CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE MODERN RISK SOCIETY: SOCIO-CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS

Monograph

Edited by

Nataliia Varha
Uzhhorod National University (Ukraine)

Bohdanna Hvozdetska
Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University (Ukraine)

eBook ISBN 978-80-88415-06-0

Print ISBN 978-80-88415-05-3

OKTAN PRINT
PRAHA 2021

Recommended for publication by the Uzhhorod National University (Protocol №4 dated 22.04.2021)

Reviewers:
Peter Jusko Professor, Head of Department of Social Work Faculty of Education Matej Bel University Banská Bystrica (Slovakia)
Beata Szluz Professor, UR, dr hab. Department of Family Sociology and Social Problems University of Rzeszow (Poland)
Fedir Sandor Professor, dr hab. Head of Department Sociology and Social Work Uzhhorod National University (Ukraine)

Editors:
Nataliia Varha Dr. habil. in Sociological, Associate Professor
Bohdanna Hvozdetska PhD in Sociological, Associate Professor

Challenges and opportunities of the modern risk society: socio-cultural, economic and legal aspects: monograph; Editors N. Varha, B. Hvozdetska. Praha: OKTAN PRINT, 2021, 169 p.

The publication is assigned with a DOI number: https://doi.org/**10.46489/CAOTM-21042601**

The paper version of the publication is the original version. The publication is available in electronic version on the website: **https://www.oktanprint.cz/p/challenges-and-opportunities-of-the-modern-risk**

Passed for printing 26.04.2021
Circulation 50 copies
Cover design: *Bohdanna Hvozdetska*

eBook **ISBN** 978-80-88415-06-0
Print **ISBN** 978-80-88415-05-3

OKTAN PRINT s.r.o.
5. května 1323/9, Praha 4, 140 00
www.oktanprint.cz
tel.: +420 770 626 166
jako svou 24. publikací
Výdání první

Contents

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

I. INFLUENCE OF MEGA-RISKS ON THE SECTORS OF SOCIAL LIFE

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042602**

1. THE PROBLEM OF CHILDREN'S OPENNESS TO THE DESTRUCTIVE NATURE OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES

Olexandr Tkachenko
Candidate of Philosophy Sciences,
Associate professor of the Philosophy Department named after Valeriy Skotnyi,
Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University,
E-mail: tkacenkoaleksandr1928@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0002-0674-0144

Olexandr Golubev
Senior lecturer,
Department of Linguistic and Inter-cultural Communication,
Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University
E-mail: alexgolubev108@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0001-7804-823X

Introduction. According to such universal essential attributes of personality as freedom, love, creativity, value, uniqueness, integrity, togetherness[1] we must feel the real, living nerve of the child – the problem of his existence as a defenseless and vulnerable person; receptive and gullible. In particular, we emphasize their irresistible openness to both positive and negative opportunities.

This idea becomes especially acute in the digital age, where the means of manipulation are becoming more cynical, sophisticated and disguised. In recent years the Internet and social networks as «behavioral modification empires» (Jaron Lanier) have dramatically influenced the dissemination of information societies. In the digital age, information is spilled out at a lightning speed (about 2.5 quintillion bytes of data per day) without any filters between consumers and the data source whatsoever. As an example, futurist and technology expert Bernard Marr offers to look at the use of social networks in 2018. In just one minute: Twitter users sent 473,400 tweets; Snapchat users shared 2 million photos; Instagram users posted 49,380 pictures; LinkedIn gained 120 new users [1]. Other mind-blowing data stats include:

[1] Which, unfortunately, are destroyed by the bad manners of the educators, that is, the adults' misunderstanding of the Child, as the unity of the spiritual and natural essences contained in him, the essence of the union of Heaven and Earth, Soul and Body, a unique particle of the Whole, unique among the only ones (Sh.A. Amonashvili).

– Google processes more than 40,000 searches every second, or 3.5 billion searches per day;

– 1.5 billion people are active on Facebook every day. That is one-fifth of the world's population;

– Two-thirds of the world's population now own a mobile phone [2].

Thus, it is clear that the definition of «online security» is constantly expanding and becoming more complex, as is the role of the online user and modern interconnected devices.

Undoubtedly, the information society makes human life *visibly* more comfortable with further promises of even freer and more interesting future. On the other hand, the question of concern arises: is a person of the information society able to live in this reality adequately to his ontological nature, that is, to realize his purpose – to humanize himself? And here we see the downside – young people are happy to escape from the real world into the virtual world.

The Internet is an increasing part of today's culture, especially for children and youth, for whom schoolwork, online gaming, and social networking are among the most popular activities. They are therefore called «the net generation», «digital natives», «screenagers», or «millenials». According to a UNICEF study «What are they, Ukrainian teenagers: about social networks, sex, alcohol, sports, trust in parents and friends», 40% of teenagers «several times a day» or «constantly – all day» communicate with close friends online. One in six admitted to having regular quarrels over the use of social media. Every tenth teenager regularly lied to his parents or friends about the time spent on social networks. Ten-year-old boys stand out by themselves here because every sixth of them reported such behavior. One third of teenagers use social networks to get rid of negative feelings. The study also showed that every eighth adolescent is addicted to social networks [4].

The Internet provides a great many opportunities for children to spend their leisure time, to learn, to express themselves. Yet, it is also a space where children are more easily exposed to violence, abuse or exploitation and therefore at risk of having their rights violated, in particular their right to be protected and to live in a safe environment, in accordance with their best interests.

It is difficult to disagree with T. Chernihivska who is convinced that «the world is becoming very dangerous, and at the same time it is a world with a huge number of opportunities» [3]. Analyzing the anthropological challenges of digital reality, a scientist in the field of neuroscience and psycholinguistics emphasizes that a «new kind» of man is being formed – «Homo Confusus» or «a man in confusion» [4].

In the proposed materials, we attempt to draw attention to the problem of vulnerable state of the human existence (particularly young people) to the negative opportunities in the digital age.

Unfortunately, the lack of common agreement about the right approach to educating and protecting children adds further challenges to a child's online experience and expression.

Literature review. The analysis of foreign and domestic literature has shown that the issue of destructive behavior, its modifications in the digital space at the moment is poorly developed and requires a more holistic and multifaceted study.

L.A. Naidenova's sphere of scientific interests centers on the problems of cyberbullying [5]. In particular, summarizing different approaches to the classification of cyberbullying, the Ukrainian psychologist proposes to consider the concept of «cyberbullying» in a broad and narrow sense. The author focuses on meta-cyberbullying (a broad understanding), which includes various types of Internet risks, as well as on «happy-clapping» – recording and distributing filming of real events or productions of bullying and other dangerous behavior). «This eighth type of cyberbullying has undergone significant changes, as it includes the creation of any media content under the pressure of the cyber environment, the promotion of extreme practices (e.g., deadly selfies, adrenaline video blogging, etc.)» [5, p. 150].

The results of the first comprehensive study in Ukraine «Prevention and Counteraction to Cyberbullying in Children in Ukraine» [4] are especially noteworthy, in which experts analyzed the situation with cyberbullying in Ukraine, Ukrainian and international law, world best practices to prevent and combat online bullying.

We also used the data from the report The Online Safety and Technology Working Group[2] «Youth safety on a living Internet» [6], which analyzes reporting apparent child pornography and examines the development of technologies to help parents shield their children from inappropriate material on the Internet.

An American scientist Professor Stacey B. Steinberg writes about the social and legal aspects of children's safety on the Internet in his article «Sharenting: Children's Privacy in the Age of Social Media» [7]. This article was the first to offer an in-depth legal analysis of the conflict inherent between a parent's right to share online and a child's interest in privacy and offers a set of best practices for parents to consider when sharing about children online. In the author's opinion: «This Article encourages scholars, policy makers, and parents to reconsider the ways society views childhood and privacy in the digital age. By exploring sharenting, this Article provides the framework to do so in the children's rights, privacy, and public health contexts and ripens sharenting as an under-investigated issue ready for further discussion» [7, p. 883].

Results. Alas, the problem of child safety when using the Internet has not yet become a significant social problem in the minds of Ukrainian society. And parents do not perceive the Internet as a potential threat to the child to become a victim of online – calls for antisocial behavior, brutality, violence, suicidal

[2] The Online Safety and Technology Working Group (Working Group) was established pursuant to the «Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act».

behavior, child pornography and therefore, this issue remains mostly ignored[3]. The studies show that parents' high estimates of online dangers were not matched by their low rates of setting limits and monitoring teens. Furthermore! Children's vulnerability to the information space has existed since their birth when parents post information about their children on the Internet without their knowledge. It is clear that most parents act with good intentions and in certain situations it can benefit their children. Although, according to, Stacey B. Steinberg «but the practice also presents a number of legal and safety risks» [7, p. 847]. «Parents should consider the objects of their disclosure, their children, as autonomous persons entitled to protection not only from physical harm (such as the harm posed by pedophiles and identity thieves), but also from more intangible harms such as those that may come from inviting the world into their children's lives without first obtaining informed consent» [7, p. 878]. Stacey B. Steinberg proposes a set of best practices for parents to consider when sharing about children online:

– Parents Should Familiarize Themselves with the Privacy Policies of the Sites with Which They Share;

– Parents Should Set Up Notifications to Alert Them When Their Child's Name Appears in a Google Search Result;

– Parents Should Consider Sometimes Sharing Anonymously;

– Parents Should Use Caution Before Sharing Their Child's Actual Location;

– Parents Should Give Their Child «Veto Power» over Online Disclosures, Including Images, Quotes, Accomplishments, and Challenges;

– Parents Should Consider Not Sharing Pictures That Show Their Children in Any State of Undress;

– Parents Should Consider the Effect Sharing Can Have on Their Child's Current and Future Sense of Self and Well-Being [7, p. 879-882].

Today, there are more than 10,000 groups on the social network trying to involve young people in destructive behavior. By destructive behavior on the Internet, we mean not only a wide range of different forms of negative, unethical, brutal, aggressive, violent online behavior that causes intentional direct and psychological harm to the individual aimed at destroying interpersonal relationships and social ties, but also those forms of behavior that contribute to the unfocused spread of negative behavior online or/and provoke appropriate behavior offline. Destructive online behavior varies broadly: from hostile destructiveness (malicious behavior, rejection, hatred, cruelty, vengeance) and defensive destructiveness (defense-related behavior, response to a threat) to self-destructiveness – self-harm.

[3] Although, The Pew Internet & American Life Project reported that most parents try to stay involved in their teenagers' "online lives" — 65% of parents reported they check the websites their teens visit on a regular basis, while 74% said they can identify whether their teen has created a page on MySpace or Facebook. Eighty-five percent of parents reported they have «established rules about the kinds of personal information their child can share with people they talk to on the Internet». While parents reported being involved in their children's Internet activity, most (68%) also reported having regulations about which sites their child may visit, and how much time their teen spends online (55%)» [8, p.460].

The main topic is cyberbullying; school shooting and calls for violence/murder; romanticization of criminal life/convicts' practice – AUE; drugs; suicide and others. «In adolescence, social media records adolescents' aspirations for groups that promote destructive behavior through sociopathy, mass and serial killings, devaluation of their own lives, and the pursuit of one's own death, drug addiction, ritual murder and suicide, Nazism and nationalism, extremism and radicalism» [9, p. 3].

Let us briefly dwell on the features that occur in all destructive groups. Firstly, it is the manipulation of consciousness. Secondly, violence is promoted as a way of expressing oneself and relieving tension. Thirdly, there is a common «engagement funnel», which consists of the following levels:

– open (broad) groups offer general information. It is very difficult to determine the negative shade at this level. Once a youngster shows further interest he is offered more specific topics;

– groups for the «mature» ones with a clear hierarchy. At this level, certain conditions need to be accepted and certain roles are offered, when a teenager begins to feel own importance;

– closed chats and personal messages for «mature» (private communication), in which the juveniles are prepared for real action;

– performing tasks in the real world (offline).

Behavioral patterns («weaknesses» of adolescents) used by the organizers of destructive groups are:

– devaluation (revision) of moral norms and generally accepted human values;

– expressed sympathy for non-heroes, anti-movements and, accordingly, the imposition of new ones;

– aspiration to destroy at all levels, reject authorities;

– inclination to follow a pattern.

There is a detailed classification of different types of cyberbullying (flaming, trolling, slander, griffin, disclosure of secrets, cyberstalking, sexting, etc.). Scientists also talk about the possibility of direct and indirect bullying, although, discussions are still going at the international level about the concept of cyberbullying and defining its characteristics.

We see, along with other researchers, electronic aggression as any type of harassment or bullying (teasing, telling lies, making fun of someone, making rude or mean comments, spreading rumors, or making threatening or aggressive comments) that occurs through email, a chat room, instant messaging, a website (including blogs), or text messaging [6, p. 12 – 13]. One of the forms of harassment on the Internet is hate groups. They are a public page on a social network, which is usually dedicated to one person, where photos, statements, appearance and behavior are published in an offensive form.

Many researchers find that bullying and harassment, most often by peers, are the most frequent threats that teenagers face, both online and offline. A report from the Working Group on Online Security and Technology notes that cyberbullying could start «as early as second grade for some kids» according to a study by the Rochester Institute of Technology [6, p. 12]. The actual percentage is difficult to determine but a 2008 Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Electronic Media and Youth Violence issue reported that «9% to 35% of young people say they have been the victims of electronic aggression» [6, p.12].

According to the results of the two months' sociological study «Health and Behavioral Orientations of Student Youth (HBSC)» [10] in 2018 35.0% of adolescents participated in the school abuse /humiliation or bullying of others and 37.9% were victims of insults, bullying and humiliation. When it comes to online cyberbullying it is 21.1% and 21.5%, respectively. The results of the monitoring and analysis of social networks and media «Krybrum» revealed that in 2018 in Russia alone 12,851,600 people joined cyberbullying in just six months including 3,494,500 adolescents. A study conducted in May-June 2018 by the Laboratory of Psychology of Mass Communication and Media Education of the Institute of Social and Political Psychology of the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine showed that the dissemination of false information takes first position in the ranking of forms of cyberbullying (21.4%). 19.8% faced the theft of personal data and the use of other accounts on behalf of respondents (imposters). Intimidation and threats of harm were experienced by 15.6% of adolescents, and bullying, insults, humiliation and psychological terror – 14% of respondents [4].

According to surveys in more than 100 countries, bullied teens experienced loneliness for the next 30 days (18%); worried that they could not sleep at night (17.2%); seriously considered committing suicide (23.4%); currently smoking (19.7%); currently consumed alcohol (30.3%); currently used marijuana (7.9%); early sexual debut (27.4%) [10].

Also of concern is the spread of the criminal subculture (AUE[4]), which is constantly mutating into various movements. According to «Kribrum», 10,911,000 Internet users joined the AUE in Russia in 2018 including 1,624,900 teenagers (almost a third!). The top-tier AUE groups, 150-200 thousand people, number from 8 to 40 thousand Ukrainians. The AUE subculture is actively spreading on the Internet and can affect every teenager. In a special risk group are those who have already been registered or children in orphanages. AUE is dangerous because it promotes not only criminal laws but the values of patriotism and the family. For instance, in such groups on the Internet you can even see emotional posts about war veterans and decent parents. And teenagers are caught in the net of false romanticism which leads to a substitution of values.

With the expansion of the Internet, sexual exploitation of children and adolescents around the world is taking on new forms. And although the scientists have described models and typologies of this form of violence against children that can help to understand this type of crime, it must be recognized that

[4] AUE — «prisoner's way of life is unified» — the name and motto of the criminal subculture.

cybercriminals, victims and the dynamics between them are often unique and diverse. The Internet groomers use a variety of methods to manipulate young people (such as flattery, bribery and threats) as well as various ways to engage young people in risky online behavior (such as, interacting with strangers online and sharing personal information). Also, the attackers appeal to the adulthood of minors, to the needs of the interlocutors in self-affirmation and easy enrichment, use provocative techniques, forms of closed questions, exploit feelings of shame, guilt and fear of punishment. In-depth interviews with men convicted of Internet grooming [11] show how actively they study the structural environment, needs and vulnerabilities of adolescents. «In this way, the aggressors adapt by using most effective strategies of persuasion at all times, so that the child feels like an active part of the plot» [11, p. 203].

In the analysis of communicative behavior of Internet criminals who initiate communication with minors in social networks and messengers, R. Akbirova identifies such types of attackers depending on the goals they pursue in the process of interaction, manipulative strategies and tactics used, age of victims (non-adults): «pragmatics»; «dreamers»; «communicators» [12]. However, we cannot rule out the combination of certain types and the possibility of changing the goals and behavior of the attackers over time.

We would like to draw attention to some research, which show that «youth were more likely to form online friendships or romances if they were troubled or, depending on gender, had high levels of conflict or low levels of communication with parents. Adolescents with these sorts of problems may be more vulnerable to online victimization» [13, p. 12].

The trend towards digital self-harm among adolescents remains alarming. This relatively new form of self-loathing and self-harm among adolescents is difficult to detect and therefore difficult to combat. A smaller study conducted by Elizabeth Englander, PhD, in 2011-2012 found that 9% of the 617 subjects surveyed admitted to engaging in digital self-harm. Similar to the larger study, Englander found a higher rate of digital self-harm among males (13%) than females (8%) [14]. Dr. Englander found a number of reasons why teens engage in this behavior, including: to get another kid's attention, to prove they can take it, to get adult attention, to get others to worry about them, as a joke on someone else, and to start a fight.

There are other risks children face online. For instance, pro-anorexia websites or the so-called «inappropriate advertising» that exposes young people to potentially unhealthy or inappropriate messages such as ads for male enhancement drugs or sugary foods. These, along with access to online pornography, hate sites, and many other problem areas related to the Information Age are a constant challenge for young people.

In this study, we would also like to focus on the relationship of parenting style and age of a child with parental restrictions and adolescent online behavior. Martin Valcke and other researchers describe the four Internet parenting styles as follows:

– «The permissive parenting style is reflected in parents that do not put forward explicit boundaries. They refrain from confrontations with their children. They give in to what their children ask and follow their ideas and will. They invest in parental warmth, but hardly give guidance.

– The laissez-faire parenting style is reflected by low levels of control and low level of involvement. They do not reflect a supportive or restrictive attitude towards Internet usage of their children.

– The authoritative parenting style is reflected in parents that set forward clear rules. These parents do not explicitly limit behavior, but expect their children to be responsible and behave in a self-regulated way. They rather put forward practical rules; e.g., in relation to Internet timing.

– The authoritarian parenting style is reflected in parents that ask for unconditional obedience and following rules without explanation. They hardly discuss Internet issues and are not open for dialogue about Internet access. They insist on accepting their perceptions about Internet usage [15, p. 458].

Many studies have shown the dominance of the authoritative parenting style. «Authoritative parents used evaluative (sharing or discussing content) and restrictive methods (setting time or content limits) more often than Authoritarian and dismissive parents. In addition, authoritative parents were more likely to use technology intermediaries (such as blocking software) than authoritarian and negligent parents» [8, p. 460]. There is a relationship between parenting styles and the age of the child. And, according to research results, relationships between parenting styles and the prevalence of Internet dangers and pre-teen and teen MySpace behaviors, «Parents with older children were more likely to have Neglectful or Indulgent parenting styles and less likely to set limits on online behavior» [8, p. 459].

It is also necessary to remember that monitoring social media with teens is a tricky business. On the one hand, teens need independence and use technology to connect with their peers. If a parent hovers consistently, a teen might create separate accounts to avoid the parent's watchful eye.

It is clear that one cannot indulge in wishful thinking and expect parenting styles to counter all Internet risks. Nevertheless, some research evidence shows that parent educational background, parental control and parental warmth can help to develop resilience in children that understand Internet risks and adopt promising Internet usage.

Conclusion. There's no one-size-fits-all, once-and-for-all solution to providing children with every aspect of online child safety. Rather, it takes a comprehensive «toolbox» from which parents, educators, and other safety providers can choose tools appropriate to children's developmental stages and life circumstances, as they grow [6, p. 5].

Protection against destructive influence is the duty of the government and society. In this context, the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2007) deserves attention, which contains provisions criminalizing the use of new technologies – the Internet in particular – to sexually harm or abuse children. In Ukraine, there is a National Expert Commission for the Protection of Public Morality; the website of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine launched the project «Safety of children on the Internet», developed several textbooks and a memo for parents: «Children. The Internet. Mobile phones», etc. As we can see, the emphasis is on digital media literacy as a cornerstone of Internet security, which enables children to assess and avoid risk.

In our opinion, the legal system has very little control over what happens on the Internet. And such monitoring should be done by a separate structure. It is necessary to categorically limit the activities of destructive groups at the level of legislation (some European countries can serve as an example). «There is a huge amount of toxic content on the Internet, to which children and adolescents have no immunity. And it will not form by mere school warning that the Internet could be dangerous. In real life, this content is prohibited. In my opinion, it should be the same in social networks» states I. Ashmanov, President of Kribrum JSC [9]. Furthermore, the results of the analysis of the functioning of destructive themes groups show that their owners are significantly less in number than the groups themselves. Therefore, they are easier to track in the Net and prosecute.

However, the introduction of categorical prohibitions provokes discussions about their effectiveness. Proponents of this position argue that it is impossible to do so in an era when a tweet, Facebook post or YouTube video can be spread around the world in minutes. Despite the fact that groups with destructive themes close every day, new ones immediately appear in their place. There is also the view that it is difficult to balance people's legitimate right to freedom of expression with the desire of others to be protected from harmful information.

Censorship with the use of new technologies is possible in today's world. But the main goal is to develop internal censorship in people, that is, to make ourselves the censors of our own thoughts and actions.

In the context of the problem we are considering, an important question arises what are the true goals and content of modern education and upbringing. We believe that is preserving inherent humane features in children and young people, their ability to think independently, expanding the inner measure of their freedom, which is a source of creativity and responsibility in any activity.

In this regard, the role of the family as the spiritual basis of a healthy lifestyle is paramount. We are convinced that the ability to love, to protect inner freedom from external negative temptations and self-protection can be preserved only in the bosom of the spiritual family. «What will come out of a person in his later life is determined in his childhood and at the same time by this very childhood; there are, of course, innate inclinations and gifts but the fate of these inclinations and talents - whether they develop further or perish, and if they do flourish, then in what way - is determined in early childhood… Here the dormant forces of the soul awaken and begin to unfold; here the child learns to love (whom and how?), to believe (in what?) and to sacrifice (what?); here are laid the first foundations of a child’s character; here the main sources of his future happiness and unhappiness are revealed in the child's soul; here the child becomes a small person, from whom a great personality or, perhaps, a low rascal later develops» [16, p. 128 – 129].

Unfortunately, we live in a period of history that leads «to detachment from substantial presuppositions, from traditions, to what constitutes bare thinking, as if in this devoid of substantiality the sphere of pure rationality (ratio) anything can be created. This is enlightenment, which, contrary to itself, does not enlighten but leads to emptiness» [17, p. 245].

We are visibly concerned about the challenges young people are facing, although in reality it is the lack of culture in our behavior and communication: hypocrisy, cynicism, negligence, helplessness, irresponsibility which has led to these problems. For various reasons, we are not able to preserve childhood both in terms of spiritual life and life on a daily basis. And if we realize that the next generations are being formed now under our parental supervision, either with or without our help; then we will be able to comprehend that we indeed shoulder a great responsibility.

REFERENCES

1. Marr, B. (2020). How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? Retrieved from: https://www.bernardmarr.com/default.asp?contentID=1846 Downloaded: 15.12.2020.
2. Chernigovskaia, T. (2018). Zadacha obrazovaniia – nauchit sokhraniat chelovechnost v tcifrovom mire [The task of education is to teach people to preserve humanity in the digital world] Retrieved from: https://philologist.livejournal.com/10596473.html Downloaded: 04.11.2020.
3. Chernigovskaia, T. «Chelovek rasteriannyi – Homo Confusus i novaia tcifrovaia realnost». [Confused Man - Homo Confusus and the New Digital Reality] Videolektciia. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4FrKm5cM6-U Downloaded: 04.11.2020.
4. Poperedzhennia ta protydiia kiberbulinhu v dytiachomu seredovyshchi Ukrainy (2020). [Prevention and counteraction to cyberbullying in the children's environment of Ukraine] Retrieved from: http://knowledge.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/cyberbuling_DOCU20.pdf Downloaded: 18.11.2020.
5. Naidonova, L. A. (2018). Kiberbulinh u pidlitkovomu reitynhu internet-nebezpek [Cyberbullying in the teen rating of Internet dangers] *Psykholohichni nauky: problemy i zdobutky – Psychological sciences: problems and achievements*, vol. 1., p. 141-159.
6. Youth safety on a living Internet: report of the Online Safety and Technology Working Group (2010) . Washington, D.C.: Online Safety and Technology Working Group, 116 p.
7. Steinberg, Stacey B. (2017). Sharenting: Children's Privacy in the Age of Social Media, 66 Emory L.J. p. 839-884. Retrieved from:

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1796&context=facultypub Downloaded: 23.01.2021.

8. Rosen, Larry D. & Cheever, Nancy A.& Carrier, L. Mark (2008). The association of parenting style and child age with parental limit setting and adolescent MySpace behavior. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, v. 29 №6 p. 459-471.

9. Metodicheskoe posobie po vyiavleniiu priznakov riska povedeniia v sotcialnykh media (2019). [Methodological guide for identifying signs of risk behavior in social media] Retrieved from: http://d-russia.ru/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/tsifrovaya-gigiena.pdf Downloaded: 15.01.2021.

10. Nasylstvo ta bulinh v osvitnomu seredovyshchi [Violence and bullying in the educational environment] (2018). Rezultaty sotsiolohichnoho doslidzhennia «Zdorovia ta povedinkovi oriientatsii uchnivskoi molodi (HBSC)» Retrieved from: http://kubg.edu.ua/images/stories/podii/2018/10_26_bullying_02.pdf Downloaded: 04.11.2020.

11. Santisteban de P. et al. Progression, maintenance and feedback of online child sexual grooming: A qualitative analysis of online predators // Child Abuse & Neglect. 2018. V. 80. P. 203–215.

12. Akbirova R.R., Abitov I.R. (2020). Tipologiia posiagatelei, sovershivshikh prestupleniia protiv polovoi neprikosnovennosti nesovershennoletnikh s ispolzovaniem seti Internet [Typology of offenders who have committed crimes against the sexual inviolability of minors using the Internet] Retrieved from: https://kpfu.ru/staff_files/F_214333084/Statya_YarGU.pdf Downloaded: 20.12.2020.

13. Wolak J., Finkelhor D., Mitchell K.J. (2004). Internet-initiated sex crimes against minors: Implications for prevention based on findings from a national study *Journal of Adolescent Health*, vol. 35 (5). P. 11-20.

14. Hurley, Katie (2018). Digital Self-Harm: Why Are Teens Cyber Bullying Themselves? Retrieved from: https://www.psycom.net/digital-self-harm

15. Valcke, Martin (2010). Internet parenting styles and the impact on Internet use of primary school children. *Computers & Education* 55(2):454-464 DOI: 10.1016/j.compedu.2010.02.009.

16. Ilin, I. A. (2011). Put dukhovnogo obnovleniia [The path of spiritual renewal]. Moskva: Institut russkoi tcivilizatcii, 1216 p.

17. Iaspers, K. (1994). Smysl i naznachenie istorii [The meaning and purpose of history]. Moskva: Respublika, 527 p.

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042603**

2. SPOŁECZNE RYZYKO MIGRACJI PRACY LUDNOŚCI W ZAKARPACIU W WARUNKACH ŚWIATOWEJ PANDEMII

Wiktoria Ruhle
Doktor Zakładu Socjologii i Pracy Socjalnej
Uniwersytet Narodowy w Użhorodzie
E-mail: viktoria.riul@uzhnu.edu.ua
ORCID ID 0000-0002-7961-1933

Kristina Novosad
Doktor Zakładu Socjologii i Pracy Socjalnej
Uniwersytet Narodowy w Użhorodzie, Ukraina
E-mail: kristina.novosad@uzhnu.edu.ua
ORCID ID 0000-0003-3335-6532

Wprowadzenie. Transgraniczna migracja zarobkowa jest powszechnym zjawiskiem międzynarodowym, odzwierciedla spontaniczny proces dystrybucji siły roboczej między krajowymi częściami gospodarki światowej, a korzystanie z zagranicznej siły roboczej jest w nowoczesnych warunkach uważane za integralną część normalnego procesu reprodukcji. W niektórych krajach aktywnie korzystających z pracy cudzoziemców istnieje uzależnienie całych sektorów gospodarki od importu siły roboczej. Głównymi cechami i trendami transgranicznej migracji zarobkowej na obecnym etapie jest wzrost czynników demograficznych migracji, poszerzenie geografii i skali, liczba i struktura przepływów migracyjnych, wzrost nielegalnej migracji, zróżnicowanie społeczno-kulturowych cech migrantów, feminizacja migracji i wykorzystania ruchów pracowników, problemy z zatrudnieniem [1]. Z każdą dekadą rozszerzają się możliwości transgranicznej migracji zarobkowej, co wiąże się z tworzeniem się jednej globalnej przestrzeni informacyjnej, gospodarczej i transportowej. W niektórych regionach gospodarczych, w szczególności na obszarze UE, istnieje wielopłaszczyznowa międzypaństwowa wymiana siły roboczej. Migracja zarobkowa ludności Ukrainy jest jednym ze sposobów przezwyciężenia głębokiego i systemowego kryzysu gospodarczego. Jeśli konsekwencje kryzysu gospodarczego są obecnie widoczne tylko dla niektórych segmentów społeczeństwa (administracja różnych szczebli, posłowie, dziennikarze, służby bezpieczeństwa i organy ścigania, eksperci), problem migracji zarobkowej jest obecny w życiu codziennym wielu ukraińskich rodzin, i bezpośrednio wpływa na procesy społeczne w kraju. Procesy migracyjne na Ukrainie, silnie zdeterminowane zmianami zachodzącymi w życiu społeczeństwa, są wyznacznikiem rozwoju niemal każdego z jego aspektów – politycznego, etnospołecznego, gospodarczego itp. Różne przepływy migracyjne mają swoją specyfikę i nie mogą nie wpływać na sytuację zarówno w krajach emigracyjnych, jak i imigranckich.

Przegląd literatury. Do tej pory środowisko naukowe zainteresowało się badaniem zagrożeń społecznych. W szerokim sensie wszystkie zagrożenia, które napotykają osobę w jej życiu, mają charakter społeczny, ponieważ wynikają z naszej egzystencji społecznej. Pojęcie ryzyka społecznego opiera się na prawie zabezpieczenia społecznego w wąskim rozumieniu tej grupy ryzyk, które obiektywnie zakłócają życie ludzkie i są związane z czynnikami społeczno-ekonomicznymi w państwie. Jednocześnie w obliczu permanentnego kryzysu społeczeństwa ukraińskiego szczególnie istotne staje się badanie różnych problematycznych aspektów migracji zarobkowej, a zwłaszcza jej potencjalnych zagrożeń społecznych. Kategoria ryzyka społecznego stała się przedmiotem badań i współczesnych naukowców. Zatem U. Roik w koncepcji ryzyka społecznego rozumie możliwość materialnej niepewności pracowników z powodu utraty zarobków i zdolności do pracy (choroby zawodowe i ogólne, wypadki przy produkcji i poza nią). Ta definicja ryzyka społecznego zasługuje na uwagę, ale jest całkiem słuszna w charakteryzowaniu ryzyka społecznego jako instytucji prawa zabezpieczenia społecznego. Uzasadniając w ten sposób pojęcie ryzyka społecznego, autor ogranicza zakres potencjalnych podmiotów stosunków zabezpieczenia społecznego («tylko pracownicy»), a nawet zawęża listę przesłanek, które dają podstawę do oświadczenia o materialnym zabezpieczeniu społecznym («utrata wynagrodzenia wskutek niepełnosprawności»).

Oczywiste jest, że współcześnie, obok przyczyn społeczno-ekonomicznych, istnieją co najmniej ważne powody pełnienia przez państwo funkcji zabezpieczenia społecznego: fizjologiczne (np. potrzeba zabezpieczenia społecznego dziecka niepełnosprawnego) i demograficzne (zabezpieczenie społeczne rodzin z dziećmi). Takie ryzyko społeczne, jak bezrobocie, jest również objęte definicją zaproponowaną przez naukowców.

Badaniu ryzyka i jego związku z niepewnością poświęcone są prace M. Alle, U. Beka, G. Wełykoiwanenka, A. Wildawskiego, W. Witlinskiego, E. Giddensa, K. Drejka, M. Dugłasa, K. Erlou , W. Zubkowa, W. Krywoszeina, S. Krawczenka, N. Lumana, A. Mozgowej, F. Najt, P. Szumejkera, O. Janickiego i innych badaczy.

Dla migranta ważne jest, aby rozumiał zagrożenia związane z migracją. Życie codzienne nie wymaga wszechstronnej wiedzy o wszystkim, co dzieje się wokół człowieka. Na przykład dogłębna znajomość zasad korzystania z telefonu nie jest konieczna do skutecznego korzystania z telefonu, a znajomość natury pieniędzy nie jest wymagana, aby zapłacić za towary. Ale informacje o prawdopodobieństwie uzyskania pożądanego wyniku pozostają bardziej istotne i ważne. Dzieje się tak zarówno z powodu niespójności i niepełnego zrozumienia samej wiedzy («wzorzec kulturowy»), jak i z powodu wybiórczej aktywności umysłu.

Na pierwszy rzut oka, na tle dużej liczby zagrożeń, szanse migrantów na osiągnięcie pożądanego rezultatu wydają się nikłe. Ryzyko związane z migrantami wzrasta z powodu niemożności rozróżnienia między cechami indywidualnymi a typowymi cechami obcej grupy. Dlatego migranci mają tendencję do konstruowania społecznego świata «pseudo-anonimowości», «pseudo-bliskości» i «pseudo-typowości». W tym wyimaginowanym świecie migrantom trudno jest dostosować się do dialogu kulturowego, a przedstawicielom innej grupy oczekują od migrantów pewnych typowych reakcji. Stąd liczne zagrożenia i nieporozumienia.

Tak więc model kulturowy grupy obcej nie jest przytulnym schronieniem dla migrantów, ale polem przygody, które nie jest danym, ale problematycznym tematem badawczym, nie narzędziem rozwiązywania problematycznych sytuacji, ale rzeczywistą sytuacją problemową, z którą migrantom trudno jest sobie poradzić. Zwiększone szanse na adaptację migrantów są bezpośrednio związane z nabyciem przez nich umiejętności intuicyjnej, standardowej formy komunikacji z inną grupą. W całości jest to prawie nigdy nieosiągalne i stanowi zagrożenie dla ludności krajów przyjmujących. Ryzyko międzynarodowej migracji zarobkowej na poziomie makro-społecznym jest naturalnym produktem niespójności między wolnością a bezpieczeństwem krajów przyjmujących. Z jednej strony międzynarodowa migracja zarobkowa jest jednym z kanałów rozwoju i wskaźnikiem otwartości krajowych systemów społeczno-ekonomicznych. Wraz ze swobodnym przepływem towarów, usług i kapitału swobodny przepływ siły roboczej jest podstawą wolnego rynku i jedną z «czterech swobód» jego rozwoju. Współczesna przestrzeń światowa nie może istnieć bez masowej migracji i pewnej koncentracji siły roboczej w regionach, w których następuje intensywny rozwój społeczno-gospodarczy i koncentracja kapitału.

Swobodny przepływ pracowników w Unii Europejskiej jest zagwarantowany. «Taka swoboda przemieszczania się oznacza zniesienie wszelkiej dyskryminacji ze względu na przynależność państwową państw członkowskich w sprawach zatrudnienia, wynagrodzenia oraz innych warunków pracy i zatrudnienia» [2, s. 65]. Swoboda przemieszczania się zapewnia pracownikom migrującym prawo do swobodnego przemieszczania się po terytorium krajów przyjmujących, przyjmowania ofert pracy i przebywania w tych krajach w celu podjęcia zatrudnienia.

Z drugiej strony międzynarodowa migracja zarobkowa w nowoczesnych warunkach jest ograniczona potrzebą bezpieczeństwa przemieszczania się. Według Z. Baumana wolność i bezpieczeństwo to «związek nie do pogodzenia», który wynika z zaspokojenia ich własnych potrzeb. Człowiek zawsze poświęca pewną dozę wolności, kierując się swoimi instynktami i pragnieniami. Bezpieczeństwo to z kolei ochrona przed trzema rodzajami cierpienia: przed tymi, które pochodzą «od nas», «ze świata zewnętrznego» i «przed naszymi relacjami z innymi ludźmi» [3, s. 52]. Bezpieczeństwo osiąga się, powstrzymując niekontrolowany przypływ pragnień, emocji, impulsów.

Jest to środek przymusu pozwalający uniknąć wahań i niepewności, zagrożeń i ryzyka, problemów i przeszkód. Obok tradycyjnego rozumienia bezpieczeństwa życia, zagrożeń i ryzyka musi istnieć nowoczesna forma rozumienia bezpieczeństwa, uwzględniająca rosnący poziom wolności w społeczeństwach postindustrialnych.

Program Rozwoju Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych (UNDP) uznał nadmierną migrację międzynarodową (ang. – excessive international migration) za jedno z sześciu głównych zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa ludzi w XXI wieku. «Prawdziwe zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa ludzkości w następnym stuleciu spowodowane są bardziej działaniami milionów ludzi niż agresją kilku narodów. Zagrożenia te przybiorą różne formy:

- Niekontrolowany wzrost liczby ludności
- Różnice w możliwościach ekonomicznych
- Nadmierna migracja międzynarodowa
- Pogorszenie stanu środowiska
- Produkcja i handel narkotykami
- Międzynarodowy terroryzm.

W interesie wszystkich narodów konieczny jest wybór nowych metod współpracy, aby odpowiedzieć na te nowe zagrożenia (i inne, jeśli takie istnieją) dla globalnego bezpieczeństwa ludzkośc» [4, s. 34].

