.
CARPATHIAN UKRAINE:
FROM AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE

On May 8, 1919 the Rus’ Central People’s Council in Uzhgorod decided to incorporate Transcarpathia into Czechoslovakia as an autonomy. This act fulfilled the requirement of the American Ruthenians, who on November 18, 1918, at their meeting in Scranton, called for the inclusion of the region into the Czechoslovak Republic. On November 18, 1919 I. Breich was appointed as a temporary administrator of Transcarpathia. According to the “General Charter”, the Czechoslovak government was obliged to give the widest autonomous rights to Subcarpathian Rus’, as the region was called at that time.

The Prague government was constantly delaying the fulfilment of its promises, arguing that the Transcarpathians had not yet “matured” to an independent life. The first stage of autonomy was realized only on October 8, 1938. It was the victory of all the political forces of the region, both Russophile and Ukrainian, who actively fought for autonomous rights throughout the interwar period. The end of September 1938 should be regarded as a decisive moment in the relationship of the above directions. It should be noted that as early as September 2, 1938, the representatives of Russophiles and Narodovtsi (Ukrainophiles) signed a declaration to which the Czechoslovak government did not respond. The requirements announced by E. Bachynsky included the incorporation of the Prešov region to Subcarpathian Rus’, the provision of financial assistance to the Verkhovyna districts (mountain districts), and the personal replacement of the representatives in governmental institutions¹.

On September 21, 1938 negotiations were held in Prague with participation of E. Bachynsky, I. Pieshchak, P. Kossey, S. Fentsyk, A. Brodi, Y. Feldeshiy, P. Zhydovsky, and Y. Revai. They were all

¹ Разгулов В. Дело №148423. Карпатская панорама. 1995. 20 января, 26 сентября, 30 августа.
members of the Czechoslovak Parliament. At the same time, a
delegation of American Ruthenians, consisting of I. Pop, I. Yanchyshyn,
and O. Herovsky, visited Transcarpathia, and it “was supposed to help
the parliamentary representatives of both groups to solve urgent political
problems of the region. The delegation did not, however, represent the
American Ruthenians of the Greek Catholics, who made up the majority
of Ruthenians in the United States”. That is why this delegation did not
fulfil its tasks.

In early October 1938 negotiations between representatives of the
two directions were resumed with the aim of creating an autonomous
government of Subcarpathian Rus’. At a meeting on October 7, 1938 it
was decided that only members of the Prague Parliament and the Senate
could be members of the government. We must agree with V. Shandor’s
assertion that this was done “with the expectation of success in the
government, because the Moscophiles were worried”. On the same day,
representatives of the Russophile bloc proposed a project of
decentralization of state and executive power, which consisted of eight
items. On October 8 a National Council of Subcarpathian Rus’ was
established in Uzhgorod, which included J. Kaminsky, V. Homichkov,
M. Demko (Central People’s Council of Rus’), A. Voloshyn,
Y. Brashchayko, D. Nimchuk (First Ukrainian People’s Council),
A. Brodi, Y. Feldeshiy (Autonomous Agricultural Union),
E. Bachynsky, P. Kossey (Republican Agricultural Party), S. Fentsyk
(Rus’ National-Autonomous Party), Y. Revai (Social Democratic Party),
I. Pieszczak (Autonomous Agricultural Union of Prešov Region),
P. Zhydovsky (Republican Agricultural Party of Prešov Region). Thus,
the National Council of Subcarpathian Rus’ included the representatives of all major political forces of the region.

At the first session of the Council, a Memorandum was adopted, which ended with a demand to immediately adopt a law on Subcarpathian Rus’. On October 8, 1938, Czechoslovakia’s Prime Minister J. Syrovy dismissed K. Hrabar and appointed I. Parkanij as the governor of the land. The latter once again emphasized the main requirements of the National Council of Subcarpathian Rus’.

Meanwhile, representatives of the two directions discussed candidates for the posts of ministers of Subcarpathian Rus’. Y. Revai proposed to invite three members from both councils. The proposition was accepted. The Ukrainian delegation was headed by A. Voloshyn, the Moscophiles delegation – by J. Kaminsky.

At a joint meeting of the Rus’ and Ukrainian Central People’s Councils, proposals were made for the composition of the future government of Subcarpathian Rus’: “At the meetings it was unanimously decided: to seek the same rights for Subcarpathian Rus’ that were granted to Slovakia on the basis of the requirements added to this Protocol. It was further decided unanimously to propose Andriy Brodi for the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Education, Dr. Edmund Bachynsky for the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Ivan Pieschchak for the Minister of Justice, Yulian Revai for the Minister of Communication, ie: railways, post and public works, Fr. Avgustyn Voloshyn for the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Dr. Stepan Fentsyk for the Minister of Economic Affairs. It is decided to demand an immediate fulfilment of these claims from the Czechoslovak government”6.

On October 11, 1938 there was formed the first autonomous government of Subcarpathian Rus’, headed by A. Brodi – the leader of the Russophile direction in the region. E. Bachynsky and Y. Revai

were appointed as the Ministers. After them, the ministerial post was taken by S. Fentsyk, and A. Voloshyn and I. Pieschchak became state secretaries. The first autonomous government included four representatives of the Russophile and two representatives of the Ukrainian direction. It is necessary to agree with the opinion of modern researchers that the correlation of two to one in favor of representatives of Russophilia, really reflected the interrelation between the two main political forces in the region.

Appointment of A. Brodi as Prime Minister was not a surprise either, as he headed a direction, which had a dominant position in the socio-political life of Transcarpathia throughout the interwar period. It should also be noted that since the beginning of its formation in 1923, the Autonomous Agricultural Union (hereinafter referred to as the AZS), headed by A. Brodi, has consistently promoted the main political task – the acquisition of autonomy, which was clearly recorded in the program, so as in the name of the party. In his article “We, the Autonomists, Build a New Free Autonomous Subcarpathian Rus”, published in 1935, A. Brodi wrote: “Let me briefly say what do we, the Autonomists, want and what we fight for: Subcarpathian Rus’ in its ethnographic borders from Poprad to Tisza, as it is stated in the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty and the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic... We must know that our aim to live and stay in a large family of peoples will be successful if only we will rule and manage in our own land ourselves. We are fighting for it to this day. Today, power in our land is not in our hands, and we see and feel that we cannot keep the consequences of our work for ourselves. That is why we are fighting for autonomy. Everyone knows, and you already feel that as it has been till now, it can no longer be neither by God, nor by human, nor by natural law”.

AZS, headed by A. Brodi, has grown dramatically in quantitative terms. In the late 1930’s it counted from 5 to 7 thousand members. From year to year the authority of the AZS grew among the population of the region. For example, during the elections to the

---

7 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 38. Арк. 1.
8 Болдижар М. Закарпаття між двома світовими війнами. Ужгород, 1993. С. 79.
9 Разгулов В. Дело №148423. Карпатская панорама. 1995. 20 января, 26 сентября, 30 августа.
Czechoslovak parliament in 1924, AZS got 21161 votes (8.4% of all voters), in 1925 – 28799 votes (11.6%), in 1929 – 48509 votes (18.2%), in 1935 – 44982 votes (13.9%)\(^{10}\).

A. Brodi was authoritative even among part of the exclusively Ukrainian population of mountainous regions. Synevyr priest (Volove District) F. Horvat wrote admiringly in a letter to the owner of the “rus” printing house Y. Feldeshiy about Brodi’s speech in his native village: “Having been sufficiently fed with empty promises, our people, inspired by the speech of deputy Andrej Brodi in our village, were so excited that they had recently stated publicly at the meeting with Soc. Dem. envoy F. Revai: “We don’t want any of the Czech parties, and we will support the Autonomous Agricultural Union”\(^{11}\).

The autonomous government of A. Brodi held three meetings (October 15, 18, 22-23, 1938). At the first meeting on October 15, 1938 the main governing bodies, consisting of 9 ministries, were considered and approved, it was stated that 170 wagons of corn were imported from Romania to Subcarpathian Rus’ in October 1938. At the second meeting, S. Fentsyk reported on the work done during the negotiations on the border marking with Slovakia, and Yu. Revai made a report on the ban on the export of state and private property from the territory of the region. Issues of amnesty, cooperation with Germany and others were also discussed. The focus of the third meeting was the internal political situation in Transcarpathia, in particular, there was discussed the issue of a reasonable response to the Hungarian ultimatum regarding the southern territories of the region.

On the initiative of A. Brodi, a commission was formed, which included well-known Transcarpathian scientists P. Sova, H. Herovsky, M. Kondratovych, M. Beskyd and I. Panjkevych, who got a task to prove scientifically that Transcarpathia is a Ruthenian land and with this to “fend off the Magyar demands”\(^{12}\). On October 23, 1938, the continuation of the third meeting of A. Brodi’s government took place, at which it was decided: “The region of the Rus’ people in the south of the Carpathians, marked by peace treaties

---

\(^{10}\) Ibid.
\(^{11}\) Особистий архів о. Феодосія Горвата.
\(^{12}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 40. Арк. 3.
as an autonomous unit, is one integral whole, parts of which are firmly connected both by the millennial history and by the millennial economic conditions and by fraternal coexistence of its indigenous population... The integrity and inseparability of the region is also recognized by the great allied and friendly states in the international and peace treaties, and the change of its political situation and its belonging we consider to be possible only in its entirety, without the rejection of its southern part from the northern and vice versa, it could be possible solely on the basis of the right of self-determination of all indigenous population by democratic principles: popular vote”\textsuperscript{13}. On October 22, 1938 correspondent of Lviv newspaper “Dilo” – part of UNDO in Galicia – R. Holian interviewed A. Brodi\textsuperscript{14}. A. Brodi and the management of the Autonomous Agricultural Union conducted a double game, focusing on Hungary, which caused dissatisfaction with the representatives of the Ukrainian direction. Newspaper “Nova Svoboda” accused A. Brodi of promoting anti-Ukrainian actions. The Prime Minister assured that the provocations would be stopped, but they continued. There have been cases of use of force\textsuperscript{15}.

It quickly became clear that A. Brodi had worked for a long time in Hungary under the nickname “Bertalon”\textsuperscript{16}. Czechoslovakian counterintelligence closely followed A. Brodi’s activities. On January 4, 1933 the head of the Presidium of the police department in Uzhgorod, Herr, reported to the Presidium of the local administration of Subcarpathian Rus’ that “editor Brodi has great ties abroad., he constantly meets with representatives of the Hungarian opposition forces in Uzhgorod”\textsuperscript{17}. In the encrypted telegram of the Hungarian Foreign Minister K. Kanya to the Hungarian ambassador in Prague, J. Wettstein, there were such instructions about A. Brodi: “…tell Bertalan that he would not in any way obey the Czechs’ promises and fully stand on previous positions, that is, with self-determination through plebiscite. Especially pay attention to the fact that if they do not join us, then in this case there will be unfavorable economic

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{13} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 40. Арк. 3..
\textsuperscript{14} Нова свобода. 1938. 20 жовтня.
\textsuperscript{16} Болдичар М. Закарпаття між двома світовими війнами. Ужгород, 1993. С. 81.
\textsuperscript{17} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 6. Арк 3.
conditions for them. And if they join us, then these issues will be resolved in a friendly spirit, taking into account their interests. A plebiscite for autonomy within the Hungarian state is the only sensible solution for the Ruthenians... If for any reason there are difficulties in upholding this position, then Bertalan should in all circumstances come to Pest".18

On October 17, 1938 Y. Revai warned the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, F. Khvalkowski, about A. Brodi’s ties with Hungary. As a result, the Prague government banned A. Brodi from leaving for Budapest to negotiate with Hungary. Czechoslovakian Minister of Interior Affairs Ya. Chernyi claimed that information from the meetings of the ministerial council goes to the Hungarian Embassy in Prague.19 The Czechoslovak government accused A. Brodi of violating the “Law on the Protection of the Republic” and arrested him. On October 26, 1938 a newsletter of the Press Service of Carpathian Ukraine reported that “with Brodi there was found a map of Carpathian Ukraine, on which he divided half to the Magyars and half to the Poles, and a lot of money.”20 Immediately after his arrest, A. Brodi went on a hunger strike. In prison he was visited by Y. Brashchayko, who gave him a letter, inviting him to accept Hungarian citizenship and leave Czechoslovakia, or stay in it, but for that he had to quit the political activity. A. Brodi rejected these proposals. On February 11, 1939 he was amnestied by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, E. Hacha, who immediately accepted him and offered to cooperate. However, A. Brodi refused and went to treatment at the Tatra

---

20 ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 1. Спр. 209. Арк. 28.
sanatorium. On March 5 he left for Uzhgorod, where his family lived\textsuperscript{21}.

It is necessary to agree with the statement of the contemporary Slovak scientist I. Vanat that “in the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia the political ruthenianism became the fertile ground for irredentist autonomous political parties of Brodi and Fentsyk, who received support from Hungary and Poland”\textsuperscript{22}. The researcher believes that after the occupation of the region by Hungary, the Horthy regime relied on the representatives of the Russophile direction. Proof of this is the fact that after the occupation of the region by the Hungarian troops, A. Brodi represented Transcarpathia in the Hungarian Parliament. The financing of A. Brodi by the Hungarian government is confirmed by the documents published in Budapest in 1959. Asked by the NKVD investigator on January 13, 1945, “what did you receive from the Hungarian government for your cooperation with them?”, A. Brodi replied: “…I received a parliamentary salary of 1500 pengoes, a ministerial pension of 1369 pengoes per month”. The resignation and arrest of A. Brodi sparked protests from his supporters, which grew into a mass demonstrations. And A. Brodi’s associate S. Fentsyk managed to escape to the Polish Embassy located nearby and then move to Hungary.

Thus, Andrej Brodi, like all his direction, has undergone a kind of evolution. During the 1920-30s, it was a progressive phenomenon in the social and political life of the region, because it reflected the people’s desire for equality within Czechoslovakia. From the late 1930s, it held a clear pro-Hungarian orientation, although his leaders continued to advocate publicly for the unity of Czechoslovakia.

\textsuperscript{21} Федака С. Д. Андрій Бродій (1895-1946). Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 2. Карпатська Україна. Хроніка подій / Упорядник С. Д. Федака; редакційна колегія: І. І. Качур (голова), М. М. Вегеш, О. Д. Гаврош, М. В. Делеган, В. І. Дмитрук, О. Д. Довганич, В. К. Дрогальчук, О. М. Корсун (заст. голови), І. Ю. Коршинський, Ю. В. Мойш, М. В. Олашин, О. М. Пагіря, С. Д. Федака; редактор Д. М. Федака. Ужгород: ПРАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2010. С. 164.

After the arrest of A. Brodi, the Czechoslovakian government appointed A. Voloshyn – the leader of the Ukrainian direction in the land – as the new the Prime Minister. He, in the presence of Minister E. Bachynsky, Czech General O. Swatek and Vice Governor of the region O. Beskyd, swore allegiance to the Czechoslovak Republic. The protocol with the text of the oath was recently published in the collection of documents on Carpathian Ukraine: “The protocol was written on October 26, 1938 in the office of the Minister Dr. Edmund Bachynsky in Uzhgorod on the occasion of the government oath by telephone for the Minister of Subcarpathian Rus’ Avgustyn Voloshyn, at the hands of the Leader of the Armada, General Jan Syrovy, in the intercession of the President of the Republic on the basis of paragraph 60 of the Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic. Minister of Subcarpathian Rus’ Avgustyn Voloshyn, at precisely 4.40 pm read the following oath by the phone: “I swear in my honor and consciousness that I will conscientiously and actively fulfil my duties and will take care of the correct implementation of constitutional and other laws”. The oath was attended by witnesses of the Division General Oleg Swatek and Vice-Governor of Subcarpathian Rus’ Dr. Olexander Beskyd.”

In a speech on October 26, 1938 A. Voloshyn stated that he would provide “the people of Subcarpathian Rus’ with their cultural, national and economic achievements... without national and religious distinction”. On October 27, 1938, the newspaper “Nova Svoboda” published an invocation of the Ukrainian National Council “To all Ukrainians all over the world! To all Ukrainian parties, organizations, groups, societies in Galicia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, Dnieper Ukraine, Canada, the United States of America, and in general to Ukrainians wherever they reside”, which testified to the clear Ukrainian

23 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 47. Арк. 12.
24 Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О. Д. Довганч, О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагіря; редакційна колегія: М. А. Попович (голова), О. Д. Довганч (зам. голови), М. М. Вегеш, М. В. Делеган, В. К. Дрогальчук, О. М. Корсун, І. Ю. Коршинський, О. Ю. Кучерява, О. М. Пагіря, С. Д. Федака; редактор Д. М. Федака. Ужгород: ВАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2009. С. 82.
25 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 47. Арк. 9.
orientation of A. Voloshyn’s government: “We believe, – the invocation said, – that the great 50 million Ukrainian people will continue to raise their great word and will not allow our eternal enemies to capture us, to put us in prisons again”26. A. Voloshyn also received a letter from the OUN Executive27.

A. Voloshyn formed a new government exclusively from the representatives of the Ukrainian direction. The exception was, perhaps, E. Bachynsky. This caused great dissatisfaction among the representatives of the opposite direction both in the land and abroad. The secretary of the AZS in Presov, V. Dancha, in the letter to A. Voloshyn expressed doubts about the possibility of joint actions of the two directions. Voloshyn’s response was unambiguous: “We want to live in peace with those people of our kind, who identify themselves as the Rus’ camp, when they think of it sincerely, which means that they feel sincerely as Slavs. But with people who, under the cover of Rus’, want to join us to Hungary and are agitating for that clearly or through the so-called plebiscite, we do not want to have anything in common with them”28. A. Voloshyn appealed to the representatives of Russophilism for cooperation, but his appeal had a declarative content. Not having their own people in the government, the Russophiles did not agree to the proposed cooperation. We believe that A. Voloshyn’s complete distraction in practice from such a mass direction as was Russophile one, was unjustified and erroneous. Instead of making a compromise, the prime minister has stepped up against the opposition29.

26 Нова свобода. 1938. 27 жовтня.
28 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 41. Арк. 1.
From the very first days of his premiership, A. Voloshyn began to focus on Germany, hoping for its patronage. As of February 13, 1939 the German national minority of the region was 8714, or 1.60% of the population. A. Voloshyn did everything to ensure that the German population did not experience any problems. He even issued an order according to which “all citizens of German nationality, regardless of their state belonging, are allowed to organize themselves in the “German Party” on the national-socialist basis and to organize in this party all the accustomed party bodies, as well as to carry honors and flags with a swastika.” Engineer E. Oldofredi, as a representative of the German national minority, was included in the list of future ambassadors of the Ukrainian parliament of Transcarpathia on January 27, 1939.

The government of Carpathian Ukraine did everything to ensure that relations between Ukrainians and Czechs, who lived in the region, remain neighborly. A. Voloshyn gave a task to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Carpathian Ukraine, “that in the shortest possible time the normal, friendly relations should be established between the Ukrainian people and the Czech government.” We
should mention that they were greatly exacerbated by the anti-Czech propaganda of the pro-Hungarian “fifth column” in the land, which will be discussed below. Appointing A. Voloshyn as prime minister, the Czechoslovak government had high expectations of him as a moderate politician, hoping for his neutrality in the internal political struggle that had not become weaker in the land. A. Voloshyn was well aware of this when he urged the local population to perform “their duties properly within the Czechoslovak Republic”. Even in the decree on the introduction of the Ukrainian language in the land, it was also suggested to put inscriptions in Czech or Slovak. Thus, the appointment of A. Voloshyn as a Prime Minister did not lead to a radical change in Ukrainian-Czech relations.

As of February 1939, there were 8,5 thousand Czech officials (together with their families – 15 thousand). It is necessary to agree with modern researchers that the vast majority of them “treated the power of A. Voloshyn and all Ukrainian with hostility”, fearing the processes of Ukrainization. Members of the Ukrainian National Council in Velyka Kopania complained to A. Voloshyn about the local commandant of the gendarmerie, J. Krizh, who “makes great trouble in our village, agitated and today is still inciting the population against one candidate’s letter”. At the request of V. Kopania residents to leave the village, J. Krizh responded: “I will leave Kopane, but first I have to kill twenty or thirty Ukrainians”. In the village Dovhe “the whole teaching staff is hostile to the Ukrainian nation”. V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote that “the Czechs, not only do sabotages at every step, but even openly agitate. Gendarmerie commander in Bushtyno says openly that with the arrival of the

35 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 47. Арк. 9.
36 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 10. Арк. 5.
38 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 28. Арк. 1.
39 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 28. Арк. 2.
40 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 55. Арк 32.
Ukrainian government it will be worse for the population”\(^41\). Inhabitants of the village Bilky complained to A. Voloshyn about the local gendarmerie commandant Bogac, who “is a fierce Czech chauvinist, who always treated and still treats the Ukrainian case in a hostile way”\(^42\). The authors of the complaint accused Bogac of provocative actions: “...Someone threw a swamp on the Czech inscription on a former Czech kindergarten, where the administration is now located... The windows of the administration chancellery were also thrown over by the swamp. Mr. commandant – soon after the swamp was thrown on the inscription – appeared in the Sich barracks and stated that this act was done by the Sich riflemen... We suspect that it was intentionally prepared to provoke us and defame, that we are against the Czechs”\(^43\).

Thus, the vast majority of Czech officials were hostile to the Ukrainian government, which had a negative impact on the development of Ukrainian-Czech relations\(^44\). However, it should be noted that often the initiators of anti-Czech actions were also the Sich Riflemen. Lawyer M. Bandusyak in his appeal to the investigative commission of the Presidium of Ukrainian Central People’s Council wrote that A. Voloshyn’s personal secretary I. Rohach “called on the Sich Riflemen to break the windows..., to take away the Czech flags. As a result of this provocation, the Sich Riflemen fought with the

\(^{42}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 21. Арк. 3.
\(^{43}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 21. Арк. 4.
soldiers and the police”\textsuperscript{45}. I. Rohach’s speeches were a signal to an action. Inhabitant of the village Kolochava, M. Shymonia, told how local Sich Riflemen together with Galicians threw down the Czechoslovak flag and replaced it with Ukrainian. The incident was settled peacefully. Another active participant in the events of 1938–1939, J. Sarvadiy, wrote about the anti-Czech actions by the district commander in Rakhiv, Solomianyi, who ordered to replace the Czech inscriptions with Ukrainian until March 21, 1939. “A local Sich team,” wrote J. Sarvadiy, “one night illegally took down the foreign language inscriptions, which caused a misunderstanding with the government. Dr. Fryshchyn publicly disapproved of this endeavor – the Sich Riflemen interfere into other people’s affairs. When Dr. Fryshyn was in the ministry of education in Khust, he was invited to the Sich’s Main Team, where the blanket was thrown over his head and he was beaten so much, that even his ribs were broken”\textsuperscript{46}.

From the above mentioned it follows that the confrontation into the Czech-Ukrainian relations was brought by both sides. The Czechs did not accept the Ukrainian authorities and their decisions, and the Ukrainians tried to get rid of the “guardianship”, often using different methods, sometimes those that contradicted the Czechoslovak constitution. A. Voloshyn’s government has not always been able to control the political situation in the land. Ukrainian-Czech relations worsened after the appointment of the Czech general L. Prchala as the third minister of Carpathian Ukraine. The government of A. Voloshyn treated the decision of the Czech authorities as interfering with the internal affairs of the autonomous state. On January 20, 1939 A. Voloshyn wrote in a letter to L. Prchala: “This violation of the autonomous rights of C.U. (Subcarpathian Rus’) caused great outrage among the Carpatho-Ukrainian population. This is evidenced by the swing of demonstrations, which have greatly aggravated the good relations between the Carpatho-Ukrainian population and the Czech government of C.U. ...Cooperation with

\textsuperscript{45} ДАЗО. Ф. 1148. Оп. 1. Спр. 2. Арк. 3.
\textsuperscript{46} Сарвадій Й. Змова проти уряду Карпатської України. Карпатський Союз, 1984. С. 14.
you in the government of C.U. (SR) in those circumstances is impossible”47.

Demonstrations against the appointment of L. Prchala as the Ukrainian minister resulted in mass protests in many settlements. Inhabitants of the village Vuchkove sent to the Ukrainian Central People’s Council a “Manifesto on life or death”, in which they demanded to withdraw L. Prchala, as well as to dismiss all the Czechs from the official positions 48. There was a protest note from the village Torun: “We will not give the Czechs our freedom, which was once gained with the price of our blood. Only after the death of all of us the Czechs can take our freedom”49. Inhabitants of Kolochava, Richky, Velykyi Studenyi and other Transcarpathian mountain villages demanded an immediate recall of the minister-Czech 50. It should be noted that some representatives of the government traveled to the villages and called on the masses to protest against the appointment of L. Prchala as Ukrainian minister. On February 5, 1939, Kost Linevych was arrested by Captain Novosad “for attempting to campaign in the village Domanynts. He was accused of distributing leaflets against Prchala”51. The case ended in a compromise: L. Prchala performed the duties of the Minister of Transport.

From the above it is evident what was the attitude of the government of Carpathian Ukraine to the Czech and German population, living in the territory of the region. A. Voloshyn tried to implement such a national policy, which would allow all the national minorities to feel at home. The attitude of the Carpatho-Ukrainian government to the Jewish population is a proof of this. According to modern researchers, over 100,000 Jews lived in Transcarpathia at the time of Horthy regime’s occupation, not counting the unspecified number of those who moved to Slovakia and the Czech Republic

47 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 64. Арк. 42, 44.
48 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 178. Арк. 42.
49 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 78. Арк. 48.
50 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 78. Арк. 44, 106, 115.
51 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 10. Арк. 3.
before the occupation\textsuperscript{52}. On December 28, 1938 A. Voloshyn received a delegation from Jewish national minorities (12\% of the total population), whose leaders declared their loyalty to the authorities. In response, the Prime Minister said: “I have always been respectful of Jews, who worship their religion and nationality. The Constitution of the state has not been altered so as to guarantee equal rights for all citizens of the federal state... As for the cultural needs of the Jewish population, they will be provided as much as it is possible”\textsuperscript{53}.

In the late 1930s, Czechoslovakia was a state in which more than thirty different political parties and associations were able to operate freely. All of them represented two main directions – Russophile and Narodovtsi (Ukrainian). One of the most influential was the local organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), with close association of the “Union of Labor Peasantry”, “The Red Trade Unions”, “Left Front” and the “Union of Friends of the USSR”. They all stood on the pro-Soviet positions. The Social Democratic Party was very close to the communist one, although it never went closer to it. AZS and the Rus’ National-Autonomous Party had Russophile and pro-Hungarian positions. Ukrainian position and position of unification were held by the Ukrainian Central People’s Council, the Agrarian Party faction, the Christian People’s Party, the cultural and educational organizations “Prosvita”, “Plast” and others. This situation existed until October 25, 1938, when the Prague government decided to dissolve the political parties.

Despite this decision by the Czechoslovak government, parties and associations continued to operate. In fact, only the Transcarpathian communists suffered the most because of this action. On October 25, 1938 the Vice-Governor of the region A. Beskyd issued an order to suspend the activities of the regional organization of CPC\textsuperscript{54}. On November 2, 1938 the chief of the Uzhgorod police reported to Prague that, according to the order, “the searches were carried out at

\textsuperscript{52} Макара М. Гнані долею (Етно-соціальний нарис історії єврейства на Закарпатті). Карпатський край. 1995. № 9–12. С. 14.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. С. 16.
the secretariats and apartments of the party leaders in Uzhgorod, Radwanka, and in Domanyntsi”, which resulted in “finding and confiscating a written material, seals, certificates and party badges. These things were taken to the police department”55. The premises of the local organization of CPC were “locked and sealed”56.

In 1938 there were four thousand Transcarpathian Communists (they worked in 261 primary organizations of 18 district committees), and in 1939-1941 they numbered only 61. The overwhelming majority of members of the regional organization of CPC emigrated to the Soviet Union57. A. Voloshyn did not intend to resume the activities of this party; on the contrary, anti-communist propaganda intensified in the region. On the initiative of Transcarpathian nationalists in Carpathian Ukraine, on February 10, 1939, the “Society for the Fight against Communism” was formed. At the constituent assembly of this organization, the following leaders were elected: Y. Perevuznyk (chairman), M. Dolynaj (deputy), Yu. Khymynets (secretary)58. “The purpose of the society,” it was said in the Charter, “is to combat communism and Marxism in all areas of national life and in all its forms, and to eliminate the consequences of Bolshevik-Marxist upbringing. A person, who during the last three years belonged to a society based on Marxist ideology, cannot be accepted”59.

On January 20, 1939 the Government of Carpathian Ukraine, “proceeding from a state of public peace and order and the fact that the activities of political parties existing in Carpathian Ukraine (Subcarpathian Rus’), whose activity was discontinued, threatened public (state) security, decided to dissolve all political parties that were active before the above-mentioned decree of the Czechoslovak government. The aftermath of the political party’s dissolution... is now upon the announcement. The property of the dissolved political parties, that made up their fund, will be liquidated and the balance

55 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 4. Спр. 12. Арк. 1.
56 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 4. Спр. 12. Арк. 2.
57 Болджар М. Закарпаття між двома світовими війнами. Ужгород, 1993. С. 123.
58 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 4. Спр. 12. Арк. 3.
59 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 4. Спр. 13. Арк. 13.
will go to the state treasury”\textsuperscript{60}. The Transcarpathian press regarded this move by the government as a manifestation of political wisdom:

“The political system of Carpathian Ukraine does not know parties. All political parties were dissolved and liquidated. The political leadership of Carpathian Ukraine belongs to the Ukrainian National Council. It is a body of political consolidation and concentration of national forces of Carpathian Ukraine. It is not a political party, though it consists of the active people of all former national-Ukrainian parties. This body is not dominated by any doctrine, only the Ukrainian state-building idea prevails here...”\textsuperscript{61}. The government explained such a departure from democracy in a not very reasoned way: “The people are already clear. In order not to be separated by their enemies, they lost all party affiliation”\textsuperscript{62}.

Dissolving all political parties, A. Voloshyn gave permission to “form a political party called “Ukrainian National Union” (UNO)\textsuperscript{63}. The text of the UNO program, signed by 56 political figures of Carpathian Ukraine, was sent for registration by the Ministry of Internal Affairs\textsuperscript{64}.

When deciding to dissolve political parties, the government of Carpathian Ukraine made a great juridical mistake, as it meant that all deputies of the dissolved political parties were automatically expelled from the parliament and the Senate of Czechoslovakia. According to V. Shandor, the representative of the government of Carpathian Ukraine in Prague, “all this could be done in another way. The government had to summon all the representatives of political parties, their ambassadors and senators, to present to them a plan on how to arrange the political life of the region and to give them a program of

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. C. 50.
\textsuperscript{61} Болдижар М. Закарпаття між двома світовими війнами. Ужгород, 1993. С. 93.
\textsuperscript{62} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 5. Арк. 5, 6.
\textsuperscript{63} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 5. Арк. 7.
\textsuperscript{64} Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О. Д. Довганич, О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагіря; редакційна колегія: М. А. Попович (голова), О. Д. Довганич (заст. голови), М. М. Вегеш, М. В. Делеган, В. К. Дрогальчук, О. М. Корсун, І. Ю. Коршинський, О. Ю. Кучерява, О. М. Пагіря, С. Д. Федака; редактор Д. М. Федака. Ужгород: ВАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2009. С. 182-190.
the new political party “Ukrainian National Union”. They had to take their position before that. Political parties and their representatives, ambassadors and senators who would accept the platform of the new party would join the UNO on behalf of their parties, thereby becoming ambassadors and senators of the new party and retaining their mandates in Prague. The situation was not even saved by the fact that on February 6, 1939 the government of Carpathian Ukraine changed its previous decision with a new order. The change meant that the original decree on the dissolution of political parties did not apply to the agrarian, social-democratic, people-socialist and Christian-People’s parties. It was the representatives of these parties who formed the backbone of the UNO.

On January 24 a central UNO leadership was appointed, it was headed by UCPC (Ukrainian Central People’s Council) chairman F. Revai. Other leadership positions in the party were divided as follows: M. Tulyk – deputy, A. Voron – general secretary, I. Rohach – secretary, V. Grendzha-Donsky – editor of the UNO press, V. Komarynsky – propaganda referent, M. Babota and M. Bandusyak – controllers, A. Shtefan, M. Brashchayko, I. Nevytska, S. Rosokha, Y. Pazukhanych, M. Dolynaj, S. Klochurak, V. Lar, D. Nimchuk, M. Marushchak, D. Popovych, I. Klympush, M. Hupalovsky – members of the central leadership of the UNO. Since its inception, the UNO, according to V. Grendzha-Donsky, has begun to make many appeals, which were rather orders. On January 27, 1939 the central leadership of the UNO formed a list of candidates for ambassadors to the Soin of Carpathian Ukraine, which included 32 persons. According to the contemporary, the selection of candidates was made hastily and unsuccessfully. But the vast majority of them were members of UNO. The formation of UNO testified that the government of Carpathian Ukraine could not completely abandon the existence of parties. Secondly, it testified to a certain independence of the Ukrainian authorities, which by the

66 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 6. Арк. 8.
67 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 13. Арк. 168.
decree on the formation of the UNO violated previous decisions of the Prague authorities.

On February 8, 1939 the government of Carpathian Ukraine appealed to the citizens in connection with the elections to the Soim\textsuperscript{69}. On February 8, 1939 “Nova Svoboda” published an appeal by Orthodox believers to the population urging them to vote for the UNO\textsuperscript{70}. The Government of Carpathian Ukraine paid the utmost attention to the propaganda work, which was described in detail by S. Rosokha\textsuperscript{71}. The leaflet propaganda has especially intensified on the eve of the elections to the Soim. All the leaflets urged to vote for the UNO\textsuperscript{72}.

It should be noted that some political forces have made their candidate lists for the Soim. In particular, the deputies of the Prague parliament from the former agrarian party and the “Group of Subcarpathian Ruthenians” did this way, but the Central Election Commission denied them. This act of A. Voloshyn’s government should be regarded as a significant violation of the basic democratic rights of the local population. The government made every effort to convince the population in a short time of the need to vote for the UNO, although there was no opposite political party and the elections were held on a non-alternative basis. It seemed that the government would not allow new parties to be formed in the near future. This idea was the leading idea in the vast majority of leaflets. “You are already united,” one of them said, “and you can never break into parties and groups again”\textsuperscript{73}. On February 10, the All-Ukrainian People’s Council’s address to the Ukrainian people was read on the radio,

\textsuperscript{69} Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О. Д. Довганич, О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагіря; редакційна колегія: М.А. Попович (голова), О. Д. Довганич (заст. голови), М. М. Вегеш, М. В. Делеган, В. К. Дрогальчук, О. М. Корсун, І. Ю. Коршинський, О. Ю. Кучерява, О. М. Пагіря, С. Д. Федака; редактор Д. М. Федака. Ужгород: ВАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2009. С. 212.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. С. 222.


\textsuperscript{72} Нова свобода. 1939. 15 лютого.

\textsuperscript{73} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 64. Арк. 163.
which ended with a call: “Ukrainian people! We are experiencing a historic moment. The star of freedom has dawned on us. The Ukrainian case came to a wide political forum. The whole world is looking at us. Let’s be wise, strong, careful. Fewer words – more action! Everyone at your place do your duty! And the planned teamwork, organization and obedience will give us invincible power”\textsuperscript{74}.

The elections to the Soim were scheduled for February 12, 1939. An eyewitness wrote that “the result of Sunday’s elections... was so extremely successful and useful to the Ukrainian people and Ukrainians in general, that it impressed with its surprise not only the enemies but also the friends of Carpathian Ukraine”\textsuperscript{75}. Of the 92,5% of the population who took part in the elections, 92,4% voted in favor of the UNO. The elections were conducted at a satisfactory level without significant disruption, and their consequences can be considered credible\textsuperscript{76}. The newsletter of the Press Service of Carpathian Ukraine conveyed the impression of a German journalist: “I had to travel through many villages, which had a white flag (that is, 98% voted for UNO – Aut.). I could see peasants staring with enthusiasm at that piece of cloth and looking at me, as if they wanted to say: “You see our pride, stranger”. You must be proud of the national consciousness of your people”\textsuperscript{77}. On February 14, 1939 A. Voloshyn addressed the population of the autonomous region in connection with the victory of the UNO Party in the elections to the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine\textsuperscript{78}.

\textsuperscript{74} Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О.Д. Довганіч, О.М. Корсун, О.М. Пагіря; редакційна колегія: М.А. Попович (голова), О.Д. Довганіч (заст. голови), М.М. Вегеш, М. В. Делеган, В.К. Дрогальчук, О.М. Корсун, І.Ю. Коршинський, О. Ю. Кучерява, О. М. Пагіря, С.Д. Федака; редактор Д.М. Федака. Ужгород: ВАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2009. С. 227.
\textsuperscript{75} ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 34. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{76} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 376. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{77} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 64. Арк. 163.
\textsuperscript{78} Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О. Д. Довганіч, О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагіря; редакційна колегія: М. А. Попович (голова), О. Д. Довганіч (заст. голови), М. М. Вегеш,
It should be noted that a number of settlements gave a majority of their votes against the UNO. In particular, the inhabitants of the villages Iza, Hudya, Verbovets, Smoholovytsia, Ruski Komarivtsi, Velyki Lazy, Bukovets, Dusyno, Pasika, Vyshnia Roztoka did so. More than two thousand votes against the UNO were recorded in the capital of Carpathian Ukraine – Khust. This evidences to the fact that people were free to express their opinions. At the same time, it proves that the Ukrainian idea was set in an uncompromising struggle of opposing forces.

According to Constitutional Law No. 328 of November 22, 1938, which legalized the autonomous status of the region, elections and the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine were envisaged. It defined the chronological framework for holding the first regional parliament the next way: “The Soim of Carpathian Ukraine will be elected no later than April 1939 and convened a month after elections by the President of the Republic to the city designated by the Carpatho-Ukrainian authorities”\(^79\). The government of A. Voloshyn planned to hold the opening of the Soim in Rakhiv on March 2, 1939, but the President of the Czechoslovak Republic E. Hacha did not convene a session that day. A special postage stamp was even issued for this solemn event. The attempt to open the Soim on March 9 in Khust was also unsuccessful. E. Hacha allowed to convene the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine on March 21, 1939, but at A. Voloshyn’s request he changed the date to March 15. Members of the government of Carpathian Ukraine, as a rule, accused Prague of permanently postponing the Soim. However, it should be noted that according to the Constitutional Law of November 22, 1938 there were no legal violations by the Czechoslovak authorities.

On March 14, 1939 A. Voloshyn declared independence of Carpathian Ukraine\(^80\). On the same day, A. Voloshyn sent a telegram

---

\(^79\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 4. Спр. 12. Арк. 4.

\(^80\) Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О. Д. Довганич, О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагір; редакційна колегія: М.А.Попович (голова), О. Д. Довганич (заст. голови), М. М. Вегеш,
to German Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Ribbentrop, stating: “In the name of the Government of Carpathian Ukraine, I request you to take note of the declaration of our independence under the protection of the German Reich”\textsuperscript{81}. Representative to the Czechoslovak Government, V. Shandor, was asked to “carry out the act of independence in Prague, and here we will do what will be necessary”\textsuperscript{82}. V. Shandor also informed the USA diplomatic mission in Prague about the declaration of independence of Carpathian Ukraine: “After Slovakia declared full independence, the Czech-Slovak Republic ceased to exist. Therefore, Carpathian Ukraine has declared itself completely independent on the basis of the Munich decisions concerning the right of self-determination of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people, as well as through the Vienna Arbitration. The Carpatho-Ukrainian people want the German nation’s leader and the government of the German state not to refuse the sovereign protection of independence of Carpathian Ukraine”\textsuperscript{83}.

This decision was undoubtedly influenced by factors of an international situation, in particular, the declaration of independence by Slovakia and the invasion of Hungarian troops into the territory of Carpathian Ukraine. These factors testified to the state breakup of the Czechoslovak Republic. Six sessions of the Soim, which took place over the course of three hours in one day, were destined to be historical, because during them the documents of historical weight had been given – on independence, state structure, name, language, flag, emblem and anthem of Carpathian Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. C.


\textsuperscript{83} Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О. Д. Довганич, О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагіря; редакційна колегія: М.А.Попович (голова), О. Д. Довганич (застр. голови), М. М. Вегеш, М. В. Делеган, В. К. Дрогальчук, О. М. Корсун, І. Ю. Коршинський, О. Ю. Кучерява, О. М. Пагіря, С. Д. Федака; редактор Д. М. Федака. Ужгород: ВАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2009. С. 277.
The Soim was opened by Avgustyn Voloshyn: “Bright Soim! From the bottom of my heart I feel the importance of the words that I gave to you as the first lawfully elected political representation of our people. On this occasion, I am experiencing the most momentous minute of my life... We will build Carpathian Ukraine, with recognition of full rights of the national minorities, to make all citizens of Carpathian Ukraine feel happy...”\(^84\).

The Head of the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine was elected A. Shtefan, who delivered a vivid speech: “…In the history of the Ukrainian people, it was not yet the case that a legislative body was chosen by popular vote. Laws were issued by Ukrainian kniazs, kings and hetmans, but one thing the past does not know – legislative Soim, elected with the will of the people. For many centuries, the Ukrainian people wandered in the dark and waited for a better fortune, for freedom. But only when the fall of 1938 came, did our people come into a mighty breakdown and started bravely a new path to the open spaces of freedom.