Zagrożenie nadmierną migracją międzynarodową jest postrzegane jako prawdopodobna utrata migrantów, którzy «opuścili swoje domy w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia, niezależnie od tego, czy ktokolwiek w kraju przyjmującym tego oczekuje, czy nie». W niektórych przypadkach będą sfrustrowani nierównościami społecznymi i istnieje ryzyko przejścia do nowych form fundamentalizmu religijnego, a nawet terroryzmu w krajach przyjmujących. Bezpieczeństwo migrantów i mieszkańców kraju przyjmującego jest zagrożone zawsze i wszędzie.

«Negatywne konsekwencje transformacji procesów migracyjnych spowodują następujące ryzyka i zagrożenia dla stabilnego rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego Ukrainy w średnim okresie: utrata części potencjalnych wpływów podatkowych; wzrost inflacji spowodowany wzrostem przekazów pieniężnych; negatywne zmiany w psychice niektórych migrantów spowodowane długotrwałym pobytem za granicą na nielegalnym lub półlegalnym stanowisku» [5, s. 9].

Ryzyko to zatem ocena i realizacja własnego wyboru w warunkach niepewnych okoliczności i nieprzewidywalności wyników. W przeciwieństwie do ryzyka, niebezpieczeństwo jest wynikiem zewnętrznej niepewności i nieprzewidywalności. Mogą ją tworzyć siły natury, technologia i ryzykowne zachowania aktorów zewnętrznych na arenie międzynarodowej. Zorganizowana złożoność społeczeństwa postindustrialnego stwarza dodatkowe warunki niepewności dla pracowników migrujących. W takich okolicznościach ocena własnego wyboru może nie odpowiadać poziomowi niepewności sytuacji w kraju przyjmującym i może być przypisana nieuzasadnionemu (nieracjonalnemu) ryzyku. Wskaźnikiem niezmotywowanego ryzyka jest wzrost liczby urazów i wypadków.

Wyniki. Ukraińscy pracownicy migrujący dokonują wyborów i podejmują decyzje w warunkach zwiększonej niepewności i zagrożeń, które wymagają zwiększonego poziomu ich kompetencji. Migranci próbują obejść brak kompetencji poprzez wyimaginowane unikanie niepewności, identyfikację niebezpieczeństwa z tymczasowymi przeszkodami lub innymi wariantami niezmotywowanego ryzyka. Migranci mogą zrekompensować swój brak kompetencji, zwracając się do pośredników, których kompetencje są często niewystarczające.

Brak motywacji do ryzyka pracowników migrujących stwarza zagrożenie społeczne dla ich najbliższego otoczenia, ich kraju jako całości oraz dla mieszkańców kraju przyjmującego. Dywersyfikacja zagrożeń i zagrożeń związanych z migracją zarobkową rozpatrywana jest w płaszczyźnie świadomości potencjalnych zagrożeń wynikających z niskich kompetencji i niechęci migrantów do zagrożeń.

Poniżej znajduje się autorska wizja różnych zagrożeń społecznych związanych z migracją zarobkową Ukraińców, w której będziemy polegać na delimitacji sfer rzeczywistości społecznej według T. Parsonsa [6]. Należy zauważyć, że są to zagrożenia, na jakie narażeni są sami migranci, ich rodziny, społeczności, do których należą, oraz ogólnie społeczeństwo pochodzenia migrantów (zob. Tabela 1). Analiza zagrożeń migracyjnych z punktu widzenia społeczeństwa przyjmującego nie jest przedmiotem naszych badań.

Istnieją również specyficzne zagrożenia dla pracowników migrujących, które pojawiają się w przypadku ich krótko- i długoterminowego pobytu za granicą. Zatem w przypadku jednorazowego wyjazdu służbowego za granicę (lub przynajmniej wyjazdów niesystematycznych lub regularnych), ryzyko może dotyczyć niedogodności w trakcie podróży, niekorzystnego dla migrantów wskaźnika nakładu pracy i wydanych pieniędzy oraz wynikających z tego osiągnięć.

W przypadku długotrwałego zatrudnienia za granicą ryzyko nie jest tak skoncentrowane w czasie, ale może mieć głębszy negatywny wpływ na migranta: ryzyko utraty lub osłabienia więzi społecznych z rodziną i bliskimi; ryzyko dyskwalifikacji, utraty ważnych umiejętności zawodowych, a nawet komunikacyjnych, niezbędnych do skutecznego funkcjonowania w społeczeństwie pochodzenia; ryzyko marginalizacji etnokulturowej i społecznej, kształtowanie się «pogranicznej» tożsamości migranta, co koresponduje z hasłem «ani tam, ani tutaj», które może być stresorem.

Zarówno w pierwszym, jak i drugim przypadku istnieje ryzyko związane z warunkami pracy, przestrzeganiem zasad bezpieczeństwa pracy i innych praw pracowniczych migrantów (prawo do wypoczynku, wynagrodzenia itp.).

W odniesieniu do migracji zarobkowej można zidentyfikować takie negatywne konsekwencje zagrożeń społecznych, jak: rozwód z rodziną, obniżenie poziomu zawodowego, dyskomfort związany z integracją w nowym środowisku kulturowym. Potencjalne zagrożenia nielegalnego zatrudnienia za granicą są znacznie zwiększone i obejmują m.in. ewentualną dyskryminację i poniżanie godności ludzkiej, nieregularne godziny pracy, nieprzestrzeganie zasad bezpieczeństwa pracy, groźbę deportacji, niemożność uzyskania wykwalifikowanej opieki medycznej z powodu braku ubezpieczenia zdrowotnego, gwarancje za przestępcze pieniądze, elementy, które często zagrażają swobodzie przemieszczania się, zdrowiu, życiu.

Tabela 1

Zakres tematyczny badań szans i zagrożeń migracji zarobkowej w sferach społeczno-kulturowych, społeczno-ekonomicznych, społeczno-prawnych i społeczno-politycznych na mikro, mezo i makropoziomie.

Szanse i zagrożenia związane z migracją zarobkową	Na mikro i mezopoziomie (osoby, rodziny, gospodarstwa domowe	Na makropoziomie (poziom publiczny)
Ryzyka w sferze społeczno-gospodarczej	• Zerwanie lub osłabienie więzi międzyludzkich • Całkowite lub częściowe niewypełnienie funkcji socjalizacyjnej rodziny, brak opieki społecznej nad małoletnimi i starszymi • Trudne warunki pracy i życia, niskie płace	Pracownicy migrujący nie uczestniczą w tworzeniu dochodu narodowego, wypełnianiu budżetu kraju, funduszach socjalnych • Brak siły roboczej na rynku pracy, aw szczególności „drenaż mózgów", utrata najbardziej produktywnej części siły roboczej • Utrata kwalifikacji przez większość nieprofesjonalnych pracowników migrujących
Szanse w sferze społecznej i prawnej	• Możliwość nabycia zestawu praw na terytorium kraju przyjmującego (prawa do pobytu i zatrudnienia, prawa do ochrony socjalnej, emerytury, dostęp do opieki zdrowotnej, prawa majątkowe itp.)	• Tworzenie grup migrantów z Ukrainy posiadających pełny status prawny obywateli kraju przyjmującego (gwarancje prawne, obywatelstwo)
Ryzyka w sferze społecznej i prawnej	• Ryzyko handlu ludźmi (wykorzystywanie seksualne za granicą, niewolnictwo pracowników), nielegalne zatrudnienie lub niechronione prawa pracownicze	• Ryzyko masowej niepewności ukraińskich migrantów zarobkowych za granicą, brak długoterminowych gwarancji zatrudnienia, ich dyskwalifikacja, odpowiedni wzrost nadużyć społecznych
Szanse w sferze społeczno-politycznej	• Możliwość rozszerzenia politycznych możliwości indywidualnych migrantów poprzez działania organizacji publicznych, stowarzyszeń diaspory w krajach przyjmujących (partie polityczne w przypadku obywatelstwa	• Możliwość pogłębienia współpracy między krajem pochodzenia a krajem przyjmującym, także za pomocą demokracji międzynarodowej

Ryzyka w sferze społeczno-politycznej	• Ryzyko utraty lub osłabienia tożsamości obywatelskiej, utraty lojalności obywatelskiej wobec kraju pochodzenia	• Możliwość uzyskania przez obywateli Ukrainy obywatelstwa kraju przyjmującego wraz z odpowiednimi obowiązkami i pojawieniem się zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego
Szanse w sferze społeczno-kulturowej	• Rozwój nowych sieci społecznościowych (w szczególności w postaci sieci diaspory, rodzin transnarodowych i międzyetnicznych) • Rozwój umiejętności zawodowych, komunikacyjnych i kompetencji międzykulturowych	• Tworzenie wspólnoty za granicą (diaspora), możliwości integracji i współpracy z krajem przyjmującym • Wymiana kulturalna z krajem przyjmującym
Zagrożenia w sferze społeczno-kulturowej Wymiana kulturalna z krajem przyjmującym	• Zagrożenia w sferze społeczno-kulturowej • Wymiana kulturalna z krajem przyjmującym	Etnokulturowa marginalizacja imigrantów Utrata poczucia tożsamości narodowej i solidarności migrantów z ludnością ich kraju pochodzenia
Szanse w sferze społeczno-gospodarczej	• Dostęp do rynku pracy kraju goszczącego, możliwość samorealizacji zawodowej • Szansa na poprawę sytuacji materialnej rodzin, które pozostały w kraju pochodzenia	• Przyjmowanie funduszy do gospodarki narodowej poprzez prywatne transfery pracowników migrujących • Częściowe rozwiązanie problemu bezrobocia i złagodzenie napięć na rynku pracy

Źródło: opracowanie własne

Wielu nielegalnych imigrantów zarobkowych ryzykuje, że padną ofiarą «handlarzy» i zostaną zaangażowani w niewolnictwo seksualne lub pracę przymusową.

Badanie migracji zarobkowej jest nadal niezwykle istotne zarówno dla całej Ukrainy, jak i dla regionów, głównych dawców siły roboczej. Zakarpacie jest jednym z wiodących liderów podaży siły roboczej, ponieważ problem bezrobocia jest nadal aktualny dla tego regionu, choć w ostatnich latach nabrał cech charakterystycznych dla regionu. Region liczy 1 mln 259 tys. mieszkańców, z czego prawie 500 tys. uważa się za zatrudnionych, 167 tys. to pracownicy etatowi, dodają emeryci, a nadal jest około 200 tys. osób w wieku produkcyjnym, które prawdopodobnie będą pracować poza naszym krajem. stan. Wyjazd Zakarpatów za granicę ułatwiają nie tylko wyższe zarobki, ale także korzystne warunki zatrudnienia stworzone w ostatnim czasie przez Słowację, Węgry i Polskę. Najtrudniejsza sytuacja na rynku pracy występuje w Wołowcu, Wielkim Bereźnym, Irszawie, Tiaczewie i Rachowie [7].

Dla zdecydowanej większości rodzin zakarpackich migracja zarobkowa jest jedynym źródłem utrzymania, dzięki czemu mają w naszym kraju przyzwoite warunki życia. Do zagranicznych migrantów zarobkowych zalicza się obywateli Ukrainy w wieku produkcyjnym, którzy prowadzili płatną działalność gospodarczą w innych krajach na stałe, sezonowo lub czasowo (w tym pracujący bez oficjalnego statusu).

Znaczenie tematu badań jest szczególnie widoczne w świetle dzisiejszych wydarzeń na świecie, a zwłaszcza na Ukrainie. Zagrożenie wirusem zmusiło już ludzi do przemyślenia wielu rzeczy w swoim życiu. Globalna pandemia dotknęła prawie wszystkie sfery życia ludzkiego, a migracja zarobkowa nie była wyjątkiem. Migracja zarobkowa w nowych warunkach nabrała nowych cech, a migranci zarobkowi zostali zmuszeni do dostosowania się do nich.

Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, jest to sytuacja na Ukrainie z migracją zarobkową w okresie kwarantanny. Na przykład poziom migracji zarobkowej Ukraińców do Polski nie zmienił się. Ponadto przez 5 miesięcy tego roku kwota przekazywanego dochodu od pracowników migrujących zmniejszyła się tylko o 2,2%, czyli znacznie mniej niż prognozowano.

Prezes Ogólnoukraińskiego Stowarzyszenia Międzynarodowych Firm Zatrudnienia Wasyl Woskobojnyk, powiedział, że z danych Narodowego Banku Ukrainy wynika, że w pierwszych pięciu miesiącach 2020 r. kwota przekazanych na Ukrainę imigrantów spadła jedynie o 2,2%. W 2019 r. Przekazano 4,64 mld dolarów, w 2020 r. – 4,451 mld, co świadczy o tym, że migracja zarobkowa nie zatrzymała się ani nie zmniejszyła. Możemy przewidzieć, że nastąpi zmniejszenie przekazów pieniężnych, ale na małą skalę.

Z danych służby granicznej wynika, że podczas kwarantanny wyjechały tysiące Ukraińców. W maju, według naszej służby granicznej, wyjechało prawie 110 000 Ukraińców. W czerwcu wyjechało ok. 230 tys. Osób, ale należy zaznaczyć, że dopiero od 15 marca do 15 kwietnia Polskę opuściło 235 tys. Ukraińców, ale nie tylko wyjechali do pracy. Byli to również ci, którzy wracali z innych krajów przez terytorium Polski, być może studenci i nie tylko.

Nie oznacza to, że 230 000 pracowników migrujących wyjechało, ale w ciągu dwóch miesięcy prawie 240 000 wróciło. Istnieją również informacje, że od 1 stycznia do 1 maja liczba Ukraińców, którzy wjechali do Polski i wyjechali z Polski, wynosi prawie 111 tys. Na korzyść Polski. Oznacza to, że do Polski przyjechało prawie 2 miliony ludzi, a 1 milion 900 tysięcy wróciło na Ukrainę. 100 tysięcy pozostanie w Polsce. Okazuje się, że migracja zarobkowa i migracja do Polski w ogóle nie uległy zmianie. Według służb granicznych w innych krajach (Słowacja, Czechy, Węgry i inne kraje UE) sytuacja jest identyczna. Najbardziej dotkliwą i bolesną sytuację społeczno-gospodarczą był kryzys migrantów, którzy byli zatrudnieni w szarej strefie, pracowali bez odpowiednich dokumentów, zezwoleń i bez ubezpieczenia zdrowotnego. Takie wrażliwe kategorie migrantów nie mogły liczyć na pomoc społeczną i stały się zakładnikami sytuacji. W niektórych krajach UE ogłoszono amnestię migracyjną i zapewniono dostęp do pomocy medycznej i społecznej, co uratowało te wrażliwe kategorie migrantów.

Na przykład we Włoszech ogłoszono masową legalizację migrantów zatrudnionych w rolnictwie i usługach domowych.

Następnie przejdziemy do specyfiki transgranicznej migracji zarobkowej na poziomie regionu zakarpackiego. Ze względu na czynniki polityczno-historyczne, przyrodniczo-geograficzne, społeczno-gospodarcze Zakarpacie w ostatnich stuleciach należało do regionów o niskim poziomie rozwoju sił wytwórczych i rozwoju przemysłowym, co zawsze było przyczyną nadwyżek siły roboczej. W związku z tym historia migracji zarobkowej na Zakarpaciu sięga połowy XIX wieku, a problem zatrudnienia osób zdolnych do pracy nie został całkowicie rozwiązany nawet w okresie gospodarki planowej.

Od początku lat 90 region Zakarpacia, ze względu na swoje graniczne położenie geograficzne, stał się swoistym detektorem trendów w ewolucji procesu migracyjnego na Ukrainie. W pierwszej dekadzie odzyskania niepodległości na Zakarpaciu nastąpił gwałtowny wzrost skali migracji zarobkowej za granicę, po którym procesy te ustabilizowały się na bardzo wysokim poziomie. Według naszych obliczeń poza regionem w 2019 roku pracowało ok. 220 tys. zakarpackich, a migracja zarobkowa na Zakarpaciu zawsze miała swoją specyfikę, gdyż obszary przygraniczne zawsze miały szczególny status. Zajmują szczególną pozycję w kartografii mentalno-geograficznej: z jednej strony są peryferiami kraju, z drugiej stają się centrum szczególnego regionu, w którym procesy determinuje czynnik graniczny. [9]. Sposób życia ludzi na obszarze przygranicznym, formy jego przejawiania się i realizacji świadczą o szczególnym stopniu interakcji między krajami, które mają wspólną granicę. Granice są nie tylko czynnikiem odległości, ale także środkiem wzajemnego połączenia tych krajów. Obszary przygraniczne wykazują proces «nawarstwiania się» różnych społeczno-kulturowych znaczeń, co czyni je «uprzywilejowanym» obszarem rozwoju, który nie tylko rozwiązuje problemy stosunków międzypaństwowych, ale także stwarza nowe problemy. Proces ten jest zwykle spowodowany różnymi poziomami rozwoju krajów, które mają wspólną granicę. Na obszarach przygranicznych struktury społeczne (przestrzenie, wymiary) nakładają się na geograficzną (fizyczną) przestrzeń społeczeństwa [10]. Granica pełni więc rolę specyficznej przestrzeni społeczno-kulturowej i etniczno-społecznej, zlokalizowanej na pograniczu kultur, grup etnicznych, pewnych formacji politycznych, co pozwala na jej interpretację nie tylko w ujęciu terytorialnym, ale także symbolicznym. Wspólna granica to specjalna przestrzeń, która nie należy w całości do żadnego z wchodzących w interakcję krajów. Ale to właśnie ta przestrzeń daje możliwość różnego rodzaju komunikacji, zarówno na poziomie życia codziennego, jak i na poziomie długofalowego planowania relacji międzypaństwowych. Obszary przygraniczne zawsze charakteryzowały się dużym stopniem różnego rodzaju ruchów (migracji), najczęściej w obu kierunkach granicy.

Wnioski. Migrujący robotnicy z Zakarpacia zawsze dobrze przystosowywali się poza regionem, byli pracowici i mogli pokojowo współistnieć i pracować z różnymi narodowościami. Migracja zarobkowa na Zakarpaciu zawsze miała charakter łańcuchowy, tzn. Dobrze zorganizowany robotnik wywlekał za granicę krewnych, przyjaciół, sąsiadów, rodaków, tworząc w ten sposób społeczną społeczność (sieć) pracowników. Takie sieci społecznościowe skutecznie przyczyniają się do wspierania migracji zarobkowej mieszkańców Zakarpacia. Są samowystarczalne i przejmują wiele funkcji. Od transportu do zatrudnienia i rejestracji dokumentów urzędowych, a także dostarczenia niezbędnych informacji pracownikowi migrującemu.

Dlatego w warunkach pandemii zakarpackich migrantów zarobkowych, którzy są oficjalnie zatrudnieni, płacą podatki i posiadają ubezpieczenie zdrowotne w krajach UE, nie groziła redukcja i przymusowa repatriacja. Ponieważ zdecydowana większość pracowników migrujących z Zakarpacia zajmuje się budową lub dużymi fabrykami, które nie zostały objęte kwarantanną, kontynuowali pracę jak zwykle. Tacy pracownicy migrujący ograniczyli liczbę podróży do domu podczas pandemii, ponieważ nie byli pewni, czy zostaną odesłani z powrotem do UE.

W innej sytuacji byli pracownicy migrujący, którzy byli zaangażowani w sektor usługowy oraz ci, w których przedsiębiorstwa zostały zamknięte na kwarantannę. Na tym polu pracowały głównie kobiety i studenci, którzy tam studiowali. Zostali zmuszeni do powrotu do domu. Nie wpłynęło to jednak znacząco na sytuację finansową ich rodzin, ponieważ nie byli oni głównymi żywicielami rodziny w swoich rodzinach, ponieważ tradycyjnie mężczyźni są głównymi żywicielami rodzin na Zakarpaciu.

Jeśli chodzi o pracowników migrujących z Zakarpacia z podwójnym (węgierskim, słowackim, czeskim, rumuńskim) obywatelstwem, można argumentować, że pandemia w ogóle na nich nie dotknęła, z wyjątkiem niewielkiego dyskomfortu podczas przekraczania granicy z powodu nowych warunków antyepidemicznych. Ta kategoria pracowników migrujących pracuje głównie w krajach UE o wyższych dochodach niż w krajach Europy Wschodniej.

Dlatego dokumenty takich migrantów są w porządku, mają wszystkie niezbędne pozwolenia na pracę, pakiety ubezpieczenia zdrowotnego i społecznego i będą kontynuować pracę zgodnie ze swoim zwykłym harmonogramem zgodnie z niektórymi przepisami dotyczącymi kwarantanny obowiązującymi w różnych krajach UE. Tym samym migracja zarobkowa Zakarpackich odbywa się w nowych warunkach, a jej skala i intensywność nie uległy istotnemu ograniczeniu. Migrujący pracownicy przystosowali się i nadal pracują, aby zapewnić dobrobyt swoim rodzinom.

Literatura

1. Yudina T.N. (2006) Sotsiolohiia mihratsii, [Sociology of migration]: Academic Project, Moskow, 272p.

2. Vilnyi rukh osib, posluh ta kapitalu. Konsolidovani versii dohovoru pro Yevropeiskyi Soiuz (vchynenoho v Maastrykhti somoho dnia liutoho tysiacha deviatsot devianosto druhoho roku) ta dohovoru pro funktsionuvannia

Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu, [Free movement of persons, services and capital. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (done at Maastricht on the seventh day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-two) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]/ Retrieved from: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_b06 Downloaded: 30.03.2010 (Last accessed: 26.04.2020)

3. Bauman Z. (2002). Svoboda i bezopasnost`: neokonchennaya istoriya neprimirimogo soyuza. [Freedom and security: the unfinished history of an irreconcilable union. An individualized society]: Logos, Moskow, P. 52 – 71.

4. United Nations Development Program (1994). «Human Development report 1994». UNDP, New York, 226p. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf Downloaded: 23.05.2017 (Last accessed: 20.10.2020)

5. Pozniak O. Sotsialni naslidky yevrointehratsii Ukrainy. Mizhnarodna mihratsiia. [Social consequences of Ukraine's European integration. International migration]. Retrieved from: http://www.fes.kiev.ua/new/wb/media/Mizhnarodna%20migrazija.pdf (Last accessed: 14.09.2020)

6. Parsons T. (2002) Ocherk soczial`noj sistemy`. O soczial`ny`kh sistemakh. [Sketch of the social system. About social systems]: Academic Project, Moskow, p.545-687

7. «Sytuatsiia na rynku pratsi ta rezultaty diialnosti Zakarpatskoi oblasnoi sluzhby zainiatosti u sichni-lypni 2018 roku»: za danymy Derzhavnoi sluzhby statystyky Ukrainy, Pensiinoho fondu Ukrainy ta administratyvnymy danymy derzhavnoi sluzhby zainiatosti ["The situation on the labor market and the results of the Transcarpathian Regional Employment Service in January-July 2018": according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the Pension Fund of Ukraine and administrative data of the State Employment Service] Retrieved from: https://zak.dcz.gov.ua/analitics/71 (Last accessed: 12.11.2020)

8. Malynovska O. (2020). Mihratsiia i koronavirus, [Migration and coronavirus], in: Migration, (06) 220

9. Breskij O., Breska Shh. (2008) Ot tranzitologii k teorii Porganich`ya. Ocherki dekonstrukczii konczepta «vostochnaya Evropa». [From transitology to the theory of Porganichya. Essays deconstruction of the concept «Eastern Europe»]: Vilnius, 336p.

10. Kryvytska O. (2018). Dyskurs pohranychchia v sotsiokulturnykh doslidzhenniakh: teoretyko-metodolohichni aspekty. [Discourse of the frontier in social and cultural preliminaries: theoretical and methodological aspects], in Naukovi zapysky: Institute of political and ethnonational research named after Kuras 4 (78), P.173-197

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042604**

3. A TÁRSADALMI HÁTTÉR VIZSGÁLATA A KÖZÉPISKOLÁSOK SPORTKÖRTAGSÁGÁBAN MAGYARORSZÁGON

Klára Kovács
Egyetemi adjunktus
Debreceni Egyetem
E-mail: kovacs.klara@arts.unideb.hu
ORCID ID: 0000-0001-7272-2756

Dániel Szabó
Doktorandusz hallgató
Debreceni Egyetem
E-mail: sz.danii90@gmail.com

Bevezetés. A mai oktatási rendszer egyik legjelentősebb kérdése a testnevelés oktatásának problémája. Rendkívül sok vita zajlik arról jelenleg is, hogy mennyi mozgás szükséges a diákoknak az iskolai falain belül és kívül egyaránt, de az egyértelmű, hogy az inaktív életmód az egyik legnagyobb egészség-rizikófaktor társadalmunkban. A mindennapos testnevelés bevezetése ezeknek a vitáknak az eldöntését volt hivatott szolgálni. A mindennapos iskolai testnevelés bevezetésének az ifjúság fizikai állapotának javítása mellett fontos szempontja volt az, hogy a sport szociális és morális értékképviselete hozzájáruljon az ifjúság fejlesztéséhez [1].

Kutatásunk azért lényeges, mert a mai középiskolás tanulók sportolási szokásait és szocio- kulturális hátterét vizsgálja és hasonlítja össze. Az eredmények rávilágíthatnak az aktuális helyzetre, problémákra, illetve pozitív tényezőkre és mankót adhatnak a további vizsgálataink fókuszálásához. Megvizsgáljuk, hogy milyen társadalmi tényezők befolyásolják a tanulók sportolási szokásait és milyen különbségek vannak iskolatípusonként. Illetve kíváncsiak vagyunk még a szocio-kulturális hátterükre, hogyan befolyásolja a szocio-kulturális anyagi háttér a sportoláshoz való hozzáállásukat [10].

Az összefüggések feltárásával az általunk vizsgált korcsoportban megismerhetővé válik a debreceni és nyíregyházi középiskolás tanulók sportolási gyakorisága és az ezeket befolyásoló társadalmi tényezők különös tekintettel a szülök végzettsége és sportolási aktivitása, anyagi helyzete, illetve a szubjektív anyagi helyzet hatása a sportolási szokásaikra.

Nyerges és Laki (2004) kutatásában többek között iskolai szinten hasonlította össze a diákok és hallgatók sportolási gyakoriságát a szakmunkásképzőtől (ma szakközépiskola) az egyetemig bezárólag. A felmérésből kiderül, hogy a szakmunkás és szakközépiskolás tanulók eredményei - sportolási szokásai - jelentősen eltérnek a velük egy korosztályú gimnazisták eredményeitől szintúgy, mint a felsőfokú oktatásban hallgatókétól. Ezek az eredmények összefüggésben állhatnak azokkal a megállapításokkal, hogy a főiskolákra vagy az egyetemekre nagyrészt csak a gimnáziumokból jelentkeznek továbbtanulásra a tanulók. A szakmunkásképzőkbe vagy szakközépiskolákból kikerült diákok nagy része fizikai munkát végez, vagy fog végezni az iskola elvégzése után is. Továbbá összefüggésben lehet a lakóhelyük településtípusával, mivel a kisebb községekben vagy hátrányosabb régiókban ugyancsak alacsony sportolási részvételt figyelhetünk meg.

A fiatalok sportolási tendenciái Magyarországon. Az elmúlt évtizedben a fiatalokat számos változás befolyásolta a szokásaik alakulásában. A kétszintű érettségi bevezetése, a felvetéli rendszer változásai, illetve a folyamatos versenyhelyzet kialakulása mind hatással volt az életvitelük alakulására. Ezek a faktorok nagymértékben befolyásolják a napi életvitelüket és hozzáállásukat az életritmusuk kialakításához. Kovács (2016) fiatalok szabadidő-eltöltési és sportolási szokásait vizsgálta Nyíregyházán. A kutatás eredményeiből kiderül, hogy a fiatal generáció tagjai elsősorban otthoni passzív kikapcsolódást végeznek szabad időjükben. Emellett inkább leköti őket a digitális közegben való időtöltés. Ezek az eredmények összhangban vannak az országos ifjúságkutatás eredményeivel is [9].

Amikor kimozdulnak az otthoni megszokott közegükből, szabadidejüket legszívesebben barátaikkal töltik, viszont művelődési szempontból hátrányos közegben: nagyon sok diák iskola után a szabad idejüket plázákban, gyorséttermekben, parkokban töltik. Ugyanakkor a sportolási attitűdjeiket vizsgálva megfigyelhető, hogy az országos átlag felett állnak, a középiskolások több, mint fele sportol, nagy részük férfi. Korábbi középiskolások körében végzett kutatási eredmények szerint a középiskolás fiatalok több mint fele (54,4%) válaszolta azt, hogy sportol a kötelező testnevelés órán kívül, ami lényegesen több, mint az országos minta (ez utóbbi esetben a fiatalok egyharmada válaszolt igennel). Azonban fontos megjegyeznünk mindkét vizsgálatra vonatkozóan, hogy mivel nem gyakoriságot kérdeztek, ezért nem tudjuk, hogy a sportolás mennyire rendszeres, így valóban elegendő-e az egészség hatékony megőrzéséhez [7].

Pluhár et al. (2003) és Fintor-Szabó (2014) kutatásai a középiskolások sportolási szokásait vizsgálta. Az eredmények kiértékelése közben optimizmusra adhat okot, hogy a fiatalok nagy százaléka (69,4%) rendszeres végez fizikai aktivitást, mindössze 3,5% nem. Fontos tényező, hogy a kutatások azt mutatják, a sporttal szignifikánsan nő a barátokkal eltöltött idő [12] amiből azt a következtetést lehet levonni, hogy a fiatalok társas tevékenységként is tekintenek a sportra, ahol új embereket ismerhetnek meg, vagy barátságokat köthetnek. A testmozgást egyáltalán nem végzők, viszont az idejüket számítógépes játékokkal tölti a szabadidőjét, ami nagy eséllyel elhízáshoz vezethet az ő esetükben.

Perényi (2013) Magyar Ifjúság kutatásaiból kiderül, hogy a fiatalok sportolási gyakorisága csökkenő tendenciát mutatnak, a kiugró 2004-es adatokhoz képest. A legriasztóbb adatok a nők sportolási szokásaiban figyelhetők meg. A szakirodalmi áttekintés ezen része, azért a 2012-es eredményekre támaszkodik, mivel a legjobban ezek a táblázatok foglalják össze az eredményeket és minimális eltérések vannak a későbbi Magyar Ifjúság 2016 kutatási eredményeivel.

Táblázat 2

Fiatalok sportolási aktivitása (Perényi, 2013 229.-250.)

		2000	2004	2008	2012
sportolási részvétel	igen (sportoló)	33	41	38	35
	nem (nem sportoló)	67	59	61	65
nem	nő, sportoló	27	34	31	27
	nő, nem sportoló	73	66	69	73
	férfi, sportoló	39	48	44	43
	férfi, nem sportoló	61	52	56	57

Szintén a Magyar Ifjúság 2012-es kutatásaiból derül ki, hogy a serdülőkortól fokozatosan csökken a fiatalok sportolási aktivitása. Itt töréspontokat figyelhetünk meg 17, 19, 25, és 27 éves kornál. Perényi (2013) szerint ezekhez a töréspontokhoz hozzárendelhetők bizonyos fiatalkori életciklusok: nemi érés (lányoknál csökkenés, fiúknál növekvő érték figyelhető meg), a pályaválasztási időszak és a tanulmányok befejezésének az időpontja is megfigyelhető a grafikonon.



Ábra 1. Sportolói aktivitás grafikon (Perényi, 2013 229.-250.)

A középiskolás fiatalok sportolásának szociokulturális háttere. Fontos tényező a fiatalok sportolási szokásaiban a szociokulturális háttér. Az országos ifjúságkutatások eredményei alapján megállapíthatjuk, hogy a sportolás még mindig férfias tevékenységnek számít (férfiak: 62,5% - nők: 47,4%). Sajnos ugyancsak figyelemreméltó adat, hogy az iskola befejezése egy töréspontnak számít a fiatalok körében, több mint 30 %-kal csökken a sportoló fiatalok száma. Ez összeköthető az anyagi és társadalmi státusz befolyásoló erejével is [11].

A szociokulturális helyzetet nagymértékben határozza meg az anyagi helyzet, a szülők iskolai végzettsége, illetve a lakóhely is. Érdemes megfigyelni a végzettségre irányuló adatokat, miképpen van összefüggésben a sportolási gyakorisággal, tehát a végzettséggel egyenesen arányosan nő a sporttal eltöltött idő. (Keresztes, Pluhár, Pikó, 2013) Településméret szempontjából a fővárosi adatok drasztikus csökkenést mutatnak a 2004-es adatokéhoz képest, ami magyarázható a globalizációval (foglalkoztatási ráta, munkanélküliség, gazdasági helyzet), illetve az emberek alkalmazkodóképességének változásaival is [11].

Táblázat 3

Szociokulturális táblázat (Perényi, 2013 229.-250.)

		2000	2004	2008	2012
korcsoport	15–19	42	52	47	44
	20–24	34	40	37	34
	25–29	25	34	31	29
aktivitás	tanul	46	52	49	46
	dolgozik	30	38	34	33
	munkanélküli	22	30	23	25
	inaktív	16	18	17	11
iskolai végzettség	alap	32	35	32	33
	közép	39	45	40	37
	felső	43	51	47	42
településméret	főváros	41	50	32	24
	megyeszékhely	38	42	47	40
	város	32	40	38	37
	község	27	38	35	36
gazdasági helyzet megítélése	felső	48	56	58	52
	felső-közép	38	44	44	41
	közép	30	36	33	34
	alsó-közép	25	29	22	28
	alsó	20	19	20	18

A lakóhely szerinti táblázat a már fentebb megfigyelhető csökkenő tendenciákat mutatja. Például a fővárosi fiatalok sportolási szokásait mutató ijesztő képet fest (24%), holott a kutatások azt mutatják, hogy az előnyösebb helyzetben lévő fiatalok többet sportolhatnának, de a kutatási eredmények szerint így a kisebb lakónépességű települések adataival említhető egy szinten. Az egyes régiókon belüli sportolási arány a dél-alföldi és közép-dunántúli térségekben figyelhető meg, sorrendben 43 és 41%-kal, a közép-magyarországi régióban sportoltak arányaiban a legkevesebben (29%), míg a további régiók 33-37 %-os arányt mutattak. Nógrád, Békés, Pest, Fejér, Zala és Tolna megye sportolási aránya kiemelkedik a megyékhez viszonyított összevetésben. Az eredmények vélhetően összefüggnek a régiók és azokon belül a megyék településszerkezetével, foglalkoztatási és munkanélküliségi rátájával, gazdasági helyzetével és lehetőségeivel, de a sportlétesítményekkel való ellátottsággal, azok állapotával és a földrajzi elhelyezkedés adottságaival (folyók, tavak, dombok, hegyek, erdők közelsége) is [11].

Táblázat 4

Sportoló fiatalok aránya régiók szerinti megkülönböztetésben (Perényi, 2013 229.-250.)

régió	sportolók	megyék (sportolók)
Észak-Magyarország	33	Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (29), Heves (35), Nógrád (45)
Észak-Alföld	36	Hajdú-Bihar (34), Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok (39), Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (35)
Dél-Alföld	43	Bács-Kiskun (40), Békés (47), Csongrád (45)
Közép-Magyarország	29	Pest (35), Budapest főváros (25)
Közép-Dunántúl	41	Komárom-Esztergom (34), Fejér (47), Veszprém (40)
Nyugat-Dunántúl	36	Győr-Moson-Sopron (36), Vas (27), Zala (44)
Dél-Dunántúl	37	Baranya (37), Somogy (31), Tolna (42)

Nyerges és Laki (2004) kutatásában, többek közt iskolai szinten hasonlította össze a diákok és hallgatók sportolási gyakoriságát a szakmunkásképzőtől (ma szakközépiskola) az egyetemig bezárólag. A felmérésből kiderül, hogy a szakmunkás és szakközépiskolás tanulók eredményei - sportolási szokásai - jelentősen eltérnek a velük egy korosztályú gimnazisták eredményeitől szintúgy, mint a felsőfokú oktatásban hallgatókétól is. Ezek az eredmények összefüggésben állhatnak azokkal a megállapításokkal, hogy a tanulók nagyrészt csak a gimnáziumokból jelentkeznek továbbtanulásra a főiskolákra vagy az egyetemekre. E tanulók csoportjait főként magasan iskolázott, a társadalmi hierarchiában magasabb pozíciót betöltő és az átlagnál jobban kereső szülők gyermekei alkotják. Szüleik egészséges életmóddal vallott vagy tanult nézetei és ennek részeként a rendszeres sportolással kapcsolatos értékei jelentősen eltérnek a kevésbé iskolázott rétegétől. Ezek a nézetek összefüggésben állnak azzal, hogy a szakmunkásképzőkbe vagy szakközépiskolákból kikerült diákok nagy része fizikai munkát végez, vagy fog végezni az iskola elvégzése után is. Továbbá összefüggésben lehet a lakóhelyük településtípusával, mivel a kisebb községekben vagy hátrányosabb régiókban ugyancsak alacsony sportolási trendeket figyelhetünk meg [11, 10].

Táblázat 5 (saját szerkesztés)

A különböző oktatási intézmények típusaiban tanuló diákok megoszlása aszerint, hogy rendszeresen sportolnak-e (Nyerges-Laki, 2004)

A diákok státusza	Ismeretlen	Sportol	Nem sportol	Összesen
Szakmunkástanuló	-	40,6	59,4	100
Szakközépiskolás	-	43,3	56,7	100
Gimnazisták	-	49,7	50,3	100
Főiskolás	0,3	50,2	49,5	100
Egyetemista	0,2	52,9	46,9	100

A kutatás bemutatása. A kutatás kvantitatív módszerrel készült. A saját készítésű kérdőívünk eredményeit használtuk fel, ahol nyíregyházi és debreceni középiskolás tanulók eredményeit és válaszait elemeztük. Az adatbázis elemszáma 450 fő. A kutatás célja ebben az esetben a szociokulturális háttér vizsgálatával kíván foglalkozni, amit a sportolási szokásokra vonatkozó kérdés vonatkozásában hasonlítunk össze. A kérdőíveket az SPSS 21.0 program segítségével dolgoztuk fel. A következő kérdések összefüggéseit vizsgáltuk az SPSS program segítségével az alábbi változók vonatkozásában: társadalmi tényezők (nem, iskolatípus, településtípus, szülők objektív és szubjektív anyagi helyzete, sportolási szokásai és iskolázottsága), kereszttábla elemzés és chi négyzet próbák segítségével. Az eredmények gyakorlatiasabb feldolgozása céljából a vizsgált változókat újra kódoltuk, és mindenhol igyekeztünk három változóra összevonni a válaszlehetőségeket.

Az eredmények bemutatása. Az alapstatisztika lefuttatása után láthatjuk az táblázat 6. eredményeiből, hogy a megkérdezett diákok mindössze 16,8%-a választotta a soha nem sportolok válaszlehetőséget, és a megkérdezettek több mint fele rendszeresen sportol, ami mindenképpen bizakodásra ad okot a jövőbeli kutatásaink szempontjából.

Táblázat 6 (saját szerkesztés)

Elemszám			**%**
Sportolási szokások	Soha nem sportolok	**75**	**16,8**
	Ritkán sportolok	**117**	**26,2**
	Rendszeres sportolok	**255**	**57**
	Összesen	**447**	**100,0**

A következőkben a kereszttábla elemzés eredményeit elemezzük és mutatjuk be. A khi négyzet vizsgálat mellett minden elemzésben az adjusted residual értékét is vizsgáltuk, amivel a szignifikáns összefüggések eredményeire szerettünk volna pontosabb képet kapni. A táblázat 7.eredményei a megkérdezett tanulók nemét és sportolási szokásainak összefüggéseit mutatják be. Az eredmények alátámasztják a szakirodalmi elemzés során bemutatott összefüggéseket, miszerint a férfiak nagyobb arányban sportolnak, mint a nők. A férfiak eredményét tovább erősíti a +2 feletti adjusted residual érték, ami ha 2 feletti értékét mutat, akkor felülreprezentáltnak tekinthetjük az eredményt, a nőknél ugyanez az érték alulreprezentáltságot jelez, ennek magyarázata, hogy a nők lényegesen nagyobb számmal képviselték magukat a mintánkban.

Táblázat 7 (saját szerkesztés)

A megkérdezettek neme és a sportolási szokások összehasonlítása					
		Sportolási szokások			**Összesen**
		Soha nem sportolok	**Ritkán sportolok**	**Rendszeresen sportolok**	
Megkérdezettek neme	**Férfi**	12,4%	24,2%	63,5%	**178**
	Adjusted Residual	-2,0	-,8	2,2	
	Nő	19,7%	27,5%	52,8%	**269**
	Adjusted Residual	2,0	,8	-2,2	
Összesen	**Elemszám**	**75**	**117**	**255**	**447**

Legnagyobb százalékban a nagyvárosból származó diákok sportolnak (66,9%). Az eredmények elemzése után, azt figyelhetjük meg, hogy minél nagyobb városban él a diák, annál nagyobb arányban sportolnak (p=0,001). Erre az lehet a magyarázat, hogy a városban élő diákoknak sokkal több lehetőségük adott a rendszeres sportolásra (konditermek, stadionok, kondiparkok), mint mondjuk egy kisebb községben vagy faluban élő diáknak van, ezt megerősíti az adjusted residual 3,1 értéke is a nagyvárosi rendszeresen sportoló diákok eredményénél.

Táblázat 8 (saját szerkesztés)

A település típusa és a sportolási szokások összehasonlítás					
		Sportolási szokások			**Összesen**
		Soha nem sportolok	**Ritkán sportolok**	**Rendszeresen sportolok**	
Település típusa	**Nagyváros**	12,1%	21,0%	66,9%	**157**
	Adjusted Residual	-2,0	-1,8	3,1	
	Kisebb város	21,0%	23,3%	55,7%	**176**
	Adjusted Residual	1,9	-1,1	-,4	
	Község/falu/tanya	16,8%	38,1%	45,1%	**113**
	Adjusted Residual	,0	3,3	-2,9	
Összesen	**Elemszám**	**75**	**117**	**254**	**446**

A szubjektív anyagi helyzet összehasonlításában a következő összefüggések állapíthatók meg. A 450 főből mindössze 22 diák választotta azt a lehetőséget, hogy nehéz körülmények között él. A sportolási szokásaik tekintetében ezért komolyabb összefüggéseket nem tudunk megállapítani a kevés elemszám miatt. Az átlagos és az átlagnál jobban élők eredményeiből viszont megállapíthatjuk, hogy mindenképp van összefüggés a vélt anyagi helyzet és a sportolási szokások között (p=0,016). Minél jobb körülmények között élőnek tartja magát a tanuló, annál gyakrabban sportol (54,2% és 65,7%).

Táblázat 9 (saját szerkesztés)

Az anyagi helyzet és a sportolási szokások összehasonlítása					
		Sportolási szokások			**Összesen**
		Soha nem sportolok	**Ritkán sportolok**	**Rendszeresen sportolok**	
Anyagi helyzet	**Nehéz körülmények között élünk**	36,4%	27,3%	36,4%	**22**
	Adjusted Residual	2,5	,1	-2,0	
	Átlagos színvonalon élünk	17,6%	28,2%	54,2%	**284**
	Adjusted Residual	,6	1,2	-1,5	
	Átlagnál jobban élünk	12,1%	22,1%	65,7%	**140**
	Adjusted Residual	-1,8	-1,3	2,5	
Összesen	**Elemszám**	**75**	**117**	**254**	**446**

Az iskolatípus és a sportolási szokások kereszttábla elemzése alapján megállapíthatjuk, hogy van összefüggés a vizsgált két változó között (p=0.000). A gimnazisták több mint 77%-a sportol rendszeresen és mindössze 8,2%-a soha. A rendszeresen sportolók eredményét megerősíti a 4,6 adjusted residual érték is, ami azt mutatja, hogy hiába van kevesebb gimnazista a vizsgált mintánkban, az eredményük sokkal erősebb, mint a szakgimnazisták vagy a szakközépiskolások rendszeres sportolására vonatkozó eredmény. A gimnazisták kiugró eredménye azzal magyarázható, hogy a szakképzésben tanuló diákok sok esetben gyakorlati órákon vesznek részt, ami a szakmájukhoz illetve fizikai munkához köthető és ezért kevesebb idejük és/vagy energiájuk marad sportolni.

Táblázat 10 (saját szerkesztés)

Az iskola típusa és a sportolási szokások összehasonlítása					
		Sportolási szokások			**Összesen**
		Soha nem sportolok	**Ritkán sportolok**	**Rendszeresen sportolok**	
Iskola típusa	**Gimnázium**	8,2%	14,3%	77,6%	**98**
	Adjusted Residual	-2,6	-3,0	4,6	
	Szakgimnázium	18,0%	27,3%	54,6%	**205**
	Adjusted Residual	,7	,5	-,9	
	Szakközépiskola	21,0%	32,9%	46,2%	**143**
	Adjusted Residual	1,6	2,2	-3,2	
Összesen	**Elemszám**	**75**	**117**	**255**	**447**

A szülők iskolai végzettsége és a tanulók sportolási szokásai során is összefüggést mutatott a chi négyzet próba (p=0,000). Kiugró érték az alapfokú végzettséggel rendelkező szülők esetében az, hogy a tanulók 20,6%-a soha nem sportolt, míg a felsőfokú végzettséggel rendelkező szülők esetében ez az érték mindössze 7,5%. Megállapítható, hogy a minél magasabb végzettségű szülő, annál nagyobb arányban sportolnak gyermekeik (76,1%) (adjusted residual emelkedő értéke is megfigyelhető). Az alábbi táblázatban az édesapa iskolai végzettségére vonatkozó eredményeit mutatjuk be, ugyanakkor az édesanya esetében is ugyanezen összefüggések állapíthatók meg, ahol szintén lineáris növekedés figyelhető meg az iskolai végzettség növekedésével. Az édesanya eredményei szinte százalékra pontosan megegyeztek az édesapáéval.

Táblázat 11 (saját szerkesztés)

Az édesapa végzettsége és a sportolási szokások összehasonlítása					
		Sportolási szokások			Összesen
		Soha nem sportolok	Ritkán sportolok	Rendszeresen sportolok	
Édesapa végzettsége	Alapfokú végzettség	20,6%	31,2%	48,2%	253
	Adjusted Residual	2,7	2,6	-4,3	
	Középfokú végzettség	12,9%	22,4%	64,7%	116
	Adjusted Residual	-1,2	-1,2	2,0	
	Felsőfokú végzettség	7,5%	16,4%	76,1%	67
	Adjusted Residual	-2,2	-2,1	3,5	
Összesen	Elemszám	72	116	248	436

A szülők sportolási szokásai és a diák sportolási szokásainak összehasonlításában hasonló összefüggéseket állapíthatunk meg, mint a végzettség tekintetében ($p=0.000$). Szintúgy megfigyelhető a lineáris növekedés: minél gyakrabban sportol a szülő, annál gyakrabban fog sportolni a gyermek is. Kiugró eredmény, hogy a rendszeresen sportoló diákok 84,4%-ának a szülei is rendszeresen sportolnak (adjusted residual=5,8). Összeségében megállapítható, amit a szakirodalom is megerősít, hogy a szülők igen komoly hatással vannak a diákok sportolási szokásainak alakulásában [3].

Táblázat 12 (saját szerkesztés)

Az édesapa sportolási szokásainak és a diák sportolási szokásainak összehasonlítása					
		Diák sportolási szerinti eloszlás			Összesen
		Soha nem sportolok	Ritkán sportolok	Rendszeresen sportolok	
Édesapa sportolási szokásai	Soha nem sportolt	23,6%	38,9%	37,4%	203
	Adjusted Residual	3,8	6,0	-8,1	
	Ritkán sportolt	14,5%	14,5%	71,0%	131
	Adjusted Residual	-,7	-3,5	3,7	
	Rendszeresen sportolt	3,3%	12,2%	84,4%	90
	Adjusted Residual	-3,8	-3,3	5,8	
Összesen	Elemszám	70	109	245	424

Végezetül az édesanya jelenlegi és fiatalkori sportolási szokásainak az eredményeit mutatjuk be. A chi-négyzet próba itt is összefüggést mutatott a vizsgált változók között (p=0.000). A legerősebb összefüggés, hogy az az édesanya, amelyik gyerekkorában se sportolt, ő felnőtt korában se fog sportolni. Itt megfigyelhetők a kiugró százalékos értékek (64,8%) amit tovább erősít az elemzéseink során legmagasabb adjusted residual érték (8,9) is. Megemlítendő, hogy vizsgáltuk az édesapa jelenlegi és fiatalkori sportolási szokásait is, és szintén szignifikáns összefüggést állapíthattunk meg.

Táblázat 13 (saját szerkesztés)

Az édesanya jelenlegi és fiatalkori sportolási szokásainak összehasonlítása					
		Édesanya fiatalkori sportolási szokásai			**Összesen**
		Nem sportolt	**Ritkán sportolt**	**Rendszeresen sportolt**	
Édesanya jelenlegi sportolási szokásai	**Nem sportol**	64,8%	15,1%	20,1%	**199**
	Adjusted Residual	8,9	-5,2	-4,5	
	Ritkán sportol	25,5%	33,6%	40,9%	**137**
	Adjusted Residual	-4,6	2,0	3,0	
	Rendszeresen sportol	18,6%	42,2%	39,2%	**102**
	Adjusted Residual	-5,4	3,9	2,0	
Összesen	**Elemszám**	**183**	**119**	**136**	**438**

Összegzés. Kutatásunkban a nyíregyházi és debreceni középiskolás tanulók sportolási szokásait vizsgáltuk. A szakirodalmat elemezve megállapíthatjuk, hogy a sportnak illetve a szociokulturális háttérnek igen fontos szerepe van a középiskolás korú fiatalok személyiség- és egészségfejlődésében és ezeknek a gyermekeknek szükségük is van a sportra, a testmozgásra, ugyanez igaz fordított megfogalmazásban is, a sportnak is szüksége van rájuk. Elemzéseink után megállapíthatjuk, hogy a társadalmi háttérváltozók (szülők végzettsége, szülők sportolási szokásai, szubjektív anyagi helyzete) és a tanulók neme, település típusa és az iskoláik típusa is mind befolyásolják a tanulók sportolási szokásait. Az eredmények elemzése után mindenképpen pozitív tényező, hogy a vizsgált diákok több mint fele sportol rendszeresen, ami magasabb a szakirodalmi áttekintésben bemutatott [11] értékeknél. Erős összefüggéseket állapíthattunk meg a szülők szociokulturális háttere és a diákok sportolási gyakorisága között. Megállapítható, hogy mind a szülők végzettsége, mind a sportolási szokásaik nagy mértékben befolyásolják a diákok sportolási habitusát.

IRODALOMJEGYZÉK

1. Bodnár I., Perényi Sz. (2016). Értékháló az iskolai testnevelés körül. In: Kovács Klára (szerk.) Értékteremtő testnevelés: Tanulmányok a testnevelés és a sportolás szerepéről a Kárpát-medencei fiatalok életében. Debrecen. Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó, 101-110.
2. Fintor G., Szabó J. (2014). Correlations of sport levels and popularity of sport programmes among elementary school students, Recreation: A közép-kelet-európai rekreációs társaság tudományos magazinja IV: (2) pp. 11-17.
3. Herpainé Lakó J., SimonI. Á., Nábrádi Zs., Mülle A.(2017). Családok sportolási szokásainak szocioökonómiai hátterére.Képzés és Gyakorlat. 2017. 15. évfolyam. 4. szám. pp. 37-52.
4. Keresztes N., Pluhár Zs., Pikó B. (2003). A fizikai aktivitás gyakorisága és sportolási szokások általános iskolások körében. Magyar Sporttudományi Szemle, 2003/4. szám, 43–48.
5. Keresztes N., Pikó B., (2006). A dél–alföldi régió ifjúságának fizikai aktivitását meghatározó szociodemográfiai változók. *Hungarian Review of Sport Science*, *7*(1), 7–12.
6. Kovács K. (2015). A sportolás, mint támogató faktor a felsőoktatásban, CHERD-H 2015, Debrecen.
7. Kovács K. (2016). Szabadidős-eltöltés és sportolás a nyíregyházi fiatalok körében, Acta Medicinae et Sociologica - Vol. 7. No. 20-21.
8. Kovács K. (2018). Bevezetés a sportszociológiába. In Münnich Ákos (szerk.): *Fejezetek a Sport-pszichodiagnosztika és Tanácsadás témaköreiből.* Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem, Pszichológia Intézet.
9. Nagy P. (1996). A sport és rekreáció közgazdaságtana. Oktatási segédanyag, BKE.
10. Nyerges M., Laki L. (2004). A fiatalok sportolási szokásainak néhány társadalmi összefüggése, Magyar sporttudományi Szemle 5. évf. 2-3. (18-19.) sz. (2004.)
11. Perényi Sz. (2013). Sportolási szokások: Sportolási esélyek és változástrendek. In.: Bauer, Béla – Szabó, Andrea (szerk.): Arctalan (?) Nemzedék. Belvedere Meridionale Kiadó, Szeged, 159-184.
12. Pluhár Zs., Keresztes N., Pikó B. (2003). „Ép testben ép lélek”– Középiskolások értékrendje fizikai aktivitásuk tükrében. Magyar Sporttudományi Szemle, 2003. 2. sz. 29-33. p.

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042605**

4. POLITICAL CYNICISM: UNIVERSAL SOVIET HERITAGE - AFTERTASTE – DANGER

Hanna Lavrynenko
PhD in Political Science
Associate Professor Department of Philosophy
Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University
E-mail: h.lavrynenko@kubg.edu.ua
ORCID ID 0000-0001-7705-6545

Introduction. Most modern challenges facing society are shaped by the political elite and the transience of political processes that drive its actions. Political realities daily challenge full-fledged development of modern society. Political pragmatism which is reflected in the nature of political decisions made by the elite, increasingly goes beyond what is permissible and turns into political cynicism. Of course transience of political cynicism's spread cannot be called the 21st century's phenomenon. It has existed and has been actively used in politics since the Renaissance period. However, the relevance of studying its modern manifestations is associated with the growing real threat to the full development of modern civilized societies, since political cynicism has actively shifted from the sphere of theoretical discourse to the field of political practice. And the key merit in this belongs to a greater extent precisely to the political elites who personify political power and are directly involved in the process of making and implementing political decisions.

Cynicism indicates the political erosion of previous methods and destruction of principles and norms, which does not contribute to the formation of new institutional relations. On the contrary, it leads to confrontation between the state, represented by political elites and the society. And in the case of states with an established democratic tradition, the spread of political cynicism is an undoubtedly dangerous political occurrence, in states in a democratic transition, including post-Soviet ones, the consequences of the «excess» of political cynicism may ultimately present themselves in the form of a threat to statehood.

Many researchers have addressed the problem of cynicism, in particular political cynicism at various times. Thus, N. Machiavelli created a set of cynical rules for a political director. Discussions about "cynicism" in the context of politics, philosophy, morality are also presented in the works of P. Sloterdijk, S. Žižek, T. Buse, D. Mazel, L.D. Gudkov and other researchers.

The purpose of this study is to retrace how political cynicism in the actions of political elites affects the process of building and developing statehood in the post-Soviet space.

Literature review. To begin with, it should be noted that political cynicism is characteristic of people who, in their behavior and political convictions, strive to achieve their own selfish goals by any means. It is defined as a quality of nihilistic attitude towards various kinds of human culture heritage, especially towards the ideas of human dignity. Beside that, cynicism finds its expression in the form of mockery and derision, mainly in relation to the official forms of the dominant ideology. Sources of cynicism are customarily viewed from two points of view.

The first one is associated with the personification of political cynicism as a type of force imparted to the ruling groups, political elites, who, in the process of exercising their authoritative capabilities and achieving their own selfish goals, resort to immoral methods of management and the realization of political interests.

The second one stems from rejecting lawlessness and injustice, in other words oppression from the ruling groups, which are guided by ideological hypocrisy and is realized through the rebellious moods and actions of the oppressed social circles due to a prolonged state of hopelessness and inability to change the situation. This understanding of cynicism has been widespread in post-Soviet states since late 1970s and has long been considered as comprehensive and commonly accepted.

If we look at cynicism from an ethical point of view, then it is necessary to turn to the «Dictionary of Ethics» edited by I. Kon, which was published in 1975. In it, cynicism is defined as «a moral quality that characterizes a contemptuous attitude towards the culture of society, towards its spiritual, and especially moral values ... initially it is a return to the «natural state». Subsequently, cynicism has been defined as the words and deeds which insult the sum of human culture’s historical achievements, mockery of moral principles, ridicule of ideals, violation of human dignity. Cynicism in behavior and beliefs is characteristic of people who pursue their selfish interests by all possible means, including immoral ones» [1, p. 342].

As for political cynicism, this term has been actively used since the 1960s. Primarily it had been used in political sciences. In general, political cynicism is meant as the conviction that politicians, political groups and political institutions cannot be trusted, they cannot be relied on even in the absence of information on specific actions they are taking. [2, p. 3].

It is generally accepted that with political cynicism, representatives of the authorities grossly disregard public opinion and they are not interested in anything other than power and wealth accumulation that they achieve through repression and corruption. The most common interpretation of political cynicism is that it is the opposite of political trust. Supporting mentioned above, an example can be cited where in the index of «trust in government» developed by the research center of Michigan’s University, one borderline indicator is designated as political trust, and the other as political cynicism [3, p. 33-48]

If we allude to history, then the first theorist of political cynicism is considered to be N. Machiavelli, and his short treatise «The Prince» - the first set of cynical rules of effective political management [4]. Machiavelli's teaching is presented as a political cynicism’s system of ideas, which is based on grounds of political realism. Its key features include double standards in politics, recognizing the state having highest value than a person, moral relativism and immorality, inhuman balance of ends and means, idealization of the monarch striving to keep his power. Machiavelli's treatise «The Prince» is not so much a prototype of the phenomenon of cynicism in its modern understanding and its use both in the scientific political-philosophical environment and in practice, but more of a rule set that should not be used in the process of governing the state, provided its democratic development. Interpretation of political cynicism’s distinctive feature is the fact that in Machiavelli’s time, cynicism in politics was declared more openly. This was due to the so-called «monarch’s divine right», which served as an ideological background for building a system of their actions. In the modern period political cynicism has begun to disguise itself under the concepts of protecting state interests, preserving sovereignty and building universal rules of the game in a geopolitical context. And these clichés are produced by the so-called meaning manufacturers. Beside political cynicism, their style of political behavior is characterized by such characteristics as impertinence and lies. Besides, more audaciously they are used the more effective a short term result will be. And although the pettiness of these manifestations of cynicism is hidden behind simulacra of intellectualism, society will have to pay for its consequences.

As we can see, the key role of cynicism’s demagogic disguise under various kinds of ideological clichés is assigned primarily to the political elite. And this was especially pronounced during the time of the Soviet Union’s existence.

Thus, the course on perestroika announced in 1985 made it possible to find a balance between the political line under new conditions and moral principles in order to soften moral ambivalence. It was needed to revise the logic of the Soviet Union’s power in order to find a way out of moral impasse. The goals of building a just society were contradicted by the facts of widespread corruption and cynicism’s manifestation in everyday life, reflecting the moral particularism and moral relativism of the entire society. As M. Garcelon noted, perestroika revealed Soviet leadership’s deep division in understanding how to deal with the existing «inconsistencies». So «... already the early phase of perestroika created ex nihilo a fragile public area in the political field, subordinated in advance to broad authoritarian control, opening up opportunities for the rapid growth of opposition to the authorities and the policies of the CPSU» [5, p. 39].

In the USSR the word «elite» had a negative connotation as a whole. During the perestroika period, a «politically encouraging» concept of the «elite» emerged as «alternative progressive forces» opposing the Soviet regime. However, the «political closed nature», as a representative indicator of society, has become damaging to the political elite. An unsuccessful attempt to transform society from «closed» to «open» has become the reason for the spread of political distrust and cynicism in society. Since the mid-1990s, the label «political elite» has been used for self-identification of groups fulfilling a political commission for a «national idea», serving the ruling power and its potential competitors. One of the clearest manifestations of cynical consciousness in the sphere of public policy of that time was the politically advantageous transformation of «reasonable oppositionists» into owned officials for the government. «It is more like morality itself put in the service of immorality - the model of cynical wisdom is to conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of dishonesty, and morals as a supreme form of profligacy, the truth as the most effective form of a lie. «, - noted Slavoj Žižek [6, p. 129-130]. Nature of the modern formation of nationwide elites in various countries is politically multidirectional (in France the elites are being renewed, in Russia they are stabilizing but not circulating). The result is a world of two different trust realities. The informed public - wealthier, more educated, and frequent consumers of news - remain far more trusting of every institution than the mass population. Distrust is being driven by a growing sense of inequity and unfairness in the system. The perception is that institutions increasingly serve the interests of the few over everyone. Government, more than any institution, is seen as least fair; 57 percent of the general population say government serves the interest of only the few, while 30 percent say government serves the interests of everyone. Evidence suggests that today, more than ever, people want to have a greater say in shaping the policies that affect their lives beyond the opportunity to vote every few years. The «stealth democracy» thesis, which argues that people do not want to intervene in public policy and they care only about outcomes, has come under scrutiny. Citizens' perceptions of fairness, in process as much as in outcome, is a critical dimension of their trust in government. Paul Webb coined the concept of 'dissatisfied democrats' – people who are unhappy with the current state of democracy, but are enthusiastic about all forms of political participation, which are more active and deliberative. More recent empirical research in the United States has found that a majority of people are willing to take an opportunity to deliberate with fellow citizens and their member of Congress; moreover, «those most willing to deliberate are precisely those who are turned off by standard partisan and interest group politics» [7]. Notable there is a certain political establishment, which «in the name of its geopolitical and value systems» specifically demonstrates double standards in relation to political and civil protests (the ban on abortion in Poland, «yellow vests» in France, events in Belarus, etc.), which provokes political actors to join discussion. The policy of double standards is a fundamentally different application of principles, laws, rules, assessments to the same type of actions of various subjects: the actions of «insiders» are justified, while the same actions of «outsiders» are condemned and considered unacceptable.

This is explained and justified by the political reality in which «all versus all» type of struggle is being waged. And in this struggle is waged by fair means or foul. In this context, it is appropriate to recall that this principle was adhered to by N. Machiavelli, who argued that there is no room for sentimentality in politics, and a good politician can deceive for the good of the state [4, p. 109-136]. But, unfortunately, what is good for one nation is bad for another. If the current trends in the world continue, the use of double standards will intensely develop. This process was recorded back in the last century by the famous futurologist A. Toffler [8, p. 43-46]. He presented that the world is becoming more inconstant, incomprehensible, unstable, and this represents a shocking future as a challenge to humanity. Durability and inviolability remain in the past, today the demand for momentary utility is increasing (probably the society will be challenged by Brexit and, potentially in the near future, by efforts to weaken the United Kingdom with increasing pressure for Scottish independence and a local drum beat for a border poll). This essential tendency is reflected in modern forms of international interaction. Today the form is becoming more and more disposable. If previously international law could be likened to a sturdy barrel for storing wine, today it is more of a paper bag that is easy to dispose of as soon as its contents are consumed.

The political cynicism of the elites shows itself in a disdainful attitude towards universal values, in justifying the exclusiveness of the managerial role and the need to distance the ruling circles from the masses, in self-confidence and denial of a critical attitude towards decisions being made. Manifestation of political cynicism is recruiting into the administrative apparatus on the basis of loyalty and personal devotion. As a result - lack of principle and looking for ways to avoid responsibility by managers at various levels. The cynical reaction involves claim that legal enrichment is much more effective than robbery, and besides, it is also protected by law. «What does bank robbery mean in comparison to the establishment of a new bank?» - said Bertold Brecht in «The Threepenny Opera». The political cynicism of the elites as an abuse of power transforms the vertical pressure of power on the population into various forms of horizontal pressure, intolerance and aggressiveness, social apathy and atomization.

Political cynicism in the international arena is becoming a generally accepted phenomenon and associated with the vulgarly understood notion of political success («love yourself, be cynical in your choice»). This is indeed some characteristic of modern discourse, philosophical and informational culture. The modern political cynicism demonstrated by the mass media has become a particular «occupational disease» of politicians and media figures. Conflict discourse aimed at discrediting a political opponent is based on the use of «political exposure»: insults, verbal attacks, degrading statements. The scandal is being «politically accustomed» as a regular cynical means of political struggle.

Specifically, the discrediting form of conflict discourse associated with moral nihilism, violation of the communication norms and behavior that manifests itself in political cynicism. This is a person’s total defenselessness in face of total political information, which deprives him of the means of protection. Thus meanings and ideas that are put into people's heads don’t correspond to their true preferences and opinions.

Cynicism and pragmatism are the same European values as human rights. Historically in the European tradition, there has always been a powerful rationalization of emotions and desires (all crusades in one way or another were reduced to one thing - looting, seizing new territories, but under moral godly slogans). Similar hypocrisy can be seen in contemporary international politics.

Let’s look at the lessons of political cynicism from a democratic Europe. The most striking examples of the use of political cynicism in the geopolitical practice of the XX century are the Munich agreement (1938), the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR (August 1939) and the Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and the Reich (September 1939).

The Europe of values gave way to the Europe of pragmatism and now to the one of a cynical politics. Ukraine, as an aggrieved party in the conflict with Russia, to some extent tried to break this system, speaking about its interests from viewpoint of their values – «we need, but you must». However, the impulses for the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are actively opposed by the politically stable European position: «security - yes, interests - yes, but what do we care about your problems?» Over the years of confrontation with Russia, Ukraine has failed to become politically and economically interesting enough for Europe to push Russia to the margins. The Ukrainian government was unable to offer the Europeans investment-worthy projects of such a level and in such a number. This European position (dialogue and communication with cunning hints for the purpose of certain benefits) itself drives Europe into a trap, which in the near future will be quite safe, so «why not take the risk».

At the same time, the European community doesn't hurry in Russia's embrace. At best, it arranges its affairs at the expense of Moscow (Turkey agreed to lay a gas pipeline on its territory, while bargaining for substantial discounts in gas prices and immediately opposed the annexation of Crimea). So Russia urgently showed international support for the so-called «healthy powers» of Europe and America. But there is nothing new or unexpected here. This is what the Soviet Union did, organizing and financing from the communist parties and relevant public organizations the movement of peace supporters, protest demonstration against American policy. They gathered all over the world, since it is not difficult in democratic states. They shouted slogans from the stands, wrote declarations, demands, etc. But the effect was practically zero. Therefore, on the pages of «Pravda» and «Izvestia», the USSR's main newspapers, much was written about international support for the Soviet peace policy.

Using the Soviet Union's experience and the newly formed states after its collapse, we can conclude that the cynicism generated by political mistakes manifests itself, on the one hand, in mass disappointment in the consistency of managerial practices, and, on the other hand, in the substitution of concepts and masking of cynicism with conditionally necessary ad hoc positive categories, provided that in parallel there is a stigmatization of those who disagree with such negative *clichés* as «the fifth column», «national traitors» and others [9, p. 73-81].

It should be noted that Soviet political cynicism has grown so deeply into the consciousness of the Soviet people that, even after becoming citizens of independent states, feeling the «freedom of speech's taste», renewing the process of forming their identity, their political reformatting is still inhibited. «And the greatest, most undoubted scoundrel has never yet reached such cynicism to publicly recognize himself as a scoundrel and be proud of this title» - this is how Saltykov-Shchedrin described the eternal city Glupov [10, p. 277]. The depth of the «political zombification» of post-Soviet societies with Soviet cynicism can be described in a similar way. But in order to assert this with confidence, one needs impressive arguments and evidences, it is necessary to «measure» the manifestation of political cynicism. To measure it at the present stage of development of political science, there are various approved methods [11, p. 123-135; 12, p. 425-447]. in which political cynicism can be viewed also as a factor that undermines people's faith in the ability to influence the actions of politicians. The more people believe that politicians are dishonest, lie to voters and care only about their own interests, the less they believe that politicians will react to their actions. It can be noted that political cynicism has the same effect on the perception of conviction in the unreliability and incompetence of politicians.

But in this situation, we can observe an unambiguous paradox in the actions of political elites holding leading positions in the state. Instead of increasing the level of legitimacy, establishing contact with society and endearing it to themselves, the elites seek to strengthen their positions by any ways, ignoring all the principles of the state’s democratic functioning and concentrating only on increasing their own powers by any means. And political cynicism in this situation acts as a key instrument to achieve this goal.

The most dangerous from the point of view of preserving statehood is the loss of a balance between the constructive use of mechanisms for forming an state policy and the excesses in the use of manipulative technologies to control society and public opinion. Otherwise, the crisis prevention policy will result in a rapid increase in confrontation within society and towards the state, which in the future will be able to lead to the levelling of the legitimacy of political institutions and the crisis of statehood in general [13, p. 307].

Hence, the level of trust in a country’s political management is inversely proportional to the level of political cynicism that guides it in the process of making and implementing political decisions.

Results. For a comparative analysis on the level of preservation and political cynicism’s spread in the former Soviet republics, the study used the index of trust in the government (political management of the state), the data of which is inversely proportional to the level of involvement of political cynicism in the implementation of state policy. Data taken from the «Nations in Transit» research conducted annually by the non-governmental organization «Freedom House» [14, 15].

The numbers in this study range from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the highest level of trust in the government and, therefore, the lowest level of political cynicism. And 7, on the contrary, attests to distrust of the state’s political management and a high level of manifestation of political cynicism in political elites’ decisions and actions.

A branch of states was selected for the analysis that are most distinguished by Soviet heredity: the clearly defined leaders of the democratic vector of development (the Baltic states, in particular Latvia), transit states (Ukraine, Moldova), with partially authoritarian tendencies (Armenia) and consolidated authoritarian regimes (Belarus, Russia). These states were divided into two groups for purposes of clarity and convenience in analyzing the data obtained. In one of them, along with states characterized by consolidated authoritarian regimes, a transit state was added to construct the diagram. And in the second, one of the leaders of the democratic vector of development in the post-Soviet space was added to the transit and partially authoritarian states.

The period from 2000 to 2020 was chosen as the time interval. This is explained by the fact that after gaining independence and until 2000 post-Soviet states were «at dawn» of building statehood, which was accompanied, as it so happens, by a protracted process of searching for options and forms of further development acceptable for each of them, and by strong influence of the universal Soviet legacy. The period from 2000 to 2010 shows the current result of building of independent states, illustrated by the level of residual influence of the legacy of Soviet cynicism.

And the period from 2010 to 2020 characterizes current trends and possible concerns associated with the preservation and spread of political cynicism in the former Soviet republics.

Analysis of the research results (Figure 2 and Figure 3) showed that in both the first period (2000-2010) and the second one (2010-2020), there is no significant dynamics of political affinity and trust in state's political management in Latvia. Over the entire time period, it remains stably high, and therefore the level of manifestation of political cynicism in political elites' activity is quite low.



Figure 2. The level of manifestation of political cynicism in the political elites' activity in Armenia, Moldova, Latvia

Source: *Developed by the authors based on Nations in Transit Report (2000-2020) data*

This can't be said about other states. It is noteworthy that both in transit states (Ukraine, Moldova) and partially authoritarian (Armenia), and in consolidated authoritarian regimes (Russia, Belarus), despite the fact that the states chose different political guidelines for development, in the period from 2000 to 2010 there was an active growth of mistrust and the preservation of the Soviet traditions of political cynicism (the persistent conviction of citizens that politicians and political institutions of different political doctrines cannot be trusted, they cannot be relied on) - the period of the «Soviet legacy».

In the next decade, such an active dynamic was not observed in the above mentioned states. This period is characterized by «political depersonalization of cynicism». Citizens of the former Soviet republics cannot get rid of this «Soviet legacy» still, which over time has developed into a «Soviet aftertaste» - «a state of deliberate disappointment - a readiness for the usual worst-case scenario» [16, p. 365]. And if the trend does not change, then a consistently high level of manifestation of political cynicism in political elites' activity may lead to the danger of statehood's existence.



Figure 3. The level of manifestation of political cynicism in the political elites' activity in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus

Source: *Developed by the authors based on Nations in Transit Report (2000-2020) data*

At the same time, any attempts to revive the formula of Henry John Palmerston («Great Britain has no constant friends or enemies but rather constant interests») [17, p. 182-209] can only aggravate the international situation and a qualitatively new round of political confrontation.

Conclusion. The universalism of political cynicism lies in the fact that it has always been present in the political arena and played a very significant role in states' functioning. Various political elites actively used the spread of political cynicism in their instrumental arsenal to maintain power. In the short term, it could bear a positive impact. However, in the long term, the abuse of political cynicism could deal a crushing blow to statehood.

Widespread in both Western democracies and post-Soviet states political cynicism created certain rules of the game, when each party, both the political elite and society, obeyed them. Although, in fact, both sides were well aware of the falsity of political statements and norms, but at the same time were masking political cynicism with the concepts of protecting state interests, preserving sovereignty and building universal rules of the game in a geopolitical context.

Certainly, society became the most vulnerable link as a result of political cynicism's use. That was exactly who directly felt on itself all the negative manifestations of the consequences of political cynicism's use, which rightly led to a decrease in the legitimacy of the state's political management.

The conducted study shows that the overwhelming majority of post-Soviet states (with the exception being the Baltic states) have not managed to get rid of the universal Soviet legacy in the form of political cynicism. On the contrary, after gaining independence and building various forms of statehood, the level of trust in the states' political management had sharply declined. The explanation for this is an excessive manifestation of political cynicism in the political elites' activity. In the last decade, there has been a «political depersonalization of cynicism», which is also a frightening process, since as a result a consistently high level of manifestation of political cynicism can lead to the danger to statehood's existence.

In the long term, the impact of post-Soviet political cynicism is that such a mechanism of value decline «politically corrupts and suppresses» the authority of the elite political groups themselves, making them internally sterile, unproductive and unfruitful. As a result, it can lead to the disappearance of any ideas about the future, the ability to make choices and changes, to introduce new meanings or guidelines for the states' further development. The danger of an inconsistent policy using the tools of political cynicism poses a threat of a geopolitical scale, forms permanent mistrust and leads to the complete discrediting of state structures.

Thereby a prerequisite for chaos and disorientation of modern political relations is created, which in turn forms the background for the further formation of geopolitical confrontations and regional interstate and intrastate socio-civil, ethnic and political conflicts.

REFERENCES

1. *Dictionary of Ethics* (1975) edited by Kon I. 1975, P. 342.

2. Gulevich, O., Krivoshchekov, V. & Shmygaleva, S. (2020). Political cynicism: Russian-language scale to measure negative attitudes towards politicians. *Psychological research*, 13(73), P. 3. Retrieved from: http://psystudy.ru/images/stories/n73/gulevich73.pdf (Last accessed: 25.02.2021)

3. Dekker, H., Meijerink, F. (2012). Political cynicism: Conceptualization, operationalization, and explanation. *Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 3, P. 33-48.

4. Machiavelli, N. (1998). *The Prince*. Rostov-on-Don, P. 109-136.

5. Garcelon, M. (2005). *Revolutionary Passage. From Soviet to Post-Soviet Russia, 1985 – 2000*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, P. 39.

6. Žižek, S. (1999). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. Moscow: Art magazine, P. 129-130.

7. Edelman Trust Barometer 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.edelman.com/trust/2020-trust-barometer (Last accessed: 21.02.2021).

8. Toffler, A. (2002). *Future Shock*. Moscow: ACT Publishing House, P. 43-46.

9. Obolonsky, A. (2016). Political cynicism: concept, practice, alternative. *Social sciences and modernity*, Vol. 2, P. 73-81.

10. Saltykov-Shchedrin, M. (1965). *Satires in prose. To the reader.* Collected works in 20 volumes. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, T. 3, P. 277.

11. Heiss, R., Matthes, J. (2016). Mobilizing for some. The effects of politicians' participatory Facebook posts on young people's political efficacy. *Journal of Media Psychology*, Vol. 28, P. 123-135.

12. Lin, M.-C., Haridakis, P.M. & Hanson, G. (2016). The role of political identity and media selection on perceptions of hostile media bias during the 2012 Presidential campaign. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*, Vol. 60, P. 425-447.