And we, representatives of Carpathian Ukraine, elected by our people, without hesitation we become where we are assigned. Because the right and power are given to us not by violence, not by party intrigues, not by bounding one against the other, not by Judas money, but by the unanimous, spontaneous will of the Ukrainian people in Carpathian Ukraine.

We want to believe that the unbreakable will of the Ukrainian people – to live their free lives – will be respected by all cultural peoples, for whom the principle of peoples self-determination is a holy covenant and not an empty phrase. For it is the audacity to think that the Almighty has created this world for only one or two nations. Every nation has a holy right to live its own life in this world. The Ukrainian nation is not a guest in Carpathian Ukraine!..

I believe that the First Ukrainian Soim of CU will continue the started work the way that our long-suffering people will rejoice with their freedom, their truth. I ask the Almighty to allow the First Ukrainian Soim of the CU to serve the interests of the Ukrainian people”\(^85\).

Delegates unanimously adopted the text of constitutional law Part 1:

1. Carpathian Ukraine is an independent State.

---

2. The name of the State is: Carpathian Ukraine.
3. Carpathian Ukraine is a Republic, headed by the President, elected by the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine.
4. The official language of Carpathian Ukraine is Ukrainian.
5. The colors of the national flag of Carpathian Ukraine are blue and yellow, whereby the blue color is up and the yellow is down.
6. The state emblem of Carpathian Ukraine is the regional emblem: a bear in the left red semicircle, four blue and three yellow stripes in the right semicircle and the Trident of St. Volodymyr the Great with a cross on the middle tooth. The transfer of this place of law is left to a separate law.
7. The national anthem of Carpathian Ukraine is “Shche ne wmerla Ukraina” (“Ukraine has not died yet”).
8. This law is now working since its adoption. The president was elected by secret voting. A. Voloshyn became the president, all ambassadors voted for him.

The Soim took place at a time when the Hungarian army had already invaded the territory of Carpathian Ukraine. The young independent state stopped its existence without starting any activity. However, despite the short duration of its existence, the very emergence of Carpathian Ukraine as a state has once again demonstrated to the whole world that there are Ukrainians living in Transcarpathia who wish to have their statehood together with their brothers from Greater Ukraine. This is confirmed by the “Proclamation of the All-Ukrainian People’s Council to all Ukrainian people”, adopted on February 10, 1939: “The Ukrainian people... we firmly believe that in the new great battle the Ukrainian nation will heroically win and will stand with its strong foot on the thousand-year-old mountains of the Golden-domed, shined with the sun of freedom, Saint Kyiv!”

The idea of the unification of all Ukrainian lands is the key idea in a memorandum of the delegation of Carpathian Ukraine to

---

87 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 32. Арк. 4.
the Chancellor of Germany on October 24, 1938. “Carpathian Ukraine”, it is noted there, “is the part of the territory of the Ukrainian people. Therefore, its population is aware of the responsibilities that it faces at the moment, not only in relation to their country, but also to all the Ukrainians”\(^{88}\). However, these intentions were not destined to come true.

Thus, the internal political development of Carpathian Ukraine from September 1938 to mid-March 1939 was ambiguous, controversial and complex. The greatest success of the political forces of the region was the acquisition of autonomous rights within the federal Czechoslovakia. The replacement of A. Brodi’s cabinet by A. Voloshyn’s government testified to a radical change in political orientation. Beginning in October 1938, A. Voloshyn and his government led a clear course on the Ukrainianization of all social life in Carpathian Ukraine. The Ukrainian government of Transcarpathia clearly adhered to the orientation towards Germany, the only country that guaranteed the security of the borders of the region.

An important milestone in the life of the Transcarpathians was the elections and sessions of the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine – the first Ukrainian parliament in the land. Despite the historicity of the decisions taken by the Soim, they were formal, because the occupation of Carpathian Ukraine by Hungary did not enable them to be implemented.

The difficult internal political situation in Carpathian Ukraine, which was simultaneously negatively affected by internal and external factors, as well as A. Voloshyn’s uncertainty in the comprehensive support of the whole population of the region, made him move to a certain curtailment of democratic processes. It manifested itself in the prohibition of all political parties and the creation of a single party – UNO, which testified to the authoritarian nature of power in Carpathian Ukraine. The departure of A. Voloshyn’s government from democracy was explained by the need to create optimal conditions for the consolidation of all patriotic forces of Carpathian Ukraine and for the socio-economic transformation in the region.

\(^{88}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 14. Арк. 1.
PART 2.
CARPATHIAN UKRAINE IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM THE MUNICH CONFERENCE TO THE VIENNA ARBITRATION

In the late 1930s, a severe international crisis arose in Central Europe. Nazi Germany and Italy were preparing for a new division of the world. The danger of World War II loomed over Europe. Czechoslovakia, which included Transcarpathia under the name of Subcarpathian Rus’, was in a difficult situation. From the second half of the 1930s, there was an accelerated process of militarization of Hungary. This country bordering on Transcarpathia constantly put forward aggressive plans for the region. Consequently, due to socio-political circumstances, Transcarpathia, which was located in the centre of Europe, was invariably part of the interests of different states\(^9\).


On September 29-30, 1938 a conference was held in Munich with the participation of Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom, surpassing in its shamelessness everything that took place after the First World War. The fate of the Czechoslovak Republic was decided during this conference, though the representatives of this country were not allowed to attend the conference. It should be noted that the idea of liquidation of Czechoslovakia has been prepared for a long time. Former US Consul in Berlin H. Messersmith told at the Nuremberg Trial: “As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues, von Papen in Vienna and his colleague von Mackensen in Budapest had openly promoted the ideas of full dissection and ultimate accession of Czechoslovakia...”\(^{90}\). This was confirmed in a letter of a Hungarian Ambassador in Germany, D. Stoai, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, K. Kanya, dated August 1, 1936: “We need to focus all our efforts on Czechoslovakia. Hitler acknowledges that our goals are the same in relation to Czechoslovakia, but he plans to implement them at a later time. He hates the Czechs”\(^{91}\). The Prime Minister of Prussia, H. Goering, during a conversation with K. Kanya, on October 11, 1936, stated unequivocally that “Germany will in no way change its plans for Czechoslovakia”\(^{92}\).

Chief of “Abwehr-1”, Hans Piekenbrock, wrote in his diary: “When I was appointed to the Ausland/Abwehr Department at the Ministry of defence in 1936, the tasks facing Abwehr-1 were next: 1. Organization of major intelligence operations in such countries: France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, England, Russia, Spain (Civil War). 2. Organization of secondary intelligence operations in the countries: Belgium, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Romania, USA. 3. Countries, where it is forbidden to conduct intelligence operations: Austria,

\(^{90}\) Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по историї кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 48.

\(^{91}\) Ibid. С. 52.

\(^{92}\) Ibid. С. 53.
Italy, Hungary, Finland, Estonia, Japan, Bulgaria. 4. All other countries did not cause interest and intelligence operations were not conducted on their territory. At that time, the Wehrmacht was in the initial stages of formation, so the main target of intelligence were the armies of neighbouring countries – Poland and Czechoslovakia... The increasing number and orientation of the tasks clearly indicated Hitler’s intentions and the OKW to occupy the Czech Republic. The intelligence operations were successful in general, as we succeeded in recruiting in the border area a large group of agents among the Sudeten Germans and conscripts of the Volksdeutsch (ethnic Germans) into the Czech army. In order to enhance intelligence operations in the Czech Republic, there were additionally established Abwehr offices in Vienna and Nuremberg. The “Abwehr-1” office in Vienna was staffed with a selected contingent, since strong family ties between the Sudeten Germans, Austrians and Czechs provided ample opportunities for the Abwehr sabotage operations in the region...”93.

The views of German leaders were fully supported by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Ciano: “Italy does not seek any agreement with Prague, although there are no direct contradictions between the two countries. In a word, Rome fully shares Germany’s position on Prague”94. During Hitler’s visit to Italy on the eve of the Munich Conference, the Czechoslovak problem was discussed only once, and quite superficially. But it was known that Mussolini spoke about Czechoslovakia with humiliation. As if preparing the country for the implementation of German plans, Duce emphasized in his speeches the need to consider and resolve the Czechoslovak question. Mussolini stated in one of these speeches: “If Czechoslovakia finds itself today in a situation that it itself could define as delicate, it is only because it was – you could say, it was, already – not just Czechoslovakia, but Czech-German-Polish-Hungarian-Carpathian-Ukrainian-Slovakia”95. It should be noted that Mussolini did not want

to involve Italy in a war for which it was not ready. He was well suited to the position of a mediator in solving the Czechoslovak question. He admitted this in a conversation with G. Ciano. Mussolini ordered his ambassador in Berlin Attolico to go to Hitler immediately to assure the Fuhrer that Italy remains on Germany’s side, proposing, however, to postpone military mobilization for twenty-four hours.  

The leaders of the Third Reich, being well aware of Hungary’s aspirations to regain their “eternal territories”, constantly pushed Budapest to take active action against Czechoslovakia. Hitler also advised Hungary “not to dissipate its political strength in different directions, but to point it to one side, namely towards Czechoslovakia”. Although the emphases in Germany’s foreign policy will change over time, this will not affect the direction of the fascist general line regarding Czechoslovakia. On May 30, 1938 Hitler issued a directive on the preparation for war action against Czechoslovakia. The plan of attack was codenamed “Grun”. According to it, “Czechoslovakia must be crushed in the near future as a result of war actions... All preparations must be carried out immediately... In the first 2-3 days there can be created a situation that will show... all the futility of the Czech military situation, and for those states that have territorial claims on Czechoslovakia, it will be an incentive to attack it immediately. In this case, we should expect Poland and Hungary to act.”

However, it should be noted that not all the high officials of the Third Reich shared Hitler’s views. The most radical anti-Hitler position was occupied by Franz Halder, who, since September 1, 1938, replaced Ludwig Beck as Chief of the General Staff of the Army High Command. He, along with Secretary of State Waizsacker, negotiated with British politicians to counter Hitler’s plans for Czechoslovakia. However, N. Chamberlain could not comprehend how F. Halder wants to enlist the support of Great Britain, contrary to

96 Ibid. C. 150.
97 Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. C. 64.
98 Ibid. C. 67.
99 Ibid. C. 97.
the political goals and intentions of his own leadership. Abwehr chief Wilhelm Canaris also belonged to those people who were clearly aware that a violent solution of the German question in the Sudeten would lead to war in Europe. He tried to do his best to avert this danger from Germany and Europe. It is known, for example, that W. Canaris contributed to a relatively moderate direction among the Sudeten Germans, led by Henlein, as opposed to the extremist national-socialist wing, led by Karl Hermann Frank.

W. Canaris, having had long-standing contacts with the relevant services of Hungary and Italy, tried to convince them of the need for a peaceful solution of the Sudeten question. By the way, there was cooperation between Abwehr and Hungarian intelligence, which included surveillance of Czechoslovakia, Eastern and South-eastern Europe. Personal ties of Canaris in Hungary soon transcended from the military sphere into the political. Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Kanya also belonged to the people with whom Canaris had a trusting relationship. On the eve of the Sudeten crisis in the fall of 1938, Canaris together with Colonel of the General Staff Tippelskirch, visited Budapest to warn Hungary of participating in the so-called "broad solution" of the Czechoslovak question, that is, the elimination of Czechoslovakia by force of arms. Canaris did similar work in Italy, but his initiative did not bring significant success. W. Canaris was well aware that the situation depended most on Britain, and was, therefore, disappointed by N. Chamberlain’s compliant position. The influential official of the German Ministry of the Interior Affairs and later the German Vice-Consul in Zurich, Hans

102 Ibid. С. 184-185.
Bernd Gisevius, was also disappointed with Great Britain. However, N. Chamberlain, twice visiting Hitler before the conference, actually contributed to the division of Czechoslovakia.

Consequently, not all high-ranking German officials shared Hitler’s expansionist plans. It is likely that, knowing this, Hitler made a great deal of effort to bring the majority of the generals to his side. This is evidenced in E. Manstein’s memoirs. J. von Ribbentrop also believed that “the oppression of the German minority in Czechoslovakia was not at all a fiction of Adolf Hitler. It began in 1918. After the Nazis took power in 1933, it was undoubtedly intensified, and the cultural life of the Germans in Czechoslovakia was increasingly eroded”. And in general, Ribbentrop stated: “The Czechoslovak people as such have never existed – either before or after 1918. On the contrary, it was a multinational state with various national groups, to which, besides the Czechs, belonged Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, Carpathian Ukrainians and Slovaks. The artificial formation, which was Czechoslovakia, created in 1919 from such heterogeneous elements, from its very inception moved to disintegration and could only be preserved as a result of strong Czech pressure”. The future English Prime Minister Winston Churchill sympathized with the Sudeten Germans, who numbered at about three million in Czechoslovakia. During a meeting with Conrad Henlein, W. Churchill supported his efforts for autonomy, but strongly opposed the transfer of the Sudeten to Germany.

The ideological consideration for Hitler’s aggressive plans was carried out by his propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels. However, Goebbels did not tell about one important detail: a few months before the sports holiday in Breslau Hitler had already decided to split Czechoslovakia. Historians E. Bramstedte, G. Frenkel and

---

106 Ibid. С. 145-146.
R. Manwell have noted that, thanks to Goebbels, “Hitler was portrayed as a kind and wise statesman of European scale”\textsuperscript{109}.

Thus, a plan to attack the Czechoslovak Republic began to be drawn up at the German General Staff long before the Munich conference. General Field Marshal Erich von Manstein recalled that in the summer of 1938 the OKH informed him that in the case of a conflict with Czechoslovakia, he would perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army, which will be stationed at the Bavarian-Czechoslovak border\textsuperscript{110}. H. Himmler together with Heidrich created a sabotage squadron of the SD, which had to follow the German army in order to “ensure the security of political life and the national economy”. Four days before the Munich Agreement, when the invasion in Czechoslovakia seemed already resolved, H. Himmler informed Henlein that he and his militia corps would be subordinated to him personally. At the same time, six battalions of security from the “Dead Head” units were brought to the border without the sanction of the high command, which overturned his orders to Henlein and gave instructions that the SS soldiers should be controlled by the military men. The order ended with an indication that all “further measures should be agreed between the commander-in-chief of the army and the Reichsführer of the SS”\textsuperscript{111}.

Hitler tried to hide his ultimate goal against Czechoslovakia, saying that he wanted only to release the Sudeten Germans, who were allegedly discriminated in the Czechoslovak Republic. To stop this, he demanded that Great Britain and France should “press” on Czechoslovakia. President of Czechoslovakia E. Benesh was in a difficult position. On the one hand, Britain and France insisted on the mandatory adoption of an ultimatum, and on the other, his own people demanded that he should rely on the treaty-allies\textsuperscript{112}. At the same time, Earl E. Halifax was convinced in another thing: “At present, no European combinations can prevent the suppression of

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. С. 233.


Czechoslovakia”\textsuperscript{113}. Of course, this was only said in a narrow circle. Czechoslovakia was further persuaded that the Sudetenland was the last to be claimed by Hitler.

The conference in Munich, according to Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, I. Maysky, was held “at a machine-gun speed: it started at 1 p.m. and ended at 2 hours 45 minutes on September 30, including the time for breakfast, lunch and other necessary breaks. The fate of Czechoslovakia was resolved in less than 13 hours. And not only the fate of Czechoslovakia”\textsuperscript{114}. Even Hermann Goering was surprised at the speed of the conference: “In reality, it all went quite simple. Neither Chamberlain nor Daladier were ultimately interested in sacrificing or risking anything to save Czechoslovakia. It was clear to me as day. Its fate was mostly resolved within three hours. Then three hours went into the dispute over the word “guarantee”\textsuperscript{115}. This conference was the first stage of what Hitler spoke about on May 28, 1937, at an extraordinary meeting of all senior leaders of his empire: “My invariable decision is to wipe Czechoslovakia off the map”\textsuperscript{116}. The results of the conference were announced to the representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic as a non-negotiable verdict.

The Munich Conference made a really brutal stroke to Czechoslovakia. The latter lost half of the heavy industry, 66% of coal, 70% of electricity, 70% of ferrous metallurgy, 86% of the chemical industry, 80% of the textile industry. In fact, “what remained of the crushed and split country was now at Hitler’s feet”\textsuperscript{117}. According to official statistics, “Czechoslovakia had 140.400 square kilometers and 15.3 million citizens. Germany took 28.200 sq. km.

\textsuperscript{114} Майский И.М. Воспоминания советского дипломата. М., 1987. С. 366.
\textsuperscript{117} Вегеш М., Задорожний В. Велич і трагедія Карпатської України: Історико-популярний нарис. Ужгород, 1993. С. 12.
and 3.6 million inhabitants”\textsuperscript{118}. Not only did Czechoslovakia lose a fifth part of its territorial area and almost a fourth part of its population, but the fact that Prague was located 40 km from the German border was also threatening. The Munich Conference struck a heavy blow to Czechoslovakia’s defence capability. By this act, Britain and France had lost a strong ally, for Czechoslovakia had 45 divisions, 1582 aircraft, 469 tanks, 5700 guns. The Germans understood this well, and when developing the “Grun” plan, they planned to send 39 divisions to Czechoslovakia. France forgot about its personal security, which in 1940 was skilfully used by Hitler, capturing it in a few days.

How was the Munich Conference treated in the ruling circles of the allies of Czechoslovakia? Realistically thinking English politician W. Churchill, mentioning the great miscalculations of his government, stated that “we (Britain – Aut.) have suffered a defeat without war, the consequences of which will be felt for a very long time. We have gone through a terrible phase in our history when Europe’s equilibrium was broken... Don’t think that it is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first treat of this bittersweet cup that we will be offered year after year”\textsuperscript{119}. Taking a speech in Weimar, Hitler pointed at his island enemy: “If Mr. Churchill had less to do with traitors and more with the Germans, he would have seen that he’s taking an unthinkable affair, for I can assure this man, who seems to live on the moon, that Germany has no forces opposing the regime – only the forces of the National Socialist movement, its leaders and defenders”\textsuperscript{120}. The Fuhrer warned that if Churchill will return to power then Germany will be facing a war.

The Parliament of Great Britain, with 366 votes to 114, approved the Munich Conference. Labour Party voted against it, 30 or 40 conservatives who disagreed with the government in Munich’s assessment, including Churchill, abstained. The Czechoslovak crisis, according to German Ambassador to London H. Dirksen, was treated in Great Britain “rather as a natural disaster that went smoothly

\textsuperscript{118} Нова свобода. 1938. 2 листопада.
\textsuperscript{119} Трухановский В.Г. Уинстон Черчилль. М.: Мысль, 1989. С. 256.
\textsuperscript{120} Уткин А. Уинстон Черчилль. М.: «Адгоритм» – Эксмо, 2002. С. 262.
enough and for which no one was held responsible”121. “Munich was the most correct,” the ambassador of Poland to London Raczyński described the mood of the English ruling circles, “if not the only way out of a desperate situation”122. Minister W. Elliott expressed similar views123. In the French Chamber of Deputies of 600 parliamentarians only 75 condemned the Munich Conference. The fate of Czechoslovakia was of little concern to anyone124. However, French politicians did not fully believe that Hitler would adhere to the Munich Agreement. For greater certainty, at the end of September 1938, a couple of millions of gas masks were given to the population. Shortly afterwards, S. de Gaulle wrote to Paul Reynaud: “The events with striking clarity show your rightness... My regiment is ready for battle. As for me, I am not surprised with the coming of great events in the history of France…”. On September 29, when the Munich conference has already begun, one officer asked him: “What to do now?” – and de Gaulle calmly said: “To fight”125.

US Ambassador to Paris W. Bullitt on September 27, 1938, that is, two days before the start of the conference, informed the Washington: “I think it’s 95% likely that the war will start on Friday night...”126. The war has not yet begun, however, the Munich Conference has not

125 Ibid. С. 75.
become a cold shower for the US administration\textsuperscript{127}. From September 12 to September 30, the ninth studio of the CBS radio company made 85 broadcasts, in most cases directly from Europe. Millions and millions at the receivers were horrified by Hitler’s hysterical speeches... They acutely felt their helplessness and fear...

Conclusions: a poll by “Fortune” showed that only 11.6 percent believed the Munich agreement to be approving, 76.2 percent believed that USA will take part in the war in Europe (a year and a half ago – only 22 percent). The CBS was pleased to confirm the result: radio now not only spreads the news, but it also acts as a social force\textsuperscript{128}. US diplomat George Kennan expressed his opinion on the consequences of Munich\textsuperscript{129}. In the deep conviction of G. Kennan, “Czechoslovakia is, after all, a Central European country and its fate, one way or another, is linked to the main forces, which are operating in the region”\textsuperscript{130}. However, the Roosevelt administration began to increase its military potential. In January 1939, an additional assignation of half a billion dollars to the military department followed. In the following months, in the spring of 1939, the United States finally started to revise the Neutrality Act. In May, Secretary of State, Hell, expressed the government’s intention to allow warring states to buy weapons from the US\textsuperscript{131}.

In the case of annexation of Czechoslovakia by the Nazi Germany, a direct road to Poland was opened before the Third Reich, which could have become a bridgehead for the attack on the USSR. It was in the interests of Britain and France. It is clear that the Soviet Union could not allow this, understanding pretty well what a liquidation of Czechoslovakia could bring to it, and therefore did everything to help it. It is possible that this assistance was not sincere, but was an ordinary attempt to survive in extremely difficult international conditions. Ten days before the Munich Conference, E. Benesh

\textsuperscript{127} Яковлев Н.Н. Избранные произведения. М.: Международные отношения, 1988. С. 260.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid. С. 260-261.
\textsuperscript{129} Кеннан Дж. Дипломатия Второй мировой войны глазами американского посла в СССР. М.: Центрполиграф, 2002. С. 66.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. С. 67.
\textsuperscript{131} Уткин А. Уинстон Черчилль. М.: «Адгоритм» – Эксмо, 2002. С. 74-75.
addressed the USSR government with a letter, asking whether the USSR would fulfil its allied obligations. On September 20, the Soviet government gave a positive answer. If earlier the USSR had stated that it would assist Czechoslovakia only if France will do the same, now it has made concessions: “The USSR will provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia, even without the participation of France, and when Czechoslovakia will defend itself and will ask for its assistance”\(^\text{132}\). This was confirmed by the People’s Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom I. Maysky: “The most important thing is how the Czechs will behave... If they will fight, then we will help them with an armed hand”. On September 25, 1938 the USSR reported to Paris that, according to the treaty, the troops were ready to defend Czechoslovakia.

According to archival materials, the measures taken by the USSR to protect Czechoslovakia were large-scale: June 26, 1938 – the urgent formation of six army and one cavalry groups; September 23 – bringing to combat readiness of one tank corps, 30 infantry and 12 aviation brigades. Then another 17 infantry divisions, three tank corps, 22 tank and three motorized infantry brigades, 34 aviation bases. In addition, the second echelon of troops, consisting of 30 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions, 2 tank corps, 15 separate tank brigades, 34 aviation bases were put on alert. A total of about 300,000 people were recruited to the armed forces. Directives were sent to the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Byelorussian, Moscow, Kalinin and Leningrad military districts\(^\text{133}\). There was nothing about Subcarpathian Rus’ in the statements of the USSR government. They were about Czechoslovakia in general. However, protection of the integrity of Czechoslovakia was also a protection of the interests of Transcarpathia, which Hungary wanted to invade\(^\text{134}\). On September

---


\(^{134}\) Гранчак І.М., Гапоненко І.С. Закарпаття в міжнародних відносинах напередодні та в період Мюнхена. Нариси історії Закарпаття. Т.ІІ. (1918–1945). Ужгород, 1995. С. 267.
23, 1938 the USSR government informed Warsaw that if Polish troops crossed the Czechoslovak border, the Soviet Union would consider the Soviet-Polish treaty of July 25, 1932 to be terminated\textsuperscript{135}. In Poland the statement of the USSR was treated as a direct support of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union strongly condemned the decision of the Munich conference.

We must agree with L. Bezimensky’s view that the USSR has suffered most from the consequences of Munich. It delivered a “major blow to its international prestige. Again, the country was pushed to the outskirts of world politics. The mechanism of military cooperation with the West was also not used. The USSR lost a good partner – Czechoslovakia”\textsuperscript{136}. However, Munich forced the USSR to radically change the orientation of its foreign policy, which subsequently led to the conclusion of infamous treaties between Stalin and Hitler in 1939. Such a course of events was predicted by the adviser to the German Embassy in Moscow Werner von Tippelskirch: “It seems to us that Stalin will make personal conclusions about the failure of the Soviet politics... If we go to the field of political speculation, it seems that the Soviet government should reconsider its policy. First of all, it concerns relations with Germany, France and Japan. What about us, the more positive attitude of the Soviet Union towards Germany could be possible, at least because France is devalued as an ally and Japan takes an aggressive stance... Anyway, I do not consider it absurd that the present circumstances create favorable opportunities for a new, larger-scale economic agreement with the Soviet Union”\textsuperscript{137}. Undoubtedly, he was not mistaken.

The leadership of Czechoslovakia was well aware of the tragedy of its situation. When handing over Munich’s demands by the German attorney in Prague, A. Henke, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Krofta said that for Czechoslovakia “this is a disaster, which we did not deserve. We obey and will try to provide a peaceful life for our people. I do not know if your countries will

\textsuperscript{136} Безыменский Л. Гитлер и Сталин перед схваткой. М.: Вече, 2002. С. 169.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
benefit from this decision, made in Munich, but we are not the last ones anyway. After us, the same fate awaits the others”\textsuperscript{138}. Czechoslovak diplomat G. Masaryk concluded that “Czechoslovak Republic in the borders of 1918 ceased to exist”\textsuperscript{139}. Implementing the decisions of the Munich Conference, the Czechoslovak troops on October 1, 1938 “began to concede from the designated Sudeto-German line... The German army crossed the border of the Czechoslovak Republic at the same time. Germany annexed: October 1 and 2 – Volyary, Vyssy Brod, October 2 and 3 – Podmokly, Decin, Friedland, Velki Shanov, Shluknov, Rumburk, Vorisdorf, October 3, 4, 5 – Cheb, Karlovy Vary, Kadan, Yakilnov, Mariani Bani, Takhov, Niden, Falknov, Ash, Kraslice, Frantisek Lazne, October 6 and 7 – Krnov, Bruntal, Frivaldov, Jawornin”\textsuperscript{140}.

Since October 1, 1938 K. Henlein was appointed as the State Commissioner for the territories that left for Germany. On the same day, a note from the Polish Government of 30 September 1938 was considered at a session of the Czechoslovakian Government, which in an ultimate form called for the “retreat of the part of the Teschen region. Having considered Polish claims comprehensively, the Czechoslovak government could not have done otherwise than accept the Polish proposals in view of the difficult international position of Czechoslovakia, created by the Munich Treaty”\textsuperscript{141}.

Although the issue of Subcarpathian Rus’ was not considered in Munich, its decisions had a very negative impact on the fate of the region. On September 29, 1938 an “Addendum to the Agreement signed in Munich between Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy” was adopted, stating that “as soon as the question of Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia will be regulated, Germany and Italy will provide a guarantee to Czechoslovakia”\textsuperscript{142}. It provided that “if within the next three months the problem of the

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid. С. 314-315.
\textsuperscript{140} Нова свобода. 1938. 4 жовтня.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Новые документы по истории Мюнхена. М.: Наука, 1958. С. 159.
Polish and Hungarian national minorities in Czechoslovakia is not resolved between the governments concerned by the agreement, then this problem will be the subject of further discussion at the next meeting of the heads of governments of the four states, which are present here". The decision of the Munich Conference marked the first major victory of Hungarian diplomacy in the fight for the revision of the borders, which also directly concerned the fate of Transcarpathia. On October 1, 1938 Hungary’s Regent M. Horthy wrote to Hitler that he was genuinely pleased that in Munich there had been “reached a peace agreement on crucial issues and that Hungary’s legitimate elections would in principle be recognized as justified”.

Hungarian diplomacy has done considerable work ahead of Munich. Head of the Chancellery of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs I. Chaki, during a telephone conversation on September 15, 1938, instructed the Hungarian Ambassador to Germany, D. Stoyai: “If a discrimination towards Hungary will take place during the liquidation of the Czechoslovak case, then the Hungarian government will be ready for anything, and in this case, it counts on the support of the German Empire”. On September 17, D. Stoyai, in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, K. Kanya, forwarded H. Goering’s proposals. According to him, Hungary must “officially demand the right for self-determination for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, it must appeal to the Czech government and other governments with a similar treatment to that of Henlein, it must provoke an armed clashes, strikes, refusal to appear at the recruiting points, because only serious incidents can draw attention of the Western states to Hungarian demands, it must do everything to make the foreign press be more involved in the Hungarian issue”. The Hungarian ambassador to Poland, A. Hori,

---

143 Ibid. С. 160.
146 Ibid. С. 101.
147 Ibid. С. 101-102.
assured Warsaw that “Hungary, in case of the collapse of Czechoslovakia, claims the historical borders. My government considers this question to be resolved”\textsuperscript{148}.

Poland has constantly defended Hungary’s interests before Germany. “With about the Hungarian demands,” wrote the Polish Ambassador to Germany J. Lipski, “I specifically highlighted the issue of Transcarpathian Rus’, emphasized the strategic moment towards Russia (meaning the USSR – Aut.), the communist propaganda, which is carried out in this territory, etc. I got the impression that the Chancellor was very interested in this issue, especially when I told him that the length of the Polish-Romanian border was small and that thanks to the joint Polish-Hungarian border through Transcarpathian Rus’ we would create a stronger barrier against Russia. In addition, I stated in relation to Transcarpathian Rus’ that this territory, which Slovakia does not claim, was only given to Czechoslovakia as a mandate, that its population is on a very low level and is highly mixed, and that Hungary has the greatest interest in it”\textsuperscript{149}.

On September 29, 1938 that is, just before the start of the Munich conference, B. Mussolini stated that “today will be a good day for Hungary. As soon as we are done with the question of the Sudeten Germans..., I will immediately put on the agenda the Hungarian and Polish claims, demanding their immediate satisfaction on the same basis as it will be done with regard to German claims”\textsuperscript{150}. “If they cannot be realized,” said I. Chaki, “then he (Mussolini – Aut.) will insist on their implementation for a strictly defined period of time – for a month. If this minimum program also does not work, then, he said, raising his voice, you will act... Put the world in front of the fact”\textsuperscript{151}.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid. С. 26.  
\textsuperscript{149} Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны. Т.1. Ноябрь 1937 – декабрь 1938 г. Из архива Министерства Иностранных Дел Германии. М.: Политиздат, 1981. С. 211.  
\textsuperscript{150} Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 105.  
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
Therefore, Hungary was actively supported in its claims by Italy. This could not but affect Hitler, who in a conversation with British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain on September 22, 1938, stated that from Hungary at one time “a large territory was taken away, leaving against their will almost one million Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.”

On October 1, 1938 a representative of the USSR in Czechoslovakia, S. Alexandrovsky, informed the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR that “in the Munich Agreement, Hitler signed a decision to give three months to regulate the issue of the Polish and Hungarian minorities and make it a subject of discussion by four states, if the Czech-Polish agreement would not be reached.”

Following the decision of the Munich Conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, K. Krofta, on October 1, 1938 addressed a Hungarian ambassador to Prague, J. Wetstein, with a note proposing “to establish as soon as possible a mixed Czechoslovak-Hungarian commission of experts in order to consider the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. This commission should prepare and submit a draft resolution of that problem.”

On October 3, 1938 Hungary prepared the ultimatum requirements for the Czechoslovak government, which the latter had to accept: 1) to immediately release the political prisoners of Hungarian nationality; 2) to immediately demobilize and release home the soldiers of Hungarian nationality; 3) to create local units to protect the lives and property of the population. Squad Command mixed; 4) to transfer to Hungary 2-3 Czechoslovak border towns, which have to be occupied by Hungarian troops. In the West, such cities should be Komarno, or Parkanjana, or Upoishag, or Chop, or Beregovo; 5) the Hungarian government proposes to begin direct Hungarian-Czechoslovak negotiations in Komarno on Thursday, 6th day of this month, at 4 in the afternoon. I will personally lead the Hungarian

---

153 Ibid. С. 243.
154 Нова свобода. 1938. 5 жовтня.
delegation (K. Kanya – Aut.)\textsuperscript{155}. At the same time, A. Brodi, on October 6, 1938, was offered “in no case to obey the Czechs’ promises” but to stand firmly in “a position of self-determination through plebiscite”\textsuperscript{156}. The Prague project to solve the problem of national minorities was “to give the purely Hungarian ethnic territory to Hungary” and, as regards the plebiscite, it “is rejected as unrealistic and superfluous, because in the territories in which, according to the Hungarian authorities, a plebiscite should be held, there is no longer a Hungarian majority”\textsuperscript{157}. There even could be no talk of a plebiscite in Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and Sevlyush (Vynohradiv).

Such positions were held by government delegations of Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the eve of the Komarno conference, which took place 9 – 13 October, 1938. Hungarian diplomacy, with the support of the fascist states led by Germany, put forward difficult conditions for Czechoslovakia: to return the lands, inhabited by the Hungarians, (on the base of the 1910 census, when the number of Hungarians was greatly exaggerated), to hold a plebiscite in the territories with mixed population, to grant the right of self-determination to all other peoples\textsuperscript{158}. “In case of fulfilment of these Hungarian claims,” “Nova Svoboda” reported, “Hungary would have taken... 400 thousand Slovaks and 80 thousand Ukrainians, so the Slovak-Ukrainian minority in the Hungary would be larger than the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia”\textsuperscript{159}.

The negotiations in Komarno did not give any positive results. They were thwarted by the fault of Hungary. Czechoslovakia could not accept the Hungarian requirements, because during the 1910 census, “the commissioners of the Hungarian authorities

\textsuperscript{155} Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 11.
\textsuperscript{157} Нова свобода. 1938. 28 жовтня.
\textsuperscript{158} Гранчак І.М., Гапоненко І.С. Закарпаття в міжнародних відносинах напередодні та в період Мюнхена. Нариси історії Закарпаття. Т. ІІ. (1918–1945). Ужгород, 1995. С. 269.
\textsuperscript{159} Нова свобода. 1938. 16 жовтня.
included in the rubric of the Hungarian nationality everyone, who could speak Hungarian, and also included the religion”\(^{160}\). On October 14, 1938 representatives of the Hungarian delegation formally declared that Hungary was “interrupting the negotiations, because it cannot continue them due to Czechoslovak preconditions”\(^{161}\). After the collapse of the negotiations in Komarno, a new stage has emerged in solving the “Czechoslovak problem”. Hungary, accusing Czechoslovakia of reluctance to make concessions, appealed to Italy and Germany to arbitrate the situation. Great Britain and France have declared their disinterest in this issue. B. Mussolini advised the Hungarians “to demand an urgent call for an immediate convening of a conference of the four great states, stating that there is little hope of resuming direct bilateral negotiations, and stressing that delay in resolving the issue will pose a threat to peace”\(^{162}\). To this Mussolini added that “at the first request, the planes (Italian – Aut.) will be immediately deployed to Hungary. They are in full readiness, and they need an hour and a half to get to Budapest”\(^{163}\). In a conversation with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, F. Khvalkovsky, Hitler “expressed his pity that the issue of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia had not yet been resolved”\(^{164}\). In a conversation with the Ambassador of Hungary to Berlin, D. Stoyai, H. Goering tried to reassure the Hungarians and “expressed confidence that Hungary would return its territories without war”\(^{165}\). The session of the arbitration commission was appointed on November 2, 1938.

On the eve of the arbitration, Hungary had high expectations on its agent A. Brodi, who, under the leadership of the government of Subcarpathian Rus’, had to invite the Hungarian troops to occupy all of Transcarpathia. The Polish government held a similar view. According to Hungarian Ambassador to Poland A. Hori, “one of the

\(^{160}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 29 жовтня.
\(^{161}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 15 жовтня.
\(^{162}\) Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 114.
\(^{163}\) Ibid. С. 115.
\(^{164}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 16 жовтня.
\(^{165}\) Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 115.
formulas... could be a statement that the Ruthenian population has asked both Hungarian and Polish troops to enter the Ruthenian region. Such an action could be quickly prepared or organized. You can also choose the following decision: Hungarian troops that will enter the Ruthenian region will seek support from the Polish army. Of course, this needs to be agreed earlier\textsuperscript{166}. However, Czechoslovak counterintelligence has closely followed the prime minister’s every move. On October 27, 1938 A. Brodi was arrested, and A. Voloshyn, who headed the new cabinet, clearly adhered to the anti-Hungarian orientation. The new appointment by Prague convinced Hungary that no territorial concessions could be expected from A. Voloshyn, and the transfer of all Transcarpathia couldn’t be even mentioned. A. Voloshyn arrived in Vienna on November 2, 1938, but did not participate in the work of the arbitration commission. We have to agree with V. Grendzha-Donsky that the Transcarpathian delegation “was invited not for consultations, but for getting a ready decision”\textsuperscript{167}.

The text of the first Vienna Arbitration Award of November 2, 1938, signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany and Italy, provided: “1. Areas departing from Czechoslovakia to Hungary are indicated on the attached map. The Hungarian-Czechoslovak commission must set the border. 2. The evacuation of the outlying regions of Czechoslovakia and their transfer begins on November 5, 1938 and must be completed by November 10, 1938. Separate stages of evacuation and transfer, as well as other formalities, should be determined immediately by the Hungarian-Czechoslovak commission. 3. The Czechoslovak Government should ensure that evacuated areas are transferred in full. 4. Separate issues arising from the territorial retreat, especially issues of citizenship and optation, must be resolved by the Hungarian-Czechoslovak commission. 5. The Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission must also take more specific decisions on the protection of both persons of Hungarian nationality who remain in the territory of Czechoslovakia and persons of non-

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid. С. 133.

Hungarian origin in the retreating regions... 6. As the transfer to Hungary could be detrimental and economic and communicational difficulties would arise in the regions under Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian royal government, in its agreement with the Czechoslovak government, would do its utmost to remedy such difficulties”\textsuperscript{168}. If the Hungarian-Czechoslovak commission fails to resolve the controversial issues, then they will be discussed by Germany and Italy.

According to the decision of the arbitration commission, the new Hungarian-Czechoslovak border was passing along the settlements of Bovtrad, Mali and Velyki Hut, Janoszowo, Kwasowo, Orosievo, Kerestury, Vilok, Beregovo, Yovrya, Uzhgorod, Radvanka, Dravtsi, Velyki Heevtsi, Kholmets, Velyka Dobronj, Barkasovo, Zhniatyno, Kliucharky, Mukachevo, Fornosh, Nove Selo, Vyshni Remety, Shalanky, Matievo, Choma, Chorny Ardiv\textsuperscript{169}. According to the information in “Nova Svoboda”, which was based on the official statistics, “the territory of the Czech Republic decreased by 33%, Moravia by 36%, Slovakia by 21%, and the territorial losses of Subcarpathia... amounted to 12%”\textsuperscript{170}. Czechoslovak Republic “retreated 28.200 sq. km. to Germany, about one thousand sq. km. to Poland, about 12.000 sq. km to Hungary. The current republic will have about 100.000 sq. km.”\textsuperscript{171}. Hungary took 171.711 people, of which 33.324 were Ukrainians, 16.463 were Czechs and Slovaks, 82.179 were Hungarians\textsuperscript{172}.

The Vienna arbitration has affected five Transcarpathian districts – Uzhgorod, Mukachevo, Beregovo, Sevliush and Irshava. Subcarpathian Rus’ lost the cities of Uzhgorod, Mukachevo, and Beregovo with the surrounding areas. In Uzhgorod district Hungary took 22 settlements, in which 10.719 Ukrainians and 18.687 Hungarians lived, in Mukachevo – 15 settlements (12.153 Ukrainians

\textsuperscript{168} Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории канун и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 120.
\textsuperscript{169} Нова свобода. 1938. 11 листопада.
\textsuperscript{170} Нова свобода. 1938. 15 листопада.
\textsuperscript{171} Нова свобода. 1938. 8 листопада.
and 12,253 Hungarians), in Sevliush – 18 villages (3,471 Ukrainians and 8,752 Hungarians), in Beregovo district – 40 settlements (6,343 Ukrainians and 40,962 Hungarians), in Irshava – the only settlement – the village Shalanky, in which 648 Ukrainians and 1525 Hungarians lived\textsuperscript{173}. It is necessary to agree with P. Stercho's assertion that “Ciano and Ribbentrop, by their decision of November 2, 1938 in Vienna, violated ethnographic principles, because they gave two cities to the Hungarians, that is, Uzhgorod and Mukachevo with a relative majority of the Ukrainian population, as well as 13 villages with an absolute majority of the Ukrainian population, among which in 4 villages the Hungarians did not make up one percent of the population. In addition, four villages with a relative majority of the Ukrainian population were given to Hungary”\textsuperscript{174}. In Baranyntsi, for example, there were 77% of Ukrainians, in Yovra – 62%, in Dravtsi – 93%, in Korytnyany – 72%, in Kvasovo – 85%, in Vyshny Remety – 92%, in Nyzhny Remety – 93%, in Chepa – 67%.

According to the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration, a joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian demilitation commission was set up, with 11 subcommittees in its structure. They solved the general political, military, territorial, ethnographic, financial, national economic, trade, legal problems. Two Ukrainians, two Slovaks and one Czech were delegated to the joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian commission\textsuperscript{175}. Carpathian Ukraine was represented by Y. Brashchayo and M. Dolynai. The functions of experts were performed by J. Jirkovsky, L. Makhachek and V. Primich. The representatives of Carpathian Ukraine and Hungary reached an agreement on a permeable system, export of property from the territory occupied by Hungary. “Nova Svoboda” reported: “Movable property will be exportable within two months since the railway and communication movement between the two countries will be started”\textsuperscript{176}. The communication line had to start its work on January 9, 1939. The

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. С. 74-75.
\textsuperscript{174} Стерчо П. Карпато-Українська держава: З історії визвольної боротьби карпатських українців у 1919–1939 роках. Торонто, 1965. С. 76.
\textsuperscript{175} Нова свобода. 1938. 21 грудня.
\textsuperscript{176} Нова свобода. 1938. 24 грудня.
evacuation, which ended on November 10, 1938, was headed by V. Komarynsky, D. Nimchuk and V. Grendzha-Donsky.177

In the circular of the Presidium of the Regional Administration of Subcarpathian Rus’ in Uzhgorod, there was an order of evacuation of Czechoslovak authorities from the territory that was taken by Hungary, following the results of the Vienna Arbitration.178 The Vienna arbitration struck a significant blow to Czechoslovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, though Hungary had not yet achieved full occupation of the region. It resulted in the creation of a new Hungarian-Czechoslovak border. Carpathian Ukraine continued to be part of Czechoslovakia, making the formation of a common border between Hungary and Poland impossible.179 Czechoslovak President E. Gacha also called on Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians to “work hand in hand to rebuild the state.”180 The authorities of Carpathian Ukraine were forced to agree with the decision of the arbitration commission. The Manifesto “Ukrainian People of Subcarpathia!”, adopted by the Ukrainian Central People’s Council on November 17, 1938, stated: “With a pain in the heart, we inform You that, at the request of Hungary, two great states, which created an arbitration commission to solve a dispute over the borders of our young Subcarpathian state, gave a large chunk of our ancient land together with the cities of Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and Berehove to Hungary. Relying on the false statistics of our enemies, they detached from the living body of the Ukrainian people many villages and cities, where the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians-Ruthenians lives... Our representatives at the Vienna International Conference were forced to accept the terms of the arbitration commission.”181

179 Нова свобода. 1938. 7 грудня.
180 Нова свобода. 1938. 27 грудня.
181 Нова свобода. 1938. 17 листопада.
The Vienna arbitration testified to the deepening political crisis in Czechoslovakia, which in fact faced a state disaster. The further development of political events in Europe was crucially dependent on Germany. This was well understood by all the leaders of the European countries. The government of Carpathian Ukraine was aware of this, too. From the very first days of his premiership, A. Voloshyn began to focus on Germany, the only major country that promised him its patronage. The German government, playing with the cabinet of A. Voloshyn, announced the opening of its consulate in Khust. This was done in order to keep under control the development of the political events in the region. A. Voloshyn hoped that the appointment of H. Hoffman as a consul “is not a journey of curiosity, but is a route of study that will have its specific consequences for our land, for our people and for the further policy of Germany towards us”\textsuperscript{182}.

It should be noted that the German government delayed the opening of its consulate in Carpathian Ukraine several times. In particular, on November 19, 1938, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, J. Ribbentrop, informed the adviser of this ministry, E. Wermann: “According to the Führer’s order and before a new order, the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian issues must be treated frostily. For this reason, the press was instructed not to publish anything about the events in Carpathian Ukraine. In addition, the question of establishing a general consulate in Khust is being postponed”\textsuperscript{183}. The adviser to the German Embassy in Poland, R. Sheliga, stated that “Poland’s fears that Germany intends to give a start to the All-Ukrainian state from Subcarpathian Rus’ have no reason. Germany has already issued instructions not to create such an impression. Subcarpathian Rus’ will retain its independence within Czechoslovakia and will play no role in international politics”\textsuperscript{184}. Anyway, the government of Nazi Germany opened a consulate in Khust. Transcarpathians were allowed to go to work in Germany, which, to some extent, reduced unemployment. The government of A. Voloshyn became so enthusiastic about this proposal that on March 6, 1939, just 8 days before the occupation of the region by the Hungarian troops, it was

\textsuperscript{182} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 45. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{183} Косик В. Україна і Німеччина у другій світовій війні. Париж – Нью-Йорк – Львів, 1993. С. 459.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid. C. 472.
resolving the issue of producing 10 thousand passports\textsuperscript{185}. Believing naively in Hitler’s promises of help, A. Voloshyn asked H. Hoffmann to “convey... to the glorious leader of the German people... our sincere thanks and heartfelt greetings”\textsuperscript{186}.

From the above, we can conclude that the government of Carpathian Ukraine clearly adhered to the pro-German orientation, while pursuing the sole aim: to preserve the territorial integrity of the region, to protect its population from the aggression of the fascist Hungary. This statement is proved by the materials of the “Personal Case of A. Voloshyn”, which is contained in the Central Archives of the Ministry of State Security of Russia in Moscow. In answering the questions of MGB Investigator Major Weindorf, A. Voloshyn stated unequivocally that “the government of Subcarpathian Rus’ set the task of creating an autonomous Transcarpathian Ukraine and focused on Nazi Germany, that is, in the latter we saw the power that could ensure the inviolability of the territory of Carpathian Ukraine. I would like to point out that the position of Germany, as the state of arbitration at that time, forced the government of Subcarpathian Rus’ to ask Germany for border protection against the occupation of the land by the Hungarians”\textsuperscript{187}.

It is known that part of the German generals advised Hitler to maintain the independence of Carpathian Ukraine. Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany E. Kleist confessed that he “tried all the time to protect Transcarpathian Ukraine”\textsuperscript{188}. In 1937 W. Canaris met the Chairman of the Leadership of the Ukrainian Nationalists E. Konovalets. The admiral promised to help him in subversion and propaganda. Canaris remembered Colonel Konovalets, and when he was killed in 1938 in a terrorist act organized by the Soviet special services, Canaris kept reminding “this wonderful man”\textsuperscript{189}. Ukrainian nationalist emigration, in particular, supporters of I. Poltavets-Ostryanytsya and Hetman of Ukraine (in exile) P. Skoropadskyi, played

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{185} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 383. Арк. 19.
\item\textsuperscript{186} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 45. Арк. 2.
\item\textsuperscript{187} Центральный архив Министерства государственной безопасности РФ. Н-17681. Л. 10.
\item\textsuperscript{188} Косик В. Україна і Німеччина у другій світовій війні. Париж – Нью-Йорк – Львів, 1993. С. 471.
\end{itemize}
a role in the pursuit of the pro-German policy by A. Voloshyn\textsuperscript{190}. As for this organization, in the late 1930s it was transformed into a small national-socialist group, fully embracing fascist ideology and practice\textsuperscript{191}. The leadership of the OUN also played a role in the rapprochement of A. Voloshyn’s government with Germany. This organization saw in Germany the savior of Galicia from Polish oppression. It was at their request that German military advisers, who contributed to the formation of local armed forces, appeared in the region. There is no doubt that there was a close relationship between the OUN and the German special services.

Thus, in the late 1930s, the international situation escalated sharply in Central Europe, and the Second World War was approaching. The Munich Conference of September 29-30, 1938 struck a significant blow to Czechoslovakia. It, like the Vienna Arbitration on November 2, 1938, in fact, signaled the beginning of the state breakup of the Czechoslovak Republic and was a prelude to the full occupation of the country by Germany and Hungary in March 1939. These decisions were the first significant success of Hungarian diplomacy on the way of implementation of its revisionist foreign policy. The collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic was possible because of a policy of toleration of aggression promoted by Britain and France. The neutral position was occupied by the United States. The USSR’s attempt to help Czechoslovakia was unsuccessful.

Germany’s policy towards Carpathian Ukraine has undergone some evolution. Initially, it did not agree to the full occupation of Transcarpathia by Hungary, fearing the establishment of a joint Polish-Hungarian border. Only after it was convinced that Hungary intends to withdraw from the League of Nations and join the Anti-Comintern Pact, Berlin agreed to the elimination of Carpathian Ukraine. The governments of Romania and Yugoslavia have been loyal to Czechoslovakia’s policies. Romania made its territorial claim to the Czechoslovak Republic only when Hungary invaded the territory of Transcarpathia and the fate of the federation was resolved.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{190} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 42. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{191} На переломі. 1939. Ч. 5.
\end{flushleft}
PART 3.
HUNGARIAN AND POLISH TERRORISTS IN CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

Germany’s position towards Carpathian Ukraine has forced the Hungarian government to suspend its aggressive plans. However, this did not mean that it gave up its intention to organize an invasion to Transcarpathia. Hungarian Ambassador to Poland A. Hori wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary K. Kanya, that Budapest “at this moment, considers it possible to achieve its goals through diplomatic means”\(^{192}\). Inspite the fact that its armed forces were ready to wage warfare across the whole front, Poland also understood that “military intervention... would rather be much more damaging to the case than giving a benefit to it”\(^{193}\). Hungary continued to hope that “the Ruthenian government... would ask us to let the Hungarian troops in with the aim to maintain order in the remaining Ruthenian territory”. Poland was required only to “intensify the actions of sabotage units”, and in the case of “operation in the Ruthenian region, the Hungarian General Staff requested support from only one Polish division”\(^{194}\).

The Hungarian preparations for the invasion of Carpathian Ukraine did not stop for a moment. M. Kozma made a note in his diary on November 17, 1938: “On the 20th, at night, the Ruthenian

\(^{193}\) Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 134.
\(^{194}\) Ibid. С. 135.
region will be ours”\(^\text{195}\). Understanding well that the occupation of Transcarpathia by the Hungarian troops would lead to the establishment of a joint Polish-Hungarian border, Germany strongly opposed the aggression. On November 18, 1938, E. Wermann brought the attention of the Hungarian leadership to the position of Germany, which considered that “such a move from the Hungarian side is risky”, which could lead to serious complications. E. Wermann recalled that “the new Czechoslovak-Hungarian border was established by the decision of the Vienna Arbitration on the basis of the national principle”\(^\text{196}\). This was followed by German and Italian notes to Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Kanya, to which Budapest replied by a memorandum of November 22, 1938. According to it, Hungary was ready to cooperate with Germany, and its government announced its intention to enter the Anti-Comintern Pact and leave the League of Nations. Thus, Hungary’s attempt to occupy Transcarpathia on November 20, 1938, ended in complete collapse. Other ways had to be found. On November 25, 1938 the Hungarian ambassador to Poland, A. Hori, expressed his thoughts on the capture “of the Ruthenian region... by closing all routes through subversive actions. Through propaganda, to prepare the population for a plebiscite and, at the same time, to create the necessary conditions with vigorous diplomatic action”\(^\text{197}\).

Germany’s policy towards Carpathian Ukraine, in particular its reaction to the attempt to occupy the land by Hungary, has drawn great political resonance in Europe. It seemed that the Third Reich really wanted to use Carpathian Ukraine as a Piedmont to unify all Ukrainian lands around it. On December 6, 1938 in an interview with I. Maysky, D. Lloyd George expressed the view that “Hitler’s plan was to take the “corridor” and Silesia, to tear off the Ukrainian part from Poland and to annex it to Transcarpathian Ukraine and to create from these two parts a vassal Ukrainian state like Czechoslovakia. That is the immediate goal. In the more distant future, Hitler may be thinking of taking action against the Soviet Ukraine”. Representatives

\(^{195}\) Ibid. C. 136.
\(^{196}\) Ibid. C. 140.
\(^{197}\) Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 144.
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain expressed similar views. The head of the French General Staff, general M. Gamelin, believed that “the most probable and immediate goal of German expansion would be Ukraine”. On December 15, 1938 French Ambassador to Germany R. Coulondre wrote to Foreign Minister J. Bonnet: “In Hitler’s surrounding, they speak of an operation that would replicate, on a larger scale, an operation in Sudeten: holding a propaganda for independence of Ukraine in Poland, Romania and the USSR... And the center of the movement will be Transcarpathian Ukraine... Thus, Czechoslovakia... serves Reich as a ram for breaking the gates in the East”

Undoubtedly, the idea of creating a united Ukraine on the base of Transcarpathia originated in Berlin. However, there were also other considerations in this regard. According to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, M. Litvinov, “the noise around the Ukrainian problem was created, quite frankly, not so much by the German press as by the press of other countries, including England and France. It is possible that all of this was run from Berlin”. In the deep conviction of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in France, J. Suritz, “Bonnet and his surrounding will breathe a sigh of relief if the Germans really invade Ukraine”. The noise raised by the European press about Carpathian Ukraine has to some extent alarmed Hungary and Poland. Budapest was ready to make any sacrifices only to obtain Berlin’s permission for the full occupation of Transcarpathia. On December 27, 1938 Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.Csaky informed the Hungarian missions in Washington, Paris and London of his intention to withdraw from the League of Nations. Warsaw also feared that Carpathian Ukraine “might one day develop into an outbreak of such anxiety for Poland that the Polish government would be forced to take into account

interventions that could lead to further complications. This is the main reason why Poland is competing for a common border with Hungary.\textsuperscript{201}

If earlier Hungary had accented Germany’s attention on establishing the Polish-Hungarian border, then in early 1939 it stated, from an economic point of view, the need to annex Transcarpathia. On February 26, 1939, in a letter to D. Stoyai, the Hungarian Ambassador to Germany, Csaky wrote: “Explain (to Germany – Aut.) that Carpathian region is of great importance for us, not because of establishing a joint border with the Poles, but because we do not want to allow forests to be destroyed by the so-called Ukrainian government. Thus, we strive not to take possession of the Carpathian Mountains, but to ensure that the Ruthenian region till the upper border of the forests is a part of Hungary.”\textsuperscript{202} That is, Transcarpathia was considered in Budapest as the base for raw materials, an integral part of Hungary, which was temporarily detached from the crown of St. Stephan. Deputy of Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Vernle informed I. Csaky that J. Ribbentrop “till now... was thinking that we are pursuing the Ruthenian region for political reasons, and he did not know what vital interests connected us to the region.”\textsuperscript{203}

Throughout the interwar period, Czechoslovakia had friendly relations with Yugoslavia. As regards Hungary, it constantly sought to isolate Czechoslovakia from its allies, Yugoslavia and Romania, through the question of national minorities. The Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations suffered a significant blow after the Munich Conference, when, in fact, Little Entente as a political union of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania came to its end. Some Balkan countries have differently felt the effects of Munich. As for Yugoslavia, it was increasingly becoming a subject to open pressure by the Nazi Germany. It is necessary to agree with V. Shandor’s view that “during the period of the first republic Carpathian Ukraine played a significant strategic role as a liaison to the countries of the Little

\textsuperscript{201} Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны. Т. 2. Январь – август 1939 г. М.: Политиздат, 1981. С. 11.
\textsuperscript{202} Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 156.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid. С. 158.
Entente – Romania and Yugoslavia. In the new balance of powers, it has lost its original significance"204.

Despite such changes in world politics, the Yugoslav government strongly opposed the Hungarian encroachment on Transcarpathia. This is also concerned with the Yugoslav periodicals. “Vreme” reported: “The population of this region does not want to return under the Hungarian rule, which left sad memories. Subcarpathian Ukrainians assert their rights in alliance with Czechs and Slovaks”205. Yugoslavian government demanded that Germany and Italy did not support the idea of a joint Hungarian-Polish border206. Yugoslav daily “Politics” supported Romania’s position, which was favorable to Carpathian Ukraine207. The attitude of the peoples of Yugoslavia to Transcarpathia can be seen in the article “Serbs, Croats and Slovenians are with us!” published on the pages of “Nova Svoboda”208.

Romania, like Yugoslavia, was loyal to Carpathian Ukraine, at least as long as there was a federal Czechoslovakia. It is no coincidence that A. Voloshyn, convinced of the hopelessness of protecting Carpathian Ukraine on his own, made an attempt to negotiate with the Romanian government on the accession of the region to it. The motivation was next: Ukrainians, who live in Romania – our brothers and sisters. Romania has repeatedly accused Hungary of frantic radio propaganda against Transcarpathia. Romania’s foreign policy was determined by the following main points: 1) loyalty of the Romanian government to Czechoslovakia; 2) the desire to maintain normal economic and political relations with it; 3) aversion to the military reinforcement of Hungary; 4) distrust to Budapest’s assurances concerning Transylvania; 5) reluctance to participate in political combinations against Germany209.

205 Вегеш М., Задорожний В. Карпатська Україна 1938–1939 рр. у світлі європейської періодики. Карпатська Україна і Августин Волошин. С. 56.
206 Нова свобода. 1938. 15 жовтня.
207 Нова свобода. 1938. 29 жовтня.
208 Нова свобода. 1938. 3 жовтня.
209 Вегеш М., Задорожний В. Карпатська Україна 1938–1939 рр. у світлі європейської періодики. Карпатська Україна і Августин Волошин. С. 58.
Romania fully fulfilled its allied commitments concerning Czechoslovakia. Proof of this is the signing of an agreement on the export of corn to the mountainous regions of Transcarpathia. However, this did not mean that Romanian government had no interest in Czechoslovakia. As soon as it became known that the Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist as a state, Romania put forward its demands. Hungarian Ambassador to Romania L. Bardoshi informed I. Csaky that on March 16, 1939, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Hafencu “referred to his earlier reports that the Romanian government due to recent events had changed its position, which it had in Galati, about the question of the Ruthenian region. Romania also has interests in the Ruthenian territory. This applies to the border villages inhabited by Romanians and to the territory through which the Maramoros – Sighetu – Colomea railway passes”\(^{210}\).

The international situation of Carpathian Ukraine has been significantly complicated by the continuous attacks of the Hungarian and Polish terrorists. As early as September 1936, there was a meeting between Hitler and Hungarian Regent M. Horthy, which “initiated later cooperation between the German-Hungarian political and military forces”\(^{211}\). At first, however, Berlin did not consent to open intervention and the Hungarian government limited itself to sending terrorist groups to the cities and villages of Carpathian Ukraine.

On October 1, 1938, Hungarian Prime Minister B. Imredy secretly instructed former Interior Minister M. Kozma to form sabotage groups for the subversive work in Transcarpathia. “In the mid-eleventh,” M. Kozma wrote in his “Diary”, “Imredy called me and asked to take over the political leadership of the action in the Ruthenian region, to promote propaganda there and to lead the rebels. He accepted all my suggestions and agreed with the use, if it is required by the situation, of illegal and violent means”\(^{212}\). Together

\(^{210}\) Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 158.
\(^{211}\) Химинець Ю. Закарпаття – земля української держави. Ужгород, 1992. С. 89.
\(^{212}\) Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 108.
with I. Geyash, M. Kozma created a “Poor Guard” (“Sabortchopot”) of 600 people. As early as September 1938, S. Fentsyk began to create terrorist groups. Blackshirts gangs were formed in Beregovo, Mukachevo and Radwanka. Their goups, which also contained the pupils of the “Rus’ Scout”, were headed by S. Krainiak, B. Baletsky, V. Reberka.

M. Kozma was convinced that waging a “small war” should be entrusted to any “former ataman of a robbery gang”. Something like this can be read in another place of the “Diary”: “Immediate resolution of the Ruthenian question is so important from the perspective of Hungary’s future that for this reason I am ready to take any risk, if necessary – to stand against the wall”. M. Kozma considered the activities of the terrorist units only in alliance with the Poles. “I suggested to Imredy,” he wrote on October 4, 1938, “that Csaky, me or anyone else would fly to Warsaw immediately to discuss directly with the Poles the political side of the issue, to organize a meeting of our people who would reach the Polish border, to discuss the question of the location and possible use of a unit of 100-200 people – the number depends on the wishes of the Polish side – and, finally, to discuss the organization of the Polish voluntary action and cooperation with them.”


215 Ibid. С. 257.

216 Ibid. С. 220.

M. Kozma’s proposal was welcomed in Warsaw. On October 7, 1938, Hungarian Ambassador to Poland A. Hori informed Foreign Minister K. Kanya that the Poles “recommend to start an immediate widespread sabotage in the Ruthenian region... I agreed on the similar actions from the Polish side – with the help of the agents. But until now, until I can’t refer to the serious acts of sabotage from the Hungarian side, all my efforts will prove futile.” The Polish General Staff was actively involved in the work. On October 10, 1938 a Hungarian military attaché in Poland, B. Lendiel, reported to the Chief of the General Staff of Hungary that “soldiers of active duty in civilian clothing, I think, will be sent to Mukachevo and Uzhgorod under the direction of an officer. The number of people in the units will be in line with our plans... On other roads they will send to the Ruthenian region patrols, consisting of volunteers, for the purpose of carrying out explosions and other disruptive actions. The Polish side will intensify its operations when Hungarian subversive forces will deploy combat operations. To coordinate all the actions, they asked to inform them daily of the situation.”

The appearance of the Hungarian terrorists was mentioned in the first half of October, 1938. In the diary of V. Grendzha-Donsky there is the following text: “Yesterday, at 4 o’clock in the morning, Hungarian terrorists appeared in our country. Near the station of Benia, they attacked the Borzhiv railway bridge, killed one soldier on guard, damaged the bridge with ekrazit and attacked the train number 1108. They also killed the station commander, robbed the passengers, captured several of our soldiers and took them with them. They went to Beregovo wineries and forests.” The first appearance of the Hungarian terrorists V. Grendzha-Donsky refers to October 10, 1938. P. Stercho also holds a similar point of view: “At night, from 9th to 10th October, 1938, the first group of “Rondosh Garda” came to the border territory of Tarpa and from there, through the connection of Mukachevo Hungarian Miklovsh Erdeli, crossed the border on the

\[218\] Ibid. C. 112-113.
\[219\] Ibid. C. 113.
Borzhava River and invaded Carpathian Ukraine”\textsuperscript{221}. Ukrainian scientists O. Dovhanych, Z. Pashkuj and M. Troyan believe that the first Hungarian terrorists of 12 people appeared on the territory of Transcarpathia on October 5, 1938\textsuperscript{222}. However, archival documents, which could testify to this fact, were not found.

From the encrypted telegram of the Hungarian Foreign Minister K. Kanya to Ambassador to Poland A. Hori, it is clear that as of October 12, 1938, the Hungarians “managed to drop approximately 750-800 people into the Ruthenian region. After the clashes and acts of sabotage that took place yesterday and the day before yesterday, the Czechs literally closed the border tightly”\textsuperscript{223}. On October 14, 1938, Hungarian terrorists were mentioned for the second time in the vicinity of Beregovo. Czech gendarme A. Rygan, from the village of Dubrynchychi, was killed in a clash with them. However, reinforcements approached in time and the terrorists had to retreat. Government newspaper “Nova Svoboda” informed about the emergence of 300 armed terrorists near Muzhievo\textsuperscript{224}, and on October 21, 1938 – near Volovets\textsuperscript{225}.

Attacks of Hungarian terrorist have intensified since the Vienna arbitration. The commander of the 12 Czechoslovak division reported that on November 3, 1938, “between 3 and 5 o’clock there was an attack by terrorists on the village Kosyno... Fire with automatic pistols and machine guns was started towards the terrorists, hand grenades were used. Post-graduate student was killed during the attack... Terrorists used the “dum-dum” bullets”\textsuperscript{226}. On the same day, the Hungarians repeated the attack, which injured five Czechoslovak border guards. On November 4, two terrorists opened fire in Kosynsky Verkh. They were armed with hand grenades and automatic pistols. Three Czechoslovak border guards suffered minor

\textsuperscript{221} Стерчо П. Урядова координація операцій мадярських і польських терористів у Карпатській Україні в 1938–1939 рр. Державність. 1993. № 1. С. 16. 
\textsuperscript{222} Довганич О.Д., Пашкуй З.А., Троян М.В. Закарпаття в роки війни. Ужгород: Карпати, 1990. С. 14. 
\textsuperscript{223} Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 113. 
\textsuperscript{224} Нова свобода. 1938. 20 жовтня. 
\textsuperscript{225} Грозджа-Донський В. Щоденник. Твори. Т.VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 34. 
\textsuperscript{226} Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.
injuries during the firefight. On 5 and 6 November, armed incidents at the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border were fixed again, during which one Czech soldier was seriously injured. On November 9, Hungarian terrorists, armed with automatic pistols and hand grenades, launched a new attack on Czechoslovak border guards in Kosyn. Czech sergeant was killed and five people were injured in the clash\(^\text{227}\). On November 11 a unit of twenty Hungarian terrorists was attacked by Czechoslovak troops near the village Pidhoryany. The Czechoslovak side had no losses\(^\text{228}\). On November 17, an attack of thirty Hungarian terrorists near Strabichovo was repelled. On November 21 they arrived in Maly Davydkiv, and on November 22 – in Shalanky, two terrorists, armed with machine guns and automatic pistols, were detained by Czechoslovak border guards. On November 25, 1938 a firefight began in the area of the village Chlumec, south of Uzhgorod. On the same day, Hungarian terrorists were attacked near Rakoshyno\(^\text{229}\). The next day, several “persistent terrorists”, led by Michal Gimro, were detained\(^\text{230}\). Hungarian terrorists have repeatedly appeared in this village. The head of the Mukachevo district administration reported on November 28, 1938 to the Presidium of the regional administration in Khust that “civilians attacked the defense of 4/86 company located in the courtyard of a Hungarian school in Rakoshyno, firing with automatic pistols”\(^\text{231}\). The attack was organized by Tor Baka Irji, Tor Baka Jozef, Molnar Jan, Alexander Tar, Stefan Geza Tor, who were suspected of being linked to Hungarian terrorists in Mukachevo. While trying to escape, three terrorists were killed. The investigation found that in Rakoshyno a local “Sabatchopot” unit was organized, which maintained close ties with Mukachevo and obtained weapons from there\(^\text{232}\).

During December 1938, armed Hungarian terrorists regularly attacked settlements in Carpathian Ukraine. On December 6, during a shootout with Czechoslovak border guards, one terrorist was killed in

---

\(^{227}\) ГренджаДонський В. Щоденник. Твори. Т.VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 73.
\(^{228}\) Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349, karton 23.
\(^{229}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 32. Арк. 1-3.
\(^{230}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 44. Арк. 1.
\(^{231}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 211. Оп. 1. Спр. 42. Арк. 20.
\(^{232}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 211. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 20.
the village Bogdan²³³. On December 7, thirty terrorists from Uzhgorod attacked the village Dovhe. The machine guns and rifles were fired at them, grenades were used. Having lost one man killed, they retreated in the direction of Uzhgorod. On December 8-9, fire from the territory, occupied by Hungary, was opened at the Transcarpathian border points. There were no casualties. On December 10 there was a new attack on the village Dovhe, and on December 12 – on the village Horyany. During the attack of six terrorists on the settlements of Verbovets and Oleshnyk on December 13, a Czechoslovak border guard was seriously injured, after what his leg had to be amputated. There was no loss on the part of the terrorists. On December 21, a shootout with terrorists in the Radwanka Forest continued until dawn. On December 23, terrorists attacked the village of Horyany, and on December 24, they attacked the village Barvinkosh. On December 25-29, Hungarian planes crossed Czechoslovakia’s airspace several times, but the attack was not started²³⁴. On December 30–31, a group of Hungarian terrorists made several attacks on the village Makarievo²³⁵. One of them was described in detail by “Nova Svoboda”: “Four Hungarian terrorists entered the house and asked if there are finances. They searched the whole house but found nothing. Now, when they left the house, they threw 6 hand grenades, then started shooting for 20 minutes. The shots of the Hungarian terrorists were answered by our guard STOS (border units – Aut.) with machine gun shots”²³⁶.

V. Komarynsky, who headed the press and propaganda department in the government of Carpathian Ukraine, wrote to the Presidium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: “I’m telling that during the last days Hungarian terrorists started to make disturbing actions at the border, they are not aristocratic Magyars, but, on the one hand, the fugitives-deserters from our army, and on the other had, the supporters of Dr. Fentsyk, Brodi and Demko, who fled from our territory to Mukachevo. According to the calculations, there are about

²³³ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.č. 5349. karton 23.
²³⁴ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.č. 5349. karton 23.
²³⁵ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 1.
²³⁶ Нова свобода. 1939. 19 січня.
300 such people in Mukachevo”. Therefore, those were the terrorist groups that began to form in the Transcarpathian territory occupied by Hungary. According to the Czechoslovak Security Service, on January 1, 1939, in Uzhgorod there were 6000 terrorists ready to conduct sabotage actions in Carpathian Ukraine.

On January 5-6, 1939 “the Hungarian terrorists themselves provoked the incident and attacked our border guards. The leader of these terrorists was the former district police inspector Bilyk Ferenc, then Basarab Ferenc, Chulak Todor and Shelebi Miklosh. Basarab, Chulak and Shelebi crossed the border near Pidmonastyr – they intended to take the Czechoslovak border guard and attack further... There were 350 terrorists, organized for this attack, almost all of them were Hungarians, 50 of them came directly from Mukachevo, others – from the neighborhood”. Similar events took place in the vicinity of Uzhgorod. Border guard was attacked by a group of Hungarian terrorists led by Ishtvan Kalmar. It should be noted that the Bolshevik newspaper “Pravda” noted on its pages “the small clashes that were taking place at the new Czechoslovak borders on the territory of Transcarpathia”.

The big fight took place on January 6, 1939 in the village Rosvygovo. There were between 200 and 250 terrorists. The fight lasted for two hours, after which the terrorists returned to their territory. Czechoslovak border guards lost one financial guard, one platoon soldier, six were injured and seven were reported missing. What were the casualties of the terrorists – that was not found out.

On January 16, “Hungarian terrorists attacked STOS guards near Barvinkosh. There were 60-80 people. They were fired from heavy and light machine guns from Baranyntsi. The crowd passed the demarcation line, and maybe even 1 km in the direction to

237 ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 2.
238 Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.
239 Нова свобода. 1939. 3 лютого.
240 Ibid.
241 Гранчак І.М., Поп І.І. Закарпаття в чехословацько-радянських відносинах періоду другої світової війни. Карпатика. Актуальні питання історії, історіографії і культури країн Центральної і Південно-Східної Європи. Ужгород, 1993. С. 221.
242 Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.
Baranyntsi. Two policemen were wounded on our side”\textsuperscript{243}. Similar clashes took place on January 2, 1939 in the village Barbovo\textsuperscript{244}. On January 7, terrorists attacked the Czechoslovakian unit of STOS in Kamianytsia\textsuperscript{245}.

Hungarian terrorist groups were constantly replenished with new people. Different methods were used for this, often with force. “According to reliable testimonies,” said the head of the Sevliush district administration of the Presidium of Subcarpathian Rus’, “the Hungarians continue to enroll in the special “Sabatchopot” formation and train persons recruited in the local territory, demobilized soldiers and refugees from this territory, whom they want to use to cause turmoil in our area. It was found out that on November 14, 1938, two Hungarian recruits came in Vyshni Shard – Vilmosh Pap and Lajos Yugas, who, as they said, had been authorized by the Hungarian authorities to recruit on the local territory 500 men for the Hungarian troops. It was further revealed that many young people, including about 30 conscripts who are expected to join military service this year, fled to Hungary, where they were enlisted for military training. The demobilized soldier Wamosh of Sevlyush told here that Hungarian soldiers had beaten him for refusing to join the so-called “Sabatchopot”\textsuperscript{246}. “In the village of Khlumtsi,” the local gendarmerie chief reported, “Vince Hortwaj and his 10-year-old son... went to the house to write down the persons... When compiling the list, Hortwaj asked people whether they would recognize themselves as Hungarians, and if the villagers answered positively, then they were writing their name themselves. Hortwaj did not explain to anybody, who was in his list, what was the purpose of the census\textsuperscript{247}.

The English journalist Henderson wrote that in the “outskirts of Shalanka, 12 miles east of Beregovo, the Czechoslovak army captured 297 Hungarian terrorists, including 26 officers, 62 non-commissioned officers, one post-graduate student, four Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian nationality and the rest were Hungarian

\textsuperscript{243} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 56. Арк. 5.  
\textsuperscript{244} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 1.  
\textsuperscript{245} Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.  
\textsuperscript{246} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 73. Арк. 18.  
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.
revisionists... The documents taken from them indicated that the terrorists had been sent by the General Staff of the Ministry of War. The interrogation of the terrorists proved that the captives were collected and trained in Kishvard near Teyashband, and are under the command of Lieutenant Ishtvan Geyash... There are around 2000 Hungarian terrorists scattered in Ruthenia...»248.

As of February 10, 1939, Hungarian terrorists attacked the borders of Carpathian Ukraine 22 times249. We should note that these are just the fights in which the Carpathian Sich participated. Director of the Police of Carpathian Ukraine Yu. Bilei in an interview to “Nova Svoboda” stated that “in Khust our Ukrainian guys caught two Hungarian terrorists”250. Ordinary terrorists were strongly encouraged and rewarded by their leaders. “The terrorist receives 3,5 pengoes a day, 50 pengoe for an attack” – reported “Nova Svoboda”251. Evidence of the massive terrorist attacks on Carpathian Ukraine is the fact that as of February 25, 1939, the State Prosecutor’s Office detained 345 Hungarian terrorists252. After the amnesty was announced, they were all released253.

In October 1938, the appearance of Polish terrorists was mentioned. Polish historian D. Dombrowski wrote: “During the interwar period, the territory of Transcarpathia was a region, which the Polish authorities observed with particular attention. This interest was triggered, first of all, by the geopolitical role, played by these lands after the First World War”254. It is worth agreeing with the scientist’s statement that “dislike of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period was felt on both sides of the border. Reasons for reluctance to settle mutual conflicts can be found in both Warsaw and Prague. In the thirties the ambitions of the architect of the foreign policy of the neighbors were imposed on mutual disputes. It was no secret that President Benesh and Minister Beck did not like each other. Both

249 Нова свобода. 1939. 25 лютого.
250 Нова свобода. 1938. 21 лютого.
251 Нова свобода. 1938. 3 лютого.
252 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 17. Арк. 3.
253 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 17. Арк. 4.
sought to emerge as leaders of the Central European countries and gave the same role to their countries”\textsuperscript{255}.

The Polish troops, like the Hungarian ones, without Hitler’s official consent to invade Carpathian Ukraine, decided to restrict themselves to terrorist acts. On October 27, they attempted to explode a bridge near Zhornava, and the next day they attacked a bridge in Vučkovo. Czech gendarme Kalchik and several Transcarpathians, in particular, J. Loy were killed in the fight with them. In the village Torun Polish terrorists killed I. Kost from Synevyr\textsuperscript{256}. However, these first terrorist attacks should not be regarded as a single attempt to undermine the stability of the internal political situation in Czechoslovakia and Carpathian Ukraine. Archival sources, taken to scientific circulation by D. Dombrowski, testify to a clear military-sabotage operation that was purposefully conducted by the Polish special services and became known under the code name “Operation Crowbar”.

Major Edmund Charaszkiewicz, who was appointed head of the “Crowbar” action, identified the following major stages: 1) preparation (from 7 to 22 October, 1938); 2) combat-sabotage actions (from October 22 to November 12, 1938); 3) guerrilla-sabotage actions (from November 17 to November 27, 1938); 4) termination of actions (from November 28 to December 31, 1938). Major Felix Ankerstein identified three cycles of sabotage operation: 1) preparatory (until October 20, 1938); 2) the organization and conduction of sabotage actions in Subcarpathian Rus’, together with fighting units from Rozluch and with guerrilla units, which are immediately mobilized with the help of the Riflemen Union (from October 20 to November 10, 1938); 3) the organization and formation of guerrilla units, their preparatory actions in anticipation of the order for the execution of the action and the completion of the whole action (from November 5 to December 10, 1938)\textsuperscript{257}.

D. Dombrowski in his monograph lists the Polish command of the action “Crowbar” in Carpathian Ukraine: Major Felix Ankerstein, alias “Malsky” – commander; Captain Jan Melcharsky, alias

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid. C. 8.
\textsuperscript{256} Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. 
“Bonetsky”, Deputy Commander, Camp Commander in Rozluch and of combat organization; Captain Alexander Romishovsky, alias “Florian” – Operative Officer; Major Vladyslav Novozheniuk, alias “Novyi” – Commander of the Eastern Subversive Subgroup (Stryi – Dolyna – Kalush); Captain Julian Bortkiewicz, alias “Bachynsky” – Commander of the Western Subversion Subgroup (Turka – Lesko – Sanok); Captain Vladislav Guttry, alias “Grodzky” – Head of the Intelligence in Carpathian Ukraine258. The latter, who was in Uzhgorod, covered himself with a diplomatic passport, “since October 12, 1938, he regularly inspected communication networks near Velykyi Bereznyi, Perechyn, Uzhgorod, Svalyava and Serednie. Taken materials about the objects to be destroyed (high-voltage transmission lines, bridges, communication lines), he sent to Captain Melcharsky by diplomatic mail”259.

On November 10, 1938 the Press Service of Carpathian Ukraine reported that the Polish terrorists had “dragged to Poland Jaroslav Vesecki, Vyacheslav Rakos and Tsiris, members of the border guards, who are still unknown whether they live”260. “Nova Svoboda” reported that “the Finance Directorate in Khust, through the mediation of the authorities of Carpathian Ukraine, will seek through diplomatic channels the Polish governments to release our border guards”261. On the night of November 18, 1938, “several dozen Polish terrorists in the vicinity of Nyzhni Veretsky (Nyzhni Vorota – Aut.) attacked our border guards. In a shootout, they were driven towards the Polish border. Terrorists left one dead and several injured”262. The attacks by Polish terrorists were mentioned on November 2, 3, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 1938. Inhabitants of Poland’s border villages of Torun, Pryslip, N. Studeni, Synevyrska Polyana suffered from these acts263.

D. Dombrowski believes that the most tragic moment of the “Crowbar” action was an operation carried out under the direction of Lieutenant Vladislav Volsky. The saboteurs of the latter suddenly

258 Ibid. С. 157.
259 Ibid. С. 155.
261 Нова свобода. 1939. 18 лютого.
262 Нова свобода. 1938. 25 листопада.
263 Нова свобода. 1938. 20, 25 листопада.
attacked on the night of November 15, 16, 1938, near the village of Pryslip. Three saboteurs were killed on the spot, another were tortured by Czechoslovakian gendarmes. Vladislav Gurnitsky, Vladislav Goffman and Adam Michalkow were killed at the scene of the fighting. The last fatal victim of the action was, according to the assumption of the Polish side, its commander... The fate of the dead was not exactly determined. The information about their deaths came to the organizers of the “Crowbar” action thanks to informants in the territory of Carpathian Ukraine. The burial places were probably never found out. On November 18, 1938 in a skirmish with Czechoslovak troops, Captain Klepacki, Roman-Józef Karpinski and Wawziniec Urbaniak were killed. According to Czechoslovak intelligence services, a unit of Polish saboteurs of up to 100 people opened the fire (and threw grenades) at a post office in Torun and at a gendarmerie post. The fight lasted from 02.00 to 04.30 in the morning on November 22, 1938. The Poles returned after coming of the support forces from Volove. On their return, the group detonated a small road bridge near the previously destroyed mail. Although about a hundred grenades were detonated during more than two hours of fighting, no casualties were recorded.

From the telephone telegram of Hungarian ambassador to Poland A. Hori to Hungarian Foreign Minister K. Kanya of November 9, 1938, it is clear that the Poles had doubts about limiting the struggle against Czechoslovakia only to terrorist actions. “The question of the Ruthenian region,” wrote A. Hori, “should be resolved quickly and in the most radical way. It is possible that we can achieve the goal solely by means of insurgent units. But what happens if they are crushed? Will we be satisfied with the fact that our attempts failed? It is possible that our insurgent actions will be repulsed by a blow to regular Hungarian troops.” On November 25, 1938, General Vladislav Langner issued an order to disband the guerrilla units. The volunteers had to be released and sent home during several days, and by the beginning of the next month they had to return their

265 Ibid. С. 203.
266 Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 133.
equipment, weapons and uniforms. Unnecessary higher staff and ordinary staff were required to return to their locations. By December 10, 1938, all calculations and reports had to be completed. After receiving the order from General Langner on November 25, 1938, Major Ankerstein ordered the finish the “Crowbar”\textsuperscript{267}. However, it is necessary to agree with D. Dombrowski’s conclusion that “the information on the completion of the action came late, General Langner’s order could not be immediately implemented. Czechoslovakian documents claim that the last Polish attacks lasted from November 26 to November 28, 1938. There was one victim of these attacks – a customs officer, who died near Synevyr Polyana\textsuperscript{268}.