13. Prymush, M., Lavrynenko, H. (2020). Political Identity as a Security Factor of Ukrainian Statehood. *Przegląd Strategiczny*, Issue 13, P. 297-316. DOI:10.14746/ps.2020.1.18

14. Nations in Transit 2020, (Alldata – Nations in Transit, 2005–2020 – EXCEL – old scale). Retrieved from: https:// freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit (Last accessed: 27.02.2021).

15. Nations in Transit 2009, (Alldata – Nations in Transit, 2000–2009). Retrieved from: http://web.archive.org/web/20131208063353/http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2009/ukraine (Last accessed: 27.02.2021).

16. Sloterdijk, P. (2009). *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Yekaterinburg: U-Factoria, Moscow: ASTMOSKVA, P. 365.

17. Vinogradov, V. (2006). Lord Palmerston in European Diplomacy. *New and Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, P. 182-209.

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042606**

5. THE BORDER STRATEGY OF TOURISM AND RECREATIONAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF PANDEMIC COVID-19

Nataliia Warga
Dr. habil. in the Department of Sociology and Social Work
Uzhgorod National University
E-mail: ignatola23@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0002-6607-2969

Karolina Sribna
Postgraduate student at the Department of Sociology and Social Work
Uzhgorod National University
E-mail: sribna007@gmail.com

Yevhenii Hoblyk
Postgraduate student at the Department of Sociology and Social Work
Uzhgorod National University
E-mail: goblikyevg1996@gmail.com

Introduction. The emergence of new directions of informal employment of the border region caused by the contradictory and complex nature of the transformation process, a significant deepening of disparities in the labor market, the complexity of the self-employment structure and the high level of labor migration. This stipulates that the development of social practices of informal employment in the border region should be based on a regional strategy for socio-economic development of the region, taking into account the inherent complexity of social determinants: *first*, social and economic resources available in the region, which is the basis of agricultural production with a predominance of subsistence agriculture; *second*, the status of the border region; *third*, the extent of foreign labor migration in the region; *fourth*, social and ethnic composition and language specifics of the region; *fifth*, social and historical background and cultural traditions of the region; *sixth*, the natural climatic conditions and the tourism potential of the region.

At present in Ukraine, there are fundamental changes to employment systems, the transformation of labor behavior of the population. In particular, as we noted, focus on self-employment of the private farms in subsistence agriculture as a source of income (additional or basic) is an objective necessity for many segments of the working population. Further development of private farms should be based on the harmonious unity of economic, environmental and social factors in order to make full use of the production and resource potential of rural areas, which is based on the labor resources of the population. These conditions significantly increase the value of scientific works devoted to rural employment, regional peculiarities of the demographic and socio-economic situation in rural areas, problems and perspectives of the functioning of private farms as the main direction of self-employment in rural areas.

An important component of the Transcarpathia Economy should be the development of tourism. Unfortunately, most profit operations are not reflected in official statistics. In 2019 the local budgets Transcarpathian region paid UAH 8,560.1 tourist tax, but this amount does not match the actual amount of profit from the operation of the tourism industry.

However, Transcarpathia local budgets in January-November this year, supplemented by more than 6 million tourist tax. This is 25% less than last year during the same period. During 11 months of 2020, UAH 6,207,200 of tourist tax was paid to the local budgets of Transcarpathian region, which is 25 percent less than in the same period last year.

The largest amounts of tourist tax went to the local budgets of the united territorial communities: Polyana (Svalyava district) - UAH 1,726.0 thousand; Uzhhorod - UAH 643.7 thousand; Uzhhorod district - UAH 633.9 thousand; Mizhhirya district - UAH 459.5 thousand; Perechyn district - UAH 366.6 thousand; Mukachevo - UAH 337.2 thousand; Berehiv district - 310.2 thousand UAH; Khust district - 288.8 thousand UAH; Rakhiv district - UAH 282.9 thousand; Volovets district - 227.0 thousand UAH and Vynohradiv district - 221.9 thousand UAH.

Literature review. The need for scientific substantiation of new directions of informal employment in the regional labor market caused by the contradictory and complex nature of the transformation period, deepening imbalances in the labor market, complicating the structure of self-employment due to the emergence of its various organizational forms. The severity and complexity of the practical solution of these problems, as noted by O. Kuznetsova, O. Karnaukhova, L. Shevchenko, necessitates the development of new methodologies and methods for studying the processes of public participation in the informal sphere and the implementation of opportunities in the regional labor market in the context of promising socio-economic development of Ukraine and its regions. Despite the continued existence of the devastating long-term unemployment problem in Ukraine, this phenomenon is not obtained the required coverage in the scientific literature.

Another counterbalance to centrifugal sentiment is the revenue from tourism and related services. The real weight of tourism, taking into account the shadow sector, is at least 20-25% of the regional product of Transcarpathia. Even transport, the financial sector, agriculture and other sectors that seem independent of tourism seem to be «launched» and supported by the costs of tourists.

Due to the low level of competition ratio «price-quality» hotels, restaurants and other tourist sites are clearly worse than in similar facilities across the border. This can be partly explained by the low income of local residents.

In the broadest sense the concept of «rural tourism» meant tourism in rural homes or farms or in rural areas in general, but does not include holidays at special recreational areas such as national parks, forest areas and others. It should be noted that there is no complete unity in defining the terms that characterize the rest in the village («rural tourism», «green tourism», «agritourism», «ecotourism») [2].

Results. In general, all forms of rural tourism have good prospects for development, because recreation in the countryside has obvious advantages, as it combines the interests of homestead owners, rural community and tourists.

The advantages of rural tourism for the owner of the farmstead are manifested in additional income (sometimes, perhaps, only the sole for the family); use of free means of the economy; aesthetic and cultural development of family members; intensification of the peasant family, reliance on self-sufficiency and development.

The main advantages of rural tourism for the rural community are the increase in employment; trade intensification (mushrooms, medicinal herbs, wild berries); preservation and development of the cultural and historical heritage of the village (wooden churches, estates); rural infrastructure development; intensification of the rural community.

However, rural tourism is expanding the scope of rural employment and gives them income, expanding employment opportunities in the service sector [3]. For the border region of Transcarpathia, the development and legalization of functioning tourist facilities can be an important resource in the accumulation of resources and development of the region.

The formation of rural tourism is under the influence of various factors, the positive factors include the presence in the region of mountainous areas with unique natural, historical, ethnographic and recreational resources. The negative factors include underdeveloped rural infrastructure and communications (especially the condition of roads), which is to some extent offset by low prices for recreation. Also, a negative impact on tourism development has: general political and economic instability; lack of legal support for the development of rural tourism; low level of infrastructure and communications; the insufficient level of staffing, advertising and information support [3].

The analysis of these factors allowed us to identify and group the main conditions, compliance with which will create a favorable climate for the consolidation and further development of rural tourism (Table 14).

Table 14

Development conditions of Rural Tourism

Development conditions of Rural Tourism		
In the region and in the village	**At the farm**	**In a rural family**
countryside; purity of nature; availability of infrastructure; a number of tourist facilities availability;	availability of households; provision of eco-products; safety of guests;	unemployed family members; the friendliness of the hosts; guarantees of quality service; possibility to provide additional services.

Source*: own study*

So, as we see, the unemployed villagers (owners of tourist facilities) do not have enough desire to provide services in this area. First, they must also be sociable and have some rural handicrafts in the household. Second, the household must provide tourists normal living conditions and quality of food. Third, not all regions of Ukraine are interesting for agro-tourists. The most attractive are the areas with clean, picturesque nature and proper infrastructure (especially attractive are the mountainous areas of Transcarpathia).

Fundamental changes in the development of self-employment can be achieved provided effective realization of economic and administrative areas of assistance: formation of entrepreneurs preferential taxation; creation of new specialized state funds and developed network of financial institutions, insurance companies, investment funds and insurance, friendly societies and credit insurance; the involvement of state and local budgets, extra-budgetary funds, private domestic and foreign investors.

In Ukraine, the economic activity of the population in the field of self-employment is largely realized through work in personal farms, sales of agricultural products (70.5% of total self-employed), temporary seasonal employment and the provision of various individual services by the subject, not registered neither as a legal entity nor as a private entrepreneur, the self-employment sector in Ukraine are mostly informal. The motivational mechanism of state support self-employment involves the interaction of appropriate tools implemented within the economic and social policy [4].

The study of self-employment in private farms is an integral part of the overall analysis of the labor market. This is due to the fact that personal peasant farms today are the only area that can quickly absorb the surplus labor released from social production as a result of reform. Only a comprehensive analysis of self-employment in these farms will allow them to develop correct recommendations for making truly effective management decisions in the field of self-employment regulation in the rural labor market and the labor market in general.

At the present stage in Ukraine, there are radical changes in employee attitudes, the transformation of labor behavior of the population. In particular, the focus on the self-employment of the rural population in the informal sphere of personal farms as a source of income (additional or basic) is becoming an objective necessity for many segments of the working population.

In general, all forms of rural tourism have good prospects for development, because recreation in the countryside has obvious advantages, as it combines the interests of homestead owners, rural community and tourists.

The advantages of rural tourism for the owner of the farmstead are manifested in additional income (sometimes, perhaps, only for the family); free use of facilities management; aesthetic and cultural development of family members; revitalization of a peasant family.

The main advantages of rural tourism for the rural community are the increase in employment; trade intensification (mushrooms, medicinal herbs, wild berries); preservation and development of cultural and historical heritage of the village (wooden churches, estates); rural infrastructure development; intensification of the rural community.

It is necessary to identify the main positive factors influencing the development of rural tourism in Ukraine: first, the increased demand for recreation in the countryside (especially among wealthy citizens); unique historical and ethnographic heritage of villages (rural color); rich recreational resources; ecological cleanliness of the countryside; free housing for receiving tourists, availability of free labor resources for tourist services; traditional hospitality of the hosts; affordable price for rest; the possibility of providing a range of additional services for excursions, fishing, picking berries and mushrooms, horseback riding in accordance with all customer preferences.

Areas of rural tourism development: preferential tax regime, financial support for the development of rural tourism by the private sector and its coordination by the government; division of rural areas into recreation areas and green areas, where coastal and wine farmsteads, horse farms, fishing houses are created; specialization of agrotourism for gastronomic and tasting; joint development of agrotourism and resort business; opportunity for agrotourists to harvest, prepare dairy products, graze livestock [5].

The next step in the formation of rural tourism should be implementation of the European experience of development has brought positive results in different countries. Analysis of activities that contributed to the formation of rural tourism in Europe has allowed highlight promising areas, the main and most common of which is a preferential tax treatment.

Rural tourism is an important area of self-employment of the rural population, contributing to solving social and economic problems of the village. However, for the sustainable development of rural tourism, it is necessary first of all to streamline the regulatory framework for its regulation and to form a rational mechanism of operation. At the same time, it is worth using the experience of developed countries, remembering that there is no single «recipe for success».

The pandemic of Covid-19 has negatively affected the development of tourism. Thus, it should be noted that 4 billion allocated for compensation of interest on existing loans and for micro and small enterprises, as well as expanded program available loans (5-7-9%); UAH 24 billion to provide loans with state investment guarantees; UAH 1.6 billion to support creative industries. The term of land tax on land rent and property tax, payment of which was held in April 2020, was extended until June 30, 2020, and similar taxes by March 2020 canceled. Temporary unemployment benefits for those who lost their jobs as a result of Covid-19 are paid in the amount of two thirds of the amount of salary for each reduced working hour, but not more than the established minimum monthly salary (currently UAH 4,723 or € 150) ; increasing pensions and unemployment benefits [6].

The Government of Ukraine continues to work to minimize the effects of the pandemic on the national economy and has proposed a number of measures, both financial and non-financial, aimed at mitigating the impact of these effects on public life, business and the economy. Tourism has historically been considered a relatively small sector in the Ukrainian economy, and therefore has not received any concrete and tangible measures to minimize the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. On the other hand, the government reorganized the Department of Tourism and Resorts of the Ministry of Economy and Trade of Ukraine and created the State Agency for Tourism Development. Currently, efforts are aimed at strengthening the position of the State Agency through human resources and financial support from the state budget. With regard to measures implemented at the national level to minimize the effects of the pandemic, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine submitted a bill № 337911, which addresses the following issues: exemption of tourism service providers from VAT, income tax and single social contribution, land tax and tax on non-residential real estate. Abolition of tourist tax by the end of 2020.

Proposal. An important area of self-employment of the rural population of the border Transcarpathian region is the tourist and recreational sphere, which contributes not only to solving socio-economic problems, but also the socio-cultural development of the region. However, most of the profits from the tourism industry are not legalized, as the owners of tourist and recreational facilities are not motivated to pay social security contributions. In addition, almost the entire tourist infrastructure of the region is based on informal social employment, because most people in this area do not work on the basis of an employment contract, but on the terms of oral employment. However, for the stable development of rural tourism in the region, it is necessary, first of all, to streamline the legal mechanisms for the functioning of social practices of informal employment in this area.

It was found that the desire to provide quality services in the field of green tourism is not enough for unemployed rural residents of the Transcarpathian region to start their own business, because: *first*, they must be sociable and have certain rural crafts; *second*, they must have appropriate conditions to provide tourists with comfortable accommodation and quality food; *third*, not every border region in Ukraine can provide quality services, for example, for car- or agrotourism, the most attractive are those villages that not only have a picturesque nature, but also the appropriate infrastructure.

REFERENCES

1. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-tourism/3129940-zakarpatta-zarobilo-ponad-5-miljoniv-griven-turisticnogo-zboru.html

2. Savchenko V. F., Stoika V. O. (2010) Problemy ta perspektyvy rozvytku silskoho turyzmu v Ukraini. Problems and prospects of rural tourism development in Ukraine. [Problems and prospects of rural tourism development in Ukraine]. Ekonomika ta upravlinnia natsionalnym hospodarstvom: Naukovyi visnyk ChDIEU. № 4 (8). S. 5–13.

3. Varha N. I. (2013) Samozainiatist naselennia yak forma sotsialno-ekonomichnoi adaptatsii: rehionalnyi aspekt. [Self-employment as a form of socio-economic adaptation: a regional aspect]. Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho

Natsionalnoho universytetu. Seriia: «Pedahohika i sotsialna robota». Uzhhorod : Uzhhorodskyi natsionalnyi universytet.Vyp. 28. S. 25–30.

4. Ihnatolia N. I., Riul V. O. (2010) Vplyv sotsialnoho seredovyshcha na rozvytok ekonomichnykh praktyk samozabezpechennia (neformalne pidpryiemnytstvo i trudova mihratsiia) naselennia Zakarpatskoho rehionu. [The influence of the social environment on the development of economic practices of self-sufficiency (informal entrepreneurship and labor migration) of the population of the Transcarpathian region]. Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu. Seriia sotsiolohichna. Lviv : Lviv. nats. un-t im. Ivana Franka. Vyp. 4. S. 126–134.

5. https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#U

II. DESTABILIZATION POSSIBILITIES OF THE RISK SOCIETY

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042607**

6. THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON EDUCATION IN THE ASPECT OF INCREASING INEQUALITY (AS EXAMPLE OF SCHOOL EDUCATION)

Valentyna Chepak
Doctor of Sociological Sciences (Dr. habil.)
Professor, Dean of the Faculty of Sociology
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
E-mail: chepak02@ukr.net
RCID ID 0000-0002-4952-0029

Iryna Nechitailo
Doctor of Sociological Sciences (Dr. habil.)
Professor of the Department of Sociology and Psychology
Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs
E-mail: nechit@ukr.net
ORCID ID 0000-0002-0656-0370

Tamara Zverko
Candidate of sociological sciences
Dean of the Faculty «Social Management»
Private higher education institution
Kharkiv Humanitarian University
«People's Ukrainian Academy»
E-mail: tamarazverko@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0002-4897-54-51

Martin Kalamković
PhD-student of Faculty of Education in Sombor
University of Novi Sad
Specialist in special pedagogy
Primary and secondary school «Milan Petrovic»,
Novi Sad, Serbia
E-mail: kalamkovic@gmail.com

Jovana Kalamković
student of EDUCONS University
Novi Sad, Serbia
E-mail: joca.kalamkovic@gmail.com

Introduction. Social, political, and economical problems manifested during the pandemic are not so much a result of quarantine measures, but of the vulnerability of modern social institutions. A definite indicator of this vulnerability as well as the inadequacy of the mechanisms of (repeated) social production is the deepening of social inequality. In our opinion, the indicative statement of an international public figure and writer A. Roy who noticed that the Covid-19 «appears to be using x-rays to display the deep lines of discord on the social body» [1, p. 10] is a good description. Let us pay detailed attention to the consideration of these «lines of discord» which symbolize educational inequality.

Literature review. Considering the fact that the problem of organizing and implementation of education in the designated facilities during a pandemic is new, there are still not enough scientific studies about the relevant questions, especially the particular questions regarding an aspect of social inequality. most scientific papers and other research contain statistical data and other facts in connection with the level of involvement of students in distance learning, indicating the willingness of teachers to such training. they also contain suggestions for efficient education organization in quarantine conditions [4; 8; 10; 15]. The authors of this source tackle the problem of educational inequality only indirectly. only a few articles whose authors are foreign researchers S. Black, C. A. Spreenb, S. Vally are dedicated to the question of social and growing educational inequality during covid-19 [1]. Therefore, we state the lack of information regarding these questions, which actualizes the need for detailed consideration and analysis of the manifestation of inequality in education and the factors of its deepening during a pandemic, which is, in fact, the purpose of this paper.

Results. The situation of growth and deepening of educational inequality will illustrate four countries which have a significant difference in the level and quality of life[5]: United States of America, South Africa, Serbia, and Ukraine.

All of these countries have in common that schools are not only for educational purposes but also a parental (disciplinary) function: child care, behavioral correction, providing food, safety, health, etc. This situation is especially regarding South African children, whose families make so little money that they cannot provide adequate living conditions at home. Even before the pandemic, only

[5] The specifics of ranging of countries in regards to their social development (Social Progress Index) is that for most of such ratings the main orientational factor is not BDP, but the parameters important for “ordinary” people: access to education, ecological situation, medical and residential insurance, etc. These parameters, according to the author’s rating show the real-life standard in each country and regarding that the level of their social progress. In 2018. The rating has been conducted in 146 countries. According to general indicators, all countries have been divided into 6 groups. The first group being the countries with high living standards, the last – with the lowest. The USA is in 25th place and is in the second category, Serbia and Ukraine are 47th and 64th place, respectively, and are in the third group. South Africa is in 77th place and is in the fourth category [20].

8% of students (those coming from the middle and upper class) had had a chance to attend a school whose public financing was high enough to provide more or less quality education. Limitation of finance for the educational system in South Africa during a pandemic has further deepened the educational inequality since children from families with little income have been left not only without education at all but without proper food and care [1, p. 5].

The USA, compared to South Africa on the world rating list is much higher on the scale according to its living standard (Ukraine is in 64th place after Jordan and Cuba, 2018). Nonetheless, it seems that this does not mean a better situation regarding educational inequality. According to South African scientists [1, p. 2], in the USA «the pandemic has discovered numerous axes of exploitation, expropriation, and social exclusion, not only by showing it but also deepening the social injustice» [1, p. 9]. The public schools here have to compete with the charter and private ones. The USA has one of the biggest levels of educational inequalities due to its high decentralized finance structures and because schools are financed from local property taxes. Education in the USA is the biggest component of the country's budget, so it is exactly that component that has suffered a cutting during the pandemic in favor of the redistribution of the finance to other spheres. So, there is a big amount of school in the States which do not meet the needs of their students due to very limited sources. The same as in South Africa, in the USA during a pandemic, millions of children from poor families have been denied not only minimal conditions of educations but of safety, social support, and medical care.

Inequality in education in South Africa and the United States had further worsened economic and gender gaps. The first has manifested in the literal starvation of children in low-income families and the second – worsening of gender discrimination. It has been shown that girls of school age from lower classes are not only exposed to a higher risk of gender violence outside of school but are less likely to have time for extracurricular activities at home because of doing chores [1, p. 13].

Serbia is in 47th place on the rating of social progress and prosperity and belongs to the three (out of six) country categories. Serbia is currently in the process of joining the EU. Therefore, we are working on the adjustments of legal regulations and standards towards the EU standards. One of the areas of changes is the education system. The analysis of the problem of education in Serbia (2014) identified the following problems: The low level of education of the population older than 15 years, significant regional and social differences in terms of the level of education, low quality, and insufficient relevance of the education at all levels. A special group of challenges is the low coverage of quality education, especially for children from vulnerable social groups [6, p. 21]. The results of measuring knowledge on the PISA test for 2018 show that more than one-third of 15-year-olds are functionally illiterate in the disciplines of reading, mathematics and science, and that percentage is even higher among students in three-year vocational schools (80%). It also states that nearly 30% of Primary and Secondary schools do not meet quality standards [7, p. 103]. It is emphasized that «there is a clear connection between students' achievement and growth at all tests and the final exam and the economic level of development of the municipality to which the school belongs» [16, p. 37]. We conclude that similar problems are repeated in all countries covered by this study.

To overcome these problems, the EU signed an agreement with the Republic of Serbia in October 2017 on financial support for education reforms, which envisages that the European Union will allocate 27.4 million Euros for training programs of 40,000 teachers, 4,000 teachers in minority languages and 7,000 scholarships to Roma children. Concerning the above report, the situation in critical areas has partially improved, but there are still visible social differences in the population. All this is projected on education as well.

This was the situation of the school system in Serbia before the arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic. Fortunately, during the period before the pandemic, one of the main tasks of the school reform was the digitalization of teaching. This process meant to equip schools and train teachers to use information technology in the teaching process. Most of the teaching staff in Serbia has undergone some form of training for the use of IT technologies in teaching. So, most teachers were trained to some extent for the implementation of on-line classes. The situation regarding the IT equipment of the population was as follows: 81% of households are connected to the Internet, and 74% own a computer. There is a difference between rural parts of Serbia and larger cities in favor of urban areas [19]. During the quarantine, classes are organized via the Internet and TV. Almost all school-age children (99%) had access to distance learning (school content via television and the Internet, communication with the teacher by telephone and the Internet, etc.) during the Covid-19 epidemic and used distance learning (98%). Children whose parents were unemployed, and children beneficiaries of social services did not have access to distance learning more frequently than the average. When it comes to the small number of school-age children who had access to distance learning but did not use it (0.6%), consistent socio-demographic characteristics do not stand out [17, p. 3]. It is expected that the current school closures lead to a significant decrease in learning. Experience from previous crises shows that school closures lower the level of knowledge and disproportionately affect members of vulnerable groups. A partial reduction in the number of students is also expected, especially among students from vulnerable social groups [5].

During the pandemic in Serbia, members of marginalized groups were the most vulnerable in terms of education: the Roma population, migrants, people with disabilities, and the poor. The majority of Roma organizations (68.42%) believe that the risks for Roma men and women in the field of inclusive education have increased during the duration of the restrictive measures. They see the basic manifestations of these risks in the lack of technical preconditions for monitoring teaching (electricity, internet, computers, tablets, and smartphones) and the lack of systemic measures to support learning. They also state the cessation of providing support to children by assistants, mentors, and facilitators in learning during the state of emergency [2, p. 12]. The majority of organizations of persons with disabilities (66.67%) believe that the risks for persons with disabilities in the field of inclusive education have increased during the duration of restrictive measures. This was manifested through the lack of a systematic approach in response to inclusive education, the lack of adapted on-line content for children with disabilities, as well as the fact that children did not receive adequate and adapted materials and tasks [2, p. 56]. Migrant children felt the consequences of the pandemic and quarantine the hardest. Their inclusion in the education system of Serbia was problematic even before the pandemic. Migrant children face many obstacles. Their education has already been hampered for several years due to distractions, trauma, and the need to help in their households. With the arrival of the pandemic, their position has become more difficult [9, p.14].

From all of the above, we conclude that Serbia has faced similar problems as other countries.

Ukraine occupies a middle position in terms of living standards between the United States and South Africa and is also not without problems of educational inequality (Ukraine ranks 64th in terms of living standards. After Jordan and Cuba, 2018). Compared to these countries, the situation with the financing of education in Ukraine did not change dramatically during the pandemic. However, it should be kept in mind that even in the best of times, funding for education was not sufficient. Thus, for example, since 2018, Ukraine has spent about 27,000 dollars per student for the entire period of their education from 6 to 15 years. This is significantly less than OECD countries - communities of developed countries with high incomes of citizens who adhere to the principles of market economy and democratic pluralism - spend on their students [15, p. 210]. By the way, insufficient funding is considered a factor that influenced the poor Ukrainian indicators in the PISA test in all three subject areas (reading, mathematics, science) [15, p. 211].

For 2020, it is planned to increase the budget funding for education in the nominal amount by 10.5% compared to 2019. As a result of Covid-19, it has become necessary to redistribute state budget expenditures. As a result, the total expenditures of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine decreased by 4.3%. About 60% of the reduction fell on targeted subsidies. The draft state budget of Ukraine for 2021. also includes an increase in spending on education by 34 billion UAH. It is planned to increase the costs of the general fund for various educational subsidies, including a new subsidy from the state budget to local budgets for activities aimed at combating the pandemic and its consequences in education [3]. However, unfortunately, in our opinion, this will not eliminate the problem of increasing and deepening educational inequality.

As noted in the Information and Analytical Proceedings of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine entitled «Education in Ukraine: Challenges and Prospects» (2020), the pandemic has deepened the problem of inequality in access to education. It is emphasized that the most negative impact of the pandemic was felt by students who are in difficult socio-economic conditions. For them, the educational process was actually interrupted [15, p. 214]. In April 2020, the Office of the Education Ombudsman, in order to study the conditions for ensuring the right of students to education during quarantine, conducted an online survey of parents and children attending general secondary education. The authors of the study note that the survey is not representative, however, important information was obtained about the presence of problematic questions that students and their parents were faced with during quarantine. A total of 8056 answers were received from respondents from all regions of Ukraine, except the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The study found that 85.1% of children continued their education during the quarantine. However, the forced transition to distance learning revealed serious organizational, educational, psycho-emotional, technical problems with ensuring the right to quality education. In 32.5% of the surveyed families, a partial or complete absence of technical equipment for distance learning was discovered. It is assumed that this figure is even higher because parents from rural areas could not participate in the research due to the lack of Internet connection and appropriate equipment. The Office of the Education Ombudsman notes that respect of the right to education in such conditions requires systemic changes, not only in the current legislative framework but also in the approach to its updating [15, p. 215].

Even before the outbreak of the pandemic, the results of the research showed a gap in the educational achievements of students due to the different socio-economic statuses of their families. As the result of an international study on the quality of PISA education in 2018. the show, children from poor and less educated families living in rural areas lag behind their peers with better social conditions by 2-3 years of schooling [18, p. 147]. It is known that more than 80 countries of the world participate in the PISA study. The study involved 5,998 Ukrainian students, as a representative sample of the total of 315,388 15-year-olds in Ukraine. Most of the students who participated in the study in 2018. attended the 9th and 10th grades of general secondary schools, educational complexes, lyceums, gymnasiums, specialized schools, or in the first year of higher education institutions at that time. The sample did not include all pupils /students of Ukraine. The general population of 15-year-olds, on the basis of which a sample of participants in the main phase of PISA-2018 was formed, did not include pupils and students living and studying in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol, and certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Thus, the sample represented only 87% of the general population of 15-year-old Ukrainian students.

The results of the PISA survey showed that in Ukraine, students with high socioeconomic status are two to three times more likely to achieve high academic results than their peers with low socio-economic status. PISA assesses the socio-economic status of students using the Economic, Social and Cultural Status Index (ESCS), calculated on the basis of several variables related to the origin of students, including education and work of students' parents; quality of living space, which indicates the material well-being of the family, books and other educational resources [15, p. 143].

Students with lower socio-economic status most often study in regular general education schools and live in small towns or villages. Students from large cities have more opportunities to study in lyceums, grammar schools, and specialized schools, which is why their level of knowledge in reading, mathematics, and natural sciences is significantly higher than the level of knowledge of other peers. The maximum difference between students whose educational institutions are located in large cities and students whose educational institutions are located in villages is more than 2 grades. This gap in achievements, a characteristic of countries with high and highest rates of socio-economic inequality among citizens, is considered very high [15, p. 145].

Despite the equality of the right of all citizens to education, the so-called «invisible barriers» to educational inequality have always existed and still do, they ensure the process of reproduction of social inequality. Foreign experts A. Osipov and N. Matveev point out the following barriers to inequality in education [14, p. 40]:

1) monitoring (educating students according to their abilities);
2) commercialization of education;
3) specifics of the relationship between teachers and students;
4) structure of the student's family and its size;
5) attitude of parents towards the value of their children's education;
6) language abilities of students, which determine their academic success.

In the context of quarantine measures and the transition of education to the distance format, these barriers are gaining even more emphasis, especially those concerning the attitude towards education value. According to the results of the above - mentioned PISA study, those students who are not supported by parents or very poorly supported in the learning process have an average of 10 points less in PISA subject areas than students whose parents supported them in the learning process [15, p. 145]. We can add that in addition to the attitude of parents towards the value of education of their children (according to A. Osipov and N. Matveieva), this barrier is formed due to the value attitude of students towards their education, as well as family attitude towards education itself. Educational inequality in Ukraine - is not related to the differentiation between in-state and non-state schools and the problem of insufficient funding. The most influential factors in deepening educational inequality are not so much economic as socio-cultural in nature.

Parents from the lower class of society, or those who earn a living by non-intellectual (or routine non-physical) work, as a rule not only have a low level of education, but also low educational aspirations related to education itself. Such claims and values are usually adopted by their children, which does not contribute to the motivation to acquire knowledge and achieve educational success [12, p. 177; 13, p. 45]. In quarantine conditions, when the process of acquiring education is much more complicated, and success largely depends on the motivation of the students themselves and the support of parents, the chances of children from lower-income class of society to gain a sufficient level of knowledge is minimal. Therefore, the situation is not improved by providing online education, because students with low educational motivation at best only imitate the learning process, and at worst do not learn at all. The transition of education to online mode only increases the manifestation of educational inequality, because this format requires not only high-speed Internet but also sufficiently powerful devices that enable work with multimedia content. Therefore, providing sufficient conditions for the education of students from low-income families is very problematic.

As noted in the above-mentioned Information-Analytical Collection of the Ministry of Education and Science, both in the United States and in South Africa, in Ukraine, there have also been problems in providing adequate nutrition and sufficient care for students from low-income families. To date, no information is available in Ukraine on female students suffering from gender-based violence while staying and studying at home. But, given the facts that confirm the still existing gender discrimination in our country, there is every reason to believe that such cases exist.

Conclusion. In general, the objective picture of the deepening of educational inequality in Ukraine during the pandemic is difficult to describe, because relevant research has not been conducted yet, but there is a need for it. At the same time, special attention should be paid to identifying the most common teaching practices in different social groups during quarantine, which is a consequence of different values towards education and leads to different results (i.e. different quality of knowledge, skills, abilities, etc.).

In conclusion, we point out that the pandemic will end sooner or later, however, the problem of educational inequality will remain. We assume that Covid-19 provides an opportunity to make certain policy decisions to develop a special state program to reduce educational inequality, which would, among other things, take into account the characteristics of online education.

REFERENCES

1. Black, S. Spreenb, C.A., Vally, S. (2020). Education, Covid-19 and care: social inequality and social relations of value in the South Africa and the United States. Submission for Southern African Review of Education. Pp. 4-24.
2. Consequences of COVID-19 on the position of vulnerable groups and groups at risk: causes, outcomes and recommendations". United Nations Office for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2020). Retrieved from: OHCHR | COVID-19 Guidance Downloaded: 2021.02.01. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).
3. Derzhavnyi biudzhet-2021: shcho chekaie osvitu? [State budget-2021: what awaits education?] (2020) Retrieved from: https://osvita.ua/news/76734/ 2021.02.01 (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).
4. Doslidzhennia stanu realizatsii dystantsiinoho navchannia v Ukraini (berezen-kviten 2020), [Study of the state of implementation of distance learning in Ukraine (March-April 2020)], (2020). Retrieved from: Research2020_ProSvit_MF1.pdf (nus.org.ua)__Downloaded: 2020.12.10. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).
5. Economic and social impact COVID-19. World bank group (2020). Retrieved from: The World Bank Group’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Retrieved from: The World Bank Group's Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic Downloaded: 2021.02.11. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

6. Employment and Social Policy Reform Program. Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction Team, 2020. 21-24.

7. European Commission Progress Report on Serbia (2020). Retrieved from: serbia_report_2020.pdf (europa.eu) Downloaded: 2021.02.11. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

8. Grinevych, L., Ilyich, L., Morse, N., Proshkin, V., Shemelynets, I., Linyov, K., Roy, G. (2020). Orhanizatsiia osvitnoho protsesu v shkolakh Ukrainy v umovakh karantynu: analitychna zapyska, [Organization of the educational process in Ukrainian schools under quarantine: an analytical note]. Kyiv, Kyivskyi universytet imeni Borysa Hrinchenka, 76 p.

9. Impact of Covid-19 on Migration and Mobility in Serbia. International Organization for Migration (2020). Retrieved from: policy_brief_labour_mobility_and_skills_in_covid_time_final_final_0.pdf (iom.int) Downloaded: 2021.02.10. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

10. Kohut, I., Nazarenko, Yu., Syrbu, E. (2020). Koronavirus ta osvita: analiz problem i naslidkiv pandemii (26 lyst. 2020 r.), [Coronavirus and education: analysis of the problems and consequences of the pandemic (November 26, 2020)]. Retrieved from: https://cedos.org.ua/en/articles/koronavirus-ta-osvita-analiz-problem-i-naslidkiv-pandemii___Downloaded: 2020.12.10. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

11. Krytychna sytuatsiia v osviti: 24 miliony uchniv ryzykuiut pokynuty, [Critical situation in education: 24 million students are at risk of dropping out] (2020). Retrieved from: https://pon.org.ua/novyny/8114-kritichna-situacya-v-osvt-24-mlyoni-uchnv-rizikuyut-pokinuti-navchannya.html__Downloaded: 2020.12.10. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

12. Nechitailo, I. (2011). Ponyatie skrytoj uchebnoj programmy: aktualizaciya i konceptualizaciya v problemnom pole sociologii obrazovaniya, [The concept of a hidden curriculum: actualization and conceptualization in the problem field of the sociology of education], in: VIstnik HarkIvskogo natsIonalnogo unIversitetu Imeni V.N. Karazina. Seriya: «Sotsiologichni doslidzhennya suchasnogo suspilstva». Kharkiv. №993, V. 29. 176-180.

13. Nechitaylo, I., Minko, A. (2018). «Nevidimi» bar'eri sotsialnoyi nerivnosti: peredumovi vidtvorennya u doshkilniy i pochatkoviy osviti, [The "invisible" bar of social inconsistencies: changing the mind of preschool and cob education], in: Naukovo-teoretichniy i gromadsko-politichniy almanah „Grani". № 9 (160), Veresen-2018. 41-46. DOI: 10.15421/1718113.

14. Osipov, A., Matveeva, N. (2015). Institucional'nye bar'ery i mekhanizmy dostupnosti obrazovaniya: koncepciya i regional'naya dinamika, [Institutional barriers and mechanisms of education accessibility: concept and regional dynamics], in: Sociologicheskie issledovaniya. №7(375). 37-48.

15. Osvita v Ukrayini: vikliki ta perspektivi : informatsiyno-analitichniy zbirnik, [Education in Ukraine: Challenges and prospects : Information-analytical Collection (2020). Ministerstvo osviti i nauki Ukrayini, Kiyiv. 292 p.

16. Report on the implementation of the Program of Employment Reforms and Social Policy in the Process of Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union for 2018. Retrieved from: The Report on the Implementation of the Employment and Social Policy Reform Programme (ESRP) in the EU Accession Process for 2018 Adopted : Inclusion (socijalnoukljucivanje.gov.rs) Downloaded: 2020.12.11. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

17. Research on the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on families with children in Serbia". UNICEF 2020. Retrieved from: Study on the effects of Covid-19 pandemic on families with children in Serbia (second wave) | UNICEF Serbia Downloaded: 2021.02.11. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

18. Sovsun, I. (2020). Nova osvitnya realnist: yaki vikliki stavit karantin pered shkoloyu i yak yih podolati, [A new educational reality: what challenges does quarantine pose to the school and how to overcome them]. Retrieved from: https://interfax.com.ua/news/blog/653826.html Downloaded: 2020.12.11. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

19. The use of information and communication technologies in the Republic of Serbia, 2020. Republic Institute for Statistics (2020). Retrieved from: Publications | Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia Downloaded: 2021.02.11. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

20. Ukraina – na 64 meste v reytinge stran po urovnyu zhizni naseleniya posle Iordanii i Kuby, [Ukraine ranks 64th in the ranking of countries in terms of living standards after Jordan and Cuba] (2018). Retrieved from: https://ain.ua/2018/09/29/rejting-stran-po-urovnyu-zhizni-naseleniya Downloaded: 2020.12.10. (Last accessed: 2021.03.01).

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042608**

7. FREEDOM ANTINOMIES IN THE DUALITY OF RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF RISK SOCIETY

Ayta Sakun
Doctor of Philosophy, Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Political Science and Ukrainian Studies,
Kyiv National University of Technology and Design
E-mail: ayta.s@ukr.net
ORCID ID 0000-0003-2340-3366

Tetyana Kadlubovich
Candidate of Political Science, Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Political Science and Ukrainian Studies,
Kyiv National University of Technology and Design
E-mail: katanka17@ukr.net
ORCID ID 0000-0003-2021-2070

Daryna Chernyak
Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Political Science and Ukrainian Studies,
Kyiv National University of Technology and Design
E-mail: daryna1804@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0002-1515-6070

Introduction. The globalization processes have embraced modern civilization and affect the space and time transformation, personal aspects of social experience, identity change, form a society of risks. The problems of freedom are outlined in a new way, its antinomies become more clear, the duality of its rational and irrational dimensions is manifested. In today's world, which is full of intensity and dynamics of economic processes, political decisions and social development, freedom cannot act as an abstract ideal. A risk society demands to «find and intensify equality, freedom and self-formation» [1] through criticism of «the human rights realization, the modern democratic societies ideals, and, of course, freedoms» [2].