The terrorist attacks caused great moral and material damage. Only the Polish terrorists, as of November 25, 1938, inflicted losses of 277500 kč\textsuperscript{269}. Inhabitants of the village Torun informed their government that “on 5.XII terrorists imposed ecrasite (explosives – Aut.) under the notarial government (damage of 3400 kč., which was partially covered by 1500 kč.), but on 22.XIII the government was again fired at each side by the terrorists for 2 hours. 3 grenades were thrown into the building – damage of 5 thousand kč.”\textsuperscript{270}. There were human casualties after almost each attack. Only in the few days of November 1938, 3 soldiers, 2 chetniks, 1 financial guard, 1 notary, 2 children were killed at the Polish-Czech border\textsuperscript{271}. On November 28, 29 and 31, Polish terrorists attacked the village of Vuchkowe three times. The Riflemen detained the persons of Polish nationality Bohdan Senczak and Rudolf Pes\textsuperscript{272}. These and other facts were reflected in the reports of Czechoslovak security personnel. They recorded weapons, funding and the level of military training of terrorists\textsuperscript{273}. The attacks of the Polish terrorists did not stop in January–February 1939 as well. Village of Pryslip was «attacked by 10 Polish terrorists, who seized the post office. The mail house was

\textsuperscript{267} Домбровський Д. Польща і Закарпаття. 1938-1939. К.: Темпора, 2012. С. 204.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 65. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{270} ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 45. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{271} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 65. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{272} Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.с. 5349. karton 23.
\textsuperscript{273} Archiv Ministerstva Zagranicnich Veci, Praha. i.с. 2012. karton 655.
bombed with hand grenades and post administrator Kalyna was killed. Ms. Kalynova and her husband defended the post office. Pieces of grenades tore her chest and head"\(^{274}\).

The Carpatho-Ukrainian authorities, in response to the Polish ambassador’s protests, which accused it of promoting anti-Polish propaganda in the territory of the region, constantly cited the facts of the devastating activities of the Polish terrorists. On November 13, 1938 in Nyzhniy Studeny, a terrorist was killed while crossing the border, at his body there was found a “pistol with a “Cerba” badge, a cigarette box, a leatherwallet, in it there were 50 kč, 1 Polish zloty and 15 Polish grosz”\(^{275}\). On November 15, 1938 hand grenades of the Polish sample, a clock mechanism for lighters, lighters with the inscription “Krakow”, Polish cigarettes, chocolate were taken from the detained Polish terrorists\(^{276}\).

On November 23 a group of foreign journalists visited the Transcarpathian villages of Vuchkove, Torun, Pryslip and Synevyrska Polyana, which were most affected by the Polish attacks. This delegation also included German Consul H. Hoffman, who “examined everything, photographed not only the places of attack, but also the belongings and weapons of the terrorists, which were left on the ground”\(^{277}\). On November 27, 1938 “Nova Svoboda” reported: “The German authorities today sent notes to the Hungarian and Polish authorities in which... they are protesting against the sending of terrorists by the Polish General Staff from Osmoloda to Carpathian Ukraine.”\(^{278}\).

According to the final report of Major Ankerstein, as a result of Polish sabotage actions in Carpathian Ukraine, 12 car bridges, one dam, a telephone switch and a post office house were destroyed (or damaged). Railway tracks and high-voltage power lines were damaged at one place. Telephone lines were damaged at 27 locations. These actions caused a complete disorder and even panic among the Czechoslovakian gendarmes, military units and border services in the

\(^{274}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 159. Арк. 9.
\(^{275}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 25 листопада.
\(^{276}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 20 листопада.
\(^{278}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 27 листопада.
northern, mountainous part of Transcarpathia. According to “Crowbar” commander, the losses of the enemy were 23 killed, 15 wounded, 20 prisoners, delivered to Poland, and 5 prisoners, disarmed and released on the spot. The casualties of the participants of the action were 11 dead (8 of which were killed and 3 were executed) and 7 were wounded. Three people (two of them wounded) have been captured and three others have been reported missing\(^{279}\). However, these data can hardly be considered accurate. D. Dombrowski is undoubtedly right, when asserting: “All information provided about both one’s own losses and losses of the enemy should be treated very carefully, as it differs from the information prepared by the Czechoslovak side. It is also unknown whether the list of Polish losses is accurate. There is no information on the fate of conductors who were not registered as participants of the action in the reports of Department II of the General Staff. Their function often depended on the tasks. It seems that some people were only interested in the positive results of actions, often refusing to participate in dangerous or risky operations...”\(^{280}\). The total balance of financial losses for the “Crowbar” action was approximately 250,000 PLN\(^{281}\). It is undeniable that Poland’s “hybrid war” in Carpathian Ukraine could not be concealed. The authorities of Czechoslovakia published information on this topic, information that had hit the foreign press, which significantly complicated the Czechoslovak-Polish relations of the time. The main thing that the Polish authorities sought was the establishment of a joint Hungarian-Polish border, but this was not possible at the end of 1938. This will only be done in March 1939, when the Nazi troops will fully occupy the territory of Carpathian Ukraine.

It should be noted that the Czechoslovak government paid considerable attention to the protection of the borders of the region. Often, joint combat operations of the STOS and the Carpathian Sich units to neutralize terrorist groups were carried out. One such


\(^{280}\) Ibid.

\(^{281}\) Ibid. С. 217.
operation ended in the defeat of the Joseph Prem group\textsuperscript{282}. The same fate befell the Ernest Berzewitzi group. 24 officers, 62 sub-sergeants and more than 200 ordinary terrorists were captured.

Not only the settlements inhabited exclusively by the Ukrainian population suffered. Hungarian terrorist attacks on Romanian villages of Maramoros have intensified. An active position was occupied by the “Order of the Brave”, which was founded in 1920 by M. Horthy. Of the many organizations of this character, the so-called “free squads” led by the mentioned above Heyash had the worst reputation\textsuperscript{283}. The main task of these gangs was to exterminate the non-Hungarian population in the area, and their program was outlined in a booklet by Decho Chaba, published in 1939. It stated that the Hungarian nation was the most prominent representative of the Mongolian ruling race, which knows only the victory, and in whose veins the blood of Atilla, Arpad and Genghis Khan boils. “I do not expect,” D. Chaba wrote, “when revenge will come. I’m not waiting! I’m destroying every Vlach who comes in my way. Destroy everyone! I will not delay. I will burn down the villages at night – Vlachs villages. I will cut with sabre the whole population, will poison all the wells and even destroy the children in the cradles, in general, I will destroy these inhumans! There will be no exception!”\textsuperscript{284}. In 1938 one of the leaders of the Party of “Crossed Arrows”, Miwau, emphasized that “the national-socialism of Hungary is intended to secure Hungary’s advantage throughout the Danube”\textsuperscript{285}.

Among the terrorist gangs there was an especially dangerous unit led by Nod Migali “from the Ungwar Unit”. He, as well as his subordinates, was fluent in Ukrainian and Romanian languages. The attacks by the Hungarian terrorists kept the local population in constant fear. There have been numerous cases of people fleeing to Romania, including Targu Mures. The situation deteriorated further when the territory was occupied by Hungary. The archival documents testify to the constant repression of the local population in which the

\textsuperscript{282} Стерчо П. Урядова координація операцій мадярських і польських терористів у Карпатській Україні в 1938–1939 рр. Державність. 1993. № 1. С. 17.
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid. P. 38.
terrorists actively participated. There were facts of abuse against people who did not speak Hungarian. In response, there were protests against the fascist regime, in particular in Velykyi Bychkiv\textsuperscript{286}. Therefore, terrorist gangs also penetrated into the settlements of Maramoros, where the Romanian population resided. Their actions were no different from those in central part of Carpathian Ukraine.

Attempts were made to strengthen the border troops. V. Komarynsky suggested that “all the guard points... of course should be fastened, namely: at the line from Zaluzh to Mukachevo about 30 people, and between the village of Staryi Davydkiv and Chomonnyk about 20 people”\textsuperscript{287}. Normal relations were established between Volove Riflemen commander S. Figura and Czechoslovak border guards. Watch units were strengthened in the villages of Torun, Pryslip, Synevyrska Polyana. “In mid-November,” H. Yavorenko recalled, “the Riflemen under the command of... engineer Voliansky arrived in Torun. At that time, the composition of the garrison ranged from 20 to 25 people... The garrison was divided into three groups... Each group consisted of 6-7 people having only one shotgun and a revolver and 6 grenades per group. The terrorists, apparently informed by local spies and their intelligence about our arrival, no longer dared to attack the neighborhoods we protected”\textsuperscript{288}. However, the latter statement is difficult to agree with. Although the attacks by the Polish terrorists were not so widespread, they did not stop.

Additional selection for gendarmerie was announced. On February 5, 1939 “Nova Svoboda” published an announcement stating that “more gendarmes will be taken to the gendarmerie of Carpathian Ukraine”\textsuperscript{289}.

According to our calculations, only in February – March 1939 278 people wrote applications to enlist them in the gendarmerie\textsuperscript{290}. Even the intellectuals expressed such a desire. M. Buksar, who worked as a teacher in the village Zavosyno

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[287] ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 1.
\item[288] Карпатська Україна в боротьбі. Відень, 1939. С. 102.
\item[289] Нова свобода. 1939. 5 лютого.
\item[290] ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 1-320.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
(V. Bereziy district), wrote: “Now all the protection of our young state is in the hands of the gendarmerie, and just among the gendarmerie commandment there are no sons of the Ukrainian people who are so needed to keep the security against active enemies at the borders, and against passive enemy of propaganda”\(^{291}\). In this form, the process of Ukrainianization of the gendarmerie took place. Although, it should be noted that it was quite slow. As of February 1939, “there are about 900 of all gendarmes in Carpathian Ukraine, and among them there are 106 Ukrainians”\(^{292}\). There have been cases of bonus payments to people who have detained a terrorist. On November 17, 1938 the Head of the Office of the Presidium of Carpathian Ukraine, M. Latsanych, issued a decree on nationwide acquaintance of the population with the government’s decision to “pay a reward for the capture of foreign terrorists”\(^{293}\). In February 1939, any person who “surrenders or tells about a provocateur agent or terrorist from a foreign country to the security agencies will be paid a reward of 500 kč”\(^{294}\).

The government of Carpathian Ukraine managed to convince the population in the relatively short period of time of the need for national protection of the borders of the region. Inhabitant of the village Synevyr ska Polyana I. Loboda wrote in a letter to his father: “You, father, stand in your place and protect our borders from the Magyars, and here in the neighborhood we will watch our traitors and mercilessly destroy the Polish bandits... Single Polish bandits at day hide in our forests and do their devilish work at night”\(^{295}\). Units of self-defense were established in all the villages bordering Poland. Despite the measures taken to combat the attacks of the Hungarian and Polish terrorists, A. Voloshyn was well aware of their danger. It was for this reason that he issued an order to temporary close the borders. In particular, it stated: “In order to ensure a peaceful election... I will close with immediate validity all demarcation lines to the Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Poland. It will be

\(^{291}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 87. Арк. 1-2.
\(^{292}\) Нова свобода. 1939. 2 лютого.
\(^{293}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 43. Арк. 2.
\(^{294}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 43. Арк. 3.
\(^{295}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 20 листопада.
locked... until twelve o’clock on Monday, February 13, 1939”\textsuperscript{296}. The terrorist attacks did not stop from October 1938 until March 1939. V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote that they had “terrorized and threatened the people”\textsuperscript{297}. A. Voloshyn stated that “attacks of the terrorists are not in the interest of good neighborly coexistence and that it is a decisively unusual act in the history of international relations”\textsuperscript{298}. He was also forced to admit that “Carpathian Ukraine is unable to repel their attacks”\textsuperscript{299}. After the invasion of the Horthy’s troops into the territory of Carpathian Ukraine, the terrorists were massively enlisted in the Hungarian army and took direct part in the repression not only against the Carpathian Riflemen but also against the civilian population of the region.

Huge material damage to Carpathian Ukraine was caused by constant attacks of the Hungarian and Polish terrorists, who pursued a common goal: to destabilize the internal political situation in the region. Civilians often suffered during these attacks, people died. The activities of terrorist groups should be regarded as an integral part of the Hungarian-Polish plan for establishing a joint border. The appearance of terrorists forced the Czechoslovak and Ukrainian governments to make considerable efforts to organize the defense of their borders. Various methods were used to prevent the attacks of the terrorist gangs: additional units were formed at the borders, gendarmerie staff was expanded, bonuses for captured terrorists being paid, and so on. These activities have led to qualitative changes, resulting in sabotage actions being significantly reduced, although they continued until the last days of Carpathian Ukraine. Young Carpathian Sich played a significant role in the struggle against terrorist groups. It often cooperated with Czechoslovak border guards, which also had positive consequences.
PART 4.
ACTIVITY OF THE HUNGARIAN AGENTS
IN CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

Archival documents clearly show that the historical fate of Transcarpathia during the 1920-30’s was constantly in the field of view of the government of Ukraine, but no less attention was paid to this problem by Hungary and other neighboring states. Throughout the interwar period on the territory of our region and beyond its borders there was an active Hungarian irredent, who sought to return the ancient Ukrainian land to the bosom of the Holy Stephen’s Crown. It is known that according to the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty, Transcarpathia was included in Czechoslovakia, which clearly did not suit the Hungarian government and political parties of the country. They sought at any cost to include Transcarpathia in Hungary. On August 5, 1919 the Ugro-Rus’ Party of Hungary adopted a memorandum to the Entente regarding this issue. In it we can read next: “...The Ruthenian question could best be solved... as for a thousand years the Ruthenians were always ready to come to the Hungarians, and now they want to fulfill their will the same way”\(^\text{300}\). The Memorandum was signed by M. Kutkafalvi-Kutka, I. Prodan, V. Balog, J. Illesh-Ilyashevych, I. Danylovych, S. Dzupan, all about one hundred people. This memorandum, so as several others, did not affect the decision of the Paris Conference, but from that time onwards the Hungarian agents launched intensive activities in Transcarpathia. The head of the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ I. Breich on January 10, 1920, informed the Civic Office in Mukachevo that “the situation in Beregovo, as a result of continuous Hungarian-monarchist agitation, makes the use of various intimidation measures impossible”\(^\text{301}\).

On March 17, 1920, the “Kashshai Munchash” newspaper posted on its front pages a report of increased terror in the cities of

\(^{300}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 63. Оп. 1. Спр. 18. Арк. 1-4.
\(^{301}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 14/43 с. Оп. 1. Спр. 15. Арк. 84.
Mukachevo and Beregovo. It stated that the policy of terror was supported by the Hungarian Christian-Socialist Party, which was active primarily in Mukachevo, Beregovo and Uzhgorod. This party “sympathizes with Regent Horthy and is well aware that it represents the Hungarian irredent”\(^3\). Beginning in 1920, the Hungarian agency started to establish on the territory of Transcarpathia its own organizations, subversive terrorist units, which were to destabilize the internal political situation in Czechoslovakia as a whole. On June 17, 1920 the chief of the police department of the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ issued an order requiring to investigate and take decisive action against the establishment of Hungarian propaganda centers in Transcarpathia. The document stated that “in Slovakia and in Subcarpathian Rus’, namely in the Sharysh and Zemplin counties, a special anti-state military organization is created by the special Hungarian military command, which is called “Command in Upper Hungary”, and which has a residence in Miskolc and is subordinated to the propaganda center in Budapest”\(^4\). According to archival sources, similar organizations existed in other counties. The military organization of the Sharysh, Zemplin, and Abauj counties was headed by Colonel Linder. Weapons for these organizations were sent from Poland and Hungary in empty oil tanks. It has been suggested that all anti-Czech propaganda is headed by the Slovak Bulisa and Professor Davski in Warsaw\(^5\).

It is interesting that the activities of the pro-Hungarian “fifth column” in the region were well known in Slovakia, and its figures repeatedly informed the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ about this. Here is the information that came from Bratislava on October 7, 1920: “...The administration in Subcarpathian Rus’ is made up of agents of the Hungarian irredent. The reason for this is that officials of the Hungarian way of thinking, who carry out the Hungarian propaganda and sabotage activity, who wait for Horthy, are not eliminated anywhere, which undoubtedly had to be done in the

\(^3\) ДАЗО. Ф. 14. Оп. 1. Спр. 17. Арк. 84.
\(^4\) ДАЗО. Ф. 63. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. Арк. 14.
\(^5\) ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 36. Арк. 6-7.
interest of some rehabilitation of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Czechoslovak Republic. The exception in this composition of irredent bureaucracy is the financial directorate, whose chief, Czech, has organized a new institution in accordance with the requirements of the republic.”306

Evidence that the pro-Hungarian propaganda in the region intensified at the end of 1920 is the report of the Solotvyno “ulan administration of November 6. In particular, it states: “Political position. In the political context there is now a complete calm in the local county. With the exception of organized workers, the Ruthenian population does not take part in political life. According to secret agents, the Hungarians have recently intensified their campaigning here, especially in the Tiachiv district. Their agitators with the help of print media spread among the people the Hungarian X law on the autonomy of Subcarpathian Rus’ and promise to give them state property such as forests and meadows on the basis of the same law, thus trying to attract the sympathies of the Ruthenian people to the Hungarian statehood idea and to the Hungarian state candidates at the coming elections. It is said that this Soim will be competent to decide on the issue of state affiliation of Subcarpathian Rus’, and therefore, somehow, it is very important who will be elected to the Soim.

The pro-Hungarian agitation in the Rakhiv district is headed by lawyer Dr. Shtefan, brother of Gustav Shtefan, who was appointed by the Hungarian Ministry in Budapest as governor of the “Rus’ Land” and who is now in Poland, leading the agitation for the annexation of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus’. His associates include the priest Demianovych, a teacher at the Church School – Chengery, the chief of the Rakhiv forest board – Weiss, and former official of the district government – Julius Hizer, who refused to take the oath for which he was fired. Another base of Magyaron is the management of the state forests, which were hired by the Czechoslovak Republic and are hated by the local people.”307

At the end of 1920 the first cases of delivery of a firearm to the territory of the region were recorded. On November 15, 1920 Chief of the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ informed the Czech Republic

306 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 22. Арк. 135-136.
307 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 28. Арк. 102-104.
representative in Budapest that “a parish priest in Nyzhni Veretski Andor Kompordai, together with his brother Julius Kossey, keep in touch with Hungary and Poland, distribute postcards of Dr. Mykulash Kutkafalvi, use poverty, which rules in the mountainous regions and finally had an agreement with the Polish army to deliver large quantities of weapons and distribute them to the local people to prepare for an armed uprising. After the conspiracy was exposed, priests Kompordai and Julius Kossey managed to flee abroad to Poland, where, according to rumors, they are still staying. His wife and several other civilian and military men were arrested. The wife of the priest Kompordai, as it was identified by the investigation, assisted her husband in all his treasonous affairs and was therefore referred to the Beregovo Prosecutor’s Office for treason. The criminal case against the aforementioned person was conducted, but Beregovo prosecutor’s office offered a pardon”.

In June 1921, an official center for irredent propaganda in the territory of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania was organized at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary in Budapest, it was called “Protecting Minorities of the Occupied Territories”. The Center was divided into three parts: Slovakia (Felvidék), Romania – Transilvania (Erdel) and Yugoslavia (Backa). The Romanian branch of the irredent center, which was located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, consisted of eight departments for eight Transilvanian counties (districts), each department was divided into three offices, namely: 1) a bureau (cadastre) – 1 employee – monitored all figures of Hungarian nationality who were capable of active propaganda in the district; 2) a bureau (cultural propaganda) – 1 employee – provided propaganda through the press (leaflets, brochures, books, films) and monitored teachers and priests of the district who devoted themselves to irredent activities; 3) a bureau (irredent) was engaged in the registration and sending of its own couriers (numbering 250 people). An important fact is that couriers travel to Romania via the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic, namely through the Kiralyhaza-Halmi”.

308 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 123. Арк. 57-58.
309 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 124. Арк. 114.
Hungary has often used students and intellectuals to promote its ideas. On June 26, 1921, the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ in Uzhgorod informed all the provincial offices about an attempt to carry out, with the assistance of Hungarian students, a large-scale campaign for the annexation of Transcarpathia to Hungary. In Uzhgorod alone, about thirty students, who lived in their local families under the guise of visiting relatives, arrived. A large number of students came to Mukachevo and Beregovo. The entire campaign is run by one of the leaders of the Hungarian Party of Right Dr. Endre Korlat and editor Tivodar. Lieutenant Colonel on the retirement, Ark Akosh, also took part in this work. Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and Beregovo became centers of this movement. The report said that “three major Hungarian parties are holding meetings with the representative of the “Rus’ Agricultural Union”, Dr. J. Kaminski, to bring him and the whole party to their side for the Great-Hungarian chauvinistic purposes,... they are working on Kaminski’s appointment as a governor. If these negotiations had led to the goal, then all the Hungarian parties and Dr. Kaminski’s party would have formed a large joint bloc. The mentioned above students are agitating that Hungary is the center where locals used to go to work and always found it, whereas now they cannot cross the Czechoslovak border. Therefore, the people are suffering misery and violence from the Czechoslovak authorities, so the local population must seek to move Subcarpathian Rus’ back to Hungary... Appropriate measures must be taken to counteract possible agitation and its consequences”\footnote{ДАЗО. Ф. 14. Оп. 1. Спр. 55. Арк. 1-3.}.

The irredent activity was so intensified that an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia wrote to the minister on July 31, 1921: “The irredent movement will sooner or later make a serious upheaval in the country”\footnote{ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 183. Арк. 1-2.}. Similarly was recorded on August 27, 1921, by a representative of the police department of the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’: “The reports from various institutions show that here (in Transcarpathia – Aut.) the Hungarian national propaganda is carried out by all forces”\footnote{ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 193. Арк. 36.}. He was convinced that “the mainstay of it is the Hungarian Christian-Social Party,
whose activities turn into a true irredent (the proof of this is the celebration of St. Stephen, which had a humiliating character, wearing Hungarian suits, lectures about unhappy Hungary, etc.), the same time the catholic character of this party is totally negative, which is also evident from the fact that in the Christian Social Party there are also progressive people and a significant number of Jews. Its core is Hungarian nobles, civil servants (mostly dismissed) and officers. The main propaganda support of this party are students studying in Hungary, who repeatedly and without passports cross the border and bring from there the leaflets, different rumors. 

In the early 1920’s the first information about A. Brodi’s pro-Hungarian activities was recorded. On April 27, 1922, the chief of the police department in Mukachevo reported to the Presidium of the Mukachevo County Department that “editor Brodi is visited by a former financial adviser to the local district administration, Mykhailovych (possibly pseudonym – Aut.), who was once arrested here for organizing Hungarian-Polish legia and was transferred to a divisional court in Uzhgorod. Dr. Mykhailovych is now in Budapest, where he was recently visited by his father-in-law Peruzzi, a restaurateur from Mukachevo”. Since this time, Czechoslovak police will follow every step of the future Prime Minister of Subcarpathian Rus’. Czechoslovak police and security also continued to oversee J.Kaminsky, Bako Gabor and other pro-Hungarian politicians of the region. Hungarian irredentists have established contacts with political figures in England and Italy. It was proved that J. Kaminsky set up a close relationship with the English consul in Prague. It is necessary to agree with the opinion of the Presidium of the Mukachevo County Administration that “the victory of Italian fascism awakened the tumultuous Hungarian temperament of the fanatical mass”. Under the influence of events in Italy, “the Hungarian gendarmes continued to threaten that our border would not remain as it is now, and they believe that they will have a service in

313 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 183. Арк. 36.
314 ДАЗО. Ф. 13. Оп. 1. Спр. 654. Арк. 1.
315 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 228. Арк. 20-21.
316 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 228. Арк. 1.
the Carpathians this spring. These gendarmes lead such conversations with our border guards. On January 21, 1923 at night reflector from the Hungarian side shone on our side, and on 20 of the same month on our border there was heard a firing machine gun for about an hour on the Hungarian side.\(^{318}\)

The evidence of the attack, which is being prepared for one of the county offices of Subcarpathian Rus’, “forced the security agencies to conduct enhanced searches, which, however, ended to no avail, as it is not excluded that officers and non-commissioned officers, who were sent to make this attack, failed to do so due to timely taken actions. Now, however, the excitement caused by the events in Hungary and Germany has subsided, however, one can still constantly see the population’s partial uncertainty...\(^{319}\).

In the mid-20’s there is an increase in the activity of the Hungarian irredent in Transcarpathia. During this period, they consolidate their forces, unite, form the main irredent centers. On February 9, 1925, the Presidium of the Mukachevo County Administration reported to the Presidium of the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ in Uzhgorod about the election of E. Korlat as a head of the opposition Hungarian forces. “In a secret way,” the report said, “it was established that on January 31, 1925, representatives of the executive committee of the union of opposition Hungarian parties in Subcarpathian Rus’ met for a secret meeting in Beregovo, at the secretariat of the party of small hosts. The meeting was chaired by Arki from Uzhgorod and the issue of ways to secure a united front of the opposition Hungarian parties was discussed. At the meeting, there were sharp disagreements between individual participants, and a vote was taken as to whether trust to Dr. Korlat should be expressed. With a small number of votes it was voted for such a trust”\(^{320}\).

In the mid 1920’s there is an increase in activity of pro-Hungarian forces in Subcarpathian Rus’. Often a variety of methods have been used to achieve their goals, such as leaflets, memoranda, etc. Senior Police Advisor Voglidal informed the Presidium of the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ about the revanchist propaganda of the

\[^{318}\text{ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 228. Арк. 27.}\]
\[^{319}\text{ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 212. Арк. 9-10.}\]
\[^{320}\text{ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 428. Арк. 127.}\]
Budapest Bank of Roth’s firm all over in Slovakia and Transcarpathia. This bank proposed to put dollars, English pounds, Swiss francs and Czech krones for Budapest houses and estates in Hungary at 32% per annum. It is interesting that on the title page of the project, developed by the bank, issued in May 1925, a number of slogans were printed in Hungarian and French, in particular, “we believe in one god, we believe in one homeland, we believe in eternal and divine law, we believe in the resurrection of Hungary”, “without expansion of production it is impossible to re-surrond Hungary with the previous radiance of glory, without American capital it is impossible to raise our production”, “Hungarian, stay always and everywhere Hungarian”, etc.\(^{321}\). On the penultimate page of the project, entitled “Expositions in the Occupied Territory of Hungary”, there were listed the cities that were once part of it (Uzhgorod, Bratislava, Kosice, Trencin, Beregovo, Mukachevo, Khust, Rakhovo, Timisoara, Zagreb, Fiula, etc., total of 114 cities)\(^{322}\). Transcarpathia was literally flooded with Hungarian agents. Since November 1927, the Presidium of the Mukachevo County Office has reported to the Presidium of the Civic Office of Subcarpathian Rus’ about the espionage of priest Karl Barkase in favor of the Horthy’s Hungary. “I inform,” the head of the Mukachevo county reported, “that the Evangelical Reformed parish priest Karel Barkase from the village of Saloka (Uzhgorod district), together with the priest Shtefan Sabo from the village of Yasenya (Uzhgorod district), and Ladislau Matyash from Illok in Hungary committed military treason, because in 1923 he sent to Hungary various maps, lists of gendarmes and financial watch stations, their location, strength, weapons, personnel by nationality, as well as information on the location of Czechoslovak military units, their forces in different garrisons. These materials were hidden at Matyash’s, who at the time was serving under the border financial guard at the section between Tisosentmarton and Soloka. On June 18, 1923 these materials were again received by the priest Barkase and together with Matiash they were sent to the military commandant’s office in Mondok, where they were transferred”\(^{323}\).
The Czechoslovak security service detained Ladislau Matyash in the village of Kapushany on July 25, 1927, and handed him over to the police in Kosice. The detainee testified against Barkase and Sabov, thereby confirming the testimony of J. Godvan, made on August 26, 1923. This gave reason to arrest Barkase and put him in the investigative prison of Uzhgorod.  

Similar espionage activities of Hungarian agents were recorded in Yasinia and Khust. On November 29, 1927, the newspaper “Czech Word” reported that “police and gendarmerie managed to expose extensive espionage for Hungary in Subcarpathia. Two residents of Yasinia village and one pensioner from Khust were arrested and taken to the Khust district court jail. It was found that the arrested (their names are kept secret) were in contact with Hungarian lawyer Dr. Ekman of Shatoro-Uygel, on the border of Czechoslovakia; they received money and orders to increase agitation among the Hungarian population in Transcarpathia and return of the Hungarian regime”.

Some pro-Hungarian parties in Transcarpathia have intensified their activities. This is especially concerned with the gas stations. The named party, headed by I. Kurtyak, promised generous fees and banquets to support the gas stations during the election. “That many of the invited and honored to receive letters of the “people’s awakeners” did not respond to sly promises,” the “Podkarpackie Glasí” newspaper stated, “it is evident from the success of the autonomous union in the elections, so it is likely that the generosity of uncle from Budapest will be limited further”. However, Budapest continued to finance gas stations. This also applies to parties of small farmers. The head of the Mukachevo County informed the Presidium of Subcarpathian Rus’ Office: “It is well known that Hungary is spending considerable funds for its political purposes. In particular, during the recent elections to the village councils, this fact was confirmed. The party receives assistance from Hungary, and for this reason it must contact Baron Zsigmond Perenyi in Budapest. Money parcels are allegedly run from Hungary through the Great

---

324 Ibid.
325 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 769. Арк. 26.
326 ДАЗО. Ф. 30. Оп. 4. Спр. 439. Арк. 1.
Sevliush”\textsuperscript{327}. This information was confirmed by the deputy chief of the Mukachevo district administration. “Undoubtedly,” the report said, “this party receives systematic assistance from Hungary. In order to do this, the Hungarian small-peasant party must be in contact with Zsigmond Perenyi in Budapest. The mentioned person at one time was a head of Maramoros County, and later Minister of Hungary. Zsigmond Perenyi has got several agents in Velyky Sevliush, in particular, such an agent was a deceased director of the Velyky Sevliush County Hospital, Dr. Koloman Nagy, an active member of the Hungarian Party of Peasant Socialists, former Baron’s family doctor. Remittances, apparently, are sent from Hungary through Velyky Sevliush”\textsuperscript{328}.

Under the heading “completely secret” the director of the Uzhgorod police informed on June 16, 1928 the Presidium of political management of Subcarpathian Rus’ that in Hungary “all public servants, as well as persons living at the expense of the population, are militarized. They all use the smallest opportunity to attack our country and talk about the capture of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus’ in the near future”\textsuperscript{329}. Even some details were cited in the report: “In state institutions, in some cafes there are maps on which there is no Czechoslovak Republic at all. In cafes, restaurants irredent songs are sung. The rural population, who strongly condemns the Hungarian bourgeois-nationalist demonstrations, has a very different mood, although it must remain silent and is severely persecuted for every word of criticism. Based on the judgments of the local agents, the Hungarian government has many problems with its own population at home, which is very dissatisfied with the social conditions”\textsuperscript{330}.

The talks about a close Hungarian invasion continued. On July 27, 1928 the Presidium of the regional board of Subcarpathian Rus’ informed the Uzhgorod Regional Gendarmerie Office: “Hungary, in case of a military conflict with Czechoslovakia, hopes very much for the support of the Hungarian population living in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus’. It must be properly organized so that Hungary’s

\textsuperscript{327} ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 796. Арк. 46.
\textsuperscript{328} ДAZY. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 796. Арк. 47.
\textsuperscript{329} ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 781. Арк. 147.
\textsuperscript{330} ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 781. Арк. 147.
invasion of Slovakia would be as successful as possible. Hungarian military circles also envisage that in case of a military conflict the Hungarian population will start protests that will not allow Czechoslovakia to make defensive preparations. Such an organization of the Hungarian population is being held, probably, in Transylvania... Who conducts the organizational work among the Hungarian population in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus’ is not known, however, according to secret information, this is primarily done by Hungarian political parties, in particular, the Hungarian Peasant Socialist Party... This party is in constant contact with the government’s Hungarian circles, who constantly assure it that the current situation will not last long and that Hungary will soon try to occupy Slovakia. The Hungarian Peasant Socialist Party has launched extraordinary organizational activities, its activists are constantly traveling around villages, strengthening and organizing new organizations, and the leaders of this party, in particular, the parliamentarists Sulle and Dr. Korlat, Senator Egri (these are more likely supporters of the Peasant Socialist Party) often go to Hungary”.

On March 21, 1929 the chief of police in Uzhgorod informed the Presidium of the regional administration of Subcarpathian Rus’ about the connections of Hungarian spy T. Hulovich with the Hungarian nationalist parties in Transcarpathia”. On August 18, a priest from the village of Chepa, Eugene Biki, was arrested for the pro-Hungarian activity”. Supervision of the agents of Z. Perenyi continued. On May 11, 1929, witnessing in the Irshava District Court, I. Iltio stated: “I can confirm as a witness that the party of deputy Kurtyak (AZS – Aut.) is supported or was supported by Hungary... The party apparatus costs about half a million crowns. In Subcarpathian Rus, it is common knowledge that members do not pay membership fees. I personally know that a secretary of Kurtyak’s party, named Demko, never wanted to speak against the Hungarians. This party published

331 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 781. Арк. 97.
332 ДАЗО. Ф. 9. Оп. 1. Спр. 60. Арк. 34.
333 ДАЗО. Ф. 29. Оп. 3. Спр. 796. Арк. 30.
334 ДАЗО. Ф. 9. Оп. 1. Спр. 60. Арк. 39.
Hungarian books, and did not want to do anything for the Rus’ culture.\textsuperscript{335}

Hungary was seriously preparing to invade Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus’. This was confirmed by the police chief in Kosice Eis Chenek on December 11, 1929, in the report to the directorate of the Presidium of the regional administration in Bratislava. The above report referred to one of the meetings of the Hungarian General Staff. “According to this information,” E. Chenek reported, “some members of the Hungarian government seemed to be surprised that the government was not informed of the meeting of the General Staff Council, especially since issues related to its competence were being resolved. The council did not even announce that its members were discussing it. With this secret, the Hungarian government is feeling insulted, and most members of the government have submitted an interpellation to Minister Gembesh. And he would sort of answer briefly that they talked about military issues that cannot be discussed openly.”\textsuperscript{336} According to Czechoslovak intelligence, “there will be changes in important positions in the Hungarian army after some time, and it is said that Commander-in-Chief Janki Kotschard will resign and a cavalry general Baron Tan will replace him. General Gukfi has been appointed commander of a military organization in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus’, who previously had been attached to the VI branch of the Ministry of Defense. He, as commander-in-chief in Slovakia and in Subcarpathian Rus’, will take lead over 5 commanders who reside in the Czechoslovak Republic and who, after their appointment, are expected to receive regular payment.”\textsuperscript{337}

On March 11, 1930 the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defense reported to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that “Hungarian propaganda had succeeded in establishing a press center in Prague, which is part of the Hungarian irredentist and espionage service in our territory.”\textsuperscript{338} The irredentist newspapers have been united around the “Pragai Magyar Hirlap”. Hungarian agents often have used various sports clubs for their purposes. On March 21, 1930 Governor

\textsuperscript{335} ДАЗО. Ф. 30. Оп. 4. Спр. 416. Арк. 2.
\textsuperscript{336} ДАЗО. Ф. 117. Оп. 1. Спр. 136. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{337} ДАЗО. Ф. 117. Оп. 1. Спр. 136. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{338} ДАЗО. Ф. 117. Оп. 1. Спр. 161. Арк. 1.
Rozsipal informed the district administration about the connections of the Beregovo sports club with the leaders of Horthy’s Hungary.\footnote{ДАЗО. Ф. 117. Оп. 1. Спр. 136. Арк. 1-2.} The district commander in Svalyava convinced the Presidium of the regional administration in Uzhgorod that the local “Roman Catholic church today, even more than before, under the influence of the pro-Hungarian elements intensified its activity”\footnote{ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 2. Спр. 359. Арк. 11.}. A Budapest-made map “Hungary before and after the Trianon Peace” was distributed on the territory of the region.\footnote{ДАЗО. Ф. 1. Оп. 2. Спр. 326. Арк. 34.} On January 13, 1934 Gembesh, accompanied by senior ministry officials, arrived in Chatorougeil, where he delivered a speech to the members of the county administration, stating that in its foreign policy Hungary had moved so far forward and so strongly that it came to the required revision of the borders already for 7.5\%\footnote{ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 2. Спр. 284. Арк. 128-129.}.

On April 16, 1933, an article “Plan of Hungarian Revision” was published on the pages of the Hungarian newspaper “Kish Uysag”. It said, in particular: “A big part of the Upper Territory with half a million population would be reached again. First of all, Rye Island, so as the territory of Ruthenians, where a council of delegates appointed a plebiscite. A number of Hungarian towns would come back to us again: for example Uzhgorod. From the territories occupied by Romania, more than 1,000,000 Hungarians would be annexed to Hungary. Verazdin, Satu Mare and Arad would come into Hungary. Hungary would take Backa, which is occupied by Serbia, as well as a large part of Banat, primarily Subotica, South Baranya and Mesimorte. Western Hungary would have fallen to us completely. At the meetings, Chancellor Dolfluss and the leader of the German people discussed the issue of Western Hungary, which is annexed to Austria. This detached part of the empire is not disputed by either the German National Socialists or the Austrians.” On January 16, 1933, an article “Plan of Hungarian Revision” was published on the pages of the Hungarian newspaper “Kish Uysag”. It said, in particular: “A big part of the Upper Territory with half a million population would be reached again. First of all, Rye Island, so as the territory of Ruthenians, where a council of delegates appointed a plebiscite. A number of Hungarian towns would come back to us again: for example Uzhgorod. From the territories occupied by Romania, more than 1,000,000 Hungarians would be annexed to Hungary. Verazdin, Satu Mare and Arad would come into Hungary. Hungary would take Backa, which is occupied by Serbia, as well as a large part of Banat, primarily Subotica, South Baranya and Mesimorte. Western Hungary would have fallen to us completely. At the meetings, Chancellor Dolfluss and the leader of the German people discussed the issue of Western Hungary, which is annexed to Austria. This detached part of the empire is not disputed by either the German National Socialists or the Austrians.” On January 16, 1933, an article “Plan of Hungarian Revision” was published on the pages of the Hungarian newspaper “Kish Uysag”. It said, in particular: “A big part of the Upper Territory with half a million population would be reached again. First of all, Rye Island, so as the territory of Ruthenians, where a council of delegates appointed a plebiscite. A number of Hungarian towns would come back to us again: for example Uzhgorod. From the territories occupied by Romania, more than 1,000,000 Hungarians would be annexed to Hungary. Verazdin, Satu Mare and Arad would come into Hungary. Hungary would take Backa, which is occupied by Serbia, as well as a large part of Banat, primarily Subotica, South Baranya and Mesimorte. Western Hungary would have fallen to us completely. At the meetings, Chancellor Dolfluss and the leader of the German people discussed the issue of Western Hungary, which is annexed to Austria. This detached part of the empire is not disputed by either the German National Socialists or the Austrians.”
the Presidium of the Regional Office by the Chief of Police Flek.\textsuperscript{344}

Hungary continued to spread rumors of a close invasion. On May 19, 1935 the Ministry of the Interior of Czechoslovakia issued an order to strengthen the protection of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border due to the possible invasion of the Hungarian armed groups. In particular, it stated: “The activities of individual gendarmerie units in the protection of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian state border from the possible penetration of armed groups into our territory requires that the order concerning the area in Rozhniava also applies to the gendarmerie units in Kosice and Trebisov. The full implementation of this order must be fulfilled by two gendarme commands with the prior agreement of the regional authorities.”\textsuperscript{345}

On July 7, 1936 the head of the Gendarmerie station in the village of Chaslivtsi, ensign Kafourek reported to the local gendarmerie command in Uzhgorod about the spread by the Hungarian agents among the population of the rumors about the occupation of Transcarpathia by Hungarian and Italian troops in the near future.\textsuperscript{346} A similar situation in the Hungarian border villages was reported by the head of the district department of Uluwacek: “Rumors are circulating in the Hungarian border line that there will be a war during which Hungary will unite with Germany and Austria and that the occupied territory will once again depart to Hungary. The secret agent of the gendarme point in Petrov reported that in Debrecen he allegedly saw German officers who were to take part in the Hungarian maneuvers.”\textsuperscript{347}

In the late 1930s, the anti-Czechoslovak and anti-Ukrainian activities of the pro-Hungarian “fifth column” in Transcarpathia culminated. Modern researchers rightly believe that in 1938-1939 the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian population, “which have been waiting for the inclusion of the region in Hungary from day to day”, were hostile to the Ukrainian government.\textsuperscript{348} A. Voloshyn and

\textsuperscript{344} ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 2. Спр. 450. Арк. 62.
\textsuperscript{345} ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 2. Спр. 418. Арк. 183.
\textsuperscript{346} ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 2. Спр. 301. Арк. 50.
\textsuperscript{347} ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 2. Спр. 301. Арк. 19.
\textsuperscript{348} Болдийар М. Закарпаття між двома світовими війнами. Ужгород, 1993. С. 125.
his close associates understood this. Describing the events of October 30, 1938, when anti-Ukrainian demonstrations took place in a number of cities in Transcarpathia, V. Grendzha-Donsky noted: “From the morning we have seen great tension and animosity towards us... In front of the People’s House there was a hostile crowd, as the wasps: “Get away with the Ukrainians! Long live Brodi! Long live Horthy!...”\(^{349}\). And there were many such cases.

Anti-Ukrainian propaganda did not stop throughout the short-lived existence of Carpathian Ukraine. Newsletter of the Press Service of Carpathian Ukraine reported that “The Motherland, without sparing money, human sacrifices, works tirelessly to reach its 20-year goals”\(^ {350}\). A. Voloshyn asked his government officials to be ready to repel hostile propaganda: “It is reasonable to believe that Hungarian propaganda will want in a short time all the constructions for presenting the recently taken territories to the world as a result of its work. If you are to prepare the appropriate material against this propaganda right now, I ask you... to send me all the material you have that would speak about it? How did the now-abandoned territory look like in 1919 (including the cities of Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and Beregovo), what investments were made in that territory until 1938 and at what cost. To clarify the matter, please, also send me the photographic material you have”\(^ {351}\). Thus, the government of A. Voloshyn was not surprised by a sharp increase of anti-Ukrainian propaganda and agitation in the region.

Throughout this period, leaflets were distributed by the pro-Hungarian elements in the cities and villages of Carpathian Ukraine, and there were pronounced slogans “Get Out with the Czechs!” and ‘Beat the Czechs!”’, which sought to sharpen relations between Carpathian and Czechoslovak governments. A. Voloshyn demanded that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Carpathian Ukraine “all such anti-state and anti-national agitation should eliminate at the root and that the initiators of the anti-Czech agitation should be restrained and actions against them should be vigorous”\(^ {352}\).

\(^ {350}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 1. Спр. 9. Арк. 2.
\(^ {351}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 156. Арк. 1.
\(^ {352}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 65. Арк. 62-64.
The leaflet propaganda intensified in the run-up to the plebiscite, which was demanded by the Hungarian government. The so-called “Committee of Independence of the Ruthenians” called on the population: “Brothers! – we do not need Czech and Ukrainian nobility, but Magyar lowland... We lived with the Czechs only 20 years, but with the Magyars we lived for 1000 years together. Do you want this old happy world be back? It’s up to you! Vote for a common homeland of Russians and Magyars!”353. The same “Committee” convinced the Transcarpathians of the need for co-existence with Hungary, because only it “will give us freedom, earnings and a better future”354. Leaflet “The people of Carpatho-Ruthenians! The Carpatho-Ruthenian brothers!” called for the protection of A. Brodi, who “for our truth bears persecution... He suffers for the fact that he wanted, so as we wanted, the happiness of the Carpatho-Ruthenian people, who wanted the connection of Subcarpathian Rus’ with Hungary”355. Leaflet “Sisters and Brothers!” was issued immediately after the elections to the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine. Its authors called for a joint struggle of the Ruthenians and the Hungarians against “Voloshyn, Revai and the Ukrainian nobility”, to meet “our liberators – Magyar Honveds”356. The same slogans were put forward at the public meeting of Fentsyk’s supporters in Svalyava357. A Czech-language leaflet called “Listen to This and Remember It!” has openly called for terror. It ended with the words: “Our patience is over!”358. Czechoslovak Security Service closely monitored anti-Ukrainian and anti-Czech political organizations359.

There were various ways of delivering leaflets to designated areas. Before the Vienna Arbitration on November 2, 1938, they tried to distribute them in the towns and villages where the Hungarians lived. “Until now (May 2, 1938) two newsletters were circulated about the distribution of leaflets,” said the chief of the police department in

353 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 170. Арк. 5.
354 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 24. Арк. 3.
355 ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 80. Арк. 4.
358 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 24. Арк. 3.
359 Archiv Ministerstva Zagranicnich Veci, Praha. karton 642.
Uzhgorod to the Presidium of the district administration, “from Sevlyush and from Beregovo, the cities where the Hungarian population is most residing... In Sevlyush district circulars of the deputy Korlat (the Hungarian parliamentarist, who openly declared a future annexation of Transcarpathia – Aut.) were secretly handed over to the Jews. But the Jews, with few exceptions, refused to take circulars. The campaign was interrupted by communists who led a strong agitation against the Hungarian opposition among the population”360.

The leaflets were forwarded to their agents in Transcarpathia, and were reprinted and distributed here. Czechoslovakian police found that one of the activists of the Hungarian National Party in Beregovo, Bodak, “printed the mentioned leaflets in the Merkur’s typography, which is in the same room with the secretariat of the Hungarian National Party, made a list of all Hungarians and Jews, and ordered his servant Antonin Maroek to spread them in Beregovo from house to house. The leaflets were enclosed in a blue newspaper folder”361. Czechoslovak police have proved that “the person of the extreme Hungarian way of thinking was signing by his full name, while persons working in public institutions and persons who were hesitating were signing with different signs, only to make it clear in the list that they received the leaflets”362. Thus, Hungarian agents, distributing leaflets, relied primarily on the Hungarian-speaking population.

Often postcards were thrown into the territory of the region from the aircraft. “The leaflets in Russian and Ukrainian,” the head of the Vyshkovo gendarmerie point reported to the chief of the Khust district, “contain appeals to the local population to speak out against citizens of Czech nationality and to pay no taxes. As it was found out, the leaflets were dropped on October 17, 1938 after 11 a.m. from a foreign plane flying along the state border from Tiachevo in the direction of Khust. The thrown leaflets fell into the free territory and inaccessible places of the local area and in most cases fell into the hands of citizens of Ruthenian nationality living separately along the

360 ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 1. Спр. 315. Арк. 28.
361 ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 1. Спр. 315. Арк. 29.
362 ДАЗО. Ф. 2. Оп. 1. Спр. 315. Арк. 30.
Czechoslovak-Romanian border. The population does not react to the content of the leaflets.\textsuperscript{363} 

Thus, Czechoslovak police closely followed the distribution of the Hungarian leaflets and often confiscated them. Such fate awaited Polish leaflets. The chief of Dubrynychi gendarme point, Malek, reported to the head of the security service of Subcarpathian Rus’ that he had confiscated Polish postcards under the titles “Brothers”, “Dear Ruthenians Brothers”, “Carpathorussian Brothers”.\textsuperscript{364} The Czechoslovak police was also taking Polish agents in the field of its view. “Yaroslav Boyko from Berezhany region,” “Nova Svoboda” reported, “is a dangerous person, and this way we warn Ukrainian citizenship in Galicia about him. Some illustrations of his activity: in Uzhgorod about 28.10. this year (1938 – Aut.) he asked for social work as a political prisoner, who was taken to Poznan during the investigation, from where he fled through Katowice to Germany, from Czechs and Slovakia to Carpathian Ukraine. A few days later he appeared in Mukachevo, where he introduced himself as a banished Ukrainian nationalist from the camp in the Carpathian Mountains, which numbered there at about 5000 people awaiting orders to cross the border. Taking advantage of the confusion encountered during the evacuation of Mukachevo and Uzhgorod, he fled through Yasinia to Lviv, where he turns around the Ukrainian editorial office and searches for the victims, offering them his help to transfer them to Carpathian Ukraine with the highest security.”\textsuperscript{365}

The State Prosecutor’s Office in Veliky Bereznyi reported: on December 22, 1938 “there was detained by the gendarme point in the village Huklyve Vasyl Gubanii, who ... publicly campaigned against the authorities of Carpathian Ukraine and its prime minister, at the same time he... was spreading the journal “Dnevnyk”.\textsuperscript{366} The State Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case against those who campaigned against A. Voloshyn’s government and for joining the village Pidhoryany to Hungary.\textsuperscript{367} On November 30, 1938 Yurko

\textsuperscript{363} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 1. Спр. 327. Арк. 14.
\textsuperscript{364} ДАЗО. Ф. 18. Оп. 1. Спр. 80. Арк. 3.
\textsuperscript{365} Нова свобода. 1938. 6 грудня.
\textsuperscript{366} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 336. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{367} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 12. Арк. 2.
Horduei convinced residents of the village Chornyi Potik that “without Uzhgorod and Mukachevo we cannot live” and that only A. Voloshyn is to blame for this. Regional court in Velykyi Bereznyi, on December 8, 1938 sentenced Y. Kleisner and Y. Pashkulyak, “charged by the state prosecutor’s office for the crime of conspiracy against the republic under §2 of the law on protection of the republic. On November 4, 1938, both of them were sent by a well-known Fentsyk supporter, Krainiak, from Radwanka to our homeland to collect signatures in our villages for the accession of the whole Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary... He gave them 12 blank forms with the inscription: “Berni government in...” and handed them a list of communities laid out on the Uzhgorod-Uzhok line. They also received 200 kč for the road and they had to go through all the villages on the list, summon the peasants, and agitate to join Hungary. With these instructions, they came to Uzhok and then walked to Volosyanka, collected signatures, but now they were arrested by the gendarmeres... Accused before the gendarmerie and today before the Senate, they completely confessed and each of them got 2 years in prison for that.

Often priests have campaigned in favor of Hungary. Apostolic Administrator of Carpathian Ukraine D. Njaradi informed the department of press and propaganda that “Fr. Silvai Nestor constantly propagates among peasants on the basis of radio announcements from Budapest”. On October 29, 1938 priest from Pistryalov Ivan Josyf “proclaimed that the sweet man Brodi had been thrown out of the ministerial presidency, and Voloshyn replaced him. Voloshyn is a bandit, a thief, he will sell us. If it were Sunday tomorrow, I would go to Uzhgorod myself and kill him”. Uzhok’s priest Zoltan Sholtes was detained for the pro-Hungarian agitation. On December 28, a parson from Patskaniovo, Ivan Min’ was detained “for the crime of preparing for a conspiracy against the republic”. Priest Izhak

368 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 83. Арк. 6.
369 Нова свобода. 1938. 13 грудня.
370 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 73. Арк. 30.
371 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 83. Арк. 8.
372 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 170. Арк. 5.
373 ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 74. Арк. 1.
Emerik during the church service urged people to join Tiachevo to Hungary\textsuperscript{374}. And there are many such examples. On December 24, 1938 the district commander in Perechyn proposed to A. Voloshyn “...that priests close to the Magyars would be relocated to the third district, so that they come among new people, whom they don’t know, and among whom they would not dare to agitate...”\textsuperscript{375}.

The State Prosecutor’s Office in Velykyi Bereznyi opened a criminal case against individual citizens who were accused of insulting A. Voloshyn and his government. Driver Filak called the government “the Ukrainian gang”\textsuperscript{376}, and Elizabeth Groskopf on December 24, 1938 declared that “Voloshyn is stupid and all power is stupid”\textsuperscript{377}. Something like that was said by Samuel Schwimmer, but A. Voloshyn stated that he “did not want further movement in the case”\textsuperscript{378}. The Prime Minister put himself above various gossip and intrigues, which almost never stopped in the company of his enemies. However, no matter what A. Voloshyn did in such situations, they undoubtedly gave rise to uncertainty in some segments of the population, undermined the authority of the power. In response to this, the press and propaganda service conducted its counter-propaganda. For this reason, leaflets appeared, which praised A. Voloshyn and his activities\textsuperscript{379}. It should be noted that the Czechoslovak security service also collected compromising materials on A. Voloshyn, as before him on A. Brodi\textsuperscript{380}.

Pro-Hungarian elements often used methods of threatening and intimidation of local Ukrainian leaders. V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote that the chairman of Volove district council J. Dudykevych “very often receives letters with threats “Tomorrow evening you will die!” – signature: “Black Hand” (Hungarian). The provoked poor almost did not attack him with the axes”\textsuperscript{381}. The press service of Carpathian Ukraine reported that on October 31, 1938, Bodak, “who

\textsuperscript{374} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 73. Арк. 31.
\textsuperscript{375} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 73. Арк. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{376} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 45. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{377} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 170. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{378} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 83. Арк. 2.
\textsuperscript{379} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 4. Спр. 12. Арк. 1-2; Оп. 3. Спр. 86. Арк. 6.
\textsuperscript{380} Archiv Ministerstva Zagranicích Věcí, Praha. karton 655.
\textsuperscript{381} Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. Твори. Т.ВIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 35.
had long campaigned for Hungary and was a member of the Fentsyk Party, knocked out windows at Ryhan’s... The mentioned one was wounded in the head by an ax by Ryhan”382. On November 1, 1938 Ivan Opalenyk “was thrown out of the hotel... outside in Perechyn and smashed his head, and that was for the Hungarian agitation”383. Similar facts are recorded in the documents of the Prague archives384.

On January 1, 1939 S. Fentsyk visited Hungarian Prime Minister B. Imredy. He was accompanied on a trip to Budapest by pro-Hungarian attorneys, doctors, judges, teachers and representatives of youth organizations. In S. Fentsyk’s deep conviction, “they represent 90% of the interests and desires of the people, and 100% stand for the policy pursued by B. Imredy. The Transcarpathian people not only pay attention to, but also proclaim the idea, which is preached by Imredi”385. The Hungarian Prime Minister expressed hope that the Hungarian flag would soon be raised over Uzhok.

Radio-propaganda was systematically and purposefully conducted from the Hungarian and Polish territories. It was conducted in several directions: first, there were all sorts of stories about Carpathian Ukraine that could not be believed; secondly, Hungary, as if sympathizing to the population of the country, “took under protection” Carpathian Ukraine. Hungarian radio spread falsifications about various uprisings and riots against A. Voloshyn’s government. So, in particular, it was about the revolts in Khust for the annexation of the city to Hungary. A number of radio programs have been devoted to the fantastic rise in food prices. It should be noted that such a phenomenon occurred, but the price of bread never reached 20 kč, as reported by Hungarian radio.

Even more falsified and even senseless sensations were broadcast by Polish radio. Here are some of them: On November 25, 1938 an army in Khust rebelled against the power of A. Voloshyn, occupied the Khust castle and bombes Prague from there; on November 16, 1938 an epidemic of Asian plague broke out in Khust. Doctors escaped, and the population is dying. Everyone who leaves the city is

382 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 50. Арк. 2.
383 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 50. Арк. 3.
mercilessly shot. The corpses of thousands of people lie on the street; on November 27, 1938 there’s a terrible famine in Subcarpathian Rus’. No one has seen bread for a long time. Many cases of cannibalism have been reported; November 28, 1938. Tonight the earthquake destroyed Rakhiv. The whole neighborhood is flooded with water. None of the population escaped.

The Hungarian secret service closely followed the developments in Carpathian Ukraine. According to Koffa’s teletype message, dated January 14, 1939, more than 740 reports from various Hungarian agents were received from Carpathian Ukraine. Koffa (Hungarian agent’s nickname – Aut.) reported that “180 Ukrainian terrorists (Galicians – Aut.) appeared in the vicinity of the settlement of Gordycho, and 160 in the Kosyno neighborhood.” Budapest constantly received reports from the Hungarian agents about mobilization in the armed forces of Czechoslovakia. During January 13–29, 1939 an agent called “Koffa” conveyed by teletype that “all Romanians, who had been sent to the reserve in 1936–1937, were returned to military units. Many of them are Hungarians. All those who received the conscription notes were asked to appear on January 15, 1939, at their military points at six in the morning. The location of the military points is not known. It is known that most of these recruits are concentrated in the Satu-Mare district.” Agent “Kuzma” reported that “two soldiers with full ammunition went to their place of residence. In the Czech territory, almost all adults received summons for immediate appearance in the barracks where they had previously served a military service. After five days, they must be moved to other placements.” Often, Hungarian agents were even aware of such little things as the number of recruits, the level of food supply, and so on. The aforementioned agent reported to his superiors that there were only 60 people left in the Bratislava prison,

---

guarded by soldiers of the 39th Infantry Regiment. All the others (more than 200 people) were released and sent to military units.\(^\text{391}\)

Among the tasks set to the Hungarian agents was the collection of compromising materials on the “unreliable” politicians, scholars and teachers of the region. Thus, Agent “G” reported that the physician M. Rizdorfer had a map of Great Ukraine, which “in addition to Ukrainian lands in Poland and in the Soviet Union also includes the territory of Northeast Hungary until Debrecen”\(^\text{392}\). The Horthy’s supporters were aware that “priest V. Lar in the Vynohradovo Seminary gave weapons to girls for the fight against the Hungarians”\(^\text{393}\). Among the unreliable there were the names of Y. Perevuznyk, M. Dolynai and others who, much to the chagrin of Hungarian agents, left Carpathian Ukraine after the occupation of the region by the Hungarians\(^\text{394}\). Drawing teacher J. Bokshai, though he remained in the occupied territory, however, “required Ukrainian citizenship”\(^\text{395}\).

Following the patriotic transcarpathians continued after the occupation of the region by the Hungarian troops. An unknown Hungarian agent reported that “when Hungarian troops entered Velykyi Bereznyi, teacher Pataki refused to hang the Hungarian flag at school”\(^\text{396}\), and “Greek Catholic priest Bachynsky did not want to perform a national anthem of Hungary during a sermon in the church”\(^\text{397}\). In Rakhiv, “the priest Voloshyn did a great deal of harm to Hungary”\(^\text{398}\). Teacher Ivancho “constantly ridiculed the Hungarian history while teaching his academic subject”\(^\text{399}\), and the Perechyn school inspector Yu. Petenko “opposed the Magyarization of the schools”\(^\text{400}\).

\(^{392}\) Hadtorteneti Leveltart. 2921/29, eln.2, vfk. ko. 1939, 525 öld.
\(^{393}\) Hadtorteneti Leveltart. Koffa 2921116/4, eln.2, vfk. ko. 1939.
\(^{399}\) Hadtorteneti Leveltart. Koffa 2921116/4, eln.2, vfk. ko. 1939.
\(^{400}\) Hadtorteneti Leveltart. Koffa 2921116/4, eln.2, vfk. ko. 1939.
Thus, along with the numerous terrorist sabotages, internal calm in the region was disrupted by anti-Ukrainian and anti-Czech propaganda, calls for the overthrow of legitimate power. The materials show that in the middle of Carpathian Ukraine A. Voloshyn’s government had a serious opposition in the face of pro-Hungarian elements, which he could not but deal with. All these factors acted at the same time and constantly, which made the internal political situation of Carpathian Ukraine unstable and explosive. They hastened the establishment of an authoritarian regime in the land, which treated democratic process as an obstacle. At a meeting of the Ukrainian Central People’s Republic, on December 30, 1938, one of the prominent political figures of the region, M. Brashchayko, frankly stated: “The democratic principle is harmful to us”\(^{401}\).

A. Voloshyn issued several orders for the closure of some editions, which dissatisfied the new government. Such fate befell the journals “Rusyn”, “Karpatskyi Holos”, “Ruskyi Holos”\(^{402}\). A. Voloshyn’s government has informed the Svaliava district authorities that an order has been issued to immediately close the “Tysa” magazine, which “threatens by its content to the public order and security”\(^{403}\). The reason for this decision was only two articles published in this journal: “Bread and work, not flying” and “Uzhgorod-Mukacheve”\(^{404}\). The editor-in-chief of the magazine, I. Kovach, and the editor B. Scytovsky convinced their readers that “the new republic and the new Subcarpathian Rus’ will not provide them with quiet life, with Rus’ culture and with daily piece of bread that they lived until now”\(^{405}\). Often the Transcarpathians themselves demanded the closure of Russophile newspapers. M. Mandryk from Sevliush informed the department of press and propaganda that “every article of the “Dnevnyk” newspaper in a nasty and vile way attacks everything Ukrainian... It is necessary to stop a magazine”\(^{406}\). It was forbidden to distribute newspapers “Kish Uyshag”, “Peshti

\(^{401}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 1148. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. Арк. 1.
\(^{402}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 48. Арк. 16.
\(^{403}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 48. Арк. 1.
\(^{404}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 8. Арк. 1.
\(^{405}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 80. Арк. 4.
\(^{406}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 75. Арк. 4.
Hirlop” and “Eshti Ushag” on the territory of the region\textsuperscript{407}. A. Voloshyn informed S. Sabol that the “Calendar” he publishes will only be printed “when the photographs on pages 39/40 and 45/46 are eliminated”\textsuperscript{408}. The above facts indicate the introduction of strict censorship of newspapers and magazines published in Carpathian Ukraine. The vast majority were closed. This also applies to the numerous “Duchnovych Societies”. In particular, on November 30, 1938, such “Society” was closed in the village Vyshkovo\textsuperscript{409}.

On November 20, 1938 in accordance with the order of A. Voloshyn, a concentration camp Dumen was established near Rakhiv and started operating in Carpathian Ukraine. “Deserters and fugitives from abroad” and “political culprits from our region…” could get into it\textsuperscript{410}. What was this camp like? Slovak writer F. Ivancho, who has been in the camp since the second half of December 1938, wrote that “Dumen can be called a concentration camp only conditionally... In the Dumen camp there was a lack of the basic things, without which the real concentration camps cannot exist: double barbed wire fence around the camp square, prohibition area around the camp – zone; at the corners of the camp are the watchtowers with armed guards; dish – according to the percentage of the fulfilled daily norm; working day – 12 hours at any time of the year\textsuperscript{411}. Undoubtedly, acts such as the closure of print bodies and individual Russophile societies, the formation of a concentration camp, the arrests of unreliable persons (who were, in fact, Hungarian agents) were undemocratic. They testified to the existence of an authoritarian state. However, taking into account a number of factors (difficult international environment, diversions of Hungarian and Polish terrorists, active and purposeful anti-Ukrainian propaganda in the land led by the pro-Hungarian “fifth column”, calls for the overthrow of the legitimate government), the government of Carpathian Ukraine, being interested in safeguarding peace in the

\textsuperscript{407} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 14. Арк. 17.
\textsuperscript{408} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 65. Арк. 26.
\textsuperscript{409} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 320. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{410} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 16. Арк. 3.
\textsuperscript{411} Карпатська Січ. Матеріали наукової конференції. Ужгород, 1996.
state and in order to create normal conditions in the land, decided to go for a certain curtailment of democracy and to consolidate all the patriotic forces of Transcarpathia.

Consequently, the anti-Ukrainian and anti-Czech activities of the Hungarian irredent, which did not cease throughout the interwar period, culminated in the late 1930s. Transcarpathia was flooded with Hungarian agents collecting signatures for the annexation of the region to Hungary, distributing leaflets of anti-Ukrainian content, and reporting on the activities of some political figures in Carpathian Ukraine. Hungarian and Polish radio propaganda was systematic and targeted. The Czechoslovak and Ukrainian governments have made every effort to resist hostile propaganda, but they could not ignore it. The activities of the pro-Hungarian “fifth column” accelerated the establishment of an authoritarian regime in the region, whose attributes were the closure of certain printing bodies and Russophile societies, the opening of a concentration camp to isolate internal and external enemies of Carpathian Ukraine. Such a move by A. Voloshyn’s government should be considered as justified because it was necessitated by the creation of optimal conditions for the functioning of the young state.
PART 5.
ILLEGAL CROSSINGS OF THE POLISH-CZECHOSLOVAK BORDER AND CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

The news that Transcarpathia had become autonomous were received with great enthusiasm in Eastern Galicia. As for the first responses of Ukrainian political organizations in Galicia concerning the autonomy claims of the Transcarpathians, they began to appear since mid-September 1938. The reason for their appearance were intensive actions of the Ukrainian Central People’s Republic in the matter of granting autonomy to Subcarpathia, in particular, sending on September 8, 1938 a delegation led by A. Voloshyn to Prague and the ever-growing international tension around Czechoslovakia concerning the Sudeten-German question.

On September 16, 1938, the PUN (Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists), which had a wide illegal network in Galicia, spread the call: “The Ukrainian Transcarpathia defends at this moment the idea of an independent Ukrainian Transcarpathian state, which with a moment of explosion of uprising in all Ukrainian lands against all Ukrainian occupiers spontaneously unites the state of all Ukrainians”\textsuperscript{412}. At that time, the chairman of the PUN, A. Melnyk, recalled: “The first days of my re-enlistment of the agencies were fervent measures to help Carpathian Ukraine, all our forces and the means at our disposal were directed there”\textsuperscript{413}.

The Ukrainian National Democratic Union, headed by D. Levytsky, expressed its attitude to the Transcarpathian events. On September 20, 1938, in Lviv, at a meeting of the Central Committee of Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, it was proclaimed: “In the historic moment of political self-determination of the peoples who inhabit Czechoslovakia, the struggle of Ukrainians to exercise the right of self-determination cannot be neglected against their will by

\textsuperscript{412} Діло. 1938. 2 жовтня.
\textsuperscript{413} Ольжич О. Незнаному Воякові. Заповідане живим. К.: Фундація імені О. Ольжича, 1994. С. 33.
any committed facts. Therefore, Central Committee of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance congratulates Transcarpathian Ukrainians in their competitions for the exercise of their rights in all Ukrainian ethnographic lands of Transcarpathia, which are in the interest of the whole Ukrainian people"414.

On September 25, 1938 a meeting initiated by the leader of the National Unity Front, D. Paliiev, took place in the premises of the Ukrainian society “Sokil” in Lviv on the occasion of the Transcarpathian events. According to the Polish police, about 200 people took part in it, and the UNDO body – the weekly “Svoboda” reported that there was a thousand people present415. After the meeting there was a demonstration under the slogans “Long live Ukraine”, “Shame on Czechs, Poles and Magyars”, “Long live Transcarpathian Ukraine”. Police stopped the demonstrators at Galytska Street; Polish students, who took part in the skirmish, beat several protesters416. A day earlier, a demonstration of Ukrainian students in support of Transcarpathia took place in Lviv417. On October 30, 1938 a demonstration was organized by the local OUN-members in Busk, initiated by D. Kupiak and H. Pryshliak418.

Immediately after the Munich Conference, there is a rapprochement between Poland and Hungary in the Transcarpathian issue. It was at this time that the representative of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I. Csaky, negotiated with the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Beck on the Polish-Hungarian cooperation. Polish radio and press began a blatant anti-Ukrainian propaganda, and Polish government decides to secretly support terrorist war in Transcarpathia419. All this forced the Central Committee of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance to make a statement on 8 October, 1938 to Polish Prime Minister F. Slavoj-Skladowski and Foreign Minister J. Beck. The Polish government in

415 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 493. Арк. 198.
416 Діло. 1938. 2 вересня.
417 Діло. 1938. 15 жовтня.
419 Діло. 1938. 16 жовтня.
the Transcarpathian case took a position contrary to the idea of self-determination and became involved in advocacy work for the accession of Transcarpathia to Hungary. This policy was actively supported by the Polish Telegraph Agency and radio. News about giving autonomy to Subcarpathian Rus’ quickly reached Galicia. A wave of rallies and demonstrations swept through the country. The vast majority of them were initiated by the OUN. R. Shukhevych, who arrived in Lviv in October 1938, was especially active. On October 11, 1938 a church service was held at the Greek Catholic Cathedral in Yaroslav. On October 14, a festive gathering was held in the church of the Basilian Fathers in Przemysl, initiated by UNDO members, followed by a demonstration under the slogans “Long live Ukraine”, “Get away with the Poles, get away with the Magyars”. The protest was stopped by a reinforced police department. Metropolitan of Galicia and Archbishop of Lviv Count Andrey Sheptytsky also expressed his congratulations and best wishes. On October 11, the Lviv newspaper “Dilo” reported that “on the shoulders of the leaders of the Ukrainian Subcarpathia, history has put a huge task and we sincerely wish that they would fulfil it with honor and success – to preserve the Ukrainian Subcarpathia for its natives”. On October 13 a telegram of the following content was sent to the editorial office of “Nova Svoboda”: “The Ukrainian National Council and the first government of Subcarpathian Rus’ received a sincere wish for complete success in the fight against the Hungarian threat. The telegram was signed by the leaders of several legally existing political organizations of Galicia – D. Paliiv, Rudnytska, Starosolskyi, Stakhiv”.

Throughout the short-lived existence of Carpathian Ukraine, Transcarpathians have been constantly receiving moral support from both the various organizations of Galicia and its individual citizens. On November 19, 1938 members of the Lviv Political College, who met in Danzig, also discussed the question of assistance to Carpathian

---

420 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 494. Арк. 52.
421 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 494. Арк. 51.
422 Діло. 1938. 11 жовтня.
423 Ibid.
424 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 5. Арк. 3.

109
Ukraine. They came to the conclusion that “Galicia could send out cooperator, teachers, engineers and drivers”\(^\text{425}\). O. Dumin wrote in a letter to A. Voloshyn: “1) what specialists does Carpathian Ukraine need? 2) in what quantity of the above named professions? 3) what roads would they need to get to Carpathian Ukraine? Straight through the mountains, or through Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic?”\(^\text{426}\). It is unknown whether A. Voloshyn responded to O. Dumin’s letter. As for O. Dumin, he “was in close contact with the German secret service. He was also a member of the German Institute of the East in Königsberg, East Prussia”\(^\text{427}\). The contemporary researcher V. Kosyk wrote that in his time O. Dumin “constantly dreamed of various intrigues” against E. Konovalets, for which he was expelled from UVO (Ukrainian Military Organization) in 1925. In 1938 he was not a member of the OUN, which he wrote in a letter to A. Voloshyn. In February 1939, the Ukrainian Central People’s Republic published in “Nova Svoboda” the appeal “To all Ukrainians in their native lands and in the scattered lands”\(^\text{428}\). A separate statement was annexed to the request of the Ukrainian Central People’s Republic and the autonomous government of Carpathian Ukraine.

Support for A. Voloshyn’s government has been revealed in hundreds of letters authored by Galicians. They wrote about their willingness to help build a young autonomous country with all their powers and experience. Galician Orest Zozulia asked to let him be enrolled in the main financial department in Khust\(^\text{429}\). The request to serve Carpathian Ukraine was expressed by the Galicians Ivan Holyk, Anton Mysyshyn, Teodor Fedus’, Toma Datskiv, Ivan Mikhailiuk. Former UGA (Ukrainian Galician Army) warrior Omelian Lysniak, who lived in Presov, wrote: “I, the undersigned... dare to offer my services in order to further serve my people”\(^\text{430}\). Many UGA soldiers

\(^{425}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 173. Арк. 15-16.
\(^{426}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 173. Арк. 17.
\(^{428}\) Нова свобода. 1939. 15 лютого.
\(^{429}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 173. Арк. 19.
\(^{430}\) ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 9. Арк. 1.
were forced to emigrate abroad after the defeat of the liberation struggle and lived in Czechoslovakia, Germany, England, USA in the late 1930s. Ivan Vovk wrote from France that he would be useful to Carpathian Ukraine as an engineer. He had a working experience “on the railways, or on electric power stations, or related industries”\textsuperscript{431}. Ivan Tsymbal, from Pidhaitsi, offered his services as a former “member of the military police in Ternopil” and who “was honored as a very skillful shooter”\textsuperscript{432}.

Many Galicians found themselves in the Hungarian-occupied territory after the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration. They asked to help them to get to Khust. It should be noted that Galician writer V. Birchak helped many of them. In particular, he contributed to the return to Carpathian Ukraine of Ivan Ferenc, a former UGA shooter who at one time participated in the battles for Kyiv\textsuperscript{433}. Hundreds of Galicians appeared in Transcarpathia in the 1920-30’s. They were also mainly involved in the development of autonomous Transcarpathia in different areas of economic life. V. Latsanych wrote about the Galician writer Kost’ Vahylevych, who lived in Rakhiv: “...he knows the local circumstances and is very desirable...”\textsuperscript{434}.

In March 1939, that is, on the eve of the opening of the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine, Olena Kysilevska from Kolomyia wrote to A. Voloshyn: “Let me congratulate you, as a father of the people, sincerely on the opening of the first Carpatho-Ukrainian Soim and on the occasion of this joyous for all Ukrainians wave to express my wishes for even greater success, even greater victory”\textsuperscript{435}. Galicians, who were a part of the organization “Young Ukraine”, on March 5, 1939 wrote from Paris: “Good luck to you, God, Stoncutters of Transcarpathia! You start a work on the great day of Shevchenko’s anniversary. The spirit of our Prophet will bless you for the work of building of a “free, new family”, and every Ukrainian heart will share with you the happiness and joy of an unforgettable March 9, 1939.

\textsuperscript{431} ДАЗО. Ф. 1148. Оп. 1. Спр. 293. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{432} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 5. Арк. 6.
\textsuperscript{433} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 343. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{434} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 92. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{435} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 5. Арк. 2.
Long live Ukraine!” A bright illustration of the general upliftment that encompassed the Galicians was the greeting letter from A. Sheptytsky to A. Voloshyn.

At the end of 1938 mass transitions of the Polish-Czech border began. “Young people, mostly peasant boys, spontaneously come from Galicia” – V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote in his diary. The Sich Border Guard constantly reported to Carpathian government: “Ukrainian fugitives from Poland have been detained in Sabinow. They ask to let them go to Uzhgorod”. This process intensified after the announcement of the order to create the Carpathian Sich. Lviv magazine “Na Perelomi” (“At the Turn”) argued that “in Sich itself there are many Ukrainian emigrants from outside the Carpathian Ukraine”.

It is impossible to answer the question of when the first such crossing of the Polish-Czech border took place. Analyzing the materials of the Transcarpathian and Galician press, separate archival materials, we can assume that the beginning of illegal border crossings should not be associated with the appointment of A. Voloshyn as the Prime Minister of the Autonomous Government. They started much earlier. This is evidenced in the memories of I. Stebelsky, an active participant in the national liberation struggle of 1938-1939.

On October 23, 1938 the Lviv newspaper “Nedilia” wrote: “Within a few days, attempts to cross the border into Subcarpathian Rus’ began. V. Marchuk, L. Petrov, V. Lesiv and D. Tepa were detained in the Lavochne district”. And already on October 31 the district prosecutors received the letter from the prosecutor of the Court of Appeal in Lviv, J. Khirovsky, which began with the words: “In recent times, there have been frequent cases of Polish Ukrainians..."
being detained for the illegal crossing of the Polish border in the direction to Czechoslovakia, and more specifically to the territory of the Transcarpathian Rus’.

This words were followed by recommendations on what to do in such cases. Not very possible occurrence of such a document indicates that as early as November 1, 1938, the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal reported to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Ministry of Justice in Warsaw about sending letters of recommendation. On the same day, a supplement to the letter of October 31 was sent from Lviv to the district prosecutors. Reports of illegal border crossings began to come from district courts in Lviv. In one of them (a letter from the prosecutor of the district court in Berezhany, dated November 30, 1938) we find the date of one of the first recorded crossings of the Polish-Czech border: “On October 20, they (a group of three Ukrainians) crossed the border near the village Rozanka of Stryi district.”

What was the reason for these illegal border crossings? First, in contrast to the Polish reality, the very existence of subcarpathian autonomy, in which Galician Ukrainians saw from the very beginning a small germ of their dreams of Ukrainian statehood, and therefore tried, though to some extent, to make their efforts to build it. The appeal for cooperation of all Ukrainians, that was made by the Ukrainian Central People’s Republic, published in “Nova Svoboda” on October 21, 1938, played an important role. However, it must be noted that the Ukrainian Central People’s Republic was referring to individual experts, not to massive border crossings.

Considering the problem of border crossings, we closely approach the question of the proportion of their spontaneity and organization. Legal political organizations could not take part in such an action, that’s why only OUN can be treated as an organizer. For the Polish political and judicial authorities the answer was unambiguous: “The data of the police and the Border Guard Service conclude that the

442 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1095. Арк. 8.
443 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 879. Арк. 97.
444 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1075. Арк. 11.
445 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1095. Арк. 6.
446 Нова свобода. 1938. 21 жовтня.
escalation of border violations in the described cases is due to the hostile to Poland action of Ukrainian organizations, which under the influence of international events have recently acted more bravely and intensive against Poland’s interests, and the activity of illegal transition of Ukrainian youth to Transcarpathian Rus’ is ruled by the OUN (From a letter from the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal in Lviv of October 31, 1938)447. However, it should be noted that this statement was a clear exaggeration. From D. Kupiak’s memoirs it is clear that as of November 1938 “there was no official permission for OUN members from the OUN Leadership to move to Carpathian Ukraine”448. In our opinion, the main reason for illegal border crossings was the desire of Galician Ukrainians to contribute to the construction of an independent Carpathian Ukraine. This is what they most sought in Eastern Galicia. Therefore, the element of spontaneity greatly outweighed the organizational and disciplined crossing of the Polish-Czechoslovak border. “The events in Carpathian Ukraine,” recalled D. Kupiak, “caused admiration among all the Ukrainian people, wherever they lived. The people believed that a new period of their history was coming”449.

The Czechoslovak government was hostile to illegal border crossings. There are hundreds of eyewitness accounts when border guards arrested the defectors and after some time, or immediately, turned them back. Also important was the fact that many Polish spies and terrorists who spoke Ukrainian fluently crossed the border. Describing the transition through the Carpathians, V. Onufryk stated that he himself initiated the organization of a marching group of seven people. Later, day after day wandering in the mountainous regions, they reached Subcarpathian Rus’, where they were sometimes taken as Polish terrorists450. Polish terrorists, crossing the border, often masked themselves as Ukrainians. M. Bazhanskyi wrote about the detention of such a group of terrorists in his memoirs451.

447 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1075. Арк. 8.
449 Ibid. С. 68.
The Czechs were really suspicious of border guards, fearing not so much the young men and girls from Galicia as the masked Polish terrorists. Great material about the devastating actions of Polish terrorists is contained in V. Grendzha-Donsky’s diary. Despite the not always favorable attitude of the Czechs to the illegal border crossings from Galicia to Carpathian Ukraine, even among them there were people who were looking at this mass phenomenon through their fingers. These include J. Ruschak, who later resided in Karlovy Vary. Undoubtedly, the fate of many Galicians depended on him to some extent.

Many defectors were detained by Polish border guards and were immediately taken to the court. On April 25, 1939 a Polish court in Sambir sentenced Ivanna Grytsyliak, a peasant from the village of Barych, in the Przemysl County, to one year in prison. It was enough for the Polish authorities to have only one letter from this girl that she wrote to her fiancé. Often Galician youth crossed the border in groups and not always successfully. In Berezhany during the three weeks a trial of 28 Ukrainians of Bobrech and Khodoriv lands took place, 16 of whom were sentenced to between 2 and 8 years in prison. It should be added that it was especially dangerous to cross the border with OUN members. In this case, the term was significantly increased. The groups of OUN members were set up in Galicia, who were tasked with recruiting volunteers and helping them navigate through the Carpathians. It is for this reason that the Stanislaviv Court sentenced V. Melnychuk and P. Ksendziuk.

Y. Solovchuk, Y. Odonii, D. Myketchuk, S. and P. Veredyuk were charged for the same crime. The Polish “district court in Stryi considered the case of Markiyan Kravchuk, Lev Sorochan, Petro Hlushko, Volodymyr Parij, Ivan Dizenko, Yakiv Maksymets, all from

454 Діло. 1939. 4 травня.
455 Діло. 1939. 11 червня.
456 Діло. 1939. 27 червня.
457 Діло. 1939. 15 лютого.
Perehinsk, distr. Dolyna, and Vasyl Slavynsky from Pidnistria. They were sentenced to one year in prison. Such facts are cited by the newspaper “Dilo”. “Nova Svoboda” reported that “...in Sambir, three girls are being judged: Maria Menzynska, Maria Nyzhnyk and Theophilia Jaworska. They are accused for the connections with OUN”. “The court in Stanislaviv,” is said in another post, “condemned the illegal transfer to Carpathian Ukraine of 14-year-old high school student P. Sovij, 18-year-old... D. Demchyshyn for 10 months in prison and M. Kalytyk from Kolomyia for 6 months in prison”. We also find the verdict for members of the OUN Volodymyr Bilaniuk, Mykhailo Klebus, Yurko Wenher, Stepan Zelsky. “Nova Svoboda” wrote about the trial of 35 OUN members.

There have been numerous cases when, in addition to “own” years or months of imprisonment, defectors have also been deprived of their civil rights. In particular, the Stryi court considered the case of R. Kundrat, S. Zavadka, V. Poryk, D. Holovchan, F. Kipash, M. Spalyn, Y. Melen’, D. Kovalev and I. Kishchuk. All of them got between half and two years in prison and were deprived of their civil rights for three to five years. On April 4, 1939 J. Kabarovskyi, E. Lytynskyi and L. Klyn were sentenced in Lviv, respectively, to one, six and one and a half years of imprisonment for hiding and assisting the Ukrainians during the crossing of the Polish-Czech border on October 25, 1939.

In November 1938 in order to avoid new lawsuits, the government of A. Voloshyn issued an advertisement “Against Unreasonable Emigration”, which was published immediately by all Ukrainian newspapers. However, the illegal border crossings did not stop. Other warnings appeared one by one. A similar statement, called “Beware of light-hearted emigration”, was circulated by the Ukrainian Press

---

458 Ibid.
459 Діло. 1938. 16 грудня.
460 Нова свобода. 1939. 7 березня.
461 Нова свобода. 1939. 25 лютого.
462 Нова свобода. 1939. 14 вересня.
463 Нова свобода. 1938. 11 жовтня.
464 Жіноча воля. 1939. Ч. 2.
465 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1089. Арк. 17-19.
Service in Berlin. V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote about such cases: “These fugitives are in danger, because the Czech gendarmerie catches and simply sends them back without telling us. There have also been cases when they have been transferred to the Poles, and the Poles punished them severely.” Among the Polish reports to the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal in Lviv, we can read that “they (three Galicians who illegally crossed the Polish-Czech border – Aut.) went to Pryslip, where they surrendered to the Czech border guards, who sent them to the gendarmerie in Torun, then to Volove, and then to Khust into the military secret service. They were interrogated there as to whether they knew about the organization of the Polish army, whether there were troops on the border, whether they were mobilizing, whether they considered themselves Poles or Ukrainians. They were locked up in a prison where there were other Polish Ukrainians. Fifteen in total. On November 12, everyone was escorted to Volove, and on November 13, they were taken by car to the border and handed over to Polish border guards in Mishkov. From there they were sent to the district prosecutor’s office in Stryi.”