Literature review. The problem of freedom is interdisciplinary. It is considered «in the ontological, socio-philosophical, socio-legal, ethical-moral and aesthetic contexts, etc» [3]. I. Berlin, L. Svendsen, I. Bychko, P. Ivanyshyn, M. Popovych, V. Lyakh, A. Loy, G. Tulchynsky and other scientists tried to fundamentally investigate the category of freedom. In Ukraine for the last decade the authors of the monographs I. Bredun, O. Onishchenko, V. Slyusar, I. Trukhin, Z. Shved and others have made the category of freedom the subject of their research; a number of dissertation researches (U. Oliynyk, V. Lymar, M. Zakala, V. Denisenko, etc.) were defended on this subject.

Results. The scientific literature analysis has revealed the study state of the problem of freedom and its antinomies in the duality of the rational and irrational dimensions of a risk society.

Freedom has always been a leading philosophical problem, one of the leading categories of philosophy. «A notable characteristic of the freedom concept is the multiplicity of its meanings» [4, p. 26]. For a reason today there are about two hundred definitions of the concept of freedom, which «testifies to the multidimensionality and ambiguity» of this phenomenon [5], its complexity and contradictions. Thus, in different contexts, freedom is understood as an essential characteristic of human existence that motivates people to think and act in accordance with their own ideas and desires, independence from external factors, unlimited choices and activities, realization of one's own goal, inner desire for something and so on.

The idea of freedom is already present in the philosophy of antiquity, «when freedom became a phenomenon of thought, through which man could rationally place himself outside the real» [6, p. 166]. Christianity is interested in the problem of free will. «Freedom of will and simply freedom became synonymous concepts, and the presence of freedom was experienced in complete loneliness, «where no one could prevent a fierce battle in which I fight with myself,» a deadly conflict that takes place in the «inner home» of the soul and dark «nook hearts» [6, p. 167]. For New time thinkers, freedom is the autonomy of the individual, based on rationality (B. Spinoza), or on the establishment of laws that, on the one hand, give freedom to the person, and on the other – limit it in the interests of others (J. Locke, T. Hobbes and others). The revolution in the freedom understanding takes place in classical philosophy (I. Kant, J. G. Fichte, F. W. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel), where the problem of freedom is analyzed through the prism of acts of self-consciousness, the priority of spiritual principles of human life. An ambiguous understanding of freedom is asserted. Freedom – and self-determination, and the ability to choose, and conscious action, and irrational desire to go beyond the natural and social world. Non-classical philosophy (S. Kierkegaard, M. Berdyaev, J.-P. Sartre, A. Camus, etc.) interprets freedom as the first authenticity and effective factor of social and cultural life. Representatives of existential psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology (E. Fromm, W. Frankl, A. Maslow, K. Rogers, etc.) reveal freedom as a way to overcome alienation and creative self-actualization of man. Ethical and ontological approach (M. Heidegger, M. Foucault, etc.) sees freedom as the basis of attitude to oneself and to others. Social and philosophical strategy of freedom draws attention to individual (F. Hayek, J. Rawls, M. Friedman, etc.) and universal principles of freedom (C. Taylor, A. McIntyre, M. Zandel, etc.). The position of K. Jaspers, Y. Habermas, M. Riedel, M. Bakhtin, G. Tulchynsky and others allows us to explain freedom through the principles of the communicative paradigm, which is based on the understanding of human existence as «being-with-others», and to understand freedom as a responsibility not only for one's own existence, but also for the existence of the Other. «Man has freedom to the extent of his universality, that is, the ability to go beyond his single, separate existence, both natural and social. Freedom is in the mind of those who think and act not in isolation from others, but together with others, in the context of a unifying the whole being» [7, p. 89].

Thus, the history of consideration of such philosophical category as «freedom» indicates the presence of antinomies of different quality. Such antinomies are conscious-unconscious, individual and social, moral and immoral, unique and universal, rational and irrational.

«Freedom is a human phenomenon, which is directly related to the individual self-consciousness, his spiritual culture» [7, p. 89]. «Freedom acts as a condition and imperative of moral development» [8], and therefore was and remains an independent value, which in society is organically associated with a reasonable understanding of the world and a reasonable attitude to it. But researchers concluded that from the standpoint of abstract-theoretical approach to freedom, it combines both rational and irrational (9, 10, 11). Freedom appears as a special, suprarational phenomenon in view of the specificity of man, who is «open to nonbeing, revealed in the transcendent, metaphysical as prenatural and supernatural. This quality allows a person to comprehend real life, going into its context, taking a position of out of existence in relation to it. Man, in contrast to the animal, has access to another dimension of experience – the metaphysical one» [12]. It is the metaphysics of human existence that generates human dignity, the manifestation of which is the love of freedom, generates the antinomy of rationality and irrationality of freedom.

Rational and irrational as freedom antinomies can be easily illustrated by the example of cognitive and social human activity. «Freedom defines human existence as such,» states E. Fromm, «but the concept of freedom changes depending on the degree of self-awareness» [13, p. 38].

For thousands of years it has been recognized that man is an intelligent being, whose activity is determined by certain rational interests. Freedom is possible because, according to L. Svendsen, a person has the ability to «think and consider different alternatives. We act from the perspective of our desires and preferences, …but we can choose how to act, taking into account the same desires and preferences» [4, p. 74]. Freud's theory drew attention to the study of irrational, subconscious phenomena that determine human behavior. Freud and his followers not only studied irrational phenomena, but also proved that they can be explained quite rationally. Thus, it was found that the individual changes only when «society increases the pressure on its natural inclinations» [13, p. 25], thereby including the mechanisms of psychological protection, in particular, sublimation. It is sublimation, this subconscious mechanism, that becomes the driving force of civilization, urges man to change, to violate established laws and principles, to make discoveries. H. Arendt describes freedom in a similar way [6, p. 161]. For her, freedom is virtuosity, ie perfect skill, when the performance itself is important, the activity itself, for example, when playing the flute, ballet dance, etc. «Action is an expression of freedom» [14, p. 449], «to be free and to act is the same» [6, p. 161].

Sublimation and virtuosity cannot be explained rationally. K. Jung also connects freedom with the «autonomy of the unconscious». Thus, the irrational properties of freedom come to the fore.

More rational understanding of freedom allows us to interpret it as a new view of existing things, as a challenge to dogmatism and conservatism. If there had not been such irrational views of existing orders, unconscious urges for a new or unconscious manifestation of spontaneity and virtuosity, humanity would not have made any discoveries, there would have been no civilizational development. The process of development of human freedom, according to E. Fromm, is «the process of human development, mastery of nature, the growing role of reason» [13, p. 50].

On the other hand, the rational understanding of human existence shows that in the world there are connections and relationships, factors that contribute to immutability, stability of laws and conditions of existence of processes, phenomena, systems, they ensure the stability of existence, emergence, functioning of natural and social objects. These connections can be called the concept of «non-freedom», which is opposed to the concept of «freedom». It is non-freedom that acts as a «guardian» of stability, in a certain way it is a «necessity», an expression of objective laws of development. The degree of necessity development is reality, realized, embodied on the basis of necessity or chance, opportunity. Reality is reasonable and rational. But over time, reality loses its relevance, loses its rationality and requires replacement, because the assessment of the rationality or irrationality of social reality can not be uniform in the whole society, which is a conglomeration of social groups. These changes lead to an action that changes the world: «to act means to change the image of the world» [14, p. 445]. But not any action could be called freedom. It requires consideration of existing circumstances and limitations, analysis of opportunities and lack of coercion.

People are faced with new dimensions of reality, they seek to achieve a certain goal, thereby changing the reality that exists. The basis of purpose, according to J. P. Sartre, is freedom. «Freedom is not an accident, the thinker writes, because it turns to its being to see it in the light of its purpose, it is a constant avoidance of chance. It is the interiorization, the «annihilation,» and the subjectivization of chance, which is thus changed into arbitrary choice» [14, p. 488]. «Freedom exists only through choice that is determined by purpose» [14, p. 494]. Freedom as an activity acts «as a disagreement with reality, with various aspects of objective and subjective reality, with activities based on this disagreement to change and improve the surrounding reality» [9, p. 18]. If we use ontological terminology, then in the understanding of J. P Sartre «freedom is the insufficiency of being in relation to this being…», a kind of «hole of being», «nothing being» [14, p. 494], in the understanding of M. Berdyaev, «freedom is rooted in nothing, in the abyss, in nothingness» [15]. «Freedom is an escape from being involved in being» [14, p. 495]. Turning into nonbeing, or non-natization, is freedom.

This irrational «hole of being» gives the impression that freedom «goes» ahead of rationality. An active, critical and responsible person, capable of neatization, changes the existing foundations with the help of «irrational» breakthroughs, building his own reality, unlike the existing one. It has always been so. For example, Albert Einstein with his relativity theory, or Ilon Mask with his «irrational» trips to Mars. One of the most important signs of freedom, according to O. Nikiforov [10, p. 294], is the violation of rationality standards, which is manifested in the setting of goals or in the creation of unusual means and ways to achieve it. This element is «an indicator of the individual uniqueness» [10, p. 295], which operates, and the activity itself will be irrational, because «deviation from the norms of rationality is assessed as irrational» [10, p. 295]. «Everything new is irrational because it does not meet the standards of rationality that make us slaves to the past» [10, p. 295]. Rational reformist, revolutionary changes are not immediately recognized by all as rational, because they first fall into the category of irrational. But rationality «catches up», turning the free activity (which seems irrational) of individuals into a rational activity for all [9, p. 17]. Therefore, the rationality or irrationality criterion of certain changes brought about by rational free activity, is practice. Freedom reflects the permanent conflict of one who seeks to limit any activity within the laws of existing existence, and one who seeks to expand the scope and improve the conditions of their existence, to overcome the freedoms (restrictions) that have arisen [9, p. 18].

In this sense, freedom acts as a spontaneous, creative process that creates something new, unknown, thereby forming a new non-freedom (stability, order). New relations, processes, thoughts are being produced. In the social dimension, freedom is a destabilizing factor, as it causes the reformation of «links in the system that lead to change, development of the system and its components» [9, p. 22]. Therefore, freedom is often frightening, and people try to find strategies to escape from freedom, avoiding the transformation «into a small part of a huge machine» and become a «full and well-dressed robot» [13]. In this E. Fromm saw a characteristic feature of modern society. The possibilities of freedom are determined by the possibilities of a certain system (political, economic, social). At the same time, freedom is a necessary condition for the transition from one stable state (non-freedom) to another (new non-freedom). In this context, freedom – the absence of order – gives rise to another order. Whereas smething that now appears to be chaos… will be explained in a new kind of order in the future [16, p. 128], a new lack of freedom. The result of the interaction of freedom and non-freedom (creativity and stability), which can act both independently and together, at the same time, is the dynamics of development: «in the social world, at all its levels, traditional subsustems are retained and, on the other hand, new subsystems are constantly emerging, which in turn are transformed, changed» [9, p. 23]. As a result, the composition, quantity and quality of the main subjects of social and cultural, political, economic and other relations in society are changing. Of course, changes occur in the process of fighting for them, which can be difficult and long-lasting. The old order always resists, strives to stay, turning to the rationality of man: everything is already built, stable, ordered. And man, sometimes can not overcome external, social slavery, but «remains free in the spirit» [15], capable of change, to overcome the obstacles that arise in the fight against the old «non-freedom».

The risk society faces neatization at every step: various monopolies, stereotypes and ways of doing things are destroyed. «Monopoly of science rationality, professional monopoly of men, sexual monopoly of marriage, political monopoly of politics lose their positions» [1, p. 68]. Such changes can be explained if we keep in mind that modern economics, politics, culture are complex systems, the development of which cannot be strictly fixed, one that corresponds to verified calculations, programs and formulas, because the laws of social development manifest themselves differently in different conditions and in accordance with the ratio of social and political forces in society. Each specifically-historical, social given has its own reality and its own system of institutional, value-normative, intellectual determinations, priorities, advantages, which are in a state of constant change and renewal. The development of society is not a linear evolution, a harmonious development. There are paradoxical phenomena, coincidences and situations of uncertainty, progressive shifts and phenomena of decline, breakage and stagnation. «Man is not able to control all energy flows: social, semantic, physical, but seeks freedom in his existence and decision-making – with which of these flows and in which direction he will move» [16, p. 127]. The causality of the world is constantly disturbed. Various probabilities create so-called points of extreme instability, when the situation can change in any of the many possible directions, which makes the civilization and a particular society history (as well as each individual) a nonlinear process. Only the evolution of closed systems seems to be completely rational, due to causation. But the level of entropy, chaos and disorder is constantly increasing even in closed systems. As a result, a new system is formed – complex, unstable, nonlinear, capable of constant self-organization, which organizes the world in a new way, brings to a new level the quality of life. Open systems are described by synergetics. Therefore, the relationship between freedom and non-freedom, rational and irrational acquires a synergistic meaning, because it is about stability and instability.

Thus, neatization, spontaneity, chance act as characteristics of freedom in a synergistic sense. In general, synergetics distinguishes two types of randomness. The first type, which before the emergence of synergetics was considered the only scientifically reasonable, a chance as a way to identify the need. Synergetics reveals another kind of chance, a chance, rich in possibilities, when necessity is born of chance. It is this kind of coincidence that gives impetus to new natural and social processes. This principle of self-organization, which explains the development of the complex from the simple and the emergence of order from chaos, is called emergence, which is characteristic of open systems.

Every existential space in which a person is, is a space between the old and the new. The new attracts human attention, «when being violates its own causality and reveals incomprehensible freedom» [16, p. 127]. «And even if an individual is deeply rational, life is sure to show him its redundancy» [16, p. 128]. Then a person will have a choice: to recognize himself as an organic part of the external laminar world, to accept the vector of its development or to realize that any activity is the result of free choice, and therefore the objective ceases to be decisive, «and then the perturbation epicenter will appear in the laminar flow that will lead to turbulent vortices and possible emergence» [16, p. 128]. There are times when being objectively becomes turbulent. And then a person «moves in time with being and experiences the act of creativity, realizes the ontology of being and its emergent qualities, while feeling admiration» [16, p. 128]. Thus, it can be argued that freedom, on the one hand, reveals «inaccessible in the laminar flow ontology», «and this kind of freedom is called rebellion» [16, p. 129], and, on the other hand – the excess of life causes another kind of freedom - creativity, which begins with the creation of an ideal model and ends with its implementation in reality. «Freedom of creativity means the ability to create new tools, set new goals, create conditions that were not possible before» [10, p. 290]. The paradox is that both kinds of freedom open a new order, perhaps incomprehensible at the time of its discovery, but which can be realized over time.

Modern risk society seeks different understanding of freedom and non-freedom in the context of rational and irrational as phenomena of social cognition and thinking culture. Thus, the French modern thinker E. Moren, characterizing the complexity of modern knowledge and its ability to acquire knowledge, points out: «The human mind must beware of its mental products, which at the same time are vital to it. … We should make our theories more civilized, that is to form a new generation of open, rational, reflective, self-critical, self-reforming theories.. … We need a paradigm that opens the possibility of complex cognition to crystallize and take root» [17, p. 35]. The realization of complexity, nonlinearity, openness brings to life innovations in the social, economic, political, spiritual spheres of society. Innovation is the result of creative activity, innovation, through which the planned changes take place and urgent problems are solved. Scholars note that the essence of the «modern age» is «the transition from the traditions domination to the innovation domination» [18]. Modern society that is the «knowledge society», deals with ideas more than with material processes, achieving its goal through innovation, especially in thinking. Innovation is a kind of indicator of growth, development, realization of human abilities. And freedom is the most important condition for growth.

Following W. Beck, the emergence of «civil initiatives and social movements» [1, p. 68], the birth of new «directions of search», experimental forms of «interaction with social conditions», «alternative and youth subcultures» [1, p. 68] can be considered peculiar innovations in public life. «New social movements… are… an expression of new dangerous situations in a risk society» [1, p. 68], but also a sign of living space, which is «freed from tradition» [1, p. 68]. Such social innovations are the result of spontaneous activity, which takes place «by itself, on its own initiative» [13, p. 262], which is true freedom. The free creative activity of an individual can be manifested in various spheres of his life and testifies to a person's acquisition of freedom, which allows him to «realize his own personality being himself» [13, p. 261].

Spontaneous activity is also an integral part of market relations, which become the basis of civil society. Thus, the thinker-economist F. von Hayek understands the market as an institution of unpredictable and unexpected innovations, the development of which occurs spontaneously, in the interaction of rational and irrational. His reasoning is based on the fact that the freedom of entrepreneurial activity gives a person a special sense of creative self-realization, fills him with confidence in himself and his mind, a sense of self-worth of his inner world. Neither a slave who is forced to work nor a worker who works for the vital necessity of survival has such confidence. Only a free person has such confidence. This confidence is dynamic because it is «based on the spontaneous activity of man himself; he finds it constantly, in every moment of his spontaneous life. This is the confidence that only freedom can give» [13, p. 267]. «The desire for freedom is the desire for self-expression, self-realization, because only free activity allows the subjects to express their essential features» [10, p. 289].

Such freedom, according to E. Fromm, I. Berlin, is positive, because it is a «realization of the individual» and involves «unconditional recognition of the individual uniqueness» [13, p. 267]. Positive freedom implies that «a person becomes the center and purpose of his own life», and «the highest goal is his individuality development, his personality realization» [13, p. 268]. M. Berdyaev did not see a person without individuality. Only individuality can be an indicator of «a certain height of man" who strives for freedom. The thinker wrote: «the individual often means the irrational, the opposite of the general, the obligatory, the reasonable, the normative» [15]. In order to acquire individual qualities, to know freedom, creativity that frees from slavery is necessary. Without creativity, the individual full realization is impossible, because creativity is the most essential manifestation of man in the world, it «liberates» the flow of spontaneity, directing its power to the further development of thinking and practice in line with social innovation. Spontaneity, creativity can be interpreted as an impulsive release into the consciousness of irrational energies hidden in the realm of the unconscious.

Freedom is «the inner need, the need for self-realization, a colossal examination of existence» [7, p. 89], which contains turbulent flows, bifurcations, deviations from the path, periods of stagnation, latent stages, followed by turbulent events. Freedom is a manifestation of inner creative balanced chaos as freedom of thought and action. «Creativity is liberation from slavery» mentioned M. Berdyaev [15]. And only creative rise is a freedom indicator.

Conclusion. Thus, the analysis of human behavior and activity in a risk society allows to distinguish freedom rational and irrational antinomies as an interdisciplinary phenomenon, which are manifested in social, economic, cognitive and psychological aspects, reflecting the transformation of all social life forms, demonstrating a new world of human life.

Freedom is a phenomenon that has a personal dimension and concerns, first of all, human self-consciousness. The irrationality of freedom is revealed in the unconscious mechanisms of human activity (in sublimation and inclinations to the new, in insights), in the phenomena of virtuosity (perfect skill), spontaneity, creativity, in various actions that are a violation of habitual rationality. Freedom is a disagreement with the existing reality, its neatization.

Globalization has become a qualitatively new manifestation of modernity, generating new crisis phenomena it unites the world on new terms, produces a risk society. The key to understanding such a world is the spatio-temporal configuration, which is characterized by turbulence generated by the information and telecommunications revolution. The world economic, social and political picture is changing. The development of information communication means has caused a profound transformation in the perception of man himself and his place in the world, ways of self-identification. The freedom phenomenon activates the civilization progress, its complexity and ambiguity. Simple forms of social and cultural, political, economic self-organization were built into a hierarchy of both controlled (rational) and spontaneous (irrational) processes, asserting themselves in the formation of changing environmental challenges. By identifying global trends and order parameters of complex dynamics, there is a chance to implement productive trends. These include the problem of the relationship between «freedom» and «non-freedom», which correlates with the rational and irrational processes taking place in the modern world. Creativity as a freedom condition and result is inseparable from knowledge, which in the rational and irrational synthesis determines the spontaneity of social and individual.

But freedom is the driving force of civilization. And even in a risk society, its irrationality will save life on the Earth.

REFERENCES

1. Bek U. (2000) Obshhestvo riska: Na puti k drugomu modernu [Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity] M.: Progress-Tradicija, 383 s.

2. Adamben Q. (2008) Wyjatkow stan. Krakow: Korporacja Halart.

3. Savytska I. M. (2013) Svoboda yak zvilnena svidomist: istoryko-filosofskyi dyskurs [Freedom as a liberated consciousness: historical and philosophical discourse] *Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. N. Karazina. Seriia : Teoriia kultury i filosofiia nauky* № 1057, Vyp. 49 (1). S. 67-71. Retrieved from: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/VKhITK_2013_1057_49%281%29__16 (Last accessed: 20.02.2021)

4. Svendsen L. Fr. H. (2016) Filosofiya svobody [Philosophy of freedom] L'viv : Vydavnytstvo Anetty Antonenko ; K. : NikaTsentr, 336 s.. Seriya : Teoriya kul'tury i filosofiya nauky]. № 1057, Vyp. 49(1). S. 67-71.

5. Liakh V. V. (2004) Sotsialni, osobystisni ta ekzystentsiini vymiry svobody [Social, personal and existential dimensions of freedom] *Multyversum. Filosofskyi almanakh*. Vypusk 44, 255 s. Retrieved from: https://www.filosof.com.ua/Jornel/M_44/Ljah.htm (Last accessed: 18.02.2021)

6. Arendt X. (2002) Mizh mynulym i maibutnim [Between past and future] K.: Dukh i litera, 321 s.

7. Kremen V. H. (2008) Filosofiia liudynotsentryzmu v stratehiiakh osvitnoho prostoru [Philosophy of anthropocentrism in the strategies of educational space] K.: Pedahohichna dumka. 424 s.

8. Kiselev G.S. (2006) Smysly i cennosti novogo veka [Meanings and values of the new century] *Voprosy filosofii.* № 4. S.3–16. Retrieved from: http://www.gskiselev.com/ideas_and_values_of_a_new_era.html (Last accessed: 17.02.2021)

9. Ioshkin V. K. (2006) Nesvoboda i svoboda v racional'nom osmyslenii mira [Non-freedom and liberty in the rational understanding of the world] *Voprosy filosofii*. № 8. S. 15-28

10. Nikiforov, A.L. (1995) Sootnoshenie racional'nosti i svobody v chelovecheskoj dejatel'nosti. Istoricheskie tipy racional'nosti [The relationship between rationality and freedom in human activity. Historical types of rationality] T.1. M.: Institut filosofii RAN, 350 s. S.282 – 298.

11. Levin G. D. (1995) Diskussija. Istoricheskie tipy racional'nosti. [Discussion. Historical types of rationality] T.1. M.: Institut filosofii RAN, 350 s. S.114 – 133.

12. Tul'chins'kij G.L. (2006) O prirode svobody [On the nature of freedom] *Voprosy filosofii*. №4. S. 17–31.

13. Fromm, Je. (2006) Begstvo ot svobody. Chelovek dlja sebja [Escape from freedom. Man for yourself] M. : ACT: ACT MOSKVA, 571 s.

14. Sartr Zh. P. (2000 ипн ирca38e14f1c64709cf0d955ff56fb2618&t=1613752009&s=yes (Last accessed: 19.02.2021)

16. Strigin M. B. (2019) Absurd ili jemerdzhentnost'? [Absurd or emergent?] *Pivovarovskie chtenija. Sinteticheskaja paradigma: nauka, filosofija, religiovedenie : sbornik materialov konferencii*. Ekaterinburg : Delovaja kniga, S. 126-129. Retrieved from: https://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/78279/1/978-5-88687-251-4_45.pdf (Last accessed: 15.02.2021)

17. Moren Je. (2007) Obrazovanie v budushhem: sem' neotlozhnyh zadach [Seven complex lessons in education for the future] *Sinergeticheskaja paradigma. Sinergetika obrazovanija*. M.: Progress-Tradicija, 593 s. S.24-96

18. Fedotova V. G. (2010) Social'nye innovacii kak osnova processa modernizacii obshhestva [Social innovations as the basis of the society modernization process] *Voprosy filosofii*. № 10. S. 11-12. Retrieved from: http://vphil.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=209&Itemid=52 (Last accessed: 13.02.2021)

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042609**

8. SOCIAL RISKS FOR THE YOUTH IN THE DYNAMICS OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Olena Bartosh
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, PhD, Associate Professor
Department of Sociology and Social Work
State University «Uzhhorod National University»
E-mail: olena.bartosh@uzhnu.edu.ua
ORCID ID 0000-0001-6733-5516

Introduction. Today's adolescents and youth form a quarter of the world's population. They are shaping social and economic development, challenging social norms and values, and building the foundation of the world's future. The beginning of the XXI century is marked by the aggravation of youth problems in different countries, among which Ukraine is no exception. Nowadays, Ukrainian youth is affected by: political and economic crisis in the country; unemployment; unresolved housing conditions; poor health; social disorders; economic and psychological dependence on parents; marital and family problems (high divorce rate, family conflicts); low birth rate; loss of ideals, social perspective, and life optimism.

Literature review. Global changes put the world in the face of a new social reality that disputes all existing notions of society. Uncertainty of the new reality, instability of social processes, penetration of risk into all spheres of society determined the emergence of border areas, the study of which was possible only on the basis of interdisciplinary approaches.

Risk is closely linked to the history of social development and has always existed, so knowledge of risks is of high demand. Risk research has been conducted for a long time and constantly by the representatives of a significant number of sciences. Each of the sciences describes risk from its point of view, builds schemes, identifies patterns and connections, develops theory and proposes methods for managing and minimizing risk. If earlier scientific researches were mainly concentrated within the frames of natural-scientific and economic disciplines, nowadays the devision of a separate interdisciplinary direction − risk science − becomes topical.

Risk research includes but is not limited to: theoretical doctrines of the «risk society» of W. Beck [1], A. Giddens [2], and N. Luhmann [3]; «concept of social risk enhancement» after R. Kasperson's et al. [4]; «psychometric paradigms» of risk after P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein and B. Fishhoff [5]; risk as a «special branch of social knowledge» after O. Renn [6]. Issues of risk science have also been studied by Ukrainian scholars. O.Ukrainska [7] speaks of V. Cheshko's «problem of risk character of modern science»; E. Golovakha's «models of spatial distribution of risks»; A. Stegnii's «institutionalization of environmental interests in the society of sociogenic risks».

Sociology of risk, as an interdisciplinary science, has become the subject of scientific interest of S. Nikitin and K. Feofanov [8], who prove, that:

− It is to function at the intersection of different social sciences and humanities, constantly referring to their material, synthesizing diverse data, mostly abstracting from the consideration of: (i) individual psychological processes with emphasis on an individual; (ii) political, economic, ethical, culturological and other processes with an emphasis on exclusively political or narrow-economic risk mechanisms.

− It is to study social communities (city, village, labor collective, industrial enterprise, family, etc.), as well as social-psychological, social-political foundations of displays of their activities.

O. Yanitskiy [9, p. 7−8] points to two basic areas of understanding risk in the science:

− Realistic − risk is defined as «the product of the probability of danger and the severity (scale) of its consequences». In this case, risk is seen as something objective, independent of social and cultural environment, recognizable, measurable and, therefore, to some extent predictable. The disadvantage of this approach is the inability to study the social and cultural aspects of risks and their impact on the security of an individual and society as a whole.

− Social-cultural − risk is seen as a social construct rooted in culture, social relations and social institutions of society. There are two approaches to this: (i) risk is seen as an «objectively existing danger» mediated by a social and cultural context; (ii) risk is a social construct, a product of historically and culturally determined interpretation.

Results

Understanding the risk in the youth environment

O.Yanitskiy [10, p. 9–35.] defines risk factors in an unstable society:

1. Social-economic factor − conditioned by: destruction of industrial and scientific-technical potential of a country; strategic dependence of its activities on imports; lags from advanced countries; orientation of governmental programs on borrowings. The natural result of such a policy is: a sharp decline in living standards of the vast population majority, including young people; the strengthening of its economic, social and political stratification, rising social tensions.

2. Social-legal factor − associated with both imperfection and non-compliance with current legislation, as well as with the lack of a developed system of legal and social protection. As a result, there is a sharp contradiction between formal and real population rights in general and young people in particular.

3. Social-political factor − determined by the inconsistency of activity of government branches. The presence of unlimited presidential power, incompetent, often changing governments / parliament, and the lack of clear ideas on possible

models of society's development make state policy unpredictable. The weakness of the adopted laws, the lack of unified legislation in the context of increasing separatism in the regions provide for favorable opportunities for power redistribution in favor of the bureaucracy, oligarchic and criminal circles.

Understanding the development patterns of the youth as a social group directly relats the defining of its role and place in the social reproduction it is a subject of.

C. Williams, V. Chuprov and J. Zubok [11] understand by reproduction the constant repetition, continuous renewal of the process of social production, called to ensure the development of society and its individual groups as a whole system. Depending on the nature of this process, it can be destructive (developmental delay), simple (repetition) and extended (recovery on an ever-increasing scale).

Accordingly, the social development of the youth can: have destructive forms (disintegration, social exclusion); become a continuation of social experience got by previous generations (simple reproduction); acquire the features of expanded reproduction by renewing living conditions and the system of social relations [12].

By engaging in social relations and identifying with them, the younger generation integrates into society. Reflecting the nature of the cyclical reproduction of the system of social relations, this process in social terms appears as a change of youth's place in the social structure, i.e. as a certain strategy of its social mobility. The positive orientation of the change of quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the youth, in the course of its formation as a subject of social reproduction, testifies to the social development of this social-demographic group [13].

However, in a risk society, as a rule, there are no clear ideas about development goals. The functioning of such a society becomes spontaneous, often uncontrolled by social institutions. There is a process of spontaneous integration in the youth environment, aimed at reproducing structures that hinder the natural historical social development. Consciously or unconsciously, many young people find themselves involved in this process, risking their careers, families, and stable life.

V. Chuprov et al. [14, p. 71] identify typical risk situations in the youth environment. This typology does not cover the whole variety of life situations with different risks produced. The basis for the selection of these situations are the cycles of youth as a subject of social reproduction. The typical risk situations in the youth environment are connected with:

1. Endangering health and life. These are the situations that threaten health and lives of young people. If society does not provide conditions for the physical development of a young person, for the protection of health and safety of life, there are real grounds for risk. In these situations, a young person is constantly at risk of: falling behind peers in the development; having chronic diseases; losing health or even life. The risk of negative demographic reproduction increases.

2. Uncertainty of life start. The lower the status attributed to young people, inherited from their parents, the more uncertain the opportunities for them to choose their life strategy. If for people from high-status families the starting positions in

education, work, in setting a family is a kind of springboard provided by the capabilities of parents, then for the others the equalization of life opportunities is determined either by personal abilities, hard work, entrepreneurship, or help from the state. In the absence of a purposeful social policy, necessary guarantees and well-thought-out social protection measures for these categories of young people, the risks become associated with inequality of starting positions and false start, the consequences of which can determine the entire life of a young person.

3. Uncertainty of opportunities for self-realization. Inclusion in social life is a process full of drama, accompanied by unrealized ambitions, unfulfilled hopes, and shattered plans. The reason is often not rooted in the lack of activity of young people, but is determined by many social factors. Determining one's social position, acquiring the appropriate status and social role, self-affirmation in them, being socially conditioned, require active social support. In the absence or lack of such support, the socially stratified risks increase, become associated with limited opportunities for upward mobility, the risks of downward mobility and social exclusion of young people.

4. Value and regulatory uncertainty. Values and norms play a crucial role in the integration of any society, giving a lasting and irreversible character to social ties. The whole inner world of an individual is based on them. In a society of risk, with its uncertainty and unpredictability, there is a significant deformation of this mechanism. Traditional social values are devalued and supplanted by group ones, the system of institutional norms is destroyed, new values and norms are rejected. In these conditions, there appear situations of insanity, in which a young person loses usual orientation, sense of support, and touch with society. The risk of social disorientation, anomie, rupture with social institutions and society as a whole increases.

5. Uncertainty of identity. The process of integration of young people into society is not limited to their mechanical inclusion in social structures, but is accompanied by internal identification with them. This makes the process sustainable. Therefore, striving to stabilize and preserve its integrity, society is interested in reproducing the socially significant foundations of identity.

The types of social conflicts discussed above are specifically youth, i.e. the basis of their emergence are the characteristics of young people as an independent social-demographic group. This does not mean that it does not take part in other types of conflicts, as it is at the same time an integral part of various social groups in the social structure (professional, political, national-ethnic, etc.). In various forms, conflicts between the youth and society are characteristic of all social systems with a developed social structure.

Yu. Zubok [15] identifies the following main ways to localize risk in the process of social integration of the youth:

– Narrowing the boundaries of risk. The problem of risk localization in the youth environment is closely related to the possibility of realizing specifically youth conflicts. By implementing the conflict through integration, society stabilizes the situation and, therefore, minimizes the risk, localizes it. Thus, the probability of risk is reduced, the environment for conflict is narrowed.

− Risk individualization. The process of individualization itself can lead to an expansion of risk situations, increasing the likelihood of its dangerous consequences. Integration contributes to the individualization of risk, localizes it within individual groups or individuals. In a risk society, individualization results in the fragmentation of opportunities and experiences, which in the absence of social goals and development criteria supports the uncertainty of a young person's life path and status.

− Lowering the uncertainty threshold. Uncertainty, in turn, involves risk at all stages of self-determination. The uncertainty of modern risk society allows great freedom for young people to choose their life path. However, the fragmentation of usual links between individual experience and possibilities of its implementation, provided by the state, significantly increases the risk of a negative outcome in the situation of choice. The balance of subjective and objective components of risk is disturbed. For example, the emergence of new forms of education, alternative to the state ones, involves expanding the opportunities for young people to choose the most acceptable path for their studies. If we take into account, that paid alternative education gradually displaces free public education, and payment for it is not affordable to everyone, it becomes obvious how high is the risk threshold for young people to remain without education.

− Regulation of risk orientation. The process of social integration of young people into the risk society involves: (i) reducing uncertainty in the environment of its activity (objective component of risk); (ii) increasing behavioral willingness to make decisions based on the nature, scale and dynamics of this uncertainty (subjective component of risk). Thus, the localization of risk is achieved by lowering the uncertainty threshold. In a risk society, the role of natural factors grows. To some extent, spontaneous processes in the social development of young people can have a constructive beginning. Without them, the innovative function of the youth, which provides an expanded reproduction of society, cannot be fully realized. However, natural processes are associated with risk, with its unpredictable consequences.

− Social insurance of failure. The integration of young people into a risk society takes place in the context of weakening its dependence on social institutions. Reducing the influence of a family and a state on young people, on the one hand, expands their independence, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of risk and minimizes guarantees in cases of failure. Localization of risk in the process of youth integration is ensured by reducing the level of uncertainty in the environment of young people's activity, by expanding social risk insurance.

Destabilizing tendencies in the life situations of young people

Based on the data of official statistics, we consider the tendencies of risk in the life situations of modern Ukrainian youth.

I. Social-demographic situation

The demographic component of social reproduction plays a leading role in the social development of youth and society. Birth and death rates, health and life expectancy are among the most important indicators that characterize the state of society, the degree of its well-being. Social-demographic problems are among the most acute in the life situations of young people. Issues of setting a family or breaking it up, giving birth to a child, child's health and development, keeping health and safety pose numerous risks for young people in any society. Thus, uncertainty in these situations in a society of risk increases.

The demographic situation is influenced by many factors (economic, social, social-psychological, political, environmental, demographic), which are the indicators of society functioning. Therefore, if we take the conditions of the demographic situation as a basis, we can clearly trace the beginning of of becoming a society of risk and its development.

The persistent depopulation is a direct evidence of the growing risk in Ukrainian society. The dynamics of population change demonstrates, that the beginning of demographic degradation of Ukraine very accurately coincides in time with the development of the systemic crisis, and falls on 1994 (Table 15.)

Table 15

Ukraine's population, 1990 − 2020

(the number for 2002 is given on the basis of the All-Ukrainian census data − December 2001)

(since 2014 − excluding the occupied territories (Crimea, Sevastopol, parts of Donbass)

Year	**Number** (thousands)			**Year**	**Number** (thousands)		
1.1.1990	51 838.5			1.1.2006	46 929.5	-351.3	-0.74%
1.1.1991	51 944.4	105.9	0.20%	1.1.2007	46 646.0	-283.5	-0.60%
1.1.1992	52 056.6	112.2	0.22%	1.1.2008	46 372.7	-273.3	-0.59%
1.1.1993	52 244.1	187.5	0.36%	1.1.2009	46 143.7	-229.0	-0.49%
1.1.1994	52 114.4	-129.7	-0.25%	1.1.2010	45 962.9	-180.8	-0.39%
1.1.1995	51 728.4	-386.0	-0.74%	1.1.2011	45 778.5	-184.4	-0.40%
1.1.1996	51 297.1	-431.3	-0.83%	1.1.2012	45 633.6	-144.9	-0.32%
1.1.1997	50 818.4	-478.7	-0.93%	1.1.2013	45 553.0	-80.6	-0.18%
1.1.1998	50 370.8	-447.6	-0.88%	1.1.2014	45 426.2	-126.8	-0.28%
1.1.1999	49 918.1	-452.7	-0.90%	1.1.2015	42 928.9	-2497.3	-5.50%
1.1.2000	49 429.8	-488.3	-0.98%	1.1.2016	42 760.5	-168.4	-0.39%
1.1.2001	48 923.2	-506.6	-1.02%	1.1.2017	42 584.5	-176.0	-0.41%
1.1.2002	48 457.1	-466.1	-0.95%	1.1.2018	42 386.4	-198.1	-0.47%

1.1.2003	48 003.5	-453.6	-0.94%	1.1.2019	42 153.2	-233.2	-0.55%
1.1.2004	47 622.4	-381.1	-0.79%	1.1.2020	41 902.4	-250.8	-0.59%
1.1.2005	47 280.8	-341.6	-0.72%	1.1.2021	41 588.4	-314.1	-0.75%

Source: *[16]*

The escalation of risk in society cannot but affect the marital status of young people. Under conditions of uncertainty, young people tend to refrain from making responsible decisions and postpone marriages. This is evidenced by the changes that take place in the marital behavior of young people. All modern tendencies taking place in marriage sphere, can be observed in Ukraine. These are, first of all, raising the age of people getting married for the first time. In Ukraine it is lower than in most European countries. Nowadays, the average age of first marriage registration for women is 25 years, and for men − almost 28 years. The tendency to early marriage, i.e. marriages before the age of 18, has gone. The marriage curve of Ukraine has a sinusoidal shape. The number of marriages decreases sharply in a leap year. Accordingly, there are more of them before and after a leap year (Table 16).