What is the position of the PUN in relation to the mass illegal crossings of the Polish-Czech border? At the beginning the PUN initiated them, then after a while, and especially after the warnings were published in Ukrainian newspapers, it changed its position. “The people of work were needed in Carpathian Ukraine,” Z. Knysh mentioned, “but it was enough of them from the leading and capable units supplied by the OUN from their local and emigration staff, and often from the ZUZ (Western Ukrainian Lands – Aut.). The mass transition of ordinary membership created only a troublesome situation for the government of Carpathian Ukraine in internal political relations and threatened with diplomatic conflicts outside. It became clear and undoubtedly after the fall of Carpathian Ukraine that these two or three hundred Galician fighters more or less did not solve anything here”.

The government of Carpathian Ukraine was dissatisfied with some members of the OUN, their radical mood.

---

466 Нова свобода. 1938. 11 грудня.
468 ІЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1095. Арк. 6.
A. Voloshyn asked “not to make a situation in relation to Prague more difficult, to send cultural figures and all kinds of specialists, but not revolutionary screamers, who had already begun to act on the nerves of the local Ukrainian leaders”\textsuperscript{470}. A. Voloshyn was also aware of the fact that some members of the OUN were actively involved in the preparation of the upheaval, which resulted in the removal of the members of Carpathian government from power. In this situation, the PUN made the only correct decision: to only send to the territory of Carpathian Ukraine military personnel who had extensive combat experience, as well as the OUN leaders. However, illegal crossings of the Polish-Czech border actually came out of PUN control.

Many Galician Ukrainians were also detained by Polish border guards. Thus, among those Galicians who failed to cross the border and fell into the hands of the Polish prosecutor’s office, there were two categories: detained by Polish border guards and handed over to the Poles by the Czech gendarmerie. There was even a separate instruction for the district attorney how to deal with such prisoners: “It is required to resolve such cases as soon as possible. The following issues need to be clarified:

1) for what purpose did the detainee try to cross the border?;
2) in what ways did he get and was he armed?;
3) did he get any help on the road and from whom?;
4) at what point did he have to cross the border and to whom should he come on that side?;
5) was the detainee agitated for illegal emigration.

It is necessary to find out separately whether the detainee belonged to the OUN. Such cases should be reported to the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal”\textsuperscript{471}. In the letter of the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal to the District Prosecutor’s Offices of November 1, 1938, we can read about the requirement of “a thorough investigation, analysis of all the papers found with the detained, personal considering of the cases. You do not need to treat them with a pattern”\textsuperscript{472}. Particular attention was paid to the agitators: “Persons

\textsuperscript{470} Химинець Ю. Тернистий шлях до України. Ужгород: МПП «Гражда», 1996. С. 49.
\textsuperscript{471} ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1095. Арк. 6.
\textsuperscript{472} ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1095. Арк. 11.
engaged in agitation for illegal crossing of the border are detained on the basis of participation in the action organized by the OUN and are criminally responsible.  

After the creation of the Carpathian Sich, many Galician defectors joined its ranks. The Polish authorities responded quickly. In the instructions of the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal we can read: “Based on the reports I received from the district prosecutor’s offices, it can be said that there is an increasing of number of cases in which persons are detained while attempting to illegally cross the border into the territory of Transcarpathian Rus’, trying to cross the border in order to enter “Ukrainian Legion”, created in Transcarpathian Rus’...” “Ukrainian Legion” should be treated as a paramilitary organization... Therefore, detainees should be judged under the law on general military service as Polish citizens who, without the consent of the Polish government, enter the military organizations.  

The Polish authorities have repeatedly appealed to the Czechoslovak government with the protest notes, in which they demanded to influence the government of Carpathian Ukraine, which, in their opinion, contributed to the spread of anti-Polish propaganda. Khust authorities, as a rule, denied it. However, such facts have taken place and they have complicated the already difficult situation of the young autonomous country. In the notes of protest of the Polish ambassador, the defectors of the Polish-Czech border were listed as “Ukrainian terrorists”. On November 29, 1938 a note of protest from the Polish government was sent to Prague, demanding the immediate return of Kostiantyn Melnyk, Colonel Andriy Melnyk, Mykhailo Bazhazaslavsky, Yevhen Kulchytsky, Volodymyr Zabavsky and Stepan Rosokha. The named persons, most of whom have found shelter in Carpathian Ukraine, were wanted by the Polish government for their involvement in a terrorist attack against Polish Interior Minister B. Pieracki. The Polish ambassador complained that “there can be no good relationship between Poland and Czechoslovakia when the Subcarpathian authorities give permission for staying” to these persons. On November 24, 1938 the Minister of
Internal Affairs of Carpathian Ukraine, Y. Revai, and the Director of Police, Y. Biley, demanded from the district governments that “each of these persons should be provided with police care...” and that “these persons should be considered interned”\textsuperscript{476}.

On December 14, 1938 A. Voloshyn, in a telephone message to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in Prague, stated that “the protest of the Polish ambassador is based on incorrect information. Dr. Hryts Melnyk, a teacher at a civic school, a Czechoslovak state citizen who lives in Korolevo over the Tysa for many years, and who, as it has been verified, is not involved in any anti-Polish propaganda”\textsuperscript{477}. A. Voloshyn assured Prague that “no anti-Polish propaganda in the territory of Subcarpathian Rus’ is under way, and anti-Polish sentiment is caused solely by the fact that terrorists are moving from Poland, and they have Polish military weapons and supplies. It is understood that people cannot be grateful and friendly to neighboring Poland for destroying their property and life”\textsuperscript{478}. Such a response by A. Voloshyn did not satisfy the Polish ambassador, who sent a second note of protest on December 28, 1938\textsuperscript{479}.

In another note of protest, the Polish government demanded the extradition of S. Yuskiv, T. Kapustianskyi, A. Melnyk and H. Stefaniv. A. Voloshyn replied: “We have no Dr. Semen Yuskiv at all, but he is a lawyer in Rakhiv and belongs to the local unit there, as a regular man. He performs no function. We do not have Teophil Kapustianskyi and Andrii Melnyk, and we do not know them at all. We do not have Hnat Stefaniv. In Rakhiv he asked for admission to Sich but was not accepted because he is not our citizen”\textsuperscript{480}. In fact, Semen Yuskiv was actually in the territory of Transcarpathia. A lawyer by profession, he was one of the initiators of the Enlightenment movement in Rakhiv. He was noted for his radical views. He considered himself a consistent nationalist.

On December 31, 1938 A. Voloshyn ordered the Director of Police Yu. Biley to make, “within 24 hours, a written report on

\textsuperscript{476} ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 51. Арк. 52.
\textsuperscript{477} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 9. Арк. 2.
\textsuperscript{478} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{479} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 12. Арк. 11.
\textsuperscript{480} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 66. Арк. 3.
whether there were such persons: Bazhanskyi Mykhailo, Alexander Khmeliovskyi, Demchuk Dmytro, Fodchuk Dmytro, Ravich Dmytro, Vretsion Yevhen in Khust, in Subcarpathian Rus’. If they are here, then put them abroad and tell the government presidium about it”481.

On January 2, 1939 Director of Police Yu. Biley informed A. Voloshyn that “Mykhailo Bazhanskyi, Alexander Khmeliovskyi, Dmytro Demchuk, Bohdan Fodchuk, Dmytro Ravich and Yevhen Vretsion were not reported by the local government. So far, it is not found where they are or anything about their activities”482. The Director of Police of Carpathian Ukraine knew that Y. Vertsion, better known in Transcarpathia as engineer Volianskyi, was a member of the General Staff of the Carpathian Sich. His signature was on most of the certificates issued to the Sich Riflemen who had completed the military training courses. This also applies to M. Bazhanskyi and O. Khmeliovskyi.

In the DAZO (State Archives of Transcarpathian Oblast’) Funds there is Y. Vretsion’s request to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for granting him a regional citizenship of Carpathian Ukraine: “Signed as Yevhen Vretsion engeneer-chemist from Prague Polytechnic, born on October 1, 1905 in Vynnyky, Lviv County, lives in the same place, the son of Omelyan and Maria of Banakhy, asks to grant him a citizenship of Carpathian Ukraine on the basis of the promise of a contract law in Khust... This person lives constantly in Khust and is working at an important position in Carpathian Sich from the first days of its existence. Already as a student he worked for the liberation of the Ukrainian nation, for which he was persecuted. When now, with the moment of the uprising of Carpathian Ukraine, new opportunities for work have opened for the nation and the state, he wants to give all his strength and experience to Carpathian Ukraine. And only for this case he asks to be granted this right, which is not now associated with privileges, but first and foremost with the obligations of which the undersigned is aware of”483.

481 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 66. Арк. 3.
482 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 9. Арк. 2.
483 Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 1. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали / Упорядники – О. Д. Довганич, О. М. Корсун, О. М. Пагіря; редакційна колегія:
In almost every daily report of the commander of the Lviv Voivodeship, we can read reports of illegal transitions to the territory of Carpathian Ukraine. The analysis of the documents leads to the conclusion that such transitions were most frequent in January – early February, 1939. Of course, not every attempt to cross the border was successful, but despite the fact that the Polish Border Service was already prepared for such a course of events, many Ukrainians from Galicia still came across the Carpathians. Polish police tried to identify the names of Ukrainians who had already secretly moved to Carpathian Ukraine. Among the reports of the Lviv commandant there is information from a Polish agent that “OUN members L. Koznarskyi, V. Stakhiv, E. Stakhiv stay in Transcarpathian Rus’ and are members of Sich”. As for E. Stakhiv, he was the commandant of the Carpathian Sich in Korolevo.

In order to prevent border crossings, the homes of citizens in Galicia, who were suspected of agitating and assisting defectors, were searched in Galicia. More often they gave negative results, but still the suspects were subject to prior arrest. Thus, in the village Velykyi Vylok, in the Sianky district, on suspicion of helping refugees four Ukrainians were searched on January 15, 1939. The search had a negative result. The detainees were sent to the prosecutor’s office in Sianky. Such actions were carried out until the middle of March, 1939. In the village Tarnava, on March 8, P. Mochko and L. Klym were detained for recruiting young people to the Carpathian Sich. Later, another 15 people were detained, and 2 carbines were taken from them.

Cases of transfer Ukrainians to Poles by Czech gendarmes continued. In one of the documents it is mentioned: “On December 29, in Sianky, it became known that Ukrainian fugitives on the border are sent by Czechs to Medzilaborce, where they pay a fine or they are...
arrested for 1-2 days, and then sent to the Polish border. However, among the Czechs there were those who sympathized with the Ukrainians. The aforementioned document states that one of the gendarmes advised them that otherwise they would “ask P. Lopata or V. Sushko, who live in Kalinov (Slovakia – Aut.), and who will direct them to the territory of Subcarpathian Rus’.”

Brutal censorship on correspondence with Carpathian Ukraine was conducted in Poland. The location and activities of the fugitives in Transcarpathia were often found out because of the letters. All letters sent to the Galicians in Carpathian Ukraine were revised, and the phrases, which had the least political implication, were deleted. Thus, on January 5, 1939, the “Prosvita” society of the village Saiach Vyshnnii of Drohobych district sent a greeting telegram to A. Voloshyn, in which they wished him “happy holidays and successes in working on the construction of the Ukrainian state”. Drohobych Vice-Governor deleted part of the text beginning with the words “and successes...”. And some correspondence was delayed. This happened to a letter of S. Onydhak from Rudky, which was sent to the “Nova Svoboda” edition of January 12, 1939, with the following content: “Please, send the magazine “Nova Svoboda” to my address, “because I want to subscribe, but I do not know how”.

The Polish authorities could not and did not want the Carpatho-Ukrainian periodicals to be spreading in Galicia.

But still, Galician Ukrainians kept a close eye on the events in Carpathian Ukraine. First of all, thanks to Galician periodicals, sometimes – thanks to the leaflets and letters that came from there. There were facts when fugitives returned to Carpathian Ukraine for several days. In the message of the Voivodeship commander of Lviv from January 11, 1939 we can read: “On December 31, 1938 S. Pinchak, who left for Transcarpathia, was for 2 days with relatives in the village Dolzhychi, Sanok district, and then returned to Jawornyk. That same way D. Karlytskyi and S. Karlytskyi were in the

488 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 498. Арк. 8.
489 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 498. Арк. 5.
490 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 498. Арк. 20.
491 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 498. Арк. 72.
village Pryluky for several days.” Another source of information about the events in Carpathian Ukraine for Galician Ukrainians was a separate, small-scale edition devoted to the history and culture of Transcarpathia, which began to appear in large numbers in Lviv in late 1938 – early 1939.

However, undoubtedly, the Polish authorities were most disturbed by the continuous illegal crossing of the Polish-Czech border. Today, it is difficult to determine the exact number of defectors. An analysis of the documents of the Court of Appeal of only one Lviv Voivodeship shows that in December 1938 the Polish police bodies identified the names of 35 Galicians who had fled to Carpathian Ukraine, in January 1939 – more than 80. There were also cases of illegal transitions that were not recorded. The last attempt to cross the border in the reports of the commandant of the Lviv Voivodeship is dated March 10, 1939.

It is interesting that the trials over defectors of the Polish-Czech border did not stop after the tragedy of Carpathian Ukraine. The new arrests and lawsuits that took place in Galicia became an echo of the Carpatho-Ukrainian events. At the end of March 1939, arrests were made among those few Sich Riflemen who returned to Poland after the tragedy of Carpathian Ukraine. So, on March 25 in the village Sokolyky of Turka County, three Ukrainians, who were crossing the Polish-Czech border illegally, were detained. The lawsuits were preceded by a lengthy investigation. The sentence to the detained A. Khomiosiak, B. Prokop and M. Levytskyi was announced only on April 28, 1939. In the Funds of the Central State Historical Archive in Lviv there are letters from the district prosecutor in Berezhany to the Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal in Lviv about the course of the investigation, the content of the interrogations and the sentence itself. Three types of punishment were applied to prisoners:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1938</td>
<td>Polish police bodies identified the names of 35 Galicians who had fled to Carpathian Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1939</td>
<td>More than 80 Galicians were identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 10, 1939</td>
<td>Last attempt to cross the border in the reports of the commandant of the Lviv Voivodeship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25</td>
<td>Three Ukrainians were detained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 28, 1939</td>
<td>Sentence was announced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

492 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 498. Арк. 38.
493 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 498. Арк. 12-110.
494 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 499. Арк. 50.
495 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 499. Арк. 128.
496 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1095. Арк. 2, 6.
497 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 1095. Арк. 2, 6, 10.

124
imprisonment, loss of civil rights, police surveillance\textsuperscript{498}. Usually, prisoners were sentenced to a term of six months to eight years. Among the sentences are the following: agitation for crossing the border, assistance in crossing the border, attempts to cross the border, illegal stay in Carpathian Ukraine\textsuperscript{499}. The list of convicts from April 1 to June 30, 1939 for belonging to the OUN, compiled by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Court of Appeal in Lviv, contains the names of 24 Ukrainians whose sentences are related to the illegal crossing of the Polish-Czech border\textsuperscript{500}. Giving an assessment to the Carpathian Sich, P. Stercho noted that in its development “our brothers from Galicia, Bukovyna, Volyn, Chelm Land and Lemkivshchyna, in particular members of the OUN, were an important factor”\textsuperscript{501}.

Galicians took an important part in the defense of Carpathian Ukraine. Vasyl Boychuk, Tymko Prots, Vasyl Sabliuk, Zenon Kossak (Tarnavskyi), Stepan Fihura, Ivan Mykhailiuk, Moniuk, Dulka, Kushnir, Meleshko, Orlovych and many others were killed during the fights or were tortured. Colonel M. Kolodzinskyi, who acted as the last Chief of Staff, refused to accept the Hungarian ultimatum to end the fight. “There is no word “capitulation” in the dictionary of the Ukrainian nationalist. A stronger enemy can defeat us in the battle, but he can never put us on our knees!” – such was M. Kolodzinskyi’s answer. After a fight with the Horthy’s soldiers in Krasne Pole on March 15, 1939, he and his comrade Z. Kossak-Tarnavsky retreated towards Solotvyno.

So, M. Kolodzinskyi (Colonel Huzar) is the most legendary figure in this segment of Transcarpathian history\textsuperscript{502}. He was born on July 26, 1902 in the village Potochyska of Horodenka district, Stanislaviv region, in a peasant family. He graduated from the Kolomyia Gymnasium (1924), the Faculty of Law of the University of Lviv and

\textsuperscript{498} ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 499. Арк. 8.
\textsuperscript{499} ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 499. Арк. 2.
\textsuperscript{500} ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 499. Арк. 2-21.
\textsuperscript{501} Стерчо П. Карпато-Українська держава: З історії визвольної боротьби карпатських українців у 1919–1939 роках. Торонто, 1965. С. 98.
\textsuperscript{502} Вегеш М. Полковник Михайло Колодзінський-Гузар у Карпатській Україні. Визвольний шлях. Кн.8. 1993. С.955-957.
the Officer’s School of the Polish Army (1928). From 1922 he was a member of the Ukrainian Military Organization, and later – a military referent of the first Regional Executive in Western Ukrainian Lands (1929). In January 1932 M. Kolodzinskyi was arrested in Lviv by the Polish police for speaking to the youth with a lecture “Nationalists and Military Education” and had been in prison for over a year. Thanks to published works “Ukrainian military doctrine”, “Military situation and strategic importance of Transcarpathia”, “Ivan Bohun”, “Polish uprising of 1863”, “Railway communication in the USSR”, “Struggle of the Italians for independence and unity”, “Partisan war” he has established himself as one of the prominent military theorists in Europe.

The military-theoretical works of M. Kolodzinskyi proved that a military theorist appeared in Ukraine, before whom a good military career was opening. M. Kolodzinskyi was one of the first to appear in Transcarpathia and was included into the General Staff of the Carpathian Sich. V. Grendzha-Donsky called Colonel M. Kolodzinskyi (Huzar) “the brain of Sich”. And he really was. Of the large number of emigrants from Carpathian Ukraine, the eyewitnesses collected the best memories first of all about Huzar. “His high figure has always been impressive to me,” V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote, “now I just adore him. Although he walks in civilian clothes, it is immediately evident that he is a warrior… He breaks hatred against enemies, his calm, balanced face is the expression of a brave soul, those firm features reflect boundless, undaunted courage…”

Simultaneously with M. Kolodzinskyi, the Ukrainian political and military figure Zenon Kossak came to Transcarpathia. He was born on April 1, 1907 in Drohobych, now Lviv oblast’. While studying at a

local gymnasium, he was elected chairman of the “Organization of Higher Classes of Ukrainian Gymnasiums”. In 1926-1928 he studied at the Law Faculty of Lviv University, actively cooperating with such editions as “Student Bulletin”, “Lviv Scientific Bulletin”, “Bulletin”. Z. Kossak passed the way from a member of the Leadership of the Union of the Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (1928), a member of the OUN (1929), a referent of the OUN Regional Executive in Western Ukraine (1929) to a deputy of combatant R. Shukhevych (1930). The UVO combat group in Drohobych, created by him, organized a number of terrorist acts against individual representatives of the Polish authorities in Boryslav, Truskavets and Horodenka (1931-1932). In June 1933 a Polish court sentenced Z. Kossak to 7 years in prison for his activities in the OUN. His final sentence was announced on January 31, 1934 in Lviv – 8 years in prison including the investigation period. He served his sentence in the prisons of Lviv and Wronki (Poznan Voivodeship of Poland), where he completed the work “44 Rules of Life of a Ukrainian Nationalist” (1934-1938). Also important is the fact that Z. Kossak participated in the development of escape plan of S. Bandera from prison in Wronki in June-September 1938, which resulted in his arrest and detention until the end of November 1938.\(^{506}\).

Z. Kossak arrived in Carpathian Ukraine in December 1938 and operated under the pseudonym Tarnavskyi. In the Carpathian Sich he was assigned the rank of lieutenant. Throughout the existence of Carpathian Ukraine, Z. Kossak headed the sub-department of ideology in the department of press and propaganda, headed by

V. Komarynskyi, as an ideological referent he was publishing in the newspaper “Nova Svoboda”. He conducted direct military training in the Carpathian Sich: he was an instructor in the undergraduate courses, as well as in the women’s departments of medicine and secret service. It was on the initiative of Z. Kossak on February 19, 1939 that the Second Sich Congress was held in Khust.

During the bloody clashes of March 13-14, 1939 between the Sich and the Czech army, M. Kolodzinskyi defended the Sich hotel. He stopped the resistance only after the order of A. Voloshyn. Participant in the fights, Galician Levko Kris, described the last moments of resistance: “Two minutes later they saw the white flag again on the other side and went with it: Prevuznyk – Minister of Internal Affairs and Slovak Lieutenant Commander Parchani. Ours let them come to the barricade and they stated that it was Mr. Prime Minister’s desire to lay down their weapons. The commander of the defense (M. Kolodzinskyi – Aut.) said that we do not give weapons for the enemies. Then they began to persuade us that there was no point in defending, because in a short time they would kill us like mice. The commandant’s response was: “No one will forbid us to die heroically!””. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr Perevuznyk, said that Mr. Prime Minister is talking to Prague on the telephone and that difficult times are coming for our people and that there is no sence to put our lives heroically here, in a minute they would be needed in another place... When I came to Prime Minister’s room, I put my revolver on the table and said that I can only give my weapon to him, and to no one else. He ordered all the Sich Riflemen to lay down the weapons that the Riflemen had and carry it to his house.”

M. Bazhansky described the above mentioned events interestingly. He did not hide that “at night from March 13 to March 14, the Carpathian Sich Riflemen prepared an uprising”. As mentioned above, M. Bazhanskyi most often saw A. Voloshyn these days. From his memoirs it is clear that M. Kolodzinskyi was not permanently in the hotel. “President Avgustyn Voloshyn negotiated with the Czechs,” wrote M. Bazhanskyi. “Father of the Carpathian people, as

he was called at that time, didn’t want the blood of young people to be spilled. He was driving in the car with Colonel Kolodzinskyi from one Czech government building to another. From gendarmerie to military command. Truce was finally concluded. The Czechs had to release all those arrested, had to hand over all governments, barracks and weapons. However, the Czechs did not fulfil the agreement in all localities. In part, this was only done by General Svatek on his own in Svalyava region\textsuperscript{509}. As a result of the fighting, both sides suffered casualties, many people were injured. In literature there are some differences concerning this issue. The authors give different accounts of the number of dead during the fighting of March 13–14, 1939. Although the information is different, it is known that the Sich Riflemen were killed far more than the Czech soldiers. According to V. Kerechanyn’s estimates, 40 riflemen were killed and 50 were injured\textsuperscript{510}.

\textsuperscript{509} Ibid. С. 89.

It is necessary to agree with the modern researcher V. Fedyna that there is no reliable information about the further fate of M. Kolodzinskyi, since none of the people in his department escaped. In the memoirs of staff officers and Sich Riflemen it was noted that the last time Kolodzinskyi was seen before the departure of the main Sich forces, and the authors’ information about the further fate of Huzar’s department coincides with the official Hungarian reports. V. Fedyna shares the opinion of M. Bazhanskyi, who noted that it is very difficult to believe that Kolodzinskyi accepted death on his feet, when he was unable to walk. As for the photographs, they were not expressive enough to claim that those were really Kolodzinskyi and Kossak. As for the Sich Riflemen, their names were given quite illiterately, and in some cases were not true. According to him, there was a fierce fight between Colonel Huzar’s department and the Hungarians, who were “just tortured animalily”, and all this information was disseminated in order to reassure the Hungarian population and not to come up with the truth that hundreds of “valiant” honveds could not defeat 15 tired and wounded Sich Riflemen511.

I. Stebelsky tried to find out the fate of his fellow-countrymen, who had previously left Carpathian Ukraine. He learned about them only in the summer of 1939, when the former Khust Sich Riflemen arrived in the Austrian Alps for training in the ranks of the anti-Polish legion, which was forming there. “I learned from them,” I. Stebelsky wrote, “that Mykhailo Andrushkiv ("Hanzio") was killed by a Hungarian machine gun during the defense of the General Command of the “Carpathian Sich”. The day before, a brave Burun fell from the Czech machine-gun. The survivals of the Sich Riflemen, retreating with the fights from Khust controlled by the Hungarians, just as usual

in such a desperate situation, in chaos and in a panic due to the difference of views, divided into three groups and retreated in different directions. The strongest group – with centenarians S. Sulatitskyi and Volianskyi – retreated to Velyky Bychkiv in the direction of Romania. The second, weaker one – led by Colonel Mykhailo Kolodzinskyi, our countryman Zenko Kossak – departed to the north in the wide Carpathian Mountains. Dorko Lata and Mykola Andrushkiv also retreated along with this group. The fate of this group is completely unknown because none of them survived. It is speculated that it was trapped in a Hungarian ambush and the survivors were passed on to the Poles who shot them at the border.

The fate of the third, smallest, group consisting of Romko Tatarskyi and Vlodko Andrushkiv, had to retreat northwestward toward Slovakia. No one could say what happened to it. In 1940 I learned that they had both fallen into Polish hands and been locked in a concentration camp in the Bereza Kartuska, from which, miraculously, thanks to the German-Polish War, they were released. Both returned home, where they were caught by the Bolsheviks, who at that time have occupied our western Ukrainian lands. By some miracle, I do not know exactly, Romko Tatarskyi escaped, and Vlodko Andrushkiv, apparently mainly due to his stay in Carpathian Ukraine, was soon arrested by the NKVD and disappeared forever.\(^{512}\)

About the terrible crimes of the terrorist group “Sabot Chopot” in the village Yasinia was told by witness Danylo Popiuk, a cemetery keeper: “In 1939, before the Hungarian invaders, a terrorist group was organized in the village of Yasinia..., which together with Hungarian terrorists took 18 Ukrainians, including 4 women, by car to the passover. Their hands were tied with barbed wire, their eyes were gouged out, ears, noses cut off, fingernails ripped, their tongues cut off and their feet were sawed in three places. Those, who were weak, died during the abuse, and those, who were still alive, were then killed and I was ordered to bury them in the ground... Three days later I was sent to bury another 8 men, also killed on the passover.\(^{513}\)
In Volove, Hungarian terrorists shot five patriots led by local Sich commander Stepan Fihura. Eyewitnesses said they found a bloody shirt under the straw hat of S. Fihura, in which there were blood clots. The villagers stated that it was a shirt of S. Fihura. Horthy’s supporters, after executing the death sentence, returned back in high spirits: there was something to take. They cut off a finger with a wedding ring from one of the killed and knocked out the golden teeth from another one\[514\]. Hungarians shot Lieutenant F. Tatsynets and four Galicians in the Soimy Forest near Volove\[515\].

Recently, in the historical literature there are often statements that there were numerous conflicts between the Transcarpathians and the Galicians. Such a statement is advantageous for researchers standing in Ruthenian positions, trying to prove the Transcarpathian separate identity. M. Makara in his monograph, which has nothing to do with the coverage of historical processes in Transcarpathia on the eve of World War II, wrote that in 1938-1939, “the local statehood was designed and dictated from Berlin by the hands of nationalist emigration, the efforts of which transformed the autonomous Subcarpathian Rus’ into Carpathian Ukraine, which, without the knowledge of the majority of the population, was to become the “germ of an independent united Ukraine” under the slogans of national idea (“nation above all”), national exclusivity, messianism, which was an illusory affair, or rather an adventurous one, in those circumstances\[516\]. He is supported by I. Pop, calling Carpathian Ukraine “the provincial theatrical scene of the Romantic era”\[517\].

V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote in his diary “Happiness and grief of Carpathian Ukraine”: “Whispers about some conflicts in “Carpathian Sich” continue, but this is not true. It is true that there are small misunderstandings between us – autochthons and Galicians, for the very reason that the Galicians have been in a very radical way against

\[514\] Вегеш М.М., Горват Л.В. Карпатська Україна 1938–1939 років в портретах.

\[515\] Ibid. С. 43-44.


Poland, and we are trying to slow them down a bit. The Galicians would like to cause an incident, hoping that Germany would intervene in it and release Galicia. But this is a gambling game, we can lose Carpathian Ukraine as well, and nothing will happen with Galicia... Little Carpathian Ukraine will not release Western Ukraine, it will not be able to release, then what is the reason for such a dangerous neighbor to touch...”

Particularly appalling are the testimonies of the execution of the riflemen in 1939, when the defenders of Carpathian Ukraine acquired the status of prisoners. One of the places of mass executions of the riflemen can be called Veretsky Pass. Witnesses to those tragic events prove that the mass executions were carried out by both Hungarian and Polish troops. Thus, one of the witnesses F. Holianych said that after the Hungarians handed over hundreds of captured Sich Riflemen (mostly Galicians) to the Polish military, they had been shot the next day. Hundreds and hundreds of bodies of defenders of Carpathian Ukraine have been found at other places. Many Galicians were shot by Poles after the defeat of Carpathian Ukraine. Six unknown patriots, whose names have not yet been found out, were shot on Verechansky Pass. A contemporary Ukrainian researcher, H. Demian, wrote that “four boys, who were returning from Transcarpathia sometime in late March 1939, were killed by Poles in

---

Eyewitness and active participant in the defense of Carpathian Ukraine, M. Chyrskyi told about the execution of 44 Galicians.

On March 16, 1939, the Hungarian troops marched on the Polish border in the Beskyd region, and on March 19, the Hungarian and Polish troops marched near Sianky and Vorokhta. During the aggression, Hungarian planes scattered “greeting leaflets” near the Polish border, which ended with the words: “Let Poland and Hungary live forever”. And what happened in Galicia? Ukrainian political parties, which had representatives in the Polish Senate, tried to cast their votes in defense of Carpathian Ukraine. On March 17, 1939 Senator Tvordnian (UNDO), on behalf of the UPR, tried to make a statement about the events in Carpathian Ukraine, but “the speaker was not given a word”. After the fall of Carpathian Ukraine, mourning services in the churches were held throughout Galicia. On March 18, the St. George’s Cathedral in Lviv held a prayer service for the fallen Sich Riflemen, attended by about 400 people. After the church service there was a meeting under the slogans “Get away with the Magyars”, “Get away with the Poles”. The police dispersed the demonstrators. District Attorney of Stanislav in his report informed about these measures on April 18, 1939.

Thus, the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia with great enthusiasm met the news of the granting of autonomous rights to Transcarpathia, and subsequently the proclamation of an independent Carpatho-Ukrainian state. Their support for the national liberation competitions of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians resulted in numerous demonstrations and protests against the expansionist plans of Poland and Hungary to create a common border. Starting in October 1938, the illegal crossing of the Polish-Czech border by young men and women of Galicia to Carpathian Ukraine began. For the most part, they were

---

522 Ibid.
524 Діло. 1939. 17 березня.
525 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 499. Арк. 99.
526 Діло. 1939. 19 березня.
527 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 499. Арк. 89.
528 ЦДІАУ у Львові. Ф. 205. Оп. 1. Спр. 879. Арк. 177.
spontaneous. The OUN and its Leadership have taken a vague position on the need to cross the border. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the OUN leaders did not believe in the victory of the idea of an independent Ukraine in the Carpathians. It was at the end of the 1930s that there was a split in the Ukrainian Nationalist Leadership, which is why, as a rule, members of the OUN of Melnyk’s wing appeared in Carpathian Ukraine. Galician Ukrainians were in great danger when they were crossing the border. They could have been detained by Polish border guards or turned back by Czechoslovakian. In any case, the Galician youth appeared in a Polish court. Archival documents show that the Polish government closely followed the events, was well informed, often addressing the Czechoslovak government with notes of protest. In the vast majority of cases, the Ukrainian authorities stated that the Polish notes were untrue and had no grounds. The authorities of Czechoslovakia have ambiguously treated those who crossed the border. There were both a favorable attitude and the extradition of Galicians to the Poles. The vast majority of Galician Ukrainians actively participated in the development of Carpathian Ukraine, joining the ranks of the Carpathian Sich. Illegal border crossings continued until early March 1939, and lawsuits in Poland over defectors took place during April-June. The illegal crossings of the Polish-Czech border by the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1938-1939 testified to their solidarity with the national liberation struggle of the Transcarpathians.
PART 6.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT OF CARPATHIAN UKRAINE
BY THE ORGANIZATIONS OF UKRAINIAN EMIRATION

In the late 1930s, about 55 million Ukrainians lived in different countries of the world. “Most of them live behind our Carpathians,” “Nova Svoboda” reported, “in addition to Subcarpathia Ukrainians live on different lands, including: 41 million in Great Ukraine (UkrSSR), 8 1/2 million in Galicia (Poland), 650 thousand in Czechoslovakia, 2 1/2 million – in Bukovina and Bessarabia (Romania), 1 million – in the USA, 300 thousand – in Canada”\(^{529}\).

After 1925, the centers of Ukrainian emigration in Europe finally crystallized. “Prague took first place, followed by Warsaw, and Vienna lost its meaning. New centers are emerging: Berlin and Paris. Weaker clusters of Ukrainian emigration are in Romania, Bulgaria, Belgium, Switzerland, England, Italy, Turkey, Latvia, Finland. Ukrainian emigration to Poland and France takes the first position”\(^{530}\).

Since the 80’s of the XIX century Galician and Transcarpathian peasants migrated overseas. “Ukrainians or persons of Ukrainian descent before the war (WWII – Aut.) were roughly divided in America between its various countries: the United States of America – 700-800 thousand, Canada – 300-400 thousand, Brazil – 50-60 thousand, Argentina – 50 thousand, other US countries – 10–20 thousand”\(^{531}\). The above statistical material shows that the Ukrainian diaspora in quantitative terms was a significant force, from which the future of Carpathian Ukraine also belonged. On this basis, it is not surprising that the government of A. Voloshyn, who was in a difficult position, appealed to Ukrainians in foreign countries for help. It should be noted that “a great amount of working emigrants

---

\(^{529}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 28 серпня.

\(^{530}\) Баран С. Українська еміграція між двома світовими війнами. Єнциклопедія Українознавства, Загальна частина. Т.2. К., 1995. С. 572.

and their leaders sincerely and honestly wished their fellow countrymen a happy, free development, liberation from centuries-old alien enslavement, in every possible way supported their struggle for autonomy and political independence. At the same time, among the emigrants there were those who, expressing minority interests, were involved in different political intrigues around Transcarpathia, pursued anti-popular activities and, by blocking themselves with reactionary forces in the “old world”, led our region to the tragedy on the eve of World War II"\textsuperscript{532}. These ideas, expressed by the modern researcher M. Boldyzhar, make it possible to state that political events of 1938-1939 in Carpathian Ukraine were evaluated by various organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora ambiguously.

On December 22, 1938 “Nova Svoboda” published an appeal by representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, which proposed the creation of a “National Fund of Carpathian Ukraine”. “It is necessary to take advantage of that great exaltation,” the statement said, “which has engulfed the Ukrainian people around the world. Everyone wants to help us. It is our duty to organize this much needed action and to move it as quickly as possible. Khust has already been influenced by many different plans, and we add one more to them: “Let’s establish a National Fund”. Let us create it today and let us tell about it to the whole Ukrainian world. It is the duty of the whole nation to build Carpathian Ukraine. Let us not boast that there are many of us – let us boast of what we can do!”\textsuperscript{533}.

There were close relationships between the Government of Carpathian Ukraine and the various political parties, associations and communities of 9 countries.\textsuperscript{534}. In the USA Carpathian Ukraine was supported by the “Organization of Democratic Revival of Ukraine”, “Young Ukrainian Nationalists”, “Committee for Defense of Carpathian Ukraine”, “Ukrainian Red Cross”, “Foreign Delegation of Carpathian Ukraine”, “United Ukrainian Organizations of America”. In Canada – “Ukrainian National Association”, “Ukrainian Riflemen Community”, “Olha Basarab Association of Ukrainian Women of

\textsuperscript{532} Болдыжар М. Закарпаття між двома світовими війнами. Ужгород, 1993. С. 74.
\textsuperscript{533} Нова свобода. 1938. 22 грудня.
\textsuperscript{534} Стерчю П. Нарціональне відродження Карпатської України. Організація Українських Націоналістів. 1929–1954. Мюнхен, 1955. С. 188.
Canada”, “Young Ukrainian Nationalists”. In Czechoslovakia – “Committee for Defense of Carpathian Ukraine”, “Central Union of Ukrainian Organizations of the Czechoslovak Republic”. In Germany – “Ukrainian National Union”. In France – “Ukrainian People’s Union”. In Argentina – “Organization of the Democratic Revival of Ukraine”. In Brazil – “Ukrainian Plowmen Union”. In the Far East – “Ukrainian National Colony” in Harbin. In establishing relations of Carpathian Ukraine with the political organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora, the foreign PUN, in particular the department headed by Ya. Baranovskyi, played a significant role.

The Ukrainian diaspora in the United States can be conditionally divided into two main groups – the pro-Ukrainian one, which advocated a federation of Transcarpathians with the Czechs and Slovaks, and subsequently supported the activity of A. Voloshyn’s government in the direction of building a sovereign state, and the second one – the Moscophiles, which often took a pro-Hungarian position. It is not surprising, therefore, that various organizations of the Transcarpathian Diaspora in the United States have differently treated the policy pursued by the autonomous government of A. Voloshyn.

On October 22, 1938 “Nova Svoboda” published a message “Ukrainians from America are protesting” which stated: “Representatives of the Ukrainian organizations in the United States of North America protest before diplomatic representatives of the great states, participants of the Munich conference, against the attempts of Hungary to enlarge its territory with the territory of subcarpathian Ukrainians”\(^{535}\). On October 23, 1938 the American Ukrainian organizations issued a “Manifesto”, in which they demanded: “1) a fully independent state of Carpathian Ukraine, to which Presov and Spis regions should be attached; 2) protest against neighbors’ plans; 3) immediate release of Ukrainian political prisoners; 4) transfer of troops and gendarmerie to the Ukrainian leadership; 5) gathering of Ukrainian troops to Carpathian Ukraine for border protection”\(^{536}\). The governments of all the great states were introduced to the Manifesto. The active support of Carpathian

\(^{535}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 22 жовтня.
\(^{536}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 23 жовтня.
Ukraine has been repeatedly urged by the American priest O. Nevyttskyi: “Do your duty for your people and your land, do not break into different parties and groups, but join to one single national camp, under one leadership”\(^{537}\).

“Organization of Democratic Renaissance of Ukraine” (hereinafter referred to as ODVU), which was operating in New York, has taken on a fundraiser for the Transcarpathian population. Representatives of the Carpatho-Ukrainian emigration in the United States organized the “Committee of Defense of Transcarpathia”, which was later renamed into “Committee of Defense of Carpathian Ukraine” (hereinafter referred to as COCU), with the assistance of the OVDU. It began its activities in such composition: V. Ben’ (chairman), M. Ben’, O. Dankanych (deputy chairman), Y. Haboda, A. Kost’ (secretaries), T. Palosh (financial secretary), P. Ikalovych (treasurer), I. Boryshkevych, Y. Boryshkevych, M. Dankanych (control commission). O. Nevyttsky was elected honorary chairman of the COCU\(^{538}\). According to P. Stercho, “this Committee has set itself the goal to take the troubled Transcarpathian Ukrainians of America out of the captivity of the Magyar-Moscophiles and, by guiding them along the lines of popular interests, to unite their support for the cause of the liberation of Carpathian Ukraine”\(^{539}\).

COCU initiated a number of events in New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, Rochester, New Ark, on which resolutions were adopted in defense of Transcarpathia. At a meeting held on October 9, 1938 in Philadelphia, a fundraiser for Carpathian Ukraine was initiated. The organizers managed to raise 152.50 USD\(^{540}\). COCU, together with the “United Ukrainian Organizations of America”, strongly condemned the Vienna arbitration award. Regarding this event, L. Myshuha, who represented the second organization, stated that “the verdict issued in Vienna on November 2, 1938 by the Divisional Commission on the issues of

---


\(^{539}\) Ibid. С. 95.

\(^{540}\) Ibid. С. 71-72.
The division of the Divisional Commission is a great shame for Carpathian Ukraine and for the whole Ukrainian people. American Ukrainians do not recognize this decision and protest against it.”

Fundraising for Carpathian Ukraine continued. In its February issue of 1939, “Nova Svoboda” published an article “Ukrainians in America for Carpathian Ukraine”, in which it noted that “Ukrainian emigration abroad, especially in America and Canada, is concerned with our destiny and tries to help us. Almost every day the donations that our brothers have collected overseas come to us. It will take many millions to build Carpathian Ukraine and that is why a brotherly help of foreign Ukrainians is very needful”.

Following a regular meeting in January 1939, the ODVU adopted a number of resolutions in favor of Carpathian Ukraine. "One of the most important decisions was to send clothes, shoes and other to Carpathian Ukraine,” wrote University of Minnesota Professor O. Neprytsky-Gromovsky in a letter to UNO leader F. Revai. “The central administration of the ODVU has already sent 117 large packages to Carpathian Ukraine. Some of them weigh 350 kilograms. They contain shoes, clothes, leather and boots and other things. Each package is addressed to Prime Minister A. Voloshyn through the Red Cross. The packages contain approximately 400,000 pieces of clothing. This means that almost every Ukrainian in Carpathian Ukraine will have one pair of clothes.”

The ODVU also organized a company to collect medical equipment and medicines. It was planned to organize mass travel trips to Transcarpathia in the spring.

On January 5, 1939 Ukrainians sent “126 large packages of clothing and footwear to the Transcarpathian population. It is interesting to add that shipping from New York to Hamburg was supposed to cost the lowest tariff of 1680 dollars, but with the help of the American-Czechoslovakian Chamber the free shipping of these large packages

---

541 Ibid. C. 96.
542 Нова свобода. 1938. 13 листопада.
543 Нова свобода. 1939. 4 лютого.
was achieved”544. The government of Carpathian Ukraine had only to bring these things from Hamburg to Khust. “Nova Svoboda” newspaper informed its readers that “soon the second transport with things for our population will be sent from America to Carpathian Ukraine”545. Organizations of Ukrainians of the nationalist movement in the US treated the formation of Carpathian Ukraine as a stage in the revival of united Ukraine. According to them, the Ukrainian state in Transcarpathia “at the appropriate moment will unite with the Ukrainian Great State in Kyiv”546. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia was not regarded by them as something tragic, since “in the place of today’s Czechoslovakia three independent states should come: Czech Republic, Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine. The thing is not at all fantastic – when there are Luxembourg, Andorra and Liechtenstein – and for the longer term, why should the Ukrainian Transcarpathian State not emerge – for a while, until it connects with Kyiv?”,547.

For the sake of historical truth, it should be noted that among the Transcarpathian Diaspora in the United States there were many Russophiles and pro-Hungarian persons who were negative about A. Voloshyn and the politics pursued by his office. The Hungarian government relied on them in their claims to Transcarpathia. It is known that in October 1938 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary handed over to the General Consul in Cleveland 10,000 dollars for revanchist propaganda among American Ruthenians548. We should also add that the government of Carpathian Ukraine did not do everything to ensure that Transcarpathians, who lived in the United States, received immediate true information about the political developments in the country. In this case V. Shandor’s thoughts are worthy of note: “The world is interested in us far more than can be observed in the world political press or literature. Here,
they have a noticeable general tendency to conceal the weight and importance of the Ukrainian problem, especially our neighbors and their allies, who are still demanding the territory of Ukraine. Unfortunately, the world is interested in the Ukrainian problem and knows about it often from alien, hostile sources more than from ourselves”549.

It should be noted that representatives of Russophilism in the United States also contributed to the Transcarpathian struggle for autonomous rights. During the Congress of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians, held in New York in February 1937, an ultimatum was adopted to the Czechoslovak government, demanding the Transcarpathian autonomy in 60 days. This ultimatum was to be handed to the Prime Minister of Czechoslovak Republic, M. Hodza, by one of the leaders of Russophilism and pro-Hungarian position in the region S. Fentsyk550. Significant work was done in Transcarpathia by a delegation headed by O. Herovskyi on the eve of the formation of A. Brodi’s first autonomous government, which will be discussed below. The attitude of Russophiles to the region has changed dramatically since the appointment of A. Voloshyn as a Prime Minister. On January 15, 1939 the participants of the meeting in Ascona declared a protest “against the forced Ukrainianization of Carpathian Rus’ by the current government on the orders of Berlin and with the help of Ukrainian emigrants”551. Participants of the “Lemko–Union” at their meeting, held on January 22, 1939 in Edson (Alta), condemning “the power of Pater Voloshyn”, expressed their desire to annex Carpathian Rus’ to the Soviet Russia552. The All-American Carpatho-Rus’ People’s Congress on February 11-12, 1939 in New York condemned the policy of A. Voloshyn’s government. However, it is necessary to agree with M. Boldyzhhar that “the congress still did not have an “all-American character”, although it represented about 50,000 emigrants553. The open pro-Hungarian

551 Ibid. С. 132.
552 Ibid. С. 133.
553 Ibid. С. 134.
orientation of the leader of the “Carpatho-Rus’ Union” in the USA caused dissatisfaction even among its members, in particular those who adhered to the pro-Czech orientation. On March 7, 1939 there was a forum of this organization in Pittsburgh, which condemned the pro-Hungarian course of the leadership. “Moreover,” wrote V. Lemak, “O. Herovskiyi was asked to leave the meeting room, and I. Pop followed him”554. About the position occupied by the “Carpatho-Rus’ Union” in the time of O. Herovskiyi it was written in the work by P.R. Magocsi555.

On March 20, 1939 a new meeting was held in New York to condemn “Hitler’s agents among the Ukrainian people in America, who, having covered themselves with nationalism, make Ukrainians ashamed before the American democratic people with statements and declarations that with the help of Hitler the Ukrainian people are moving to the creation of their state”556. M. Boldyzhar, who cites this document, is certainly aware that A. Voloshyn’s government had no choice in orientation. As for the resolution he cited, it was adopted after the tragedy of Carpathian Ukraine, that is, when confusion was inherent not only to US Ukrainians but also to Galicians. We believe that in adopting this paragraph of the resolution the participants of the meeting tried, above all, to condemn fascism in general and its expansionist policies.

Ukrainian emigration in Canada has also declared its readiness to help Carpathian Ukraine. Particular activity was shown by the members of the UNO organization. The “Committee of Help to Carpathian Ukraine” (hereinafter referred to as the DCCU) was established on its initiative with a center in Saskatoon. By mid-January 1939, the DCCU had raised 325,122 dollars557. Assistance from the “Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics” in Canada was also received – 7,500 dollars, and with private parcels reaching up to

557 Нова свобода. 1939. 11 січня.
100,000 dollars. In general, Ukrainian emigration in Canada planned to transfer 150,000 dollars to Carpathian Ukraine. “Ukrainian Rifle Community” in Saskatoon has sent 5200 dollars to Carpathian Ukraine. In March 1939 the DCCU in Canada appealed to Ukrainian farmers to help Transcarpathians with grain. In addition, the Ukrainians of Canada held an action “Easter for Carpathian Ukraine”.

Avgustyn Voloshyn, as evidenced by his numerous letters of thanks, tried to personally respond to the receipt of funds from abroad. In a letter to the UNO leadership in Canada, the Prime Minister wrote: “Dear brothers and sisters! Your message from December 8, 1938, to which you have added a check for 1,550 dollars (One thousand five hundred and fifty dollars), has moved us to our heart. Thank you very much for your warm welcome and for such a generous gift. We ask you to convey our thanks to all the donors through your “New Way” authority. In particular, the name of V. Kossar, who was a former colleague in Uzhgorod, made a pleasant impression on me, with his signature below, that he is alive and that he worked one of the first in the Committee. I congratulate him warmly and his dear family. Our young state now faces the most important task: elections to the first Soim. Your sincere help will lead to our future victory. Glory to Ukraine! Your A. Voloshyn, Prime Minister”.

Here are some other letters of thanks by A. Voloshyn for providing financial assistance for the development of Carpathian Ukraine: “In Khust on day 3/II 1939. Mr. Ukrainian National Association in Saskatoon. For the received gift of 1300 dollars – 37992.50 kč. Sent for the development of Carpathian Ukraine”. “In Khust of Day 3/II 1939. Mr. Ukrainian National Association in Saskatoon. For the account received in the amount of 1250 dollars –

---

558 Нова свобода. 1939. 19 січня.
559 Болджиар М. «Карпато-українська Свобода» писала...». Новини Закарпаття. 1995. 4 лютого.
560 Нова свобода. 1939. 12 березня.
562 Ibid. С. 40.
36678.75 kč. Sent for the development of Carpathian Ukraine”. \(^{563}\) “In Khust on February 23, 1939. Mr. Ukrainian National Association in Canada. For the received gift of 1100 dollars. Sent for the development of Carpathian Ukraine. I ask you to take our gratitude. With brotherly greetings: Dr. Avgustyn Voloshyn, Prime Minister. Glory to Ukraine!”\(^{564}\).

On March 3, 1939 A. Voloshyn expressed his gratitude to the UNO Regional Executive in Saskatoon for “assistance to Carpathian Ukraine”: “We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated February 2, 1939 and the Montreal Bank check no. 04388 for the sum of 1100 dollars, and we ask you to accept our sincere thanks for this gift. We support with your gifts the “Sich” organization, which is developing well. The central power has not yet recalled its general, but we have not appointed him and he is not ruling here, even though the 7th week has passed since his appointment. The revision of citizenship will be conducted by our governments, it cannot harm our people. Warmly greet all ours. Glory to Ukraine! Your A. Voloshyn”\(^{565}\).

In early 1939 the holiday of Carpathian Ukraine took place at the largest radio station in São Paulo (Brazil). Its participants listened to the speech, after which “the concert of the artist M. Nemolovsky took place, whose program included Ukrainian songs”. The “Carpatho-Ukrainian Freedom” newspaper, which was published in Prague, concluded with the words: “Although being distant from their native land, the faithful sons of Carpatho-Rus’ and other Ukrainian lands are pleased with the success that Carpathian Ukraine has achieved”\(^{566}\). The Ukrainians of the Far East also did not stay away. Here the fundraising was held under the slogan “Donate for Carpathian Ukraine”. “Nova Svoboda” quoted from the Ukrainian magazine “Far East” in Harbin as saying: “The board of the Ukrainian National Colony Manchukuo has decided to allocate 200 man. dollars to

\(^{563}\) Ibid.
\(^{564}\) Ibid.
\(^{566}\) Болдижар М. «Карпато-українська Свобода» писала...». Новини Закарпаття. 1995. 4 лютого.
Carpathian Ukraine". Altogether, thousands of Manchurian dollars have been raised in the Far East for Carpathian Ukraine.

The assistance of Ukrainians living in European countries was also noticeable. Prague remained one of the main centers of Ukrainian emigration. According to S. Vidnianskyi, in 1939 8 thousand emigrants arrived in Prague. The age of 82.6% of Ukrainian immigrants ranged between 15 and 34 years. Almost half of them had completed secondary, professional and higher education. What about the Transcarpathian Ukrainians, as of November 1938, there were 700 people living in Prague. They were united in the organizations “Prosvita”, “Ukrainian Workers Academy”, “Union of Subcarpathian Ukrainian Students” and “Union of Youth”.

On November 1, 1938 “Nova Svoboda” published an appeal by Ukrainian emigrants in Prague, which emphasized that the “highest and most authoritative body of organized Ukrainian society” is the UCNR (Ukrainian Central People’s Council) in Uzhgorod. The authors of the appeal proposed to use the names “Ukrainian”, “Carpathian Ukraine”, to immediately create a “National Fund” and to transfer in his favor money from all lands where Ukrainians live, to pay more attention “to the process of awareness of the masses of the population. There should be no town, no village, no dwelling today, where there would be no Ukrainian literature, fliers, the press and the lively word of propagandists”. The appeal of the Ukrainians of Prague made a huge resonance in the Czechoslovak Republic. “We must help the poorer, even if we are poor ourselves,” P. Bohach wrote in the article “We can’t leave the people of Subcarpathian Ukraine”, “we cannot, therefore, leave that simple and hardworking people, who are characterized by their extraordinary ability to live and want to save the bare existence with the “rolled up sleeves” and save their families from starvation.”

---

567 Нова свобода. 1939. 11 березня.
569 Нова свобода. 1938. 1 листопада.
570 Ibid.
571 Ibid.
572 Нова свобода. 1938. 21 листопада.

146
At the beginning of 1939 the weekly “Carpatho-Ukrainian Freedom” began to be published in Prague, the materials of which were printed in Latin letters, and in each of its numbers there was a two-page insert with publications in the Ukrainian language. Along with the coverage of events that took place directly in Carpathian Ukraine, there were also their reviews, and the materials on the Ukrainian issue were presented in general. There was a Radio Journal in Prague, which prepared radio programs for Transcarpathia and other countries. Following the appointment of A. Voloshyn as Prime Minister, a Ukrainian section was formed under the Radio Journal, which included M. Rusynko (Chairman), E. Shtefan (Deputy) and M. Ihnatyshyn-Lohush (Speaker). “The Ukrainian section,” V. Shandor wrote, “broadcast seven times a day and ran a rich cultural program. Carpatho-Ukrainian radio programs were transmitted through radio stations: Bratislava-Banská Bystrica-Presov, and they were heard in Galicia. They informed about the events in Transcarpathia and denied attacks of the hostile, mainly the Hungarian and Polish, press and radio. Although the Ukrainian section was not numerous, it played an extremely important national role by only the fact that it was Ukrainian.”

In more detail, the work of the Ukrainian section of the Radio Journal was described by its speaker M. Ihnatyshyn-Lohush: “Ukrainian radio programs from Prague had the following program: news – six times a day, ten minutes each; three times a week – on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays – 20 minutes each, and each Sunday – 45 minutes. So for a few months we read the news at 10.15 in the evening, and at 7 am. I was in front of the microphone. Three times a week shortwave messages for North America were broadcast at 1:00 in the morning. I often spend the night in a radio house where I had a room for such occasions. In addition, every day we had a telephone connection with Khust to get the latest news from there, and when there was an important event – several times a day... For

---

573 Болдижар М. «Карпато-українська Свобода» писала...». Новини Закарпаття. 1995. 4 лютого.
575 Ibid. С. 245-246.
foreign press agencies, we translated in English, French and German languages important news, received from Khust... During the elections to the first Soim of Carpathian Ukraine on February 12, 1939, we had five minutes every day to inform about the election results. Throughout the day, we had a constant phone connection with Khust and we knew in what terrain we had a 98 percent lead in voting, leaving white flags there”

Thanks to radio broadcasts from Prague, the world community received information about life in Carpathian Ukraine. The Ukrainian problem in radio broadcasting was constantly on the top. This state of affairs was of concern to the Soviet Union, which “through the mediation of newly built eight radio stations in the Soviet Ukraine, decided to fight on the air against the Czechoslovak radio station, which is in Ukrainian language and emphasizes the Ukrainian problem. Czechoslovakian Ambassador to Warsaw Dr. Yurij Slavik reported this to Prague”

Ukrainian emigration in Czechoslovakia held an action to help the Carpathian Sich, which “ended in very good success. All gathered resources helped to get 150 sets of uniforms (150 caps, cloaks, sweaters, ties, belts, boots and 300 pairs of linen). The rest of the money was sent in cash”. Ukrainians of Prague, Brno and other cities have collected 100 thousand kč. “Nova Svoboda” published a letter from students of the Ukrainian gymnasium in Mordzhany (near Prague) to Ukrainian Central People’s Council. It ended with the hope that “other Ukrainian children scattered around the world will be responding to your call”. The successful holding of the assembly actions was facilitated by the activity of former UNR Directory members A. Makarenko and F. Shvets, who established close contacts with Representative Office of Carpathian Ukraine in Prague.

“During my activities in Prague,” V. Shandor recalled, “Prague Ukrainians and Ukrainians from all over the Czech Republic frequently visited our institution (Representative Office of Carpathian

578 Нова свобода. 1939. 8 березня.
Ukraine in Prague – Aut.) and brought various projects for use in Carpathian Ukraine. They needed to be considered and evaluated. Some of the projects were very relevant and useful and we submitted them to Khust\textsuperscript{579}.

Among the proposals received by A. Voloshyn from Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia were such as joining Prešov region to Carpathian Ukraine, transfer of Ukrainian Free University from Prague to Khust, opening of Ukrainian educational institutions, etc. We should note that many of them were not within the competence of the government of the region. On November 15, 1938 A. Voloshyn received a delegation from the Prešov region, headed by teacher A. Kolenko. “...We look at Presov as a new center,” A. Voloshyn said. “We will negotiate to get as much as possible for us. We will do everything to win a possibility for you to get where your nature, language and faith takes you. Do not be discouraged, we think and work for you. It is the matter of talks to have the secretariat of state at Bratislava by the time of border decision. We have no candidates yet. I want to agree with Presov representatives in this case\textsuperscript{580}. Delegates expressed the need to open a Ukrainian gymnasium in Medzilaborce.

In 1938 the Ukrainian Free University awarded A. Voloshyn the title of Honorary Doctor of Philosophy. “This is an extraordinary celebration of our honored father of the Ukrainian people for his more than forty years of work in the cultural field, which has now been crowned with great success!” – reported “Nova Svoboda”\textsuperscript{581}. The issue of the transfer of Ukrainian Free University to the capital of Carpathian Ukraine has been repeatedly raised. “Ukrainian Free University,” noted S. Vidniansky, “was founded primarily in view of the needs of inter-war emigration and its leadership considered the activity outside the native land as temporary, being ready at any favorable moment to move to Ukrainian land, where it is most

\textsuperscript{580} Нова свобода. 1938. 17 листопада.
\textsuperscript{581} Нова свобода. 1938. 1 листопада.
needed”. The transfer of Ukrainian Free University to Carpathian Ukraine became impossible due to the unfavorable international situation and the occupation of the land by the Horthy’s troops.

Ukrainians in France were the first to respond to the call by Ukrainian Central People’s Council and the government to adopt “the principle of collecting a half-percent tax from the payment”. In March 1939 85,000 francs came to the “Fund of Development of Carpathian Ukraine” from France. The same was done by the Ukrainian workers in France, who “work hard in coal mines and do not earn much themselves...” On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the ZUNR (West Ukrainian People’s Republic) proclamation, the Ukrainian society “Prosvita” in the French city of Chausee-le-Roi “organized an Academy on November 27, 1938, which collected 33 francs 75 centimes for our disabled people and 232 francs for the needs of Carpathian Ukraine”.

The Ukrainians of Belgium were interested in the situation of the region. “Nova Svoboda” wrote: “Our subcarpathian workers work in the mines of Belgium, where they earn as much as 60-70 kč. daily. There are also people who have lived there for ten years, but everyone is interested in the events in their native Subcarpathia... Everyone said that the “state people” should be a greater lord on their land than they are now”. On November 13, 1938 a welcome telegram was sent to A. Voloshyn from “Flemings- friends of Ukraine, who send the most cordial gratulations on the occasion of the uprising of the Ukrainian Carpathian state. The truth won”. For the Ukrainian from Italy M. Tovt «our biggest treasure is the free Carpathian Ukraine! Carpathian Ukraine is like one chain, and the parts of this chain are us, the Ukrainians. The chain, in order not to break, must consist of all the strong parts. To be strong, Carpathian Ukraine must throw out all the

---

584 Нова свобода. 1938. 14 грудня.
585 Нова свобода. 1938. 6 грудня.
586 Нова свобода. 1938. 9 вересня.
587 Нова свобода. 1938. 17 листопада.
bad “parts” and replace them with healthy, strong and conscious citizens, who would not be subject to any hostile propaganda in the disinterest of our Ukrainian national state. We must unite as much as the parts of the chain are united, then our Carpathian Ukraine will stand on strong feet”\textsuperscript{588}. In February 1939 Swedish journalists visited Carpathian Ukraine, they wanted to make sure that there was “complete order and silence” on the territory of the region\textsuperscript{589}. Shortly after their visit, the Swedish charitable association “Radda Bernek” sent 6 parcels weighing 150 kg to V. Shandor, the commissioner of guardianship of fugitives in Prague\textsuperscript{590}.

According to the Romanian census conducted in 1931, 600,000 Ukrainians lived in Bessarabia and 300,000 in Bukovina\textsuperscript{591}. The government of Carpathian Ukraine has been constantly monitoring the situation in Romania. On the pages of Transcarpathian periodicals we can find information that “the Romanian authorities... these days (August 8, 1938 – Aut.) began to work out the Romanian statute of nationalities. The statute should standardize the lives of the Hungarian, German, Ukrainian and Russian national minorities. The main points of the statute are: 1) prohibition of ruining of nation’s features; 2) free use of the mother tongue in governments, churches, self-governing institutions; 3) the nationality of the child is determined by relatives when writing to the matrix; 4) freedom of cultural organizations of national minorities”\textsuperscript{592}.

“Ukrainians in Romania are pleased with our success” – under this title “Nova Svoboda” published a letter from the Romanian city of Bystrica. “All Ukrainians,” it said, “wherever they lived, have been following the events in Carpathian Ukraine for a long time. Ukrainians in Romania are pleased that at least our brothers in Carpathian Ukraine have gained their full freedom and can live free lives on their land and can make the order which most meets the

\textsuperscript{588} Нова свобода. 1938. 16 грудня.
\textsuperscript{589} Нова свобода. 1939. 2 березня.
\textsuperscript{590} Нова свобода. 1939. 2 березня.
\textsuperscript{591} Нова свобода. 1939. 2 березня.
\textsuperscript{592} Ibid.
needs of the Ukrainian people”⁵⁹³. An important factor in the loyalty of the Romanian government to the region was the activity of the Ukrainian national minority. On October 16, 1938 Bucharest radio reported that “Ukrainians in Romania are developing lively activities against the accession of Subcarpathia to Hungary. This action proposes, among other things, that the accession of Subcarpathia to Hungary could reinforce the Hungarian revisionist tendencies towards Transylvania, which would be covered on three sides by the Hungarian border. Ukrainian action seeks to evoke intention in Romania that would be contrary to the Hungarian plans”⁵⁹⁴. This message evidences that the main reason for Romania’s loyal attitude to Carpathian Ukraine is the threat posed by Hungary’s proximity to the Romanian border.

In Vienna there was a “Committee of Support of Carpathian Ukraine” headed by O. Levytska and O. Hrytsai. After the occupation of Transcarpathia, the DCCU was headed by the head of the regional OUN Yu. Khymynets, and his active assistants were M. Khymynets, M. Pankewychivna and R. Haras. “The first and most important thing for us,” recalled M. Khymynets, “was to accept transport and register refugees. The healthy persons had to be taken to “Schober Platz” in Vienna, where they waited for their work or for the travel to Prague or Bratislava. Ill persons had to be treated separately. This problem became very urgent when in May 1939 prisoners from the Voruloposci concentration camp from Hungary began arriving. Most of them were so crippled and beaten that they needed hospital treatment. I took care of the sick and the children. We were lucky to place the sick and the cripples from the Hungarian concentration camp in local hospitals and sanatoriums”⁵⁹⁵. From the outset, the DCCU in Vienna worked in conjunction with the Foreign PUN and the German Army Main Command. According to the head of the

⁵⁹³ Нова свобода. 1938. 27 грудня; Lidove Listy. 1938. 11 decembrie; Narodni Politika. 1939. 7 Ianuarie; Venkov. 1939. 19 Ianuarie.
⁵⁹⁴ Нова свобода. 1938. 17 грудня; Curentul. 1938, 24 octombrie; Frontul. 1938, 28 noiembrie.
DCCU Yu. Khymynets, “at that time it was almost the only way to send our people out of Hungarian captivity”\(^{596}\). Thanks to the active work of the DCCU members, about 900 people were transported from Vienna to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and 52 children were transferred to the Ukrainian gymnasium in Mordzhany.

In Yugoslavia there lived many Ukrainians, “who, even under Maria Theresa, left the inhospitable Presov peak and settled in the fertile fields of Bačka, in Krstur”\(^{597}\). On July 30, 1938 “Nova Svoboda” interviewed the editor-in-chief of the “Rus’ News” and “Native Word” in Krstur, M. Firak, who concluded that the Ukrainians in Yugoslavia had all the conditions for their national and cultural development. Thus, there were 1,200 copies of the newspaper “Rus’ News” for 40,000 Ruthenian-Ukrainians in Backa, while for the Galicians and Bukovinians living in Bosnia, 800 copies of the “Native Word” were published. There was a cultural and educational society “Prosvita” in Krstur, there was a printing house where these magazines were published. According to M. Firak’s deep conviction, “all inhabitants of Backa are nationally conscious, although they speak a Saris dialect! They are further away from our Saris people!”\(^{598}\). The editorial office of “Nova Svoboda” was outraged by the publication in the Slovak magazine “Slovenski Glas”, which stated that the Ukrainians of Yugoslavia were “put there at risk of losing native character”\(^{599}\). “Although the Slovak chauvinists a bit late remembered our Backa brothers,” “Nova Svoboda” wrote, “we still need to be prepared for an attempt of uninvited Slovak encroachment on our life in Backa”\(^{600}\).

The Ukrainians of Yugoslavia were pleased to hear the news that Transcarpathia had been granted autonomous rights and an attempt by the government of Carpathian Ukraine to lead an independent state life. In the article “Backa Ukrainians to Carpathian Ukraine”, “Nova Svoboda” reported: “The independence of their ancient homeland caused great joy among Ukrainians in Backa. For this reason they

\(^{596}\) Химинець Ю. Закарпаття – земля української держави. Ужгород, 1992. С. 283.
\(^{597}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 20 листопада.
\(^{598}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 30 листопада.
\(^{599}\) Нова свобода. 1938. 9 вересня.
\(^{600}\) Ibid.
want to manifest their joy not only in words but also in deeds, and that is why the Backa edition “Rus’ News”, published in Ruski Krstur, calls to unite for the benefit of the brothers from Carpathian Ukraine. “Interest in the affairs and needs of Carpathian Ukraine in Yugoslavia began to grow day by day,” wrote E. Matsiakh, “together with the US and Canadian dollars, although not in such sizes, but very generously, the Yugoslav dinars also came. Unfortunately, it was not yet finished the collecting when there came the thunderous news that Hungarian riders hit the Silver Earth – Carpathian Ukrainian state. The Ukrainians of Yugoslavia ached for the news of A. Brodi’s betrayal, who was “arrested and there was an inspection at Brodi’s premises in Vienna audited by the Viennese police. The audit revealed that he was an agent of the Hungarian government. Several issues of the Croatian magazine “Hrvatska Strazha” included A. Voloshyn’s appeal to the Ukrainian people. Yugoslav periodicals welcomed government’s desire to establish Ukrainian university in Carpathian Ukraine, and Zagreb Radio noted on March 1, 1939: “Ukrainian case is gaining more and more importance and interest in the world. Carpathian Ukraine is a particular point of interest”.

From the memories of V. Shandor it is evident that he, on behalf of the Government of Carpathian Ukraine, informed the Yugoslav Government of the act of declaration of independence. However, at the time it was a more symbolic act than real politics. The fate of Carpathian Ukraine has been resolved. On March 25, 1939 “Ridne Slovo” made an inscription on the entire first page: “The heroic struggle for freedom of Carpathian Ukraine with the Hungarian invaders”. In the article we find such subheadings as “Bloody struggle with the Magyars”, “Slovakia an independent state”, “Czech state does not exist”, “First victims”, “People’s power and UNO”,

---

601 Нова свобода. 1938. 6 грудня.
603 Нова свобода. 1939. 1 січня.
604 Нова свобода. 1939. 5 січня.
605 Нова свобода. 1939. 3 березня.
“New power”, “Soim declares independence” and “Heroic Fighting with the Magyars”. “Ukrainians in Carpathian Ukraine,” “Ridne Slovo” reported, “fought for Truth and Justice! The enemy drew a sword at us. He will die for this, and we will rise again!”607. In “Ridne Slovo” there were articles entitled “Blood written history of Carpathian Ukraine”, “Students in the front ranks”, “Conscious peasants in the struggle”, “We will not return home alive”, “In Bilky all gymnasium students have fallen down dead”, “Fights of the Carpathian Sich Riflemen in the middle of Carpathian Ukraine”, “The Future of Carpathian Ukraine”, “The Shameful Role of General Prchala”608. There were large articles about Carpathian Ukraine in “Rus’ Calendar” and various periodicals and books of Ukrainians of Yugoslavia609. Evidence of the commitment of the Ukrainians of Yugoslavia to Carpathian Ukraine was the friendly attitude of representatives of the government of A. Voloshyn and ordinary refugees who were forced to leave the territory of the region in the tragic days of 1939. Galician magazine “Women’s Will” posted a short message: “Fr. Dr. A. Voloshyn celebrated Easter in Yugoslavia”610. In this country he visited the cities of Belgrade, Zagreb and Crikvenica611.

At the request of D. Njaradi, residents of the Ruski Krstur gave a shelter to 200 emigrants from Carpathian Ukraine612. As for D. Njaradi, in 1939 he was appointed papal administrator in Carpathian Ukraine and “was characterized by his patriotism, which differed from the distinctive pro-Hungarian position of the clergy”. Following D. Njaradi’s request, Ukrainian patriots in Yugoslavia did

607 Мизь Р. Відгуки на проголошення Карпатської України та її трагедії в українській пресі Югославії. Карпатська Україна і Августин Волошин. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. Ужгород, 1995. С. 125.
608 Ibid. С. 125–126.
610 Жіноча воля. 1939. Ч. 5.
611 Центральний архив Министерства государственной безопасности РФ. Н–17681, л. 11–12.
612 Олеяр Я. Духовни и церковни вязи Русского Керестура зоз Закарпатську Україну, Правшовщину и Галичину. Культура Українських Карпат: традиції і сучасність. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. С. 427.
their best to make the refugees from Carpathian Ukraine feel at home. “My task,” M. Kovach recalled, “was to organize food and accommodation in the houses, and to find a way to support our dear guests further. And we were not wrong. The whole village (Ruski Krstur – Aut.) accepted the refugees as their truly relatives. I was helped by peasants, students, members of society, everyone. There was organized the collecting of products, food, etc… And not only in R. Krstur, but also in the villages and towns where our people lived…”613. According to M. Kovach’s estimates, 189 people, mostly intellectuals, came to Ruski Krstur.

The Transcarpathian intelligentsia in Ruski Krstur was worthily represented by the famous theatrical figure of the region Yu. A. Sherehii, who came at the invitation of M. Firak.614 Ya. Oleyar mentioned that Yu. Sherehii wrote six plays615. For the period from April 23 to June 18, 1939 the theater “New Scene” staged performances “Zaporizhia Treasure” and “Fair in Sorochyntsi”, which “were played for Ukrainian Transcarpathian emigration”616. On August 13, 1939 in Miklosevce, the actors of the theater staged the folk drama of Sukhodolsky “The Cloud”, and on October 29, 1939 – the drama of Yu. Hrom “On the threshold of the baptism of Rus” in Krstur. In November 1939, Y. Sherehii was granted a residence permit in the Croatian city of Shidi. The “Yugoslav period” in the life and work of Yu. Sherehii was quite fruitful. As the director later recalled, he “wrote... another drama from the life of the inhabitants of Backa “Unmarried” and “Pan”, the plays about peasant life in 4 parts... Both were published in “Calendars” in Ruski Krstur and

615 Олеяр Я. Просвітни, шкільни і культурні вязі у прошлості Руського Керестура (Бачка) зоз Закарпатією, Пряшівщину і Галичину-Горніці. Українські Карпати: етнос, історія, культура. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. – С. 363.
Dervent (1940 and 1941)". D. Latiak, evaluating the presence of the “New Stage” in Yugoslavia, noted that “although they did not live for a long time in Ruski Krstur, they left a deep trace in the revival of theatrical life among the Yugoslav Ruthenians”. Yu. Sherehii’s plays “are still mentioned today by older residents of Ruski Krstur”. The famous director also taught Ukrainian folk dances in the Rus’ localities of Backa, Srem and Slavon.

Vienna arbitration has not only struck an irreparable blow to all the leading sectors of the economy, it has, in fact, left the autonomous Ukrainian state without highly qualified specialists. Carpathian Ukraine lost 78 146 (45.11%) of farmers and forestry workers, 31 350 (18.10%) of industry workers and artisans, 17 658 (10.11%) of trade workers and workers of financial authorities, 7 177 (4.14 %) of transport workers, 19 754 (11.40%) of civil service workers, of free and soldiers, 19 148 (11.06%) of others. There were almost no intellectuals left in the country.

This state of affairs has not withstood any criticism. The government of Carpathian Ukraine has made considerable efforts to attract highly qualified specialists to the national economy. The Ukrainian Emigrant Bureau in Carpathian Ukraine, which emerged on December 10, 1938, played a significant role in this case. During the first period the Bureau did a considerable amount of work to find the specialists, who were recruited to work in various sectors of the national economy. The government of Carpathian Ukraine has set high salaries for them. For example, K. Osaulenko from Prague, received a salary of 1 500 kč, engineers H. Rudenko, A. Pasichny, V. Frantyk – at 1 200-1 500 kč, professor V. Melnyk – 1200 kč. After a while, the Bureau “was mainly concerned with giving Carpatho-Ukrainian citizenship to some of

---

617 Ibid.
619 Олеяр Я. Просвітни, школски і культурні вязи у прошлости Руского Керестура (Бачка) зоз Закарпатйом, Пряшовщину і Галичину-Горніцю. Українські Карпати: етнос, історія, культура. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. – С.363.
621 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 32-34.
the nationalist elements. The presence of such citizenship made it possible to obtain Czechoslovak citizenship and thus to carry out their activities freely. M. Boldyzhar believes that “the involved personnel did not have a special influence on the economic development of the region”, which is impossible to agree with. Hundreds of letters were received by A. Voloshyn, whose authors requested the prime minister’s permission for citizenship, expressed their desire to work for the benefit of the development of Carpathian Ukraine. The letters were written by experts from different fields of knowledge, whose fate thrown them beyond Ukraine. The vast majority of the letters came from former UGA soldiers, members of the OUN, who at one time emigrated abroad, trying to escape Polish and Bolshevik terror. Former Imperial Army colonel F. Yuriev, who resided in Germany, requested to be hired in the field of jurisprudence. He had higher military and juridical education, worked for a long time as a judge, investigator, prosecutor. In a letter to A. Voloshyn, S. Fedorov listed all the positions he held during his life: “Doctor of Law, Engineer-Economist, Military and Naval Aeronaut, Colonel of the Kuban Army, of Ukrainian Army and of Engineering Troops of the former Russian Fleet and Naval Office”. However, he did not receive permission to come to Carpathian Ukraine.

On December 10, 1938 a letter from M.S. Pavlenko, who was at that time residing in Iran, was sent to the Czech Foreign Ministry. He offered his services as a graduate of the Kharkiv Agricultural Institute and a land reclamation specialist. “When the country is in need for specialists, I will be glad to come to your permission”, he wrote. A. Voloshyn replied: “We have many unemployed people, evacuation, may be it would be better later?”. B. Teslenko from Kharkiv, who has lived in Iran since 1937, offered his services to the autonomous country. He was a famous scientist. In 1932 B. Teslenko defended his dissertation and received the degree of associate professor at the Department of Iranian Philology. At the same time, he was a corresponding member of the All-Ukrainian

---

623 Ibid. С. 89.
624 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 56. Арк. 5.
625 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 54. Арк. 2.
626 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 56. Арк. 1.
627 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 56. Арк. 2.
Scientific Association of Orientalists and took part in two research expeditions to the countries of Central Asia. Intensive scientific activity did not prevent B. Teslenko to be actively engaged in political activity in the ranks of the illegal OUN\textsuperscript{628}.

Well-known architects who lived in different countries of the world offered their knowledge and experience. For example, Prague-based engineer and architect S. Dzydz published an article in “Nova Svoboda” “Where the capital of Carpathian Ukraine should be?”, in which he proved the necessity that “capital… should be built the way that it would be worthy of that name and to be the pride of the Ukrainian people”\textsuperscript{629}. The author of the article wrote about the extreme importance of the geographical location of Khust, because “the capital is located on the main routes that will connect it with the world internal and external”\textsuperscript{630}. The author of the first book on Ukrainian architecture, M. Shumnytsky, who has lived in France since 1921, wanted to help Carpathian Ukraine. In a letter to A. Voloshyn, he wrote that he would do his best to “make Khust a big modern city”\textsuperscript{631}.

P. Manchenko, a graduate of the Ukrainian Economic Academy in Podebrady, send a request “for appointment to a teaching service in Carpathian Ukraine”\textsuperscript{632}. A desire to work for the benefit of the region was expressed by of V. Akindinov from Podillya\textsuperscript{633}, H. Sholudko from Harbin\textsuperscript{634}, A. Bibikov from Kyiv\textsuperscript{635}. Yu. Horodianyn-Lisovsky actively participated in the fight against the Bolsheviks, and in 1924-1931 he “stayed in the Bolshevik prison”\textsuperscript{636}. It is unknown what his profession was. O. Krasysytsky, who lived in Vienna, wrote to A. Voloshyn: “Following the Viennese happy reports on the events in Transcarpathia, I have a hope again to serve our unfortunate people once again and with my modest powers to take – even microscopically small – part in the

\textsuperscript{628} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 36. Арк. 5.
\textsuperscript{629} Нова свобода. 1939. 15 лютого.
\textsuperscript{630} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{631} ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 173. Арк. 53.
\textsuperscript{632} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 369. Арк. 2.
\textsuperscript{633} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 344. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{634} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 372. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{635} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 346. Арк. 1.
\textsuperscript{636} ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 372. Арк. 1.
resurrection of their rights.” There are many examples of this. They testified that Ukrainians, who had been thrown by their fate into different corners of the world, sincerely wanted to help Carpathian Ukraine at a difficult time. However, in the vast majority of cases, A. Voloshyn responded with a refusal. At Fershman’s request, he wrote: “We cannot accept your request favorably.” Engineer M. Hryhoriev was also denied due to the fact that “there are still no vacancies in the civil service.” Therefore, despite the lack of highly qualified personnel, the government of Carpathian Ukraine made a careful selection of a large number of people wishing to serve the young autonomous state.

Thus, the government of Carpathian Ukraine established relations with many organizations and societies of the Ukrainian diaspora, which organized fundraising, food and provided other material assistance to the Transcarpathian population. Particularly noticeable was the financial assistance that came regularly from the US and Canada, in particular, from the ODVU, the DCCU, the UNO and so on. At the same time, it should be noted that Ukrainian emigration over the ocean was quite diverse. As for the Transcarpathians, they usually represented two camps – Russophiles and Narodovtsi (Ukrainian). While the former supported the formation of the autonomous government of A. Brodi, the latter were pleased to hear the news of his overthrow and the appointment of Prime Minister A. Voloshyn, the brightest representative of the Ukrainian direction in the country. This explains the diversity of approaches to assessing the very formation of Carpathian Ukraine and the policy pursued by its government. Ukrainian organizations in Europe and Asia did not remain aloof. The various “Support Committees” operating in Prague and Vienna have done considerable work. Support for the government of Carpathian Ukraine was reflected in the hundreds of letters that were constantly sent to A. Voloshyn. Their authors expressed a desire to work for the benefit of the young autonomous country, to be involved in its development.

637 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 52. Арк. 4.
638 ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 87. Арк. 17.
639 Ibid.
PART 7.
TRAGEDY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AND CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

On March 15, Hitler started to implement a plan to completely eradicate Czechoslovakia. By the way, the plan of the military operation “Grun” was approved by the German General Staff on October 21, 1938. In particular, it stated: “Solving the issue of the rest of the Czech Republic. It has to be a possibility to defeat the rest of the Czech Republic at any time if, for example, it starts a policy hostile to Germany. The preparatory activities that the Wehrmacht should carry out for this purpose will be considerably smaller in scope than for the “Grun” plan in its time; but they must, therefore, in the absence of planned mobilization activities, ensure constant and substantially greater readiness. The organization, deployment and the level of readiness of the connections envisaged for this purpose in peacetime should be targeted for attack in such a way as to deprive the Czech Republic of even any possibility of systematic defense. The aim is to quickly occupy the Czech Republic and isolate Slovakia. Preparatory activities should be carried out in such a way that the plan “Border Protection in the West” could be implemented at the same time”\(^{640}\).

On March 6, 1939 Hitler decided to finally liquidate Czechoslovakia. “After the planned territorial changes,” said E. Kleist, German Foreign Ministry adviser, “we will have in our hands Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia”\(^{641}\). On March 13, J. Tiso was called to Berlin to meet with Hitler. The conversation was attended by J. Ribbentrop, who later conveyed its content: “My then-addressed remark to Tiso, that it was not a matter of days, but hours during which Slovakia had to make a decision, was caused by the announcement during the conversation of the transfer of Hungarian

---

troops on the Slovak border and in the near future Hungary’s invasion to Carpathian Ukraine, which, as it is known, followed on the 14th of March. It was necessary to prevent a military conflict of Czechs and Slovaks with Hungary. When Tiso returned to Bratislava, the Slovak landtag declared the independence of Slovakia in the morning of the 14th of March. The next day, on March 15, Tiso sent a request to Hitler to take the Slovak state under his protection. This defense treaty was ratified on March, 23\textsuperscript{642}. However, everything was not as simple as described by J. Ribbentrop. The threats also took place. On March 13, Hitler told J. Tiso that his country would be given to Hungary if he continues to hesitate\textsuperscript{643}.

In the same way, Hitler acted with President E. Hacha. “I visited Hacha,” recalled J. Ribbentrop, “immediately after his arrival in Berlin and heard from him: he is convinced that the fate of Czechoslovakia is in the hands of the Fuhrer, and he believes that it is protected in his hands. Then Hacha was admitted to the Imperial Chancellery at night, and Adolf Hitler explained to him that he intended to occupy Bohemia and Moravia. I had a lengthy conversation with Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky, who, realizing the course of events, joined our view. In addition, prior to signing the agreement, Hacha got a permission by phone from his government. There was no protest from the Czech side, and Hacha gave an instruction to meet the German army in a friendly manner. The entry of German troops and the occupation took place without any incident\textsuperscript{644}.