Table 16.

The number of marriages in Ukraine, 1990 − 2019

(since 2014 − excluding the occupied territories (Crimea, Sevastopol, parts of Donbass)

Year	Distribution in units	Year	Distribution in units	Year	Distribution in units
1990	482 753	2000	274 523	2010	305 933
1991	493 067	2001	309 602	2011	355 880
1992	394 075	2002	317 228	2012	278 276
1993	427 882	2003	370 966	2013	304 232
1994	399 152	2004	278 225	2014	294 962
1995	431 731	2005	332 143	2015	299 038
1996	307 543	2006	354 959	2016	229 453
1997	345 013	2007	416 427	2017	249 522
1998	310 504	2008	321 992	2018	228 411
1999	344 888	2009	318 198	2019	237 858

Source: *[17]*

In the European Union, there are 1 million divorces per year (6 000 marriages and 2 700 divorces per day) and 7 out of 10 European families have no children. In the USA, 53% of marriages end in divorce (every 6 seconds). The lowest number of divorces is observed in Ireland − no more than 15% annually and Chile − 3% [18].

In recent years, there has been a downward tendency in the number of divorces in Ukraine (Table 17).

Table 17.

The number of divorces in Ukraine, 1990 − 2019
(since 2014 − excluding the occupied territories (Crimea, Sevastopol, parts of Donbass)

Year	Distribution in units	Year	Distribution in units	Year	Distribution in units
1990	192 835	2000	197 274	2010	126 068
1991	200 810	2001	181 334	2011	182 490
1992	222 630	2002	183 538	2012	168 508
1993	218 974	2003	177 183	2013	164 939
1994	207 577	2004	173 163	2014	130 673
1995	198 300	2005	183 455	2015	129 373
1996	193 030	2006	179 123	2016	129 997
1997	188 232	2007	178 364	2017	128 734
1998	179 688	2008	166 845	2018	153 949
1999	175 781	2009	145 439	2019	138 005

Source: *[17].*

The Charitable Foundation «Family», with the assistance of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, conducted a study on the crisis of the Ukrainian family [19]. 1 256 respondents aged 18 to 75 were interviewed in 5 cities of Ukraine − Kyiv, Konotop, Donetsk, Lviv, Sevastopol. Among the respondents, 42% were male and 58% − female, 16% were divorced and 84% − married. Survey results and statistics demonstrated that Ukrainian families were no longer as strong as they used to be. 52-62% of divorces were observed among young couples. The peak of divorces occured in the first years of married life due to a misunderstanding in a married couple, mistrust, and financial difficulties. 30% of divorces took place in the western regions of Ukraine, and 70% − in the eastern.

Thus, the support of the state is to be aimed at shaping the family image and preparing young people who enter married life, because there are so many challenges that they are not ready for. Comprehensive preparation for marriage helps to reduce the number of divorces and improve the demographic situation.

The decrease in the birth rate is also considered as an increased risk in society. Declining birth rates are a significant threat to the processes of social and economic development of any country, as they set a number of risks for:

− Demographic stability: unfavorable population ratio in different age groups; increasing the rate of population aging; population reduction due to a decrease in the number of subsequent generations (e.g., if the birth rate remains at 1.3 children per woman of childbearing age in three demographic generations each lasting 30 years, the fourth generation is only 25% of the first one) [20];

− Economic stability: the loss of competitiveness of the national economy due to the reduction in the number of young skilled workers (according to Eurostat [21] 80% of the latest technologies, used mainly by young people, become outdated within 10 years; in countries whith high production technologies predominating, older workers cannot replace young employees with aqcuired modern education); increase of supply fluctuations on the labor market; reduction of reliability and sustainability of the pension system and social security system; reduction of opportunities for public health care for a growing aging population due to limited fiscal resources; loss of competitiveness of certain regions of a country due to deepening disparities in the age structure of the population;

− Social stability: increase in the income gap between families with children and without children; intensification of fluctuations in the level of workload on educational institutions caused by «demographic waves» of different cohorts; deepening of difference between the number of desired and available children in families; destruction of a «child-friendly» society as a threat to the preservation of childbearing traditions.

During 2020, the population of Ukraine decreased by 314.1 thousand people (excluding the occupied territories of Crimea, Sevastopol, parts of Donbass). The excess of the number of deaths over the number of live births remains significant: 48 births per 100 deaths [22].

According to United Nations projections, by 2050 the population of Ukraine will have decreased by 16% (Table 18).

Table 18

Projections of Ukraine's total population (thousands)

Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number
2025	42 339	2045	36 606	2065	31 041	2085	26 622
2030	40 882	2050	35 219	2070	29 728	2090	25 851
2035	39 425	2055	33 826	2075	28 537	2095	25 128
2040	38 002	2060	32 423	2080	27 503	2100	24 413

Source: *[23]*

Ukraine is among the top seven European countries in terms of depopulation by 2050 (Table 19).

Table 19.

Average annual rate of Europe's population change (%)

	Region, country	2025-2030	2030-2035	2035-2040	2040-2045	2045-2050
1.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0,54	-0,63	-0,72	-0,81	-0,89
2.	Albania	-0,38	-0,48	-0,65	-0,78	-0,88
3.	Bulgaria	-0,82	-0,88	-0,89	-0,87	-0,86
4.	Republic of Moldova	-0,45	-0,60	-0,71	-0,78	-0,83
5.	Serbia	-0,61	-0,68	-0,75	-0,80	-0,82
6.	Croatia	-0,59	-0,64	-0,69	-0,74	-0,78
7.	Ukraine	-0,70	-0,73	-0,74	-0,75	-0,77
8.	Lithuania	-0,84	-0,85	-0,84	-0,77	-0,71
9.	Latvia	-0,89	-0,87	-0,79	-0,72	-0,65
10.	Romania	-0,50	-0,54	-0,58	-0,61	-0,64
11.	Poland	-0,31	-0,42	-0,50	-0,56	-0,60
12.	North Macedonia	-0,22	-0,36	-0,48	-0,55	-0,60
13.	Italy	-0,28	-0,31	-0,34	-0,43	-0,57
14.	Greece	-0,47	-0,42	-0,42	-0,47	-0,56
15.	Portugal	-0,30	-0,34	-0,39	-0,47	-0,55
16.	Estonia	-0,41	-0,48	-0,50	-0,50	-0,52
17.	Hungary	-0,37	-0,45	-0,50	-0,51	-0,49
18.	Slovakia	-0,17	-0,30	-0,40	-0,45	-0,47
19.	Spain	-0,15	-0,20	-0,24	-0,31	-0,41
20.	Montenegro	-0,10	-0,18	-0,27	-0,33	-0,37
21.	Slovenia	-0,16	-0,23	-0,27	-0,31	-0,36
22.	Belarus	-0,26	-0,35	-0,37	-0,35	-0,34
23.	Malta	0,08	-0,13	-0,26	-0,31	-0,31
24.	Andorra	0,04	0,01	-0,03	-0,14	-0,31
25.	Germany	-0,09	-0,12	-0,16	-0,21	-0,26
26.	San Marino	0,09	0,02	-0,06	-0,15	-0,26
27.	Russian Federation	-0,25	-0,31	-0,30	-0,25	-0,22
28.	Netherlands	0,15	0,06	-0,05	-0,14	-0,20

29.	Finland	0,04	-0,02	-0,08	-0,11	-0,13
30.	Austria	0,16	0,08	0,00	-0,06	-0,12
31.	Gibraltar	0,09	0,08	0,05	-0,02	-0,11
32.	Czechia	-0,02	-0,10	-0,12	-0,09	-0,06
33.	France	0,19	0,16	0,10	0,03	-0,03
34.	Liechtenstein	0,31	0,25	0,15	0,06	0,02
35.	Isle of Man	0,32	0,27	0,20	0,12	0,02
36.	Belgium	0,25	0,21	0,16	0,11	0,06
37.	Iceland	0,48	0,38	0,28	0,18	0,09
38.	Holy See	0,03	-0,03	0,05	-0,03	0,12
39.	Faroe Islands	0,44	0,40	0,29	0,18	0,12
40.	Denmark	0,34	0,27	0,21	0,16	0,16
41.	United Kingdom	0,35	0,30	0,26	0,24	0,20
42.	Switzerland	0,55	0,43	0,35	0,30	0,26
43.	Channel Islands	0,59	0,50	0,41	0,33	0,27
44.	Ireland	0,54	0,47	0,43	0,38	0,29
45.	Sweden	0,47	0,37	0,33	0,34	0,34
46.	Monaco	0,59	0,55	0,48	0,44	0,46
47.	Norway	0,78	0,70	0,61	0,54	0,49
48.	Luxembourg	0,87	0,79	0,71	0,63	0,56

Source: *[23]*

Therefore, encouraging an increase in the birth rate is to become a strategically important direction of Ukraine's state policy. Due to the growing demographic problems observed, reflected in the depopulation, aging of population and decreasing of supply and quality of labor forces, the relevance of this policy direction seems undeniable.

II. Life start situation

The starting positions of young people are broadly seen as the initial potential of the younger generation in social reproduction. Each new generation begins life path, so to speak, not from a "blank slate", but by imitating material conditions and perceiving the life experience of previous generations. Succession of generations provides a simple reproduction of society. However, nowadays the pace of development of social processes becomes so rapid that past experience is not only insufficient, but often an obstacle to modernization. Therefore, the starting potential of young people in modern society is to contain an innovative component that provides expanded social reproduction.

The period of social start is short, from 15 to 18-20 years, when a young person enters the age of social maturity and finds oneself in a situation of choosing a life strategy. The success of life strategy choice is ensured by: the state of health, level of physical and spiritual development; material support necessary for continuing of education, employment; setting a family; social and professional advancement [24].

High uncertainty in the situation of social start is multiplied in a society of risk. At practice, no society can ensure full equality of social start for young people, but the process of democratization involves equalizing the rights of different groups of young people to full integration into the social structure. Thus, the risk of social start is minimized.

The problems of life start have a negative impact on the working career of young people, their family life and lifestyle. This is reflected in the difficulties that young people overcome in achieving economic independence, a stable position in the professional sphere, in setting a family and in arranging household. On the other hand, there are negative tendencies related to the postponement of professional careers, obstacles to a family setting, and financial dependence on parents.

Empirical indicators of un / successful social start are: the level of education achieved before the social self-determination; the state of employment; the breadth and stability of interests; the direction of value orientations. Each of them characterizes a certain aspect of a young person's social position and place in the system of social relations, which allows not only to take a position in the social structure, but also to realize individual identity. As a result, different models of life start are formed [25].

V. Chuprov et al. [14, p. 114−115] outline that life strategies of young people are focused on higher education and provides three typical models:

− Young people are motivated to acquire knowledge, nevertheless part of them is guided by purely instrumental motives, such as obtaining a diploma.

− Social start of young people is also related to education, but specific forms of its continuation are not defined and depend on circumstances: availability of an educational institution in the residence area; the level of knowledge acquired at school; parent financial support to pay for tuition, etc.

− Young people do not continue educating and direct their activities to finding a proper job, often due to financial reasons. Therefore, the main search criterion is the level of salary. The content and even working conditions are taken into account last. Most of them rely on occasional earnings and parental assistance.

In all these models there is a large share of risk. It is different in each model, but what they have in common is that the youth's social start becomes its personal (parents') deal. Society «turns its back on them», and the state «washes its hands».

III. Potential for self-realization

The starting position at the very beginning of a young person's life path is the starting point for the further self-realization. Realizing personal potential, abilities and interests in the process of inclusion in public life, young people find their own social status. Therefore, self-realization of young people includes the process of: self-determination; finding place in a society; self-affirmation in various spheres of life (work, education); self-expression, i.e. self-awareness.

In a risk society, opportunities for self-realization undergo significant changes. In the individual-personal plan, the risk in a situation of self-realization is displayed in the uncertainty of opportunities: to implement life strategy according to abilities and aptitudes; to express oneself in the results of activities; to feel individuality and independence from circumstances. Social consequences of self-realization uncertainty become apparent in the changes taking place in the youth's social composition, social position, social mobility, and social stratification.

Researchers of the problem are forced to draw the disappointing conclusion that in reality the driving forces of self-realization of young people go beyond its influence and control. Reflecting this tendecy, scholars K. Evans, E. Furlong, D.Woodman [26; 27, p.36.] identify the following types of youth strategies for self-realization:

− «Strategic» model − based on careful life planning with clear goals for the professional development set.

− «Step-by-step» model − based on a vague professional choice, the search for an interesting profession without clear professional orientations.

− «Taking chance» model − characterises a society of risk. The youth is aware of tendecies unpredictability in the professional and other fields, thus simultaneously attempt to realize interests and ambitions through continuing education.

− «Wait-and-see» model − is characterized by a complex of risk victim, which arises due to previous failures, a sense of unnecessary action, and passive expectation of a successful coincidence.

Self-realization is not limited to achieving professional status. In addition, it includes setting a family, gaining independence from the parental family, arranging household, etc. The problem is in delay of the status transitions for all these indicators. In modern Ukrainian society, young people increasingly try to rely on themselves, not wanting to depend on their parents, which of course involves risk.

In comparison, 68% of young people in the EU from 16 years (considered as the beginning of working age) to 29 years live with their parents. Moreover, females stay with their parent less often than males − 63% of females and 73% of males live with their parents [28]. Moreover, a family setting, arrangement of household, the birth of children, parallel inclusion in employment is now replaced by a variety of transitions to other states: partnership without its formalization, the birth of children out of marriage, civil marriage, sharing of housing in parts with someone else [29].

Thus, we can identify the main risk of society's influence on the self-realization of young people: (i) the acquisition of professional status is forcibly postponed by young people due to uncertainty in the labor market and limited employment prospects; (ii) the gap in opportunities for successful self-realization between the younger and older generations widens; (iii) the institutional factors of self-realization lose their influence simultaneously with the strengthening of the tendency of its individualization.

IV. Search for moral support and social guidelines

In the process of self-realization, a young person needs reliable life guidelines. Without a strong reliance on social and group values, that exist in the collective perceptions of people, it is difficult to find a personal sense of existence, to define goals for the nearest and longer perspective, to choose adequate action towards these goals. Due to the normative-regulatory function of values, the motivational sphere of consciousness of the youth acquires a selective and purposeful character.

The effectiveness of search for such landmarks, which can form the basis of a young person's self-awareness, depends both on a young person and on the specific life situation. In any case, this is a difficult and very controversial process. However, it is often unpredictable in uncertainties and risk situations.

There is a shift in the structure of value orientations of young people towards the so-called modern (post-modernist) model, in which individual freedoms resist traditional (modernist) values. However, the pace and the direction of change differ significantly, which is determined by the level of well-being of young people [30].

In other words, by satisfying the basic needs of a comfortable existence, modern societies demonstrate idealistic and universalist aspirations. Moreover, these new values are combined with traditionally liberal ones: freedom, tolerance, permissiveness.

Conclusion. Consideration of aspects of modern approaches to the study of risk allows us to draw the following conclusions: «risk society» is actually a new paradigm of social development. Reforming society, its transition to modern one, involves the renewal of the entire system of social relations, as well as the modernization of productive forces and production relations. The process, connected with innovation in all society spheres, cannot be fully predicted. This means it involves a certain risk. Under normal conditions, society is a system that develops dynamically, constantly overcoming one after another stages of modernization.

Therefore, risk in the society is a necessary component of social development. Risk society is a specific way of organizing social relations, interaction and relations of people in conditions of uncertainty, when the reproduction of living conditions, of physical and spiritual forces of an individual aquires not socially conditioned, but mostly random, probabilistic character.

REFERENCES

1. Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: towards a new modernity. London: Sage Publications. 260 p.
2. Giddens, A. (1991). Fate, risk and security. In A. Giddens (Ed.), *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press. PP.109−143
3. Luhmann, N. (1991). Der Begriff Risiko. In N. Luhmann (Ed.), *Soziologie des Risikos*. Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter. S.9–40.
4. Kasperson, J., Kasperson, R., Pidgeon, N., & Slovic, P. (2003). The Social amplification of risk: assessing fifteen years of research and theory. In N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson, P. Slovic (Eds.), *The social amplification of risk*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. PP.13−46.
5. Slovic, P. (2000). Introduction and overview. In P. Slovic (Ed.), *The perception of risk*. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. PP.21−37.
6. Renn O. (1998). Three decades of risk research: accomplishments and new challenges. *Journal of Risk Research, 1* (1), 49-71. DOI: 10.1080/136698798377321
7. Ukraynskaya, O.A. (2012). Ryskolohyya: sotsyal′no-fylosofskyy podkhod k yssledovanyyu «obshchestva ryskov» [Risk science: social and philosophical approach to «risk society» research]. *The Journal of V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. Series: Theory of Culture and Philosophy of Science, 1* (1029), 42−47.
8. Nikitin, S., & Feofanov, K. (1992). Sotsiologicheskaya teoriya riska: v poiskakh predmeta [Sociological theory of risk: in search of a subject]. *Sociological Studies, 10,* 120−127.
9. Yanitskiy, O.N. (2003). *Sotsiologiya riska* [Sociology of risk]. Moscow: Izd-vo LVS. 191 p.
10. Yanitskiy, O.N. (1998). Sotsiologiya i riskologiya [Sociology and riskology]. In O.N. Yanitskiy (Ed.), *Rossiya: riski i opasnosti «perekhodnogo obshchestva»* [Russia: risks and dangers of a «transitional society»]. Moscow: Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Sciences. 237 p.
11. Williams C., Chuprov V., Zubok J. (2003). *Youth, risk and russian modernity*. Aldershot: Ashgate. 248 p.
12. Zubok, Yu., & Chuprov, V. (2020). Zhiznennyye strategii molodezhi: realizatsiya ozhidaniy i sotsial'nyye nastroyeniya [Youth life strategies: implementation of expectations and social moods]. *Monitoring of public opinion: economic and social changes*, 3, 13−41. DOI: 10.14515/monitoring.2020.3.1602
13. Woodman, D., & Wyn, J. (2015). *Youth and generation: rethinking change and inequality in the lives of young people.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 201 p. DOI: 10.4135/9781473910591
14. Chuprov, V.I., Zubok Yu.A., & Williams, C. (2003). *Molodezh' v obshchestve riska* [Youth in the risk society]. Moscow: Nauka. 161 p.
15. Zubok, Yu.A. (2003). Risk v sotsial’nom razvitii molodezhi [Risk in the social development of young people]. *Sotsial’no-gumanitarnye znaniya, 1,* 147–162.

16. Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. (2020). Naselennya Ukrayiny [Population of Ukraine]. URL: https://index.minfin.com.ua/ua/reference/people (accessed 18.02.2021)

17. State Statistics Service of Ukraine. M.Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. (2019). Shlyuby ta rozirvannya shlyubiv [Marriages and divorces]. URL: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Dialog/statfile_c_files/shlub.html#C0002 (accessed 18.02.2021)

18. Simya. (2017). Statystyka rozluchenʹ v Ukrayini ta sviti [Divorce statistics in Ukraine and the world]. URL: https://www.simyapidpokrovom.lviv.ua/?p=7818 (accessed 18.02.2021)

19. iPress.ua. (2012). Kryza ukrayinskoyi simyi: 61% podruzhnikh par rozluchayutsya [Crisis of Ukrainian family: 61% of married couples divorse]. URL: http://ipress.ua/news/kryza_ukrainskoi_simi_61_podruzhnih_par_rozluchayutsya_21641.html (accessed 18.02.2021).

20. McDonald, P. (2007). Time for action: public policies to revert low fertility. *Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law, 9* (1), 237−243.

21. Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union. European Commission Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. (2011). *Demography Report 2010. Older, more numerous and diverse Europeans*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 180 p. DOI: 10.2767/79004

22. State Statistics Service of Ukraine. (2021). Demohrafichna sytuatsiya v Ukrayini v 2020 rotsi [Demographic situation in Ukraine in 2020]. URL: ukrstat.gov.ua (accessed 18.02.2021)

23. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2019). Probabilistic Population Projections based on the World Population Prospects 2019. URL: https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Probabilistic/Population (accessed 18.02.2021)

24. Osipova, L.B., & Prykina, L.V. (2014). Formirovanie zhiznennykh strategii molodezhi [Formation of the youth life strategies]. *Proceedings of Higher Educational Institutions. Sociology. Economics. Politics, 4* (43), 77–81.

25. Osipova, L.B., & Enveri, L.A. (2016). Life strategies of young people: sociological research experience. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 4, 108−129. DOI: 10.15838/esc/2016.4.46.6

26. Furlong A. , & Woodman, D. (Eds.). (2014). *Youth and Young Adulthood. Series: Critical concepts in sociology*. London: Routledge. 1544 p.

27. Evans, K., & Furlong, A. (1997). Metaphors of youth transitions: niches, pathways, trajectories or navigations. In J. Bynner, L. Chisholm, A. Furlong (Eds.), *Youth, Citizenship and Social Change in a European Context*. USA: Ashgate, Aldershot and Brookfield. PP.17−41.

28. Choroszewicz, M., & Wolff, P. (2010). Population and social conditions. *Eurostat. Statistics in focus, No 50*. URL:

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5565692/KS-SF-10-050-EN.PDF/877f8776-e7fe-4f2b-8bec-0a5cf54dcba4 (accessed 19.02.2021)

29. Enveri, L.A., & Osipova, L.A. (2012). Zhiznennye strategii sovremennoi molodezhi [Life strategies of modern young people]. *Bulletin of Vyatka State University of Humanities, 4* (4), 106–109.

30. Abramson, P., & Inglehart, R. (1992). Generational replacement and value change in eight West European societies. *British Journal of Political Science, April, 22*, 183−228.

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042610**

9. FUNKCJONOWANIE JĘZYKA W KONTEKŚCIE ETNO-SPOŁECZNYM (NA PRZYKŁADZIE MNIEJSZOŚCI ETNICZNEJ BUŁGARSKIEJ

Natalia Nikon
Doktor Zakładu Psychologii i Pracy Socjalnej
Narodowy Politechniczny Uniwersytet w Odessie
E-mail: nikonnataliy@ukr.net
ORCID ID 0000-0002-0827-0895

Bohdanna Gwozdecka
Doktor Zakładu Prawa, Socjologii i Politologii
Państwowy Pedagogiczny Uniwersytet imienia Iwana Franki w Drohobyczu
E-mail: *bogdankauafm@gmail.com*
ORCID ID 0000-0003-2240-3508

Mariana Lyashko
Starszy wykładowca, Zakładu Socjologii i Pracy Socjalnej
Uniwersytet Narodowy w Użhorodzie, Ukraina
e-mail: mariana.lyashko@uzhnu.edu.ua
ORCID ID 0000-0002-6607-3214

Wstęp. Złożoność sytuacji etnokulturowej i językowej na Ukrainie rodzi wiele problematycznych kwestii, zarówno na poziomie porządku publicznego, jak i przestrzeni społecznej. Dlatego ukształtowanie jasnego stosunku do procesów językowych, stwarzanie sprzyjających warunków dla zachowania i rozwoju języka ukraińskiego, optymalizacja warunków istnienia języków etnicznych, jest jednym z najważniejszych zadań państwa o populacji polietylenowej. Utrzymanie języka jako ważnego elementu tożsamości etnokulturowej jest możliwe tylko przy uwzględnieniu etnospołecznego kontekstu funkcjonowania języka. Wpływ różnych obcych języków etnicznych i przyspieszenie procesów interakcji językowych aktualizuje problem funkcjonowania języka.Wpływ różnych obcych języków etnicznych i przyspieszenie procesów interakcji językowej aktualizuje problem funkcjonowania języka. Współczesne procesy formowania się i rozwoju państwa wymagają zachowania i reprodukcji ukraińskości, jednym z czynników jej reprodukcji jest język. Chociaż art. 10 Konstytucji Ukrainy stanowi, że «językiem państwowym na Ukrainie jest język ukraiński», w życiu codziennym używane są języki innych narodowości.Aby chronić, zachować i funkcjonować język państwowy jako ważny składnik kultury, element tożsamości narodowej i świadomości narodowej grupy etnicznej na poziomie państwowym, postanowiono wzmocnić funkcjonowanie i znaczenie języka państwowego na wielonarodowej Ukrainie. [1] oraz podpisanie 15 maja 2019 r. Ustawy «O zapewnieniu funkcjonowania języka ukraińskiego jako języka państwowego» [2].

Ustawy te wywoływały wiele kontrowersji i gorącej debaty publicznej, zwłaszcza w regionach przygranicznych Ukrainy i niepokoiły kraje sąsiednie – Węgry, Rumunię, Bułgarię, Grecję, Polskę, Rosję, Mołdawię, że przepisy ustaw ograniczają prawa mniejszości etniczne, a nawet więcej.

Głównym celem badania jest zdefiniowanie języka jako systemu społecznego, czynnika identyfikacji etnicznej oraz badanie funkcjonowania języka w obwodzie odeskim poprzez kompetencje językowe i orientację językową mniejszości etnicznych w społeczeństwie ukraińskim (na przykładzie bułgarskiej grupy etnicznej mniejszości).

Język odgrywa ważną rolę w procesie wzmacniania tożsamości etnicznej i ma ogromne znaczenie dla integracji mniejszości etniczno-narodowych.

Zwróćmy uwagę, że język jest złożonym systemem społecznym, który sam się organizuje, a zatem pełni funkcje i zadania społeczne. Biorąc pod uwagę społeczne funkcje języka związane z identyfikacją norm etnokulturowych, należy wyodrębnić funkcję informacyjną, służy jako uniwersalny środek przekazywania i przechowywania informacji (pisanie), funkcję wpływu (sugestii), funkcję komunikacyjną, funkcję jest indykatywnym środkiem przynależności do określonej grupy etnicznej, instrumentem tworzenia, rozwoju, ochrony i tłumaczenia kultury, utrwalającym i samookreślającym się.

Definicję języka jako kryterium tożsamości etnicznej w kontekście wielonarodowości i granic komplikuje rozprzestrzenianie się zjawiska dwujęzyczności (dwujęzyczności) [3, s. 124]. Dwujęzyczność jest zjawiskiem społeczno-kulturowym związanym z: 1) funkcjonowaniem dwóch języków na jednym terytorium administracyjnym lub państwowym; 2) znajomość dwóch języków przez jedną osobę (umiejętność mówienia i pisania w dwóch językach), która występuje w następujących sytuacjach: a) opanowanie języków do przygotowania zawodowego; b) opanowanie dwóch języków w celu nawiązania codziennej komunikacji w obszarach kontaktowych interakcji międzyetnicznych [4, s. 88].

Na przykład w południowym regionie Ukrainy, zwłaszcza w rejonie Odessy, mniejszości etniczno-narodowe są stale w stanie dwujęzyczności (trójjęzyczności), drugi język ulega ciągłym zmianom w zależności od okresu historycznego.

Polski socjolog i kulturolog A. Sadowski pisze: «Interpretacja miejsca języka w strukturze tożsamości w sposób instrumentalny oznacza poszukiwanie jego funkcji instrumentalnej, która kształtuje inne typy identyfikacji. Na przykład język jest ważnym warunkiem wstępnym identyfikacji kulturowej, narodowej, religijnej, terytorialnej, a także wieku, wykształcenia i innych ważnych zmiennych społecznych».

Znana ukraińska badaczka procesów etnokulturowych L. Aza zauważa w tym względzie, że «w grupie komponentów kulturowych język jest jedną z najważniejszych cech tożsamości etnicznej. Jednak nie można tego nazwać pojedynczą sytuacją, gdy kilka grup etnicznych mówi jednym językiem lub odwrotnie, jedna grupa etniczna mówi kilkoma językami. Ponieważ jednak tożsamość jest relacją, która nieustannie kształtuje się i reformuje w ramach pewnego dyskursu, jej postrzeganie może się zmienić, jeśli jakiekolwiek cechy „ich" przestaną odpowiadać istniejącym ideom, a ich zachowaniu – spełnieniu oczekiwań.Odnosząc się do tego faktu, wielu badaczy aktualizację roli języka w procesie identyfikacji etnicznej tłumaczy chęcią odróżnienia swojego pochodzenia etnicznego od innych» [6, s. 221].

Ona zwraca uwagę, że «… język może stać się etnicznym symbolem, środkiem etnodyferencjacji i urzeczywistnieniem archetypu„ my "– „ oni ". Chociaż np. bliskość językowa nie przyczynia się do powstania tak sztywnej tożsamości uwarunkowanej etnicznie, ale pozwala jedynie mówić o tożsamości dwukulturowej, dwukulturowej kompetencji, a co za tym idzie o dwukulturowym charakterze wyboru grup reprezentatywnych» [6, p. 221]. D. Leiten w książce «Formowanie tożsamości» argumentuje, że wybór języka etnicznego koreluje z wyborem tożsamości etnicznej [7, s. 199-243].

Należy zauważyć, że język etniczny jest językiem będącym jednym z głównych wyznaczników społeczności etnicznej i głównym środkiem komunikacji w tej społeczności. Najczęściej jest utożsamiany z jedną lub drugą osobą, tą lub inną narodowością [8, s. 115].

Przegląd literacki. Badania zagranicznych badaczy Kronenfeld D., Sadowski A., Laitin D. itp. poświęcone są badaniom i różnym aspektom funkcjonowania języka jako czynnika etnoidentyfikacji. Wśród ojczystych badaczy poważne praceDanylewskiej O., Szewczuk-Klużnej O., Bardinej N., Azy L., Rudnickiej T., Szestakowej K., Jewtucha W., Lisejenko O., Mosijczuk T., Kalasznikowej L. i inni.

Zatem znaczenie badań języka funkcjonującego w międzynarodowych, przygranicznych regionach Ukrainy jest niezaprzeczalne.

Metody badawcze. W badaniu wykorzystano ilościowe i jakościowe metody ankietowe – kwestionariusze i wywiady pogłębione. Jako dodatkowe źródło informacji społecznych, oprócz badania, zastosowano metodę analizy dokumentów (statystyczną). W ramach tego badania wykorzystano dokumenty statystyczne – dane z Ogólnoukraińskiego Spisu Powszechnego z 2001 roku, dane Głównego Departamentu Statystyki obwodu odeskiego.

Empiryczne podstawy badania. Przeprowadzając badanie w południowo-ukraińskim regionie Ukrainy, w szczególności w obwodzie odeskim, wykorzystano wieloetapową próbę docelowych kwot terytorialnych. Najbardziej kontrolowanymi parametrami próby są narodowość respondentów, płeć, wiek i miejsce zamieszkania. Wielkość próby (n) to 622 osoby z błędem (Δ) ± 4%.

Zatem próba objęła 298 mężczyzn i 324 kobiety, co stanowi 47,81% i 52,19% całej próby, obywatelstwo bułgarskie, w wieku 14 lat i więcej. Przetwarzanie danych zostało przeprowadzone przy użyciu programu „SPSS 11.0” forWindows, MS Excel oraz z wykorzystaniem metody analizy treści.

Wyniki. Według ostatniego spisu (2001) struktura etniczna Ukrainy przedstawia się następująco: Ukraińcy – 37 mln 541 tys. 700 osób, Rosjanie – 8 mln 334 tys. 100 osób, Białorusini – 275 tys. 800 osób, Mołdawianie – 258 tys. 600 osób, Tatarzy Krymscy – 248 tys. 200 osób, a na szóstym miejscu w strukturze etnicznej wśród wszystkich obywateli Ukrainy łączna liczba osób określających się jako Bułgarzy wyniosła 204 tys. 600 osób, co stanowi 0,4% populacji [9]. W obwodzie odeskim Bułgarzy zajmują trzecie miejsce, tu mieszkają trzy czwarte całej grupy państwa – ponad 150 tys., Czyli 6,1% ogółu ludności regionu [10, s. 46]. Dane te przesądziły o wyborze przedmiotu badań i pozwoliły ograniczyć region południowej Ukrainy do jednego regionu.

Według Ogólnoukraińskiego Spisu Powszechnego z 2001 r. Tożsamość narodowo-językowa Bułgarów przedstawia się następująco: 64,2% Bułgarów ukraińskich wskazało bułgarski jako swój język ojczysty, 30,3% rosyjski, 5% ukraiński i 0,5% inne języki [11]. Jest to dość wysoki wskaźnik tożsamości narodowo-językowej, biorąc pod uwagę poletniczność i wielokulturowość ukraińskiego społeczeństwa.W obwodzie odeskim, według Głównego Departamentu Statystyki, 77,8% Bułgarów jako język ojczysty wskazało swój język, w tym 15,4% ludności miejskiej i 62,4% ludności wiejskiej; Język rosyjski - 19,6% Bułgarów, wśród ludności miejskiej język rosyjski nazywano językiem ojczystym 16,1% Bułgarów, wśród mieszkańców wsi – 3,5%; Język ukraiński jest uważany za rodzimego przez 2,1% Bułgarów, z których 1,2% to mieszkańcy miast, a 0,9% mieszkańcy wsi; 0,4% Bułgarów w regionie Odessy uważa inny język za swój język ojczysty [12].

Znacząca różnica na Ukrainie jako całości oraz w obwodzie odeskim świadczy o wysokiej identyfikacji narodowo-językowej Bułgarów mieszkających w obwodzie, co można tłumaczyć zwartym życiem.

Na podstawie danych Głównego Departamentu Statystyki w obwodzie odeskim języki, którymi posługują się Bułgarzy, oprócz języka ojczystego, nazywano językiem ich grupy etnicznej – 7,85% (wśród nich ludność miejska wynosiła 6,37%). wieś – 1,48%); Ukraiński – 29,5% (miejski – 16%, wiejski – 13,5%); Rosyjski – 69,4% (miejski – 14,1%, wiejski – 55,3%); 3,12% Bułgarów biegle włada innymi językami. Należy przypomnieć, że stosunek całkowitej liczby ludności miejskiej i wiejskiej Bułgarii w regionie odeskim wynosi 1: 2 (w liczbach fizycznych – 49 tys. 298: 101 tys. 385 osób) [12].

Studiując zagadnienie języka, najpierw rozważmy kompetencje językowe Bułgarów, przez co rozumiemy stopień znajomości języka. Należy pamiętać, że znajomość języka nie jest definicją języka ojczystego. Wyniki badania pokazały następującą tendencję: 99,7% respondentów w życiu codziennym czyta, mówi i pisze po rosyjsku, nieco mniej (61,7% respondentów) –zrozumiały ukraiński – z tych dwóch języków jeden to państwo, a to determinuje jego użycie, a po drugie – regionalny język komunikacji. Pomimo tego, że według spisu ludności w regionie

Odessy 77,8% Bułgarów uznało bułgarski za swój język ojczysty [13], 56,8% respondentów nadal w nim czyta, mówi i pisze.

20,7% respondentów czyta, mówi i pisze w języku obcym, jest to wynik niezbyt wysoki, ale nadal stanowi prawie jedną czwartą respondentów. Wśród badanych Bułgarów ukraińskim mówi się na stanowisku – «Czytam, mówię, ale nie piszę» – 15,3%, rosyjskiego nie mówi tylko 0,3% respondentów, tak mały odsetek ze względu na naukę w liceach, natomiast bułgarscy nie piszą – 28,6%, zagraniczni – 5,0% respondentów. Zgodnie ze stanowiskiem «ogólnie rozumiem tekst i język», odpowiedzi rozkładały się następująco: ukraiński – 11,9%, bułgarski – 11,1% i zagraniczny – 18,9% respondentów.W przeciwieństwie do innych języków, więcej ludzi mówi po rosyjsku i zna go lepiej niż na przykład z definicji ich język ojczysty. Ogólna treść jest określana przez 10,6% respondentów w języku ukraińskim, 2,6% w języku bułgarskim i 25,7% w języku obcym. 0,5% respondentów w ogóle nie mówi po ukraińsku, 1,0% nie mówi po bułgarsku, a 30,1% nie mówi w języku obcym.

Tabela 20.

Kompetencje językowe Bułgarów na południu Ukrainy (%)

Język	Czytam, mówię, piszę	Czytam, mówię, ale niepiszę	Ogólnie rozumiem tekst i język	Łapię ogólne znaczenie	Nieposiadam
Język ukraiński	61,7	15,3	11,9	10,6	0,5
Język bułgarski	56,8	28,6	11,1	2,6	1,0
Język rosyjski	99,7	0,3	-	-	-
Język polski	20,7	5,0	18,5	25,7	30,1

Z analizy wynika, że w obwodzie odeskim stopień znajomości języka rosyjskiego jest wyższy niż bułgarskiego, stopień znajomości języka państwowego i języka ich narodowości, tj. ukraińskiego i bułgarskiego, jest prawie taki sam, ale stopień znajomości języka inne języki to ostatni krok kompetencje językowe Bułgarów.

Znajomość orientacji etnolingwistycznej pozwala poszerzyć ideę funkcjonowania różnych języków w społeczeństwie i rodzinie, stopień znajomości języków ludów zamieszkujących Ukrainę, możliwość edukacji językowej, stosunek do język narodowy, jego rozprzestrzenianie się. W ramach *orientacji językowej* rozumiemy praktyczne wykorzystanie wiedzy językowej. Dlatego należy przestudiować kwestię orientacji etnolingwistycznej.

Z danych ankietowych wynika, że większość Bułgarów w regionie – 54,3% - myśli po rosyjsku, jedna czwarta respondentów (24,8%) –w języku swojej grupy etnicznej. Nie należy ignorować faktu, że w regionie południowej Ukrainy językiem komunikacji międzyetnicznej był rosyjski, w rodzinach posługuje się nim również 26,0% respondentów. W swoich rodzinach 23,3% Bułgarów mówi po bułgarsku, a dokładniej –dialektach, ale fakt ten nie koliduje z ich komunikacją.

14,6% badanych mówi po rosyjsku ze znajomymi i sąsiadami, a prawie tyle samo Bułgarzy mówi po ukraińsku (16,1%) i bułgarsku (16,2%). Znacznie mniejszy odsetek tych, którzy porozumiewają się ze znajomymi i sąsiadami w języku obcym (1,9%). Jednocześnie, choć Bułgarzy na co dzień dość dużo porozumiewają się po ukraińsku, czytają gazety, literaturę, oglądają programy telewizyjne, dużo częściej słuchają radia po ukraińsku (odpowiednio 47,6% i 36,3%), bułgarscy – 21,2% i 14,5%, w języku rosyjskim – 3,4% i 1,6%.

Z tego możemy wywnioskować, że Bułgarzy mówią zarówno po ukraińsku, jak i po rosyjsku. Z otrzymanych odpowiedzi wynika, że Bułgarzy zachowując swój język, rozumieją język ukraiński, używają go jako języka państwowego. Czynnik ten obrazuje orientację integracyjną Bułgarów w społeczeństwie ukraińskim.

Tabela 21.

Orientacja językowa Bułgarów na południu Ukrainy, (%)

Język	**Myślę na nim**	**Komunikuję się w rodzinie**	**Komunikuję się z przyjaciółmi, sąsiadami**	**Czytam gazety, lit-rę**	**Oglądam telewizję, słucham radia**
Język ukraiński	-	-	16,1	47,6	36,3
Język bułgarski	24,8	23,3	16,2	21,2	14,5
Język rosyjski	54,3	26,0	14,6	3,4	1,6
Język polski	-	-	1,9	30,2	11,7

Należy zaznaczyć, że respondenci odpowiadając na pytania dotyczące kompetencji językowych i orientacji językowej, zwracali uwagę przede wszystkim na znaczenie danego języka dla nich. Wynika z tego, że respondenci do pewnego stopnia bagatelizowali znaczenie jednego języka, wyolbrzymiając inny.

Jednak według badania przeprowadzonego przez organizację pozarządową «Południowo-ukraiński oddział Towarzystwa Socjologicznego Ukrainy» [14] w 2018r. Uzyskano następujące dane, językiem komunikacji w domu są głównie dwa lub więcej języków, odnotowano 58,0% respondentów mówi w domu po bułgarsku – 30,9% badanych, po rosyjsku – 9,8% i po ukraińsku – 1,2%. W pracy lub na studiach Bułgarzy również najczęściej posługują się dwoma lub więcej językami – 58,0%, rosyjskim – 29,6%, bułgarskim – 9,9%, ukraińskim – 2,5% respondentów.

65,8% Bułgarów uczy się języka swojej grupy etnicznej w sposób bardziej szczegółowy i głębszy, 34,2% nie uczy się dokładnie swojego języka. Chęć poznania języka narodowego pojawia się zwłaszcza wtedy, gdy grozi utrata korzeni etnicznych. Ułatwia to sytuacja w regionach o zwartej populacji Bułgarów. Nauka języka ojczystego staje się tutaj koniecznością.

Wśród respondentów, którzy konkretnie uczą się języka bułgarskiego, 29,1% stwierdziło, że jest on akceptowany w ich rodzinach, 18,6% uczy się lub utrzymuje dobrą znajomość języka, aby przekazać jego cechy dzieciom i wnukom, 15,6% uważa, że zatrzymać się tam, gdzie mieszkają jego przedstawiciele, ich kultura jest możliwa przede wszystkim poprzez język, 1,8% uczy się języka, aby kiedykolwiek powrócić do swojej historycznej ojczyzny, 0,6% – aby porozumieć się z krewnymi mieszkającymi poza Ukrainą.

Żyjąc w społeczeństwie wieloetnicznym przez długi czas, grupy etniczne muszą dostosować się do dominującej kultury, a pilne i konieczne staje się podjęcie decyzji, jaką edukację powinny otrzymać ich dzieci.Według respondentów język ukraiński jest obowiązkowy do nauki w szkołach ponadgimnazjalnych – 31,0%, jest językiem państwowym, sporządza całą dokumentację, na potrzebę nauki języka obcego przypada 30,2%, wynika to z faktu że język obcy jest Jako język komunikacji międzynarodowej, co jest konsekwencją globalizacji świata, związanej z koniecznością wymiany informacji, osiągnięć itp., naukę języka rosyjskiego uważa za konieczną 25,9% –jedna czwarta respondentów. Wybór edukacji językowej obejmuje wiele aspektów, a wynik tego wyboru może wpłynąć na przyszłość jednostki.Stąd potrzeba edukacji dwujęzycznej (dwujęzycznej) w społeczeństwie o składzie polietylenowym. Dwujęzyczność (trójjęzyczność) to sposób na kulturową integrację mniejszości etnicznych w społeczeństwie wielonarodowym.

Korzystając z bazy danych badań prowadzonych przez organizację pozarządową „Południowo-ukraiński Oddział Towarzystwa Socjologicznego Ukrainy” przeprowadzonych w 2018 roku [14], uzyskano następujące wyniki, z których wynika, że Bułgarzy studiujący w szkołach i na uczelniach świadomość konieczności prawidłowej nauki języka państwowego, gdyż opcję „To jest język państwowy, wszyscy obywatele powinni się nim władać” wybrało 50% badanych. Chęć posługiwania się językiem ukraińskim jako językiem ojczystym znalazła odzwierciedlenie w odpowiedzi „To mój język ojczysty, chcę go dobrze znać” – stwierdziło 8,7% respondentów.

Świadomość znaczenia znajomości języka ukraińskiego dla realizacji planów życiowych odzwierciedla odpowiedź «Studiuję, bo to da możliwość zdobycia lepszego wykształcenia wyższego lub specjalistycznego» –stwierdziło 28,3% badanych, a odpowiedź «Ja studiować, bo to poszerzy moje możliwości w zakresie poszukiwania pracy. w rozwoju kariery» wybrało 30,4% respondentów. Brak pozytywnej motywacji do nauki języka państwowego wykazało 32,6% badanych, którzy zaznaczyli odpowiedź «Gdyby była okazja, odmówiłbym nauki».

Tym samym młodzi Bułgarzy są świadomi wagi nauki języka państwowego, która jest ważna dla dalszej edukacji na ukraińskich uczelniach i realizacji planów życiowych.

W trakcie wywiadów pogłębionych pedagodzy, przedstawiciele władz lokalnych i regionalnych oraz przedstawiciele stowarzyszeń narodowych i kulturowych zauważyli, że bułgarscy uczniowie nie mają problemów ze znajomością języka ukraińskiego, gdyż uczą się w zwykłych ukraińskich szkołach. Jednak większość uczestników wywiadów pogłębionych podkreślała potrzebę wzmocnienia szkolenia nauczycieli w szkołach krajowych do nauczania przedmiotów specjalnych w języku ukraińskim.

Uczestnicy wywiadów pogłębionych zgodzili się, że poziom znajomości języka ukraińskiego wśród absolwentów szkół z językiem wykładowym mniejszości narodowych jest niższy niż wśród absolwentów szkół, w których językiem wykładowym jest ukraiński.

Wskaźnikiem wagi i pilności języka wykładowego może być częstotliwość jego dyskusji. Kwestia języka nauczania młodzieży najczęściej dyskutowana jest z przyjaciółmi – 58,7% i rodzicami – 52,1%, nieco mniej z nauczycielami – 42,6%. Rodzice licealistów rozmawiają na ten temat z dziećmi – 60,0%, z przyjaciółmi – 54,3% i nauczycielami – 34,3%, a także z przedstawicielami stowarzyszeń narodowo-kulturalnych i samorządowcami – 17,1%.

Dlatego kwestia języka nauczania jest ważna i istotna dla Bułgarów, o czym świadczy częstotliwość dyskusji.

Wnioski. Sytuacja językowa i funkcjonowanie języka państwowego na Ukrainie są stale w centrum uwagi społeczeństwa o populacji polietylenowej, problem jest szczególnie dotkliwy w regionach przygranicznych, gdyż w opinii mniejszości etnicznych wpływa na ich interesy narodowe. W celu zachowania i rozwoju języka państwowego, który kształtuje tożsamość narodową i samoświadomość narodową, rząd realizuje politykę językową.

Język to cały samoorganizujący się system społeczny, z jego funkcjami, mechanizmami i elementami. W przygranicznych regionach Ukrainy funkcjonuje dwujęzyczność językowa, co komplikuje definicję języka jako kryterium tożsamości etnicznej. W badaniu podjęto jednak próbę analizy sytuacji językowej w Odessie wśród bułgarskiej mniejszości etnicznej, określenia poziomu znajomości języka ojczystego, określenia poziomu znajomości najpopularniejszych języków Ukrainy – ukraińskiego, rosyjskiego, a także ich znajomości.

Ten problem został rozwiązany za pomocą skal kompetencji językowych i orientacji językowej. Badanie kompetencji językowych i orientacji językowej pokazuje, że w południowym regionie Ukrainy, w szczególności w regionie Odessy, w którym biegle włada językiem rosyjskim, zachowując swój język, Bułgarzy rozumieją i uczą się języka ukraińskiego, używając go jako języka państwowego. Kwestia językowa jest istotna dla respondentów, zgodnie z danymi badawczymi rośnie świadomość potrzeby prawidłowej nauki języka państwowego.

Uczestnicy badania nie zaprzeczają, jak ważna jest znajomość języka ukraińskiego jako języka państwowego, a także innych języków. Decydującym czynnikiem w opanowaniu języka ukraińskiego jest poziom motywacji do nauki języka.

Będąc w stałym kontakcie etnicznym z sąsiednimi grupami etnicznymi - Ukraińcami, Rosjanami, Mołdawianami, Gagauzami - Ukraińcy Bułgarzy częściowo dostrzegają i zapożyczają elementy kultury tych grup etnicznych. Etnos bułgarski jest stale w stanie dwujęzyczności (trójjęzyczności), drugi język ulega ciągłym zmianom w zależności od okresu historycznego. Ważną rolę w reprodukcji kultury etnicznej odgrywa tzw. Diachroniczna informacja etnokulturowa między pokoleniami. Ciągła zmiana pokoleń w etnosie zapewnia stabilność kultury etnicznej w czasie. Dwujęzyczność (trójjęzyczność) to sposób na kulturową integrację mniejszości etnicznych z wielonarodowym społeczeństwem ukraińskim.

Uzyskane wyniki mogą stanowić podstawę do dalszych badań nad zagadnieniami związanymi z funkcjonowaniem języków narodowych grup etnicznych na Ukrainie.

Literatura.

1. Zakon Ukrainy «Pro osvitu» (2017). [Law of Ukraine «On Education»] Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy; Zakon vid 05.09.2017. № 2145-VIII. Retrieved from: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2145-19 (Last accessed: 20.02.2021)

2. Zakon Ukrainy «Pro zabezpechennia funktsionuvannia ukrainskoi movy yak derzhavnoi» (2019). [Law of Ukraine «On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language»] *Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy; Zakon vid 25. 04. 2019. №21, st.81.* Retrieved from: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2704-19 (Last accessed: 20.02.2021)

3. Shestakova K. Y. (2005). Etnichna identyfikatsiia na ukrainskomu pohranychchi : dys. ... kandydata sots. nauk [Ethnic identification on the Ukrainian border: dis. ... candidate soc. Science]: 22.00.03. – К., 2005. 188 s.

4. Yevtukh V. (2011). Etnosotsiolohiia : dovidnyk [Ethnosociology : a handbook]. K. : Vyd-vo NPU imeni M. P. Drahomanova, 205 s.

5. Sadowski A. (2000). Miejsce języka w strukturze tożsamości osobniczej na pograniczu kultur (na przykładzie badań nad tożsamością Polaków na Wschodzie). *Język a tożsamość na pograniczu kultur* / Pod red. E. Smułkowej, A. Engelking. Białystok-Warszawa : AGRAF. S. 115 – 128.

6. Aza L. (2002). Mova yak faktor etnichnoi identychnosti [Language as a factor of ethnic identity]. Sotsiokulturni identychnosti ta praktyky / pid red. A. Ruchky.K. : Instytut sotsiolohii NAN Ukrainy.S. 221 – 236.

7. Laitin D. (1998). Identityin Formation : The Russian-Speaking Populationsin the Near Abroad.*Cornell UP*. London. 243p.

8. Yevtukh V. (2010). Tendentsii etnonatsionalnoi dynamiky ukrainskoho suspilstva [Trends in ethno-national dynamics of Ukrainian society] (1990-pp. – 2010 p.). Metodolohiia, teoriia ta praktyka sotsiolohichnoho analizu suchasnoho suspilstva : zbirnyk naukovykh prats.Vyp. 16. Kharkiv : Vydavnychyi tsentr Kharkivskoho natsionalnohouniversytetuimeni V. N. Karazina. S. 436 – 444.

9. Pro kilkist ta sklad naselennia Ukrainy za pidsumkamy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku [On the number and composition of the population of Ukraine according to the results of the All-Ukrainian census of 2001].

Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy (Derzhkomstat Ukrainy). Retrieved from: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality (Last accessed: 1.02.2021)

10. Kisse A. (2006). Vozrozhdenie bolgar Ukrainyi [Revival of Bulgarians in Ukraine]. Ocherki. – Odessa: Izd-vo «Optimum». 288 s.

11. Pro kilkist ta sklad naselennia Ukrainy za pidsumkamy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku [On the number and composition of the population of Ukraine according to the results of the All-Ukrainian census of 2001]. Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy (Derzhkomstat Ukrainy). Retrieved from: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/language/ (Last accessed: 2.02.2021)

12. Potochni materialy viddilu statystyky naselennia Holovnoho upravlinnia statystyky Odeskoi oblasti. – 2001.

13. Movnyi sklad naselennia Odeskoi oblasti za pidsumkamy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2001 roku [Linguistic composition of the population of Odessa region according to the results of the All-Ukrainian census of 2001]. Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy (Derzhkomstat Ukrainy). Retrievedfrom: http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/odesa (Last accessed: 18.02.2021).

14. Mova navchannia etnonatsionalnykh menshyn Odeskoi oblasti: sotsiolohichnyi vymir [Language of instruction of ethno-national minorities of Odessa region: sociological dimension]: kolektyvna monohrafiia (2020) / O. V. Liseienko, N. O. Nikon, T. Ye. Mosiichuk [ta in..] ; za zah.red. O. V. Liseienko. Odesa : Astroprynt. 176 s.

III. SOCIO-CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF THE RISK SOCIETY

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042611**

10. LEGAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC FINANCIAL POLICY IN UKRAINE: CHALLENGES, IMPACT OF RISKS, LANDMARKS

Larysa Trofimova
Ph.D. in Law, Associate Professor,
Senior Researcher of Dnipro Polytechnic National Technical University
E-mail: lv_lecturer@ukr.net
ORCID: 0000-0002-6768-9290

"do not remain frozen in the fetters of yesterday's views, ideologies and problems"
Saburō Ōkita

Introduction. The diverse geopolitical and economic life of society during the pandemic requires awareness of the analysis of the states' effectiveness in implementing careful public financial policies and requires proper changes in the legal regulation of relations based on understanding of social, spiritual and legal values in the context of moral and physical health of humankind. The content and nature of legal regulation of public policy, financial crises, the development of democratic institutions, awareness of the impact of risks in balancing different interests in the formation and distribution of public finances and the nature of financial activities of the state affect the dynamics of reforms and socio-economic transformations in society that change the possibilities of mankind development and create the basis for the protection of state sovereignty.

Following the adoption on 25.09.2015 № 70/1 at the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 17 global goals of sustainable development, the Renewed EU Strategy for Sustainable Development. In order to ensure the national interests of Ukraine for sustainable development of the economy, civil society and the state to achieve growth and quality of life, respect for constitutional rights and freedoms of person and citizen in accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated 02.01.2015 № 5/2015 «On Sustainable Development Strategy «Ukraine 2020»» the achievement of European standards of living and a well-deserved place for Ukraine in the world through the implementation of reforms in the directions of development, security, pride, responsibility were declared, the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated 30.09.2019 №722/2019 provides for compliance with Sustainable Development Goals of Ukraine for the period up to

2030 with the introduction of an effective system for monitoring their implementation.

B.D.Hawrylyshyn dedicated to his Motherland-Ukraine the book «Towards more effective societies. Road Maps to the Future» with chapters «Retrospective-2009» and «Ukraine: 20 Past and 20 Future Years» noted: there is no real competition of ideas, political philosophies or economic doctrines, no real geopolitical counterbalance, we have no real political elite. After all, until real political patriotic elite grows up with knowledge of languages, with an understanding of how to weave into our national fabric threads of the best experiences of countries from different continents, there will be no rapid progress in Ukraine [1].

The Strategy of Public Security and Civil Protection of Ukraine identifies threats to national security in the areas of public security and civil protection and ways to achieve the goals and priorities of state policy in these areas, in particular: budget funding needs sufficient to achieve determined goals and objectives, and main directions of financial resources use, as in accordance with the Law of Ukraine dated 21.06.2018 № 2469-VIII «On National Security of Ukraine» national security of Ukraine is protectability of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order and other national interests of Ukraine from real and potential threats (section 9, part 1 of Article 1), national interests of Ukraine are vital interests of person, society and state, implementation of which provides the state sovereignty of Ukraine, its progressive democratic development, as well as safe living conditions and welfare of its citizens (section 10, Part 1 of Article 1) [22].

Ukrainian scholars reasoned that «given the general conditions of post-crisis development of the global financial system in the next 5-10 years, the step-by-step creation of a state system of monitoring, systematization, analysis and risk assessment may be included in the list of critical tasks for public administration system reform of Ukraine» [16, p. 256].

Voronkova V.G. is convinced that in the «risk society» all the problems of modern society crystallize, which led to the emergence of risks - organizational, technological, environmental, civilizational, global, in which all the contradictions of civilization are concentrated. The crisis of modern civilization in the global dimension contributes to the emergence of globalization processes - the globalization of risks, anthropological catastrophes, various forms of destabilization and destruction of society in all aspects of public life [2].

The political risk for each state depends on its strategy and tactics. The same event or government action can be insignificant or catastrophic for the country. This risk is significant in countries that are in a stage of profound institutional changes, where economic and social political situations are unstable, where markets and legislation are still imperfect, there are no adequate traditions and culture of political activity [17, p. 35].

O. Demyanchuk notes that «the absence or low development of civil society, including political parties, in post-communist countries distorts the structure of acting persons in the implementation of public policy, and this applies to almost all spheres of public activity. The formation and implementation of public policy in post-communist states are concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of the highest executive and, to some extent, legislative authorities» [3, p. 33].

The Chairman of the Supreme Court Valentyna Danishevska during a meeting with the chairmen of the general, commercial and administrative courts of appeal, which took place in the Civil Court of Cassation as part of the Supreme Court on 26.02.2021, emphasized: «In our country the importance of the independence of the judiciary is underestimated and not even apperceived. We will work to ensure that the legislative and the executive authorities finally realize that the authority of the court is not only the success of the judiciary; it is the success of the whole state and all state bodies» [23].

The start of renewal of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in 2021 opens opportunities for Ukrainian business, in particular through the expansion of trade and economic cooperation between EU partners and will let Ukraine’s investment attractiveness develop. Another window of opportunity is the involvement of Ukraine in the formation of the European Green Deal, as well as participation in related international Alliances [24].

The study of human development models up until 2050 of the Club of Rome in the field of global modeling is based on the methodology developed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Jay Forrester (published in the book «Industrial Dynamics») based on analysis of existing tendencies, their impact on each other, their possible results dealt with study of the main factors influencing the long-term behavior of the world system, raising the standard of living of each person in order to propose changes in political, economic, social systems to eliminate the possibility of crises.

Ukrainian scientist Bohdan Hawrylyshyn was a full member of the Club of Rome, the President of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Academician Borys Paton - an honorary member [25].

As is known, the Club of Rome is an international non-governmental organization that has been operating since 1968 and unites prominent scientists, statesmen and entrepreneurs from more than 30 countries and is designed to be a catalyst for solving global problems of mankind. The Association of the Club of Rome in Ukraine was founded in 2005 and covers a wide range of authoritative scientists, statesmen and public figures, industrialists and entrepreneurs who contribute to the Ukraine’s development strategy in the context of globalization and European civilization choice thanks to the active participation of the public in its development and implementation [26].

Modern futurology studies the probability of realization of different scenarios of possible and desired future of humankind. It is based on historical patterns, trends in social development and the latest technological advances. The task of futurology is to find sound models of the future, as well as answers to the essential questions of the future existence of man and humankind, in particular such as: the likeliness of a global catastrophe that will lead to the death of all humankind; the possibility or impossibility of creating artificial intelligence and its consequences for human civilization; further directions of human evolution; mechanisms for preventing global risks; optimization of ways to predict the future; preparing a person for new opportunities, including choosing a profession, gaining new knowledge; means of prolonging human life and health. If futurology focuses mainly on broad social strategy, then forecasting (in this case political) is mostly implemented in tactical short-term forecasts: analysis of political risks, prevention of predicted conflicts, forecasting available for review political situations, planning of government decisions and forecasting their consequences [4, p.37].

If we dedicate ourselves to the development of a specific project or program of political activity in a clearly defined segment of political life, then we must adhere to the existing methodologies and practices of providing scientifically plausible developments, plans, projects, programs [4, p.40].

As it is known, one of the tasks of the training course «Informatics» is the formation of algorithmic thinking, which in a broad sense is defined as a system of ways, techniques, methods and corresponding strategies aimed at solving both theoretical and practical problems and the result of which is algorithms as specific products of human activity.

In Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the human rights impacts of algorithmic systems (adopted on 08.04.2020 at the 1373rd meeting of the Deputy Ministers), in particular, it notes that Member States should ensure that any design, the development and ongoing deployment of algorithmic systems was in accordance with human rights and fundamental freedoms and the standard of the rule of law governing public and private relations, such as legality, transparency, predictability, accountability and control, and must also be maintained in the context of algorithmic systems. According to paragraph 10, when algorithmic systems have the potential to adversely affect human rights for a particular group, group or wide population, including the impact on democratic processes or the rule of law, such influence determines the respective obligations of the state and the obligations of the private sector concerning human rights [27].

The formation of a positive political image of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign, social, legal state depends on all those who dedicate their lives to serving the people, the rule of law, establishing and ensuring human rights and freedoms, administering fair justice, protecting individuals from arbitrary government interference in private life.

Robert Jackson noted the importance of providing policy makers, as well as all those who wish to use them, with a tool to address issues that arise according to the needs of individual countries, and stressed that in providing opportunities for dialogue and exchange of views one should take into account certain risk elements that can be minimized through careful preparation and training. There are relevant methods and procedures for creating a safe educational space, but all types of interaction involve some degree of risk, especially when discussing controversial issues and different notions of truth [28].

In the article by B.D. Hawrylyshyn «Ukrainian signposts at the crossroads of civilization» in the magazine «Suchasnist» from 2007 outlines the main problems of our country with the selection of important research and reports of the present: «Growth limits (limits of growth)» (under supervision of Denis Meadows), «Humanity at a Turning Point» (1974, M. Mesarovich and E. Pestel), «Revision of the International Order» (1975, J. Tinbergen), «Beyond the Age of Waste» (1976, D. Harbor and others), «Purpose for Humanity» (1977, E. Laslo and others), «Energy: Countdown» (1978, T. Monbrial), «There are no boundaries of education» (1979, J. Botkin, E. Elmandzhra, M. Malitsa), «Roadmaps to the Future» (B. Hawrylyshyn, 1980), «Microelectronics and Society» (1982, G. Friedrichs, A. Schaff), «The First Global Revolution (1991, A. King, B. Schneider)» «Factor 4: double well-being – double halved resources» (1997, E. Weizsäcker, E. Lovins, L. Lovins), «Boundaries of social unity: conflict and understanding in a pluralistic society» (1997, P. Berger), «How we will work» (1998, O. Jarini, P. Lidtke), «Humanism wins» (2000, R. Mon), «Information society and demographic revolution» (2001, S. Kapitsa), «Boundaries of privatization» (2004, E. Weizsäcker), «Limits of growth: 30 years later» (2005, D. Meadows and others) [1].

Teleshun S.O. identifies the main risks and threats at the regional and global levels: 1. uncontrolled migration, permanent humanitarian and social crises in a number of regions of Europe, Latin America, Eurasia, the Middle East, etc .; 2. threats of global extremism and terrorism – “asymmetric approach”. Individualization and local specification of these manifestations on the territories of Central and Eastern Europe; 3. increasing the number of regional points of tension in the form of nonlinear methods of warfare; 4. expansion of the geography of activity of quasi-state paramilitary formations – creation of new zones of tension; 5. energy revolution and redistribution of certain regional markets in the world. Six zones of conflict; 6. critical growth of social and economic inequality. Man-made catastrophes and pandemics in the centers of world influence and on their peripheries; 7. non-systemic civil conflicts and the systemic crisis of the modern middle class. Criminalization of political and social processes in the European space; 8. strengthening the role of nation states and reformatting of overnational world and regional political and economic entities of the twentieth century; 9. threats to liberal-democratic political trends: the global dimension. Strengthening of left-wing social and right-wing national movements and public associations; 10. growing of borders and the number of cross-border conflicts; 11. deepening of the crisis and the end of the period of international relations of the post-Yalta world [5].

The strategy of public administration reform of Ukraine for the period up to 2021 was approved by the order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 24.06.2016 № 474 (as amended by the order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 18.12.2018 № 1102-p) provides that public administration reform is one of the main reforms in the countries with economies in transition, carrying out comprehensive reforms in various areas of public policy. The strategy, taking into account the Principles of Public Administration, identifies the following areas of reform, in particular: formation and coordination of public policy (strategic planning of public policy, quality of regulatory framework and public policy in general, including requirements for public policy formation based on thorough analysis and public participation); public finance management (tax administration, preparation and execution of the state budget, public procurement system, internal audit, accounting and reporting, external audit). According to the legislation, ministries are defined as bodies responsible for the formation and implementation of state policy, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine - as a body that directs, coordinates and controls the activities of ministries. However, the existing mechanisms for directing and coordinating ministries, as well as the capacity of ministries to formulate policies, need to be improved. Another problem is the lack of unified rules or criteria for organizational support for the implementation of public policy. A significant number of functions for the implementation of public policy are performed by ministries, which reduces their ability to qualitatively formulate public policy. The quality of state policy formation determines the efficiency and effectiveness of state policy implementation. The Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine define the basic conceptual principles of policy formation (in particular, analysis of the state of affairs in the industry, forecasting the results of policy implementation, determination of efficiency criteria, financial and economic reasoning), but in practice these provisions are almost never applied; lack of clear classification and relationship between program and forecast documents in the areas of public policy and regulations; low level of application of modern technologies and use of analytical tools for work with data in activity of executive bodies that causes low level of analytical work; lack of clearly defined approaches to mid- and long-term planning of central executive bodies activity, which leads to the production of a significant number of decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine that are not financially sound in the mid-term.

According to Article 116 of the Constitution of Ukraine, conducting financial, pricing, investment and tax policies; policies in the areas of labor and employment, social protection, education, science and culture, nature protection, environmental safety and nature use are provided by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which directs and coordinates the work of ministries and other executive bodies. The Concept of ensuring national security in the financial sphere was approved by the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 15.08.2012 № 569-p: the state of national security in the financial sphere depends on the events and factors of both internal and external financial and credit policy of the state, the current political situation in the state, perfection of legislative maintenance of functioning of financial system, and also international obligations of the state. The purpose of the Concept is to define the basic principles and directions of state policy on ensuring the national security of the state in the financial sphere. Monetary policy within the limits set by law should be conducted in a coordinated manner together with economic policy and ensure the maintenance of structural changes in the national economy and sustainable economic and social development of the state. The expected results of the Concept implementation make it possible to: resolve the issue of ensuring the protection of the national interests of the state in the event of the emergence and deepening of threats in the financial sphere; to develop a mechanism of state risk management in the financial sphere; to minimize the consequences of global threats in case of their occurrence, which will contribute to the balance of the financial sphere and ensure the effective functioning of the national economy and economic growth of the state [29].

Ruslan Stefanchuk notes: «We have recently presented the concept of updating the Civil Code of Ukraine, on the basis of which we will formulate the relevant legislation. Another important issue: we must adopt the legislation provided for in Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine. After adoption, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of the impact and monitor the proper implementation of the adopted legislation. If these laws do not achieve their goal, we must together with the Government analyze the causes and work on the errors» [30].

It should be noted that according to Article 74 of the Constitution of Ukraine, a referendum on bills on taxes, budget and amnesty is not allowed.

Kotenko S.L. believes that public financial policy in Ukraine is not aimed at human development, which is one of the main reasons for the low indicators in the human development index in the world [6].

Digitalization exacerbates the problem of risks at the state and personal levels: in the production and use of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of nuclear war, terrorism, property rights, hacking and cybercrime, financial fraud, drug trafficking, breach of privacy and family life, freedom of the speech, copyright, etc. [7].

Literature review. Ukrainian scientist and politician O.A. Lukashev in his works substantiates that the institutions of «public banking law», «organization of money circulation and accounts», «currency regulation and currency control» are not included in the subject of financial and legal regulation [8, p. 35].

I, as the author of the scientific work, on September 26, 2012 noted that «the content of financial policy is multifaceted and includes: development of scientifically sound concepts of financial development, formed on the basis of studying the requirements of economic laws, comprehensive analysis of the historical development of the state, prospects of labor and production relations, population needs and interstate competition; pricing reforms and updating antitrust laws; decentralization of the budget, as well as opportunities for public awareness of draft laws and documents relating to the interests of society (publication of demos gives users an idea of product preparation (in this case - strategies, concepts, programs) and are created as advertising, drawing attention to the future changes) [9].

However, in 2014, in violation of the principles of academic integrity[6], a student of the Faculty of International Economic Relations of KhNEU after

[6] Larysa Trofimova. Problemy akademichnoyi kul′tury: poshuk bona fides ta equitas [Problems of academic culture: search for bona fides and equitas]. p. 458-461 (Retrieved from http://idpnan.org.ua/files/-1-efektivnist-norm-prava.pdf).

S. Kuznets, A.I. Komyshan with unfounded and erroneous approval by the supervisor

N.I. Voznenko without appropriate citation uses citations, text and structure of my work as his own, violating copyright, which cannot but cause a response.

According to Article 23 of the Constitution of Ukraine, everyone has the right to the free development of his personality, provided that the rights and freedoms of others are not violated, and has responsibilities to a society in which the free and comprehensive development of his personality is ensured.

According to Nesterenko A.S., the financial policy of the state is an independent sphere of activity of its government in the sphere of financial relations, and the purpose of financial policy is «protection and realization of material interests of subjects of society» [10].

In our opinion, the position of A.S. Nesterenko deserves a critical assessment in the context of the relationship of different social groups and individuals in the use of public institutions and respect for the rights and different needs of each person in the development of personality in relation to only the aspect of «material interests» as the purpose of financial policy in part that «the scope of its government in the field of financial relations» without taking into account public consultations, discussions, communications, case-law and the links of the transparent process of political, including management decisions - development strategies, since in accordance with Art. 100 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Council of the National Bank of Ukraine develops the basic principles of monetary policy and monitors its implementation. The National Bank is not liable for the obligations of public authorities, and public authorities are not liable for the obligations of the National Bank, except in cases where they voluntarily assume such obligations. According to the Law of Ukraine «On the National Bank of Ukraine», the National Bank issues regulations on matters within its competence, which are mandatory for public authorities and local governments, legal entities and individuals (Article 56).

The historical development of this concept must be taken into account in the analysis of the relationship between public opinion and public policy. Analysis of the influence of public opinion on the policy agenda and the formation of its new sphere, which would present the processes of determining socially significant issues that constitute public policy and public affairs and priorities [11].

In 2019, fraudsters stole more than UAH 360 million from Ukrainians' payment cards, which is one and a half times more than in 2018. The Ukrainian Interbank Association of Members of Payment Systems «EMA» reports: every day 1-2% of Ukrainians face cybercriminals by phone, e-mail, in online stores, online services for posting ads, employment and lending, etc. In July 2020, the National Bank launched a large-scale information campaign and online game «Overcome the swindler!» [31].

Ochkurenko S.V., Bashtovoy S.V. emphasize that the most important socio-economic function of the modern state is the function of ensuring macroeconomic stability, which involves ensuring the stability of the currency. The activity of the National Bank as the issuing center of the state is subordinated to this function, and it is realized by means of use of means and methods of the monetary policy defined by Art. 25 of the Law of Ukraine «On the National Bank of Ukraine». Since the central bank's property, including funds, is state-owned, and the issuance of funds has always been seen as a «privilege of the ruler» and is logically a condition of the fiscal function of the state (to raise money in the budget, they must first be put into circulation) then the legal regulation of relations conerning the issuance of funds, distribution and use of monetary funds of the central bank and the implementation of monetary policy, is now recognized as financial and legal even by supporters of the narrowest approach to defining the scope of financial regulation [12].

The Constitutional Court of Ukraine in its Decision dated 26.12.2011 №20-рп/2011 noted that the socio-economic rights provided by law are not absolute. The mechanism of realization of these rights can be changed by the state, in particular because of impossibility of their financial maintenance by proportional redistribution of means for the purpose of preservation of balance of interests of all society. Such measures may be conditioned by the need to prevent or eliminate real threats to the economic security of Ukraine, which according to the first part of Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine is the most important function of the state. The change in the mechanism of calculation of social benefits and assistance must take place in accordance with the criteria of proportionality and fairness and is constitutionally permissible to the extent that the very essence of the content of the right to social protection is questioned [32].

The phrase «the state seeks», according to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, means the efforts and obligation of the state to direct its activities to fulfill a certain task defined by the Constitution of Ukraine. Analysis of the terms «balance», «to balance», «balanced budget» shows that the balance of the budget (state, region) provides a uniform (parity) ratio between its expenditure and revenue parts, compliance with expenditures to revenues, but does not preclude the adoption of the budget with the excess of expenditures over revenues and vice versa (with a deficit or surplus). At the same time, the legal nature of the budget cannot be limited to the financial and economic component. The budget is a plan for the formation and use of financial resources [33].

The formation of public financial policy takes into account the challenges, the state of the economy, the dynamics of debt and analyzes the impact of risks, chooses the best option for state administration, public administration, market management to create a basis for quality, timely and equitable service to the person, sustainable social economic development of the rule of law. The Law of Ukraine «On Economic Independence of the Ukrainian SSR» dated 03.08.1990 №142-XII (as amended on 04.11.2018) on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine defines the content, purpose and basic principles of economic independence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, management mechanism, economic regulation and social sphere, organization of financial and budgetary, credit and monetary system. The Address of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky to the Verkhovna Rada on the internal and external situation of Ukraine deals with the prevention of threats in order not to overcome the consequences. The NISS

Analytical Report to this Address states: demographic aging causes challenges in the field of public finance with outlined priorities of public financial policy - full implementation of mid-term budget planning with improving the quality of macroeconomic forecasting, budget discipline; keeping the state budget deficit and borrowings within the legally defined limits; ensuring transparency of public finances using specialized open data portals [34].

Results. Politics is the area of relations between different social groups and individuals in the use of public authorities' institutes to exercise their socially significant interests and needs; social science that studies political institutions and the principles and behavior of government. Politics in this sense is studied mainly by political analysts; policy is a plan, course of action or «direction of action adopted and followed by the government, leader, political party, etc.»; a certain course of action, chosen for the sake of profitability, convenience, etc. [18, p. 262].

S. Sytnyk notes that the meaning of the concept of «public policy» can vary depending on the specific context: 1) public policy as a transparent process of political, including management decisions. The degree of publicity, in this case, will be determined by the availability of channels of access of stakeholders to this process and, accordingly, it gives the opportunity to assert the presence / absence of public policy; 2) public policy as a purposeful influence exercised by public authorities. This meaning of public policy is most often used in the context of the implementation of public administration; 3) public policy as a program that contains strategies for state development. These are usually area policies (in the area of health, education, industrial policy, etc.). In this case, the concept of "public policy" is identical to the understanding of the concept of «state policy»; 4) public policy as a certain course of action of public authority. Such meaning may take place in the context of the implementation of a certain ideology of the ruling class; 5) public policy, the essence of which is public activity. The latter is understood as the activity of political and non-political persons represented in the public sphere, who through interaction seek to exercise their own interests. For example, the activities of the state are manifested in the area of meeting of social demands, respectively, public activities are carried out in order to optimize and rationalize management decisions. Public is the activity of the state aimed at meeting the demands of social groups; 6) public policy as a mechanism for maintaining public order [13].

Political analytics in public policy becomes a tool for shaping public opinion (artificial change of public attitudes, priorities, perceptions, expectations, etc.) and the implementation of certain projects of the future or the most favorable and expected for world policy models of situations in high-risk zones. This is primarily due to the political motivation and involvement of well-known expert and analytical institutions in various power centers of influence [14].

R. Kobets emphasizes that the concept of «state/public policy» contains fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand, public policy is the adoption of a decision by a competent authority aimed at solving a certain socially significant problem, which is consistently implemented by all authorities and public institutions. On the other hand, it is obvious that the real process of preparation, adoption and implementation of a policy is a complex network of interaction with various «participants of the game» who participate in it, guided by a variety of considerations: maintaining the existing status quo, gaining specific benefits, increasing powers, expansion of funding, involvement in the decision-making process, etc. [19, p. 56].

The capacity of public arenas depends on the resource capabilities of actors (time of institutional interaction, finances, etc.). Each public arena has a characteristic rhythm of organizational (institutional) life, which affects the temporal order of its interaction with social problems, and, consequently, their selection [20, p. 44]. The development of public policy does not end with its formation or approval, the main thing is the result of its implementation and analysis of the effectiveness of the system. Models of public policy implementation in political science reflect the tendencies of changing the position of public institutions (status, functions and resource opportunities) in the process of policy formation and the problem of implementation of the set programs [20, p. 45]. Civil society, institutionalizing, has acquired the features of political and financial independence, characterized by the active promotion of their interests and involvement in the processes of co-management at both national and global levels [20, p.116]. All types of activity of public power (financial, political, legal) and the participants of the public process (deputies, politicians, representatives of the legislature, etc.) fall into the area of public control [20, p.138].

R. Rummel and D. Hinen substantiated the need for a combined approach that would combine the subjective perception of the foreign environment with quantitative analysis of objective data to form a general perception of country risk [15, p. 31].