On March 12, Berlin agreed Hungary’s occupation of all Transcarpathia. M. Horthy immediately sent a greeting telegram to Hitler, in which he thanked for the gift, “because this life-giving territory for Hungary... is actually a matter of life”\textsuperscript{645}. On March 14, A. Voloshyn declared independence of Carpathian Ukraine, announcing his decision to the German Foreign Ministry. Such a

\textsuperscript{645} Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 158.
decision was influenced by factors of an international nature, in particular, the deployment of Hungarian troops on the borders with Carpathian Ukraine and the declaration of independence by Slovakia, which testified to the state breakup of the Czechoslovak Republic. “For every political observer,” V. Shandor wrote, “it should have been clear at the time... that in case of declaration of complete independence of Slovakia the fate of the federation was doomed and Carpathian Ukraine could again be under Hungarian occupation”\textsuperscript{646}. The tragedy of Czechoslovakia started the tragedy of Carpathian Ukraine. Thus, the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine began its work when the fate of the country had already been resolved. In a letter to French Foreign Minister J. Bonnet, French ambassador to Germany R. Coulondre said that “Transcarpathian Rus’... has asked Berlin for protection. However, Hitler’s leaders remain deaf to the calls of this country, which has associated all their hopes with them... Transcarpathian Ukraine is occupied by Hungarian troops”\textsuperscript{647}.

According to the plan of the attack, the Hungarian troops attacked in three directions. The group of troops “East” moved to Korolevo–Khust–Rakhiv–Yasinia, the group of troops “Center” – to Irshava–Bilky–Dovhe–Neresnytsia–Svalyava–Nyzhni Veretsky, and the group “West” – to Perechyn–Velyky Bereznyi–Uzhok. Part of the forces was transferred to the Turian Valley–Turia Remety–Poroshkovo\textsuperscript{648}. Due to the efficiency of the Hungarian secret service, Budapest had a fairly clear vision of the location of Czech military units, equipment and even mountain divisions\textsuperscript{649}. The Hungarian General Staff prepared the “Economic, Social and Geographical Information on Transcarpathia”, which indicated the national and age composition of the population, the system of government, the national composition of the military units, the settlements in which the Hungarian language is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{646} Шандор В. «...Читайте нашу будуччину в нашій долі»: Русини-українці і словаки. Пам’ятки України. 1992. № 1. С. 93.
\item \textsuperscript{647} Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны. Т. 2. Январь – август 1939 г. М.: Политиздат, 1981. С. 44-45.
\item \textsuperscript{648} Гранчак І.М., Гапоненко І.С. Окупація Карпатської України військами Угорщини. Нариси історії Zakarpattya. Т. II. (1918–1945). Ужгород, 1995. С. 330-331.
\item \textsuperscript{649} Hadtorteneti Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 18 old.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
used⁶⁵⁰. On the eve of the invasion, a detailed plan for securing the rear of the advancing Hungarian troops was developed.

According to P. Stercho, “in total for the battle in Carpathian Ukraine 12 divisions were prepared, of which on March 12 three infantry brigades, two cavalry brigades and one brigade of motorized units were already concentrated in the Mukachevo-Uzhgorod stretch... In addition, two brigades of infantry were also concentrated west of Uzhgorod, near the Slovak border... At the same time, the Poles were concentrating their three divisions”⁶⁵¹. The preparation and the course of the military operation in Carpathian Ukraine was directly led by the commander of the garrison in Uzhgorod, General Olojos Byldy, under the command of Lieutenant-General Ferenc Szombathelyi, commander of the 7th Hungarian Army. The 12th Bicycle Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ontol Bendy was the first to attack on March 14, 1939⁶⁵².

Hungarian archival material testifies to the great moral uplift that prevailed in military units on the eve of the invasion. Major Ivan Njari wrote in a report to the Hungarian Ministry of Defense on the progress of the “March operation”: “We all felt that a new life was beginning. It was still dark, but a happy day of Hungarian history began beneath the walls of the castle (Mukachevo – Aut.). Trianon swayed. It is symbolic that the order to start the attack has just come. The Hungarian hearts filled with joy when the glorious knight Oloyos Byldy announced the alarm and issued orders... The main direction of the heroic road was to run along the lowland of Latorica to the Veretsky Pass, where the holy millennial Hungarian border was located. Selected Hungarian units were preparing to fight...”⁶⁵³.

Hungarian troops went on the offensive throughout the demarcation line. Despite the high discipline that prevailed in the Czech armed forces, the Hungarian attack was somewhat unexpected for the STOS detachments, although it is difficult to agree with the

---

⁶⁵² Orszagos Levełtar. T. gy, 3095, Nov. naplo, 60/88, 1–3 old..
statement that “the Czech army proved incapable”\textsuperscript{654}. One of the STOS officers reported: “As threats about the capture of Subcarpathian Rus’ by Hungary – which were orally expressed by the Hungarian border guards to the soldiers of the STOS, and which were spreaded in the leaflets – were so many that no one has taken them seriously. Even the dates of the Magyars’ attack were indicated, but they were never fulfilled. That is why no one believed such “news”... At the Rakoshino Company section, a few days before the occupation began, Hungarian officers, accompanied by the patrol service, often inspected the demarcation line between Horonda and Rosvigovo. In November the leaflets were circulated in which the local population was urged to be prepared for the entry of the Hungarian troops in order to occupy the territory until the river Latorica. Messages of this kind were repeated daily, so they were treated as part of a propaganda campaign aimed at demoralizing the local population and undermining the positions of the then authorities of Subcarpathian Rus’. It was illogical for the enemy to announce their aggressive intentions in advance. Therefore, we only responded to all this with increased attention. It can be supposed that the main command did not have accurate data on the planned operation, so events in both Subcarpathian Rus’ and Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Moravia developed so quickly that they became a real surprise\textsuperscript{655}.

The Hungarian invasion has been postponed so many times that the order for an offensive was somewhat unexpected even for Horthy’s army. Lieutenant-Colonel O. Bendy complained about how to go on the offensive when 35% of his battalion’s personnel had only six weeks of military training\textsuperscript{656}. Moreover, such a state of affairs was in the vast majority of Hungarian military units. M. Horthy also drew attention to this in a letter to Hitler. The suddenness of the announcement of the order of attack is evidenced by the fact that “Hungarian troops, stationed in the former barracks of the 36th Infantry Regiment in Uzhgorod, which are directly on the demarcation line, left the building on a white day on the eyes of

\textsuperscript{654} Гранчак І.М., Гапоненко І.С. Окупація Карпатської України військами Угорщини. Нариси історії Закарпаття. Т.ІІ. (1918–1945). Ужгород, 1995. С. 328.
\textsuperscript{655} Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.
\textsuperscript{656} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 28 old.
STOS soldiers on the day of attack, retreated to the bridge, and were there preparing for the attack”\textsuperscript{657}. The close distance to Czechoslovakian positions did not allow the Hungarians to act unnoticed. This was later confessed by the Hungarian Colonel V. Andor, who commanded the 24th Infantry Brigade, stationed in Uzhgorod\textsuperscript{658}.

After learning about the beginning of the Hungarian offensive, General of the 12th Czechoslovak Division L. Prchal appealed to Budapest demanding the immediate suspension of the advance of the Hungarian troops to Carpathian Ukraine. The Hungarian government replied that it was technically impossible to fulfill this requirement. According to Polish Ambassador to the USSR V. Gzhibowski, “Hungarian troops were supposed to reach the Polish border last night (March 15 – Aut.)”\textsuperscript{659}. Ambassador V. Gzhibowski’s testimony is largely confirmed by Hungarian sources. On March 14, the Hungarian army, without meeting strong resistance from the Czechs, was approaching the Verechansky Pass. The advance of the troops, according to the participant of the campaign, “was interfered with by snow, which in some places reached 20-30 cm, but also the fact that we were at an altitude of 250 meters above sea level. It slowed us down a lot because every 7 km we had to stop for rest... Half a regiment reached the pass”\textsuperscript{660}. These losses can only be explained by adverse climatic conditions and a large number of militarily inexperienced recruits. The Czech army did not resist. On March 15, 1939, at 2 pm, Hungarian troops entered Nyzhni Vorota, where they were met by a “group of people... (undoubtedly, supporters of Hungary – Aut.) with tears of joy in their eyes”\textsuperscript{661}. They welcomed the “Hungarian liberation honvédv”. At about 15 o’clock “we went out to Verechansky Pass and set the Hungarian flag. There was an honorable Polish guard on the pass, who saluted us... We intended to engrave in gold letters the names of all who came to the border and

\textsuperscript{657} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 25 old.
\textsuperscript{658} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 27 old.
\textsuperscript{660} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 29 old.
\textsuperscript{661} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 30 old.
took their eternal territory — an eyewitness wrote. This is how the Hungarian-Polish border, which Budapest and Warsaw sought to achieve, was established, though it was short-lived.

The situation on the demarcation line Sharkad-Lalovo-Kolchyno-Rosvygovo-Seredne-Domanyntsi was quite different. These boundaries were protected by the STOS companies “Domanynsi”, “Rakoshyno”, “Kolchyno”, platoons “Pidmonastyr-Monastyr”, “Lalovo”, “Zaluzh”, “Makariovo”, “Sharkad”, which were well armed. The first encounters with the aggressor indicated that the Czech troops were fully combat-ready and ready to repel a hostile attack. In particular, on March 14, between 6 and 7 am, the Magyars attacked in the direction of the villages of Horonda – Strabichovo, as well as the eastern part of the village of Chomonyn... The advantage was 4 times on the Hungarian side, not considering the large number of terrorists. Platoon Commander Zaichek and his men defended themselves in Chomonyn as well as the Senior Warden Volny in Strabichovo, and in Horonda – Senior Warden Radil. The interaction between them was such that the positions were managed to hold on all day long, and only the lack of ammunition made them retreat beyond the Latorica River in the evening.

At about 6 o’clock, the Magyars attacked in the direction of Rosvigovo-Pidmonastyr-Monastyr. The posts and patrols went beyond the walls of the monastery, which was well prepared for protection. This platoon was already on alert as it was aware of the Magyars’ attack in Pidhoriyan. The Hungarian infantry attacked the monastery from the west and south and came within range of hand grenades. They were thrown into it and it suffered great losses. All, who did not lie down, escaped, as a result, the attack was stopped for 2 hours. On March 15, the “Sharkad” platoon, although it was isolated from the rest of the troops, “captured 11 Hungarian soldiers, with a machine-gun fire killing part of the Hungarian platoon (machine gun Vanga)”. Hungarians have suffered heavy losses in the

---

663 Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5597. karton 24.
664 Ibid. Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5597. karton 24.
665 Ibid. Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5597. karton 24.
villages of Lavky, Pistrialovo and Romochevytsia\textsuperscript{666}. The Hungarian troops failed to capture the villages of Dravtsi, Baranyntsi, Chaslivtsi and Koritnyany for the first time. 80 Hungarian cavalrymen who attacked the village Lalovo, were also thrown back. In the Perechyn area, Czech border guards hit a Hungarian tank. Near Nevytske, a small detachment of the STOS organized a circular defense, so the Horthy’s soldiers had to use heavy artillery against it. The fight lasted until three in the morning\textsuperscript{667}.

This state of affairs lasted until 5:30 pm, March 14, that is, until General L. Prchala announced an order to “evacuate Czech troops and civil servants from Subcarpathian Rus”\textsuperscript{668}. Since then, Czech troops have in fact ceased resistance, leaving one locality after another. For the sake of historical truth, it should be noted that their retreat was cleverly organized and disciplined. The situation was further complicated by the fact that on March 15, at 5 pm, appeared the news of German troops entering Prague\textsuperscript{669}. This testified to the fact that Czechoslovakia as a state organism ceased to exist, that is, there was nothing to defend. Czech troops thought of leaving the territory of the region as soon as possible. In Perechyn on March 15, “a Czech officer requested that we (the Hungarians – Aut.) temporarily stopped war actions until 10 pm. It was clear to us that they wanted to win the time. It was important for them not from a military point of view. The Czechs tried to take out more things with them... Of course, we could not accept their request. The attack continued...”\textsuperscript{670}. The reports of STOS commanders indicate that the Czechs burned military documentation, exported ammunition, weapons, money. And this was done when the Carpathian Sich found itself face-to-face in front of the dominant forces of aggressor.

It seemed that the Czech army would not resist. On March 14, 1939, Hungarian General O. Byldy met with Major of the Czech Army T. Melicher behind Mukachevo on the river Latorica. “When

\textsuperscript{666} Гранчак І.М., Гапоненко І.С. Окупація Карпатської України військами Угорщини. Нариси історії Закарпаття. Т.ІІ. (1918–1945). Ужгород, 1995. С. 331.
\textsuperscript{667} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 30-31 old.
\textsuperscript{668} Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5597. karton 24.
\textsuperscript{669} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 37 old.
\textsuperscript{670} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 40 old.
the two commanders saw each other,” the eyewitness recalls, “they hugged each other tightly and shook hands. We have heard that the two commanders were classmates in the Winnerstadt Military Academy during the time of the Monarchy. It was the fact that our further advance did not meet resistance from the Czechs”\textsuperscript{671}. Soldiers of STOS squadrons and platoons departed from Carpathian Ukraine in three directions: most of them through Slovakia, from the Polish border from Uzhok to Volovets – through Poland, and parts, located east of Svalyava, moved through Khust and Tiachyeva – to Romania\textsuperscript{672}.

On March 14, 1939 A. Voloshyn sent three telegrams to Berlin asking to help him defend Carpathian Ukraine\textsuperscript{673}. No answers followed. On the same day, at about 7 pm, the Hungarians handed to the representative of Carpathian Ukraine in Prague V. Shandor an ultimatum, which demanded: “1) to release the Magyars who were interned in Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia); 2) to stop the persecution of Magyars in Carpathian Ukraine and allow them to organize freely; 3) to give weapons to the Hungarian local guard; 4) to make a way for the Czech-Moravian army to depart from Carpathian Ukraine within 24 hours; 5) to guarantee full protection of the life and freedom of the Magyars in Carpathian Ukraine”\textsuperscript{674}. A. Voloshyn’s government rejected an ultimatum. The Prime Minister of Carpathian Ukraine was convinced that the Hungarians had invaded the territory without the permission of Germany. By the way, Prague also rejected the Hungarian ultimatum, explaining its decision by the fact that Carpathian Ukraine became an independent state on March 14.

On March 15, German Consul H. Hoffman handed A. Voloshyn a statement from the German Foreign Ministry, which stated that Berlin “advises not to resist to the advancing military units of Hungary on the broad front against Carpathian Ukraine. In this case the German government is, unfortunately, unable to take care of the defense”\textsuperscript{675}.

\textsuperscript{671} Orszagos Leveltar. K–184, tetel 3733, 42 old.
\textsuperscript{672} Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5597. karton 24.
\textsuperscript{674} Ibid. С. 339-340.
\textsuperscript{675} Ibid. С. 338-339.
The commissioner for German affairs in Prague A. Henke also advised “not to resist to the Magyars, because the German army moves to the borders of Carpathian Ukraine and will fix everything”\(^{676}\). At the end of the day on March 15, A. Voloshyn left Khust, and without ordering an armed struggle, he emigrated abroad. He wanted to resolve the conflict through negotiation. This fact dictated his telegrams to the governments of Germany, the United States, Romania, appeals to all democratic states. His attempts were unsuccessful.

The Hungarian army was opposed by the Carpathian Sich, the leadership of which had some changes\(^ {677}\). In the absence of

---

\(^{676}\) Ibid. С. 340.


170
D. Klympush, Minister of War of Carpathian Ukraine S. Klochurak appointed Colonel S. Yefremov as the commander of the Carpathian Sich. As for S. Klochurak, the order on his appointment to the post of Minister of War has not been revealed in the archives. It is known that on March 16, 1939 the newspaper “Nova Svoboda” published the composition of the government of Carpathian Ukraine, in which S. Klochurak held the post of Minister of Economic Affairs. It is possible that the lack of archival materials is explained by the fact that the situation in the region has changed dramatically and the government didn’t have time to deal with such formalities. Contemporary biographer of S. Klochurak, M. Mushynka, believes that his appointment as a Minister of War was natural and logical. It is necessary to agree with this statement, since S. Klochurak had a military officer’s rank, and during the period of existence of the Hutsul Republic he made considerable efforts to create a capable armed forces. However, in the current situation, it was impossible to save the situation.

On March 15, as the Hungarian troops of the group “East” moved towards Khust, it became clear that the previous headquarters was inactive and they had to start from the very beginning. This also applies to the new headquarters, which, according to the contemporary, “did not exist during the fighting against the Magyars”. The only exception was Colonel M. Kolodzinskyi, who began hastily forming Sich units. According to his order, “units in the strength of one regiment... occupy the position of the beaten road on the Krasne pole (Beautiful Field) and further along the railway
embankment. An eyewitness and an active participant in those events J. Sarvadiy wrote that “about 1600 young men took part in the fight... at the Krasne Pole”. In fact, the students of gymnasiums, who were brought to Krasne Pole by their teacher Ya. Holota. They were unable to stop the advance of the enemy. There was also no reinforcement because the mobilization call came to some districts with great delay. Inhabitant of the village V. Lozianske in the Mizhhirya region, V. Pylypchynets said that only on the evening of March 15, the local team of the Carpathian Sich learned about the hostile invasion. “After a short defense (half an hour),” wrote Ya. Holota, “the Sich Riflemen retreated to the line Kopanya-station and the bridge on the Tysa. Meanwhile, the Magyars were attacking the village of Kopanya. At about 12 o’clock one hundred of Sich Riflemen came from Khust to help and, together with those who were in the line, went on the counterattack. However, they were repulsed, mainly by artillery fire... The main offensive of the Magyars was on the way in the direction of Khust. Gymnasium student V. Poshtak wrote that “the Magyars captured many seminarians. Jud, and ten others. Everyone was shot.”

On March 16, 1939 the Hungarian attack on Korolevo began at 5 am. “I defended my position,” recalled Lieutenant I. Chuchka, “but Korolevo fell at 10 o’clock. The rest of the living riflemen under the command of prof. Holota returned from Korolevo, and I already had about 150 riflemen and placed 15 riflemen, 1 shotgun on the right wing, Rokosovo; 15 riflemen, 1 shotgun on the left wing, a railway bridge over the Tysa (Korolevo), the rest was placed along the Rokosovo-Korolevo railway. The Magyars were advancing very strongly. We were also fired by planes and artillery. I asked for help from Khust almost every hour, and I was promised that there was help along the way... At 2 pm, the Magyars caught us on both sides and I was forced to order a retreat in the direction of Khust... Before Khust I secured the bridges, and at that time I received an order to

---

681 Ibid. С. 31; Жіноча воля. 1939. Ч. 4; На переломі. 1939. Ч. 6.
682 Карпатська Україна в боротьбі. Відень, 1939. С. 140.
683 Ibid. С. 139.
hold for 24 hours. I understood that it is impossible\textsuperscript{684}. The fights on separate sections of the front were described by I. Rohach and M. Chumalivskyi\textsuperscript{685}.

The Sich Riflemen, weakened in the battle, retreated. On March 17-18 the remains of the detachments left the territory of Carpathian Ukraine. E. Stakhiv, a participant in the events, wrote that they were “morally broken, hungry, walked depressed, about 600–700 fighters. They crossed near Maramoros – Sighet in the morning, at 5 o’clock, on Saturday, March 17, 1939”\textsuperscript{686}. The Romanian authorities handed them over to the Hungarians. Lieutenant of the Carpathian Sich, O. Voliansky, wrote that 273 people were handed over by Romanians, including six officers\textsuperscript{687}. Similar events were described by Yu. Khymynets\textsuperscript{688}. However, there is considerable evidence that Romanians treated favorably the retreating Sich Riflemen. The management of the Trade Academy, headed by A. Shtefan, decided to cross the Slovak border.

The published and oral memoirs of eyewitnesses prove the cruelty of the Horthy’s men in the occupied territory. Some of them contain a list of victims of Hungarian terror. It should be noted that there were often significant exaggerations. J. Terelia writes that near the Torun Pass only the Poles shot 3421 Sich Riflemen. And it was made during July 21, 1939\textsuperscript{689}. Such a statement is not supported by eyewitnesses to those events. According to Hungarian sources, in the course of March 16–17, 1939, the Sich Riflemen lost about 200 people killed and

\textsuperscript{684} Ibid. С. 134-135.
\textsuperscript{685} Ibid. С. 121-122.
\textsuperscript{686} Стахів Є. Спогади колишнього січовика. Закарпатська правда. 1990. 24 березня.
\textsuperscript{687} Карпатська Україна в боротьбі. Відень, 1939. С. 11.
\textsuperscript{689} Карпатська Україна – 50. Торонто, 1988. С. 5.
nearly 400 were injured. About 300 defenders were captured. The loss of the Hungarians – 37 killed and 134 wounded\textsuperscript{690}.

Modern researchers H. Bozhuk and V. Zilhalov believe that the total losses of the defenders of Carpathian Ukraine are estimated in the range of 3 to 5 thousand people\textsuperscript{691}. This data should also not be considered accurate because detailed calculations have not been carried out. Search work in this direction should be conducted at the state level in all areas of the Transcarpathian oblast. The search conducted in some regions of the oblast makes it possible to claim that the number of victims of Horthy’s terror does not exceed 1 thousand people. An active participant in the events of 1938-1939 M. Bandusiak concluded that if there were about 150 fighters who died in the fight with the Czechs, and 143 fighters in the fight with the Hungarians at Krasne Pole, then the total number is 293. If we include that there were mass shootings at the border and in different localities, then probably the number of killed is about 1,000 people. Today, the names of 151 Sich Riflemen who died in combat or were tortured in Hungarian concentration camps and prisons are known\textsuperscript{692}.

\textsuperscript{690} Гранчак І.М., Гапоненко І.С. Окупація Карпатської України військами Угорщини. Нариси історії Закарпаття. Т.ІІ. (1918–1945). Ужгород, 1995. С. 335.
Thus, on March 15, 1939 the Czech Republic and Moravia were occupied by German troops, and on March 18 the territory of Carpathian Ukraine was left by its last defenders. “In connection with the tragic events in Czechoslovakia,” the Czechoslovak Ambassador to the Soviet Union said, “I consider it necessary to resign. In my opinion, the occupation of the Czech territory by the German army was carried out by gross deception and intimidation against the existing constitutional order and against the true will of the Czechoslovak people”\(^{693}\). The USSR government strongly condemned the occupation of Carpathian Ukraine by the Hungarian troops. “The actions of the German government,” the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated in the note to the German ambassador to the country, “signaled a gross invasion of the Hungarian troops in Carpathian Ukraine and a violation of the elementary rights of its people”\(^{694}\). President of Czechoslovakia E. Benesh, who emigrated abroad in October 1938, set up an emigrant government in London, which was recognized by the USA, USSR, Great Britain and France. But more importantly is the fact that none of the Allies recognized the Munich Agreement or any other international treaties that in the fall of 1938 divided the territory of Czechoslovakia\(^{695}\). One only has to regret that the insight for the great states came only in 1940.

During the occupation of Carpathian Ukraine by the troops of Horthy’s Hungary, A. Voloshyn and a number of members of his


\(^{694}\) Ibid. С. 428.

government emigrated abroad. “In connection with the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine by the Hungarian troops,” A. Voloshyn said during an interrogation in Lefortovo on May 24, 1945, “I fled to Prague on the route: from Khust to Cluj (Romania) – Temesșuara (Romania). Then I went to Yugoslavia – Belgrade, where I stayed for 4 days. From Belgrade I went to Zagreb, where I stayed for 7 days. From Zagreb I moved to the resort town in Yugoslavia – Cirkvenica, where I stayed for 11 days. Then I returned to Zagreb again and from there through Vienna I moved to Berlin, where I stayed for a month and a half. From Berlin I traveled to Prague in May 1939.”

Y. Revai, A. Shtefan, S. Rosokha, I. Rohach, V. Komarynsky and others also left Carpathian Ukraine.
In the “Personal Case of Voloshyn” there are two letters to the leaders of Hitler’s Germany (Memorandum of the Government of Carpathian Ukraine in exile to J. Ribbentrop of November 30, 1939 and Memorandum to Hitler of July 11, 1941). From the researched materials it is obvious: being in exile, the leading figures of the Ukrainian direction remained steadfast supporters of the unification, doing their utmost to prevent the world from forgetting the wrongs caused in Transcarpathia in 1939-1941. To this we add that A. Voloshin’s emigrant government not only informed Germany about the situation in Carpathian Ukraine, but also offered its own ways out of the situation, which took place after the Hungarians arrived. Thus, in the Memorandum of November 30, 1939 A. Voloshyn, Y. Revai, S. Klochurak and A. Shtefan proposed the idea of unification of Carpathian Ukraine with Slovakia. They convinced J. Ribbentrop that as a result of such a political state union the position of Germany would stabilize\footnote{698}, however, Hungary will have territorial losses. A. Voloshyn and his associates also suggested the technical side of solving this problem. They believed that “until the final regulation of the state status of Carpathian Ukraine its territory must be occupied by the German army. To determine the state identity of Carpathian Ukraine by means of a plebiscite, to decide whether Carpathian Ukraine will remain in Hungary or it will form a federation with Slovakia. All citizens who lived before November 4, 1938 in Carpathian Ukraine have the right to vote. Taking into account the hostile attitude of Carpathian Ukraine’s population towards Hungary, the Ukrainian government is confident that a plebiscite would decide to form a federation with Slovakia”\footnote{699}. The leaders of Carpathian Ukraine did not receive a reply to this Memorandum. As for the Memorandum to Hitler of July 11, 1941, it outlined a plan to build a united Ukrainian state\footnote{700}. German government did not respond to it also. It should be noted that the Government of Carpathian Ukraine has not limited itself to these two

\footnote{698} Ibid. Л.75-76.  
\footnote{699} Центральный архив Министерства государственной безопасности РФ. 11, Н–17681, л.76.  
\footnote{700} Ibid. л. 94-96.
Memoranda. It is known that similar documents were sent to Berlin on May 27 and October 15, 1940, on March 12, 1941. There is no doubt that they could shed some light on the related problems.

On March 14, 1939 the troops of Horthy’s Hungary invaded the territory of Carpathian Ukraine, and the following day the German Wehrmacht occupied the Czech Republic and Moravia, leaving Slovakia as an independent state, but with a focus on Berlin. This development of political events testified to the final elimination of Czechoslovakia. This could not but affect the course of the war actions during March 14-18, 1939. Archival documents indicate that the Czech troops resisted the aggressor only on the 14th of March. From March 15 to March 18, the planned and organized withdrawal of the Czech armed forces from Carpathian Ukraine continued. The real fight, despite the great advantage of the enemy, was given only by Carpathian Sich. However, it was an act of despair rather than realistic politics. The government of Carpathian Ukraine, being well aware of the impossibility of protecting the country in an armed way, tried to resolve the issue peacefully, through diplomatic channels. A. Voloshyn and members of his government had been hoping for Germany’s protectorate. They did not depart from the pro-German orientation even after the occupation of Carpathian Ukraine by Hungary. Their intentions were unsuccessful. The occupation of Carpathian Ukraine was condemned by the USSR government. As for the major European countries and the United States, it was only in 1940 that they recognized that all decisions of international conferences that divided Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938 were considered invalid.
CONCLUSIONS

Autonomous Subcarpathian Rus’, and subsequently independent Carpathian Ukraine, existed for an extremely short period of time: from October 1938 to the second half of March, 1939. Despite this fact, there was such a rapid development of political events in the country that the attention of the whole world was drawn to Carpathian Ukraine. This also applies to the researchers who, at the end of the 1930s, began to study the history of Carpathian Ukraine.

The short-lived existence of Carpathian Ukraine coincided with the sharp exacerbation of the international situation in Central Europe and the emergence of an acute political crisis in the Czechoslovak Republic, which contained Transcarpathia as its part throughout the interwar period. The Munich Conference of September 29-30 and the Vienna Arbitration on November 2, 1938, not only signaled the beginning of the state breakup of the Czechoslovak Republic, but significantly worsened the position of Transcarpathia, to which Hungary constantly raised territorial claims, which were fully supported by Poland. The rapid disintegration of Czechoslovakia was caused not only by the annexationist policy by Germany, but also by the position of agreement of Great Britain and France, which in fact contributed to the aggressor. Romania and Yugoslavia, loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic and Transcarpathia, could not significantly influence the course of political events in Europe. The Soviet Union’s proposals to protect Czechoslovakia were not accepted.

This situation was in favor of Hungary, which was openly preparing to capture the whole territory of Transcarpathia. Although Germany agreed with Budapest’s demands only in March 1939, the Hungarian terrorists, with the support of the Polish terrorists, carried out constant terrorist actions on the territory of the region, thereby destabilizing its internal political situation. Having obtained the consent of Germany to occupy Carpathian Ukraine, the Horthy’s soldiers crossed the border. Without meeting any resistance from the Czechoslovak troops, they occupied the entire territory of the region during March 14-18, 1939. Only the Carpathian Sich Riflemen gave them a real fight, though of course they could not stop the advance of the enemy.
Carpathian Ukraine constantly felt the moral and material support of the world community. The assistance of Ukrainians living in different countries of the world was especially significant. Voloshyn’s government succeeded in establishing relations with many organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora, which organized fundraising, food and other material assistance to the population of Transcarpathia. Ukrainians who lived in Europe, Asia and the Far East also did not stay away. Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia closely followed the events in Carpathian Ukraine. The Galician press on its pages constantly placed materials in which they were in solidarity with the national liberation struggle of Transcarpathian Ukrainians. Correspondents of a number of Galician periodicals in 1938-1939 stayed in Carpathian Ukraine. Their reports, articles and messages were characterized by their emotionality and accurate presentation of informative material. Although, some materials of the Galician press were characterized by idealization, inaccuracies. Galicia’s Ukrainians have been in solidarity with the Transcarpathians, taking part in a number of protests against joint action by Poland and Hungary over Carpathian Ukraine. Archival sources testify to the mass illegal crossings of the Polish-Czech border by the young people from Galicia. However, the mass crossings of the border not only testified to the solidarity of Ukrainians of Galicia with the struggle of the Transcarpathians, but at the same time, they complicated the activities of A. Voloshyn’s government, as he stated ambiguously. The anti-Polish actions of individual, radical-minded Galician and Transcarpathian nationalists, including attacks on the Polish consulate in Svaliava, etc., also played a negative role.

Since the granting of autonomous rights to the region, a large number of OUN members have appeared in Carpathian Ukraine. The OUN members played a major role in the formation of the Carpathian Sich, although they failed to create a capable armed force. Historical documents show that cooperation between the OUN and the German government continued throughout the entire existence of Carpathian Ukraine. Thanks to OUN members, Transcarpathia made contacts with Ukrainian organizations of the world, which provided financial assistance to the government of Carpathian Ukraine. However, it should be noted that the OUN played an ambiguous role in the development of political events in 1938-1939 in Carpathian Ukraine.
Some of its members took part in the government coup attempt of March 13–14, 1939, and the Carpathian Sich headquarters, despairing in their forces, emigrated abroad at the time of the advance of the Hungarian troops. This fact could not but affect the further development of relations between the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists and A. Voloshyn’s government in exile.

The declaration of independence on March 14, 1939 was explained by the desire of the Ukrainian population of the region for freedom. However, the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the declaration of independence by Slovakia were also of great importance for this act. Despite some spontaneity and haste, this historical event in the life of not only Transcarpathian Ukrainians, but of the entire Ukrainian people was of great historical importance. After January 21, 1919, it was the second attempt to declare to the whole world that Ukrainian nation is alive and ready for state life. Although this act of declaration of independence, ratified on March 15, 1939 at the Soim of Carpathian Ukraine, was more symbolic than real politics, it played a large role in forming the self-consciousness of the entire Ukrainian nation. It was during the period of Carpathian Ukraine that a kind of transition from consciousness of Transcarpathian Ruthenians to Transcarpathian Ukrainians ended.

Archival documents show that the government of Carpathian Ukraine had to act in conditions when the attacks on its territory by Hungarian and Polish terrorists did not cease, anti-Ukrainian and anti-Czech propaganda – a real leaflet and radio war – continued. The political crisis in the region was deepened by the contradictions between the Czech government and the local population, as well as numerous conflicts in the Ukrainian camp itself. In 1938-1939 the representatives of two generations clashed with each other: young radical nationalists, who demanded decisive action from the government and older, moderate politicians who sought to preserve the autonomous status of the region through maneuvers. Conflicts in the Ukrainian camp culminated on March 13-14, 1939, when bloody fights ensued between the Carpathian Sich and the Czech army. The Carpathian Sich, having suffered considerable losses in these fights, proved unable to withstand the well-armed aggressor troops. The group of Sich Riflemen and some of the radical members of the OUN
inflicted great moral harm with the coup attempt against the
government of Carpathian Ukraine.

Throughout the interwar period, there was a Hungarian irredent on
the territory of the region, whose anti-Ukrainian activities culminated
in 1938-1939. Transcarpathia was flooded by Hungarian agents, who
collected signatures for the annexation of the region to Hungary,
made lists of unreliable ones, organized sabotages, called for the
overthrow of the legitimate government of the region. The
Czechoslovak and Ukrainian governments have made every effort to
counter hostile propaganda, and they could not ignore it. The difficult
internal position of the region and the need for consolidation of all
patriotic forces made the government of A. Voloshyn to move to a
certain curtailment of democratic processes, which was manifested in
the prohibition of political parties, the non-alternative elections to the
Soim, the closure of some pro-Hungarian newspapers, societies, and
creation of a concentration camp. The country could sink into anarchy
and permissiveness without such decisive measures. However,
despite this motivation for A. Voloshyn’s departure from democracy,
it is necessary to characterize A. Voloshyn’s regime as authoritarian.
Carpathian Ukraine originated in the center of Europe when the latter
was enslaved by fascism, it originated in spite of their will. Defenders
of Carpathian Ukraine rose to fight the aggressor without waiting for
the order of their government. Numerous archival documents, first of
all the Hungarian ones, testify to the fact that the Transcarpathians
would still not have escaped the repression, that Hungary was ready
for it before the invasion began. The last Sich guerrilla units
continued to fight until May 1939.

In the late 1930s, Carpathian Ukraine was the only state where a
small branch of the Ukrainian people proclaimed their independence
and declared their desire to live a state life. The Ukrainians who were
part of the USSR, as well as the Ukrainians under the control of
Poland and Romania didn’t have such opportunity. However, they
treated Carpathian Ukraine as an area where an attempt was made to
restore Ukrainian statehood. On this basis, it is necessary to consider
the formation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state as the second stage –
after the liberation contest of 1918–20’s – in the struggle for the
creation of Ukrainian state formation on a separate Ukrainian
territory.
REFERENCES

Archives
1. Державний архів Закарпатської області (ДАЗО).
2. Державний архів Івано-Франківської області.
3. Особистий архів о. Феодосія Горвата.
4. Центральний державний історичний архів України у Львові.
5. Центральний архив Министерства государственной безопасности РФ.
7. Arhivele Cluj-Napoka M.I.
8. Hadtorteneti Leveltar.

Materials of periodicals
11. Діло 1938
12. Діло 1939
13. Жіноча воля 1939
14. Костер 1946
15. На переломі 1939
16. Неділя 1939
17. Нова свобода 1938
18. Нова свобода 1939
19. Українське слово 1918

Monographs, brochures, articles
23. Баран О. Чехо-Словаччина і уряд Карпатської України. Карпатська Україна і Августин Волошин. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції «Карпатська Україна – пролог


36. Богів О., Задорожний В. Карпатська Україна (Підкарпатська Русь) у міжнародних відносинах (травень 1938 р. – березень 1939 р.). Ужгород, 1999. 91 с.
42. Болдижар М. «Карпато-українська Свобода» писала...». Новини Закарпаття. 1995. 4 лютого.
46. Болдижар М. Закарпаття між двома світовими війнами. Частина 2. Ужгород, 1996. 96 с.
52. Болдижар М. Політична драма чи авантюра? Закарпатська правда. 1990. 21 березня.

186


60. Болдижар М., Панов А. Державність Закарпаття в політико-правовій діяльності Т. Масарика. Ужгород: Закарпаття, 2005. 104 с.

67. Вегеш М. Августин Волошин і Карпатська Україна. Дзвін. 1991. № 3. С. 85–90.
74. Вегеш М. Віденські арбітражі. Енциклопедія Сучасної України / Національна академія наук України; Наукове Товариство ім. Шевченка; Інститут енциклопедичних досліджень НАН України. Том 4. В-Вог. К., 2005. С. 492.


90. Вегеш М. Історія і політика: В чотирьох томах. Т. 2. Історія Карпатської України. Августин Волошин – президент Карпатської України. Будівничі Карпатської України. Василь Гренджи-Донський розповідає... Ужгород, 2005. 552 с.


98. Вегеш М. Колодзінський Михайло Франьович. Вони боронили Карпатську Україну: Нариси історії національно-визвольної боротьби закарпатських українців / М. М. Вегеш,


111. Вегеш М. Українське Закарпаття в контексті загальнонаціонального визвольного руху. Августин Волошин як


126. Вегеш М., Палінчак М. Релігійне життя в Карпатській Україні. Карпатська Україна – етап українського державо-творення: історія і сучасність. Матеріали наукової конференції,


135. Віднянський С. Карпатська Україна як етап українського державотворення. Український історичний журнал. 2019. № 2. С. 67-93.


144. Гранчак І. М., Поп І. І. Закарпаття в чехословацько-радянських відносинах періоду другої світової війни. Карпатика. Актуальні питання історії, історіографії і культури країн Центральної і Південно-Східної Європи. Ужгород, 1993. С. 223–236.


156. Довганьч О. Клочурак Степан Степанович. Вони боронили Карпатську Україну: Нариси історії національно-


175. Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 2. Карпатська Україна. Хроніка подій. Персоналії / Упорядник С. Д. Федака; редакційна колегія: І. І. Качур (голова), М. М. Вегеш, О. Д. Гаврош, М. В. Делеган, В. І. Дмитрук, О. Д. Довганич, В. К. Дрогальчук, О. М. Корсун (заст. голови), І. Ю. Коршинський, Ю. В. Мойш, М. В. Олашин, О. М. Пагір я, С. Д. Федака; редактор Д. М. Федака. Ужгород: ПРАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2010. 776 с.


201. Магочій П. Р. Народ нізвідки. Ілюстрована історія карпаторусинів. Ужгород: Видавництво В. Падяка, 2006. 120 с.


204. Мазило І. Проблеми історії Карпатської України на сторінках підручників вищої школи. Карпатська Україна –


207. Мизь Р. Відгуки на проголошення Карпатської України та її трагедії в українській пресі Югославії. <strong>Карпатська Україна і Августин Волошин</strong>. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. Ужгород, 1995. С. 121–126.


232. Офіцинський Р. Прелюдія осені 1944 року (Листівки часу Карпатської України). *Закарпатська Україна. Осінь 1944 року*. Матеріали наукової конференції, присвячені 50-річчю
визволення Закарпаття від фашизму та 50-річчю Першого з’їзду Народних комітетів Закарпатської України. С. 130–135.

233. Офіційний Р. Сучасні уявлення про Карпатську Україну. Українське державотворення: альманах. 2019. № 1. С. 44-47


265. Сарвадій Й. Могікани Діаспори. Карпатський край. № 7-12. 22-31.
268. Сливка Ю. Україна в Другій світовій війні: політичний та міжнародно-правовий аспекти. Україна у Другій світовій війні:


270. Сливка Ю. Ю. Підступи міжнародної реакції на Закарпаттє в 1938-1939 роках. Львів, 1966. 72 с.


276. Стерчо П. Батько Карпато-українського відродження. Америка. 1965. 4-11 вересня.


294. Федака С. Економіка Карпатської України. Карпатська Україна – етап українського державотворення: історія і сучасність. Матеріали наукової конференції, присвячені 80-річчю проголошення незалежності Карпато-Української держави і 145-річчю від дня народження видатного


300. Федина В. Михайло Колодзінський (1902-1939). Карпатська Україна. Документи і матеріали. Хроніка подій. Персоналії: У двох томах. Том 2. Карпатська Україна. Хроніка подій. Персоналії / Упорядник С. Д. Федака; редакційна колегія: І. І. Качур (голова), М. М. Вегеш, О. Д. Гаврош, М. В. Делеган, Б. І. Дмитрук, О. Д. Довганич, В. К. Дрогальчук, О. М. Корсун (заст. голови), І. Ю. Коршинський, Ю. В. Мойш, М. В. Олашин, О. М. Пагіря, С. Д. Федака; редактор Д. М. Федака. Ужгород: ПРАТ «Видавництво «Закарпаття», 2010. С. 381-386.


310. Химинець Ю. Мої спостереження із Закарпаття. Нью-Йорк, 1984. 188 с.
318. Худанич В. Карпатська Україна і Карпатська Січ. Карпатська Україна і Карпатська Січ. Ужгород, 1996. С. 8-17.
327. Шандор В. Армія і Карпатська Січ. Дмитріо Климпуш – головний комендант «Карпатської Січі». Документи, спогади,


342. Якимович Б. Драма Карпатської України. Дзвін. 1990. № 11. С. 84-87.