According to Part 3 of Article 6 of the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (ratified with applications by the Law of Ukraine dated 20.05.2020 № 631-IX), a public authority may grant access to an official document by indicating to the applicant easily accessible alternative sources.

In order to promote high-quality public control and active public discussion, the state budget web-portal for citizens (https://openbudget.gov.ua/) in the section «budget literacy» informs about the stages of the budget process, gives access to the glossary and reminds that indicators of the consolidated budgets are used for forecasting of economic and social development of the state. The state institution «Open Public Finance» has projects: a single web-portal for the use of public funds (spending.gov.ua) with an open database on public finances of Ukraine, developed to meet the requirements of the Law of Ukraine «On the openness of the use of public funds»; register of projects of social and economic development of Ukraine (Proifi.gov.ua), implemented with the involvement of funds of international financial organizations; presentation (openbudget.gov.ua) of the main budget indicators, aimed at informing the general public in an accessible form about the main goals, objectives and priorities of budget policy, sources of budget filling, justification of budget expenditures, planned and achieved results of budget funds use [35].

The Declaration of State Sovereignty declared that Ukraine regulates immigration processes. Order of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 12.07.2017 № 482-р approved the Strategy of State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the period up to 2025 (goal 8 is to strengthen control over compliance with migration legislation within the country - it is necessary to adopt appropriate legal acts to effectively monitor compliance with immigration legislation to prevent abuse of rights for family reunification (including the introduction of liability for fictitious marriage or fictitious adoption) and other legal means of immigration. Goal 9 is to ensure respect for the human dignity of returnees by encouraging them to return voluntarily - the legal, financial and procedural aspects of the voluntary return process need to be reviewed. It should be reminded that the Concept of State Migration Policy (30.05.2011 №622 / 2011) recognized the need to improve the system of state management of migration processes, due to political and socio-economic factors affecting the situation in Ukraine and the world, the main of which are, in particular : integration of Ukraine into the international labor market, accompanied by the outflow of labor from Ukraine; population decline in Ukraine and other European countries; active immigration policy of foreign countries aimed at attracting foreign labor; inconsistency of Ukrainian legislation on migration with current requirements.

In the judgment of the ECHR in the case of Amann v. Switzerland dated 16 February 2000, the quality of a law requires that it be available to that person and that he/she is also able to foresee the consequences of its application to him/her and that the law not be contrary to the rule of law. This means that there must be a remedy in national law against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The danger of arbitrariness is especially evident when the executive branch performs its functions behind closed doors. The law should contain sufficiently clear and concise wording that would give citizens a proper understanding of the circumstances and conditions under which public authorities are authorized to interfere with the right.

The Civil Court of Cassation of the Supreme Court pointed out that according to Articles 120 and 121 of the Marriage and Family Code of Ukraine, an adoption could be declared invalid if it was carried out on the basis of forged documents or without intent to create a relationship for parents and children (fictitious adoption), or a person who could not be an adoptive parent, only at the request of the person whose rights were violated by the adoption, as well as at the request of the guardianship authorities and the prosecutor. The legal grounds for annulment of adoption were determined by Article 123 of the Code Marriage and Family Code, according to which adoption is annulled if it is contrary to the interests of the child. The court noted that, as a rule, this occurs when the adopter ceases to care for the adopted child, negatively affects him/her, leaves him/her without care. The Court of Cassation drew attention to the fact that in accordance with Article 124 of the

Marriage and Family Code, the vacation of adoption is not allowed if the adoptee has reached the age of majority by the time the claim for its vacation is filed. Vacation of adoption after the adoptee reaches the age of majority is allowed if the actions of the adopted (adopter) threaten the life or health of the adopter (adopted), the other spouse or their children. The CCC of the Supreme Court pointed out that similar grounds for vacation of adoption in respect of an adult are contained in the provisions of Article 238 of the Family Code of Ukraine, according to which vacation of adoption is not allowed after the child reaches adulthood (decision dated 29.01.2020 in case № 387/1023/17).

Vinnyk O.M. argues that the essence of economic transformation in Ukraine, ultimately, is to optimally take into account and ensure both public and private interests, in managing them and through them - in order to build a socially oriented market economy. The main goal of this transformation is to ensure the optimal balance between freedom, in particular economic, and legal equality and social justice, on the other. No one has ever been able to ensure that all categories of economic interests are taken into account in their ideal ratio. This is one of the sources of conflicts of interests of different people in the process of their collision - opposing, competing, hostile. Ensuring a balanced way of taking into account private and public interests in companies through legal means will prevent a significant part of corporate conflicts, and improving legal mechanisms for resolving disputes between corporate parties will help resolve these conflicts with the least loss to the society [21].

In case № 910/18645/19 of the USRCD 92886296 collected from the National Agency of Ukraine for Detection, Investigation and Management of Assets Obtained from Corruption and Other Crimes (identification code 41037901, address: 01001, Kyiv, 1 Borys Hrinchenko Street) in favor of «ABS Technology» Limited Liability Company (identification code 38119250, address: 04073, Kyiv, 15-A Stepan Bandera Avenue) costs of professional legal assistance - UAH 343,825.75 (three hundred forty three thousand eight hundred and twenty UAH 75 kopecks). The court of first instance collected from the National Agency of Ukraine for Detection, Investigation and Management of Assets Obtained from Corruption and Other Crimes in favor of the Limited Liability Company «ABS Technology» a court fee of UAH 676,192.00. The amount of the court fee to be paid by the complainant for filing an appeal is UAH 1,014,288.00 and is calculated: UAH 676,192.00 (the amount to be paid when filing the statement of claim) * 150% (rate of court fee when filing an appeal) = UAH 1,014,288.00 (USRCD 93191290).

Conclusion. Prudent public financial policy is a set of systematic management of ideas, developments, measures and means of legal, administrative, information-analytical, organizational nature for quality formation and sufficient for the distribution of public financial resources to ensure the functions of the state (local communities) in specific historical conditions of society development.

Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 22.02.2021 in monitoring report on the implementation and analysis of the effectiveness of the adopted regulations noted about the systematic aspect in development of legislation and the importance of the functioning of the center for the formation of legal policy. The model of legal acts development, proceeding from the systematic analysis of the current legislation, looks as follows: a) monitoring, meaning: 1) search for problems of legal regulation which need to be solved; 2) thorough analysis of identified problems by analyzing international experience, statistics, case law and scientific materials, conducting surveys and consultations; 3) choosing the best solution of the problem; b) development of a legal act draft on the basis of monitoring. Following this scheme, 19 concepts for solving the problems identified as a result of the monitoring were taken into account in the development of the work plan of the Ministry of Justice for 2021, and in the future they will be transformed into drafts of regulations.

As the Committee on Legal Policy and other relevant committees function in the body of representative democracy - the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, it is important to ensure high-quality rule-making of normative legal acts in the development of constitutional principles of law-making, taking into account the mission of each sector ministry. Given that the High Council of Justice provides binding advisory opinions on draft laws on the establishment, reorganization or liquidation of courts, the judiciary and the status of judges, summarizes the proposals of courts, bodies and institutions of the judiciary on legislation on their status and functioning, the judiciary and the status of judges, the important issue of the implementation of judicial policy is their publication on the website of the draft laws of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine with the review of the Center for Legal Policy Development of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.

In the context of the formation of public financial policy as a purposeful influence of local government and the state on financial relations should be given that Aristotle divided the law into groups: adopted on the basis of law as a measure and expression of justice and normative material adopted to meet the mercantile interests of one person, group individuals or even the state as a whole, but does not carry a sign of justice and is not a normative expression of law, to remember the legal interpretation, doctrinal, educational, law enforcement, law-making forms of legal policy.

The subject and method of legal regulation of law branches in the legal system of Ukraine with clear criteria for distinguishing public financial law in the formation of content and structure requires updated understanding and further research of formation and implementation of public financial policy in the context of harmonization of geopolitical financial and legal regulation and harmonization of Ukrainian legislation with European Union requirements in order to achieve macroeconomic stability in the country, its competitiveness, the development of economic and monetary relations in a multilateral world.

References

Articles:

1. Bohdan Hawrylyshyn (2007). Ukrainski dorogovkazy na rozdorizhzhyah civilizastii [Ukrainian signposts at the crossroads of civilization] in Suchastnist. No. 10. – p. 58-64 (Retrieved from http://m.day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/top-net/ukrayinski-dorogovkazy-na-rozdorizhzhyah-cyvilizaciyi); B. Hawrylyshyn - report to the Club of Rome “Towards more effective societies. Road Maps to the Future” (2009). comp. V. Rubcov. – 3 edition. – Kyiv: Univ. edit. Pulsary. – 248 p. (Retrieved from http://www.clubofrome.org.ua/ukrayinski-dorogovkazi-na-rozdorizhzhyah-tsivilizatsiyi-bogdan-gavrilishin/).

2. Voronkova V.G. “Suspilstvo rysyku” yak naslidok kryzy suchasnoyi tsivilizatsii u globalnomu vymiri ["Risk society" as a consequence of the crisis of modern civilization in the global dimension] (Retrieved from http://vestnikzgia.com.ua/article/view/27881).

3. O. Demyanchuk. “Derzhanva politica” ta “publichna politica”: variant perehidnogo period [“State policy” and “public policy”: a variant of the transition period] (Retrieved from http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/portal/soc_gum/naukma/Polit/2000_18/05_demyanchyk_op.pdf)

4. V. P. Horbatenko. U poshukakh maybutnʹoho: do problemy evolyutsiyi futurolohiyi yak nauky [In search of the future: to the problem of evolution of futurology as a science]. Naukovi pratsi MAUP. Politychni nauky. - 2017. - Vyp. 1. - p. 35-48 (Retrieved from http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Npmaupp_2017_1_6).

5. Teleshun S.O. Ukrayinsʹki politychni realiyi i heopolitychni vyklyky na tereni yevraziysʹkoho kontynentu (2013–2015) [Ukrainian political realities and geopolitical challenges on the territory of the Eurasian continent (2013-2015)]. - "Global challenges in the Eurasian space: prospects for Ukraine" May 14-15, 2015: materials of reports and speeches / ed. count V. Tsvykh [etc.]. - K., - 2015. - P. 173–178 (Retrieved from https://ipiend.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/teleshun_vyklyky.pdf).

6. S. Kotenko. Regulatory support of the state financial policy behind criterion of human development. - Derzhavne upravlinnya. - Investytsiyi: praktyka ta dosvid № 21/2015. – p. 130-135 (Retrieved from http://www.investplan.com.ua/pdf/21_2015/29.pdf).

7. Bochkov A.A. Sovremennoye gosudarstvo v usloviyakh tsifrovoy real'nosti [The modern state in the context of digital reality]. - Pravo. Ekonomika. Psikhologiya. 2019. № 3. p. 3–9.

8. Lukashev O. A. Teoretychni problemy systemy finansovoho prava [Theoretical problems of the financial law system]. - Pravo ta derzhavne upravlinnya: zbirnyk naukovykh pratsʹ / Klasychnyy pryvatnyy un-t; Zaporizʹka torhovo-promyslova palata. – Zaporizhzhya, 2010. – № 1. – p. 33-37.

9. Trofimova L.V. Finansove pravo yak osnova finansovoyi polityky [Financial law as the basis of financial policy]. Chasopys Kyyivsʹkoho universytetu

prava. - 2012/3. Administratyvne pravo i protses. Finansove pravo. Informatsiyne pravo. – p. 143-149. (Retrieved from http://kul.kiev.ua/images/chasop/2012_3/143.pdf).

10. Nesterenko A.S. Finansova polityka derzhavy yak osnovnyy metod pravovoho rehulyuvannya finansovykh vidnosyn shchodo funktsionuvannnya finansovoyi systemy Ukrayiny [Financial policy of the state as the main method of legal regulation of financial relations regarding the functioning of the financial system of Ukraine] (Retrieved from http://pravoisuspilstvo.org.ua/archive/2015/6_2015/part_3/26.pdf).

11. Borysevych S. Sutnistʹ i zavdannya publichnoyi polityky [The essence and objectives of public policy] (Retrieved from www.nbuv.gov.ua/portal/Soc_Gum/Nrzd/2011_1/2.pdf).

12. Ochkurenko S.V., Bashtovoy S.V. Aktualʹni problemy vyznachennya mezh finansovo-pravovoho rehulyuvannya [Actual problems of defining the boundaries of financial and legal regulation] (Retrieved from http://lcslaw.knu.ua/index.php/arkhiv-nomeriv/4-5-2013/item/137-aktualni-problemy-vyznachennia-mezh-finansovo-pravovoho-rehuliuvannia-ochkurenko-s-v-bashtovoi-s-v).

13. Sytnyk S. Mizh teoriyeyu ta praktykoyu publichnoyi polityky [Between the theory and practice of public policy] (Retrieved from www.vidkryti-ochi.org.ua/2010/11/blog9).

14. S. Teleshun. Vyklyky ta zahrozy svitovomu poryadkovi: pohlyad z Ukrayiny [Challenges and threats to the world order: a view from Ukraine] (Retrieved from https://ipiend.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/teleshun_vyklyky.pdf).

15. Podkolzina I. A. Problemy definitsii i otsenki politicheskogo riska v zarubezhnykh issledovaniyakh [Problems of definition and assessment of political risk in foreign studies] - Vest. Moskovskogo un-ta. Seriya 12 «Politicheskiye nauki». – 1996. – № 5. – p. 19 – 33.

Publications:

16. Priorytety natsionalnogo economichnogo rozvytku v conteksti globalizatsiynyh vyklykiv [Priorities of national economic development in the context of globalization challenges]: a monograph in 2 parts (2008). – Part 1, edit by V.M. Geytsya, A.A. Mazaraki. – Kiyv. KNTEU. – 389 p.

17. Djus I.V. Politicheskie riski: otsenka, analis i upravlenie [Political Risks: Assessment, Analysis and Management]. – M.: IMEMO RAN, 2004. – 92 p.

18. Kiliyevych O. Anglo-ukrainian glossary of terms and concepts from the analysis of state policy and economy. - Kyiv: Solomiya Pavlychko Publishing House, Fundamentals, 2003. - 510 p.

19. Kobetsʹ R. Analiz polityky dlya potreb lobistsʹkoyi kampaniyi [Policy analysis for the needs of the lobbying campaign: textbook]: navch. posib.; Fond “Yevropa KHKHI”, T-vo Leva. – K., 2007. – 212 p.

20. Chalʹtseva O.M. Publichna polityka: teoretychnyy vymir i suchasna praktyka [Public policy: theoretical dimension and modern practice]: monohrafiya / O. M. Chalʹtseva. – Vinnytsya: FOP Baranovsʹka T. P., 2017. – 336 p.

21. Vinnyk O.M. Publichni ta pryvatni interesy v hospodarsʹkykh tovarystvakh: problemy pravovoho zabezpechennya [Public and private interests in business associations: problems of legal support]. Monohrafiya.- K.: Atika, 2003. - 352 p.

Electronic resource:

22. Law of Ukraine dated 21.06.2018 № 2469-VIII "On National Security of Ukraine". Retrieved from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19#Text

23. “Avtorytet sudu – tse uspikh ne lyshe sudovoyi systemy, a vsiyeyi derzhavy – Valentyna Danishevsʹka” [The authority of the court is the success not only of the judicial system, but of the whole state - Valentyna Danishevska] (Retrieved from https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1081584/).

24. “Olʹha Stefanishyna: Onovlena Uhoda z YES - investytsiyno pryvablyva Ukrayina” [Olga Stefanishyna: Renewed Agreement with the EU is an investment-attractive Ukraine] (Retrieved from https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/olga-stefanishina-onovlena-ugoda-z-yes-investicijno-privabliva-ukrayina).

25. Gorbatenko V. Rymsʹkyy Klub i orhanizatsiya transdystsyplinarnykh proektiv z dovhostrokovoho prohnozuvannya hlobalʹnykh problem [The Club of Rome and organization of transdisciplinary projects for long-term forecasting of global problems] (Retrieved from https://ipiend.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/gorbatenko_rymskyi.pdf).

26. Key Objectives of the Ukrainian Association for the Club of Rome (Retrieved from http://www.clubofrome.org.ua/en/about-us/ukrainian-association/).

27. Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the human rights impacts of algorithmic systems (Retrieved from https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=09000016809e1154).

28. Robert Jackson. Dorohovkazy – Polityka i praktyka vyvchennya relihiy i nerelihiynykh svitohlyadiv v interkulʹturniy osviti [Roadmaps - Policies and Practices for the Study of Religions and Non-Religious Worldviews in Intercultural Education] (Signposts Ukrainian version): Council of Europe, March 2016 (Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806cd45d).

29. Kontseptsiya reformuvannya publichnoyi administratsiyi v Ukrayini [The concept of public administration reform in Ukraine] (Retrieved from http://www.pravo.org.ua/files/stat/Concept_public_administration.pdf).

30. "Sluga naroda" Stefanchuk predlagayet Rade izbavit'sya ot zakonodatel'nogo "musora", otmeniv svyshe tysyachi aktov SSSR i USSR ["Servant of the people" Stefanchuk offers the Rada to get rid of the legislative "rubbish" by

canceling over a thousand acts of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR] (Retrieved from https://censor.net/ru/n3249473).

31. Ukrayintsiv navchatʹ vyyavlyaty kartkovykh shakhrayiv [Ukrainians will be taught to detect card fraudsters] (Retrieved from https://finclub.net/ua/news/ukrajintsiv-navchat-viyavlyati-kartkovikh-shakhrajiv.html).

32. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated 26.12.2011 №20-рп/2011 (Retrieved from http://www.ccu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/docs/13_p_2020.pdf).

33. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated 27.11.2008 №26-рп/2008 (Retrieved from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v026p710-08).

34. Analytical Report of the National Institute for Strategic Studies to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Internal and External Situation of Ukraine (Retrieved from https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/00/95/25/4d9f69fcaf6e5c6605b334c09fecad60_1603202563.pdf).

35. Vidkryti publichni finansy [Open public finances] (Retrieved from https://www.publicfinance.gov.ua/ua/projects).

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042612**

11. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES AS A FACTOR OF FINANCIAL ENSURING BUSINESS SAFETY

Bryhinets Oleksandr
Doctor of Juridical Sciences, As. Prof. (Law),
Professor of Constitutional,
Administrative and Financial Law Chair
Khmelnytsky University of Management and Law
named after Leonid Yuzkov
E-mail: BriginetsO@meta.ua
ORCID ID 0000-0003-4058-7566

Anastasiia Kovalova
Applicant for the second (master's) level of higher education
of Kyiv University of Law of the NAS of Ukraine
E-mail: *ansk1864@gmail.com*

Introduction. International investment disputes between states arise in connection with different interpretation and application of the provisions of international investment treaties and agreements. As the matter of fact, such disputes also appear from violations of the provisions of international investment agreements that may prejudice the rights of foreign private investors. Since a dispute arises from a violation of investor rights, most modern investment treaties provide for the right of investors to submit a dispute to an independent arbitration or judicial authority. Investment disputes between the host state and the investor, mostly, come from the violation of international investment treaties that may become the subject of an interstate dispute only by mutual consent of the host state and the investor state.

The legal mechanism for resolving investment disputes is regulated either in bilateral agreements on the promotion and mutual protection of investments concluded between the host and the state of origin of the investor, or in an investment agreement between the recipient country and the investor. The importance of alternative in defining mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes is evidenced by the steady annual growth of the latter.

Our state is a full member of several agreements on the promotion and mutual protection of investments, these include both bilateral and multilateral treaties. Among the latter, the most significant are the Energy Charter Treaty of December 17, 1994, the Washington Convention on the Procedure for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Foreign Persons of May 18, 1965 (hereinafter – the Washington Convention) and the WTO system of treaties. But in practice, a number of problematic issues arise concerning both the international settlement of investment disputes and the implementation of such decisions in Ukraine.

Literature review. Modern international investment agreements (such as Energy Charter Treaty, the Washington Convention on the Procedure for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Foreign Persons of May 18, 1965, Seuli Convention 1985 on the establishment of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, etc.) include mutual investments and investment commitments. Violation of rights and obligations on the part of the receiving state of the investment may be the basis for an interstate dispute.

The procedures for the settlement of interstate investment disputes related to the protection of the rights of foreign private investors are contained in the provisions of bilateral investment treaties (hereinafter – BIT)[3,5,6,7,8,10,11].

Results. International investment disputes are distinguished by a mixed subject composition, often a private foreign investor acts as the plaintiff, and the state – the recipient of the capital – is the defendant. The mechanism for resolving investment disputes is proposed within the framework of an agreement on the encouragement and mutual protection of investments. The procedure for resolving international investment disputes is governed by the national law of the recipient state and public law. Disputes between a court and a foreign investor – a private person of relations, a challenge, which is a private law relationship, according to the norms of public international law, are, first of all, subject to nationality in the nationalities of one of the disputing parties. Most often, these courts start a lawsuit on the state in whose territory the investment is made.

An important guarantee of the protection of foreign investment is the establishment of a flexible procedure for the settlement of various disputes, including on the interpretation and agreement between the parties, preferably by way. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that most of the treaties «On mutual encouragement and protection of foreign investments» provide for the possibility of considering such disputes in international arbitration [1, p. 25-40].

Investment disputes may arise on the following grounds:

1) on claims of a foreign investor against the state due to an unjustified refusal to register an enterprise with foreign investment;

2) due to a refusal to transfer profits received by a foreign investor abroad on issues related to the payment of compensation;

3) on the issue of freezing foreign currency accounts of a foreign investor;

4) on the issue of early termination of the concession agreement;

5) on the issue of changing the terms of the concession agreement, etc.

The above agreements provide for two main procedures for the settlement of disputes:

1) through negotiations between the parties;

2) by way of arbitration procedure.

After all means of peaceful settlement of disputes between the state and a private investor have been exhausted, at the request of one of the parties, they are resolved in arbitration and the Arbitration Court is created for each specific case of the dispute. The sequence of recourse to various forms of dispute resolution can be either strictly defined, for example, recourse to international arbitration is possible only after the exhaustion of the possibilities of domestic arbitration and judicial protection, or it can be applied at the option of the plaintiff. The inclusion of a specific provision in bilateral investment treaties means that states agree to refer to investment disputes to international commercial arbitration.

As has been repeatedly emphasized with the emergence of a large number of investment disputes, there is also a need to create mechanisms that will be able to effectively resolve existing investment conflicts. There is no doubt that each of these systems has its own advantages and disadvantages. It is worth considering that the sequence of referring to various dispute resolution systems can be either strictly defined, for example, appeal to international arbitration is possible only after the exhaustion of the possibilities of domestic arbitration and judicial protection, or applied at the option of the plaintiff. Bilateral agreements on mutual protection of investments and capital investments and membership in certain structures and international treaties serve as the basis for contacting a certain structure; they are aimed at resolving investment disputes.

In fact, States don't seek an opportunity to resolve investment disputes at the national level. At the international level, States use to consider such cases that were established on the basis of two of the most famous international legal acts: the Washington Convention «On the Procedure for the Resolution of Investment Disputes between States and Foreign Persons» 1965 and the Seoul Convention «On the Establishment of a Multilateral Guarantee Agency investments» 1985.

Another interesting problem arises in connection with the activities of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (hereinafter – the Agency), founded in 1988 on the basis of the Seoul Convention 1985, which is by its legal nature an interstate international organization. The investor's relationship with the Agency is formalized by a private law agreement, which obliges the investor to pay an insurance premium annually, which is determined as a percentage of the amount of the insurance guarantee. For its part, the Agency undertakes to pay a certain insurance amount depending on the amount of losses.

At the same time, claims to the relevant state are transferred to the Agency by way of subrogation, thus, the dispute from a private law turns into an international one.

According to V.A. Trapeznikov, «The Seoul Convention is a document containing the recognition by the overwhelming majority of the world's states of the principle of subrogation in insurance against political risks carried out by the Agency» [2].

An extraordinary situation arises, thereby the Agency, a dispute arises not between two states, but between one of them and an international organization, significantly reduces the possibility of a negative impact of the dispute on the relationship of the states interested in it. The qualification of problems related to foreign investment as international legal changes both the nature and the mechanism of resolution. So, in the field of public international law, the question appear from how to resolve a dispute that arises between MIGA and a member state of this organization on the payment of amounts due to the Agency, due to the transfer of claims to it on the basis of subrogation. The fact is that the dispute is international legal since the parties to the dispute are subjects of public law, and the content of the claimed claim is purely commercial in nature. In this regard, the Seoul Convention 1985 establishes the following provision: if MIGA acts as a subrogate, that is, a person to whom the rights of claim are transferred by virtue of subrogation, the parties to the dispute can agree on the procedure for resolving it [3].

Matters that were related to the payment of compensation in the event of nationalization or other compulsory seizure of foreign property is only one of the few grounds for the emergence of investment disputes. Investment disputes can arise in any of the many cases when a foreign investor has claims against the state, for example, through an unjustified refusal to register an enterprise with foreign investments or a refusal to transfer profits abroad, or through the freezing of foreign currency accounts, early termination of a concession agreement, changes its conditions, etc.

Thus, the aforementioned Treaty established direct arbitration between the investor and the state [4, p. 377]. The draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment Guarantees, which is designed to provide a higher degree of protection for foreign investments to create an effective mechanism for resolving disputes arising in this area of legal relations provides not only a formal procedure for resolving disputes and has developed an effective mechanism for resolving disputes at the initial stages of their occurrence. The Agreement provides for a conciliatory negotiation mechanism aimed at reaching a settlement agreement. The decision of the arbitration must be binding. As we can see, the concept of the MIGA mechanism for resolving investment disputes has already been developed. In the field of regulation of investment relations, the Seoul Convention has proven its effectiveness.

On the other hand, it seems that the Energy Charter Treaty of December 17, 1994 should play an important role in the international legal regulation of the procedure for resolving investment disputes. In accordance with Article 26 of this Agreement, disputes shall be resolved in a specially created investment arbitration. In agreement with this Treaty, investors have the right to sue all States Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty for violation of obligations under Part III [5].

The WTO represents an atypical system for resolving disputes between member states, having its own mechanisms and an integral system, which has been successfully existing for several decades.

The international trading system, which is based on the WTO, consists of numerous agreements and documents reflecting the obligations of its members. One of the important elements of this system, ensuring the fulfillment by the member countries of their obligations, is the dispute settlement mechanism. The foundations of this system are laid in a special agreement, the so-called «Dispute Resolution Understanding», adopted as part of a package of agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round negotiations. This system came into effect on January 1, 1995.

However, it is worth noting that the WTO dispute settlement system did not emerge from scratch. First of all, it is the many years of experience in resolving disputes under the GATT. Thankfully to this that a dispute resolution system has been formed.

The main goal and task of the WTO dispute settlement system is to promptly resolve disputes between WTO members on the implementation of relevant rights and obligations under the WTO Rules. According to Articles 3.2 Agreements on Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures: «The WTO dispute resolution system is central to ensuring the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. Members acknowledge that it serves to protect the rights and obligations of members under the covered agreements, as well as to clarify the existing provisions of the agreements in accordance with generally accepted rules of interpretation of public international law» [6].

Dispute settlement arrangements provide for several methods of resolving disputes between WTO members:

− consultations or negotiations;

− consideration by panels and the Appellate Body;

− arbitration;

− reconciliation and mediation.

A characteristic feature of the development of international economic and legal relations at the present stage is the strengthening of interstate investment cooperation, which is due to the needs of globalization at all levels. Existing trends in the economic and legal sphere indicate the interest of states in raising their own investment rating of the state and in increasing the volume of attracting foreign investment. The development of any state is directly related to its ability to effectively attract foreign capital to promising areas of the economy. Along with the presence of a stable political situation, stable investment legislation, minimized risks, a detailed investment agreement, an important factor in an investor's assessment of investment opportunities is the procedure for resolving investment disputes, namely, the use of independent and authoritative jurisdictional bodies not subordinate to the government of the recipient state.

It should be mentioned that the Energy Charter Treaty, the Washington Convention and the WTO system of treaties establish a procedure for resolving investment disputes, which provides for the jurisdiction of both adhoc arbitration and institutional arbitration.

At the same time, an assessment of the participation of states, for example, in the procedures of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter – ICSID), is a rather serious issue.

On the one hand, the presentation of a large number of claims against a certain state indicates the presence of problems in the legal regulation and law enforcement on foreign investment issues. In this regard, Ukraine occupies a leading position, in which a total of 19 lawsuits have been filed over the past five years. For comparison, we can see a number of Eastern European states and the quantifiers of their cases in the ICSID: the Republic of Belarus – 3 cases, Slovenia – 5 cases, Estonia – 7 cases, Bulgaria – 10 cases, Greece – 16 cases, Latvia – 6 cases [7]. On the other hand, the complete absence of precedents for the use of investment mechanisms may indicate a high level of legal regulation of foreign investments in this state and the absence of claims from foreign investors, as well as indicate the state's unwillingness to use alternative methods of dispute settlement. The fact is that the jurisdiction of the ICSID is based on the consent of the state, therefore, only the participation of the recipient state, according to the Washington Convention, is not enough to initiate ICSID arbitration or conciliation procedure. The preamble of the Washington Convention emphasizes that none of the contracting states only by virtue of the fact of ratification, accession or approval of this Convention and without its consent that it will not be able to resolve any specific dispute, participate in conciliation or arbitration. Consent to be bound by the competence of the ICSID can be given by the state in an investment agreement between the state and a foreign investor.

In assessing the use by the state of the mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes proposed by the ICSID, the attention should be paid to the use by the state party to the Washington Convention of the right granted to it by the first part of the Article 13 of this international treaty; the appointment of four people to the lists of arbitrators and mediators constitutes an important element of the ICSID system. The presence in such a list of candidates proposed by the state indicates its interest in cooperation with the ICSID, on the unconditional recognition of its competence, which, in our opinion, has a positive impact on the investment rating of the state itself [8].

It should be noted that Ukraine often attracts funds from the International Monetary Fund, other credit organizations and individual loans from various states. It is quite profitable to invest in our country, due to the low cost of skilled labor in the country, territorial proximity to the European Union, low cost of assets, and many other factors. Given the level of investment attractiveness of our state, it can become the most investment attractive state in the Eastern European region.

But further attraction and retention of foreign capital is possible only through the establishment of a transparent mechanism for doing business, a necessary component of which is the proper regulation of the procedure for resolving investment disputes.

At the same time, accepting the jurisdiction of the ICSID, Ukraine is constantly increasing the number of precedents of non-compliance with court decisions. The main problem faced by the investor is the immunity of the state that recognized in relation to the implementation of decisions in accordance with Article 55 of the Washington Convention, according to which none of the provisions of Article 54 should be interpreted as a derogation from the legislation in force in the territory of a contracting state regarding the immunity of such state or any foreign state [8]. This state of affairs is not conducive to effective resolution of international investment disputes.

Another problem arises in connection with the unequal status of the parties to the dispute, if the foreign investor refuses to comply with the decision. The state is bound by the binding agreement of the arbitration of the ICSID on the international contractual agreement, and the foreign investor is only bound by the request for the transfer of the dispute to the arbitration. Also, it is decided to rely on the state-participant of the Convention, a physical or legal special, such as foreign investor. The convention of imposing obligations on all participating powers (including those who are not parties in the dispute) according to the list of arbitration decisions on these territories [9].

Proceeding to considering examples of investment disputes where Ukraine did not comply with the decisions of international mechanisms for resolving investment disputes. In particular, the Western NIS Enterprise Fund v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2), which concerned the refusal to recognize and enforce an American Arbitration Association award in favor of the plaintiff. But on this investment consideration, no decision was made, because an amicable agreement was concluded between the parties, the terms of which were not disclosed [10].

Another example is the case of the company «Regent» v. Ukraine No. 773/03 dated April 3, 2008, which was considered by the European Court of Human Rights and concerned the failure to comply with the decision of the ICAC at the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry against the state company «Oriana». The court concluded that the state had indeed breached its obligations, and ordered Ukraine to pay compensation in the amount of the unfulfilled arbitral award [11].

As an example we could consider the decision on the claim of GEA Group Aktiengeselschaft against Ukraine No. ARB/08/16 dated March 28, 2011 that was rendered on 30.03.2011. This dispute concerned the failure to comply with the decision of the arbitration court of the International Chamber of Commerce. However, the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes came to the conclusion that the state had not violated any obligations, refused to satisfy the plaintiff's claims and, moreover, obliged the latter to compensate the state for all legal costs of representing interests in court [12].

Based on the above domestic practice, it can be concluded that, in fact, international mechanisms do provide guarantees for the protection of the rights of foreign creditors and investors. At the same time, these guarantees are far from absolute.

Article 54(3) of the Washington Convention can serve as a proof that the decisions of international arbitration are accepted for execution in Ukraine: «Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought» [8]. This implies that the execution of the decision of the Arbitration will be carried out in accordance with the legislation on the enforcement of court decisions to enter into force on the territory of the state where the decision is subject to execution. At the same time, there is no special procedure for the recognition and enforcement of decisions of international investment arbitration in Ukraine. This means that in practice, ICSID decisions on the territory of Ukraine are executed in the same manner as all other decisions of foreign courts and international commercial arbitrations, that is, in the civil procedure (Section VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure of Ukraine) [13] and in accordance with United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958). Thus, practice shows that there are no actual obstacles in the execution of the ICSID decisions themselves in Ukraine [14]. Attracting foreign investment can become the main driver and guarantee of Ukraine's economic growth.

After analyzing a kind of dispute resolution system, we came to the conclusion that the system is more aimed at mitigating the situation with the resolution of disputes. The parties most often prefer to resolve disputes through consultations, that is, negotiations between the parties. Thus, consultations, or at least attempts at consultations, should always precede at least legal proceedings. The rules and procedures for consultation are described in Article 4 of WTO Domestic Regulation and Services Trade [15].

In the WTO, there is no court as such, there is a quasi-judicial body is a body for resolving disputes. Still, «court» carries a more negative connotation than «dispute resolution body». To mitigate, which was mentioned above, there is the first stage is consultations – a kind of negotiations. And further, the next steps are carried out with increasing binding force of the decision of the dispute resolution body.

In our opinion, this system works well in terms of regulating economic disputes. Since the states express their intentions to collaboration with each other entering the WTO, then the resolution of disputes is in their own interests. Suppose there is a dispute, and the supply and sale of certain goods stops, which in turn affects suppliers and consumers directly. Therefore, it is in their interests to resolve the dispute as soon as possible. As a rule, based on practice, most disputes are resolved at the first stage.

And in-depth analysis of both conventions – The Washington and Seoul – confirms that a single mechanism for the protection of foreign investments has been created on their basis, they are based on the same principles of regulation. Concession agreements and disputes related to the irrevocability of their terms constitute the main part of investment disputes considered by the ICSID, created on the basis of the Washington Convention on the Procedure for the Resolution of Investment Disputes between a State and a Foreign Investor.

Conclusions. Based on the foregoing, there are no reasons for non-compliance with the decisions of international mechanisms for resolving investment disputes since the relevant articles of the Washington Convention provide for the inability of the state to deviate from its obligations under the jurisdiction of the international mechanisms for resolving investment disputes themselves (as well as the jurisdiction of the ICSID). However, the main problem remains precisely the immunity of the state, because the state can speculate with this right without giving the investor the opportunity to sue the state for his investments. But as practice shows, at this point the mechanisms of investment arbitration and the European Court of Human Rights really provide opportunities to protect the interests of foreign creditors and receive compensation from the state for the clearly unlawful failure to enforce an arbitral award by state bodies. Nonetheless, the choice of specific mechanisms should be approached very carefully, weighing in detail all the risks and prospects of such proceedings, taking into account all the details of each specific case. Perhaps other international organizations should take the WTO model in terms of dispute resolution as one of the most effective today.

Thus, we come to the conclusion to what extent all the listed international dispute resolution bodies are different and at the same time each of them has both advantages and disadvantages. Each of them functions within its competence, trying to adapt and modernize to the modern realities.

REFERENCES

1. Bogatyrov, A. G. (2002) Gosudarstvenno-pravovoy mehanizm regulirovaniya investicionnuh otnosheniy [State legal mechanism for regulating investment relations]. Moscow, 303 p.

2. Trapeznikov, V.A. (2004) Valytnoe regulirovanie v megdunarodnom investicionnom prave [Currency regulation in international investment law]. Retrieved from: https://www.eurasialegal.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=889%3A2011-09-29-06-02-54&catid=117%3A2011-09-20-07-18-21&Itemid=37&limitstart=2. Downloaded: 2020. 04. 15. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

3.Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 10/11/1985. Retrieved from: https://www.miga.org/sites/default/files/archive/Documents/MIGA%20Convention%20(April%202018).pdf. Downloaded: 2018 04. 20. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

4. Farhutdinov, I. Z., (2014) Megdunarodnoe investicionnoe pravo i process [International investment law and process] Moscow, Publishing house „Prospect“, 416 p.

5. Energy Charter Treaty 04/16/1998. Retrieved from: https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECT-ru.pdf. Downloaded: 2004. 09. 01. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

6. Agreement on the rules and procedures for resolving disputes 04/15/1994. Retrieved from: http://www.ind.kurganobl.ru/assets/files/WTO/rules_procedures.pdf. Downloaded: 2009. 10. 01. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

7. ICSID Cases Database – World Bank Group. Retrieved from: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx. Downloaded: 2020. 09. 12. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

8. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 1965. Retrieved from: https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/icsid.settlement.of.disputes.between.states.and.nationals.of.other.states.convention.washington.1965/doc.html. Downloaded: 2000. 03. 16. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

9. Dgabrailov, R.A., Pravovue problemy priznaniya i ispolneniya megdunarodnuh arbitragnih reheniy po investicionuh sporov [Legal problems of recognition and enforcement of international arbitral decisions in investment disputes]. Retrieved from: http://www.irbis-nbuv.gov.ua/cgi-bin/irbis_nbuv/cgiirbis_64.exe?I21DBN=LINK&P21DBN=UJRN&Z21ID=&S21REF=10&S21CNR=20&S21STN=1&S21FMT=ASP_meta&C21COM=S&2_S21P03=FILA=&2_S21STR=FP_index.htm_2008_3_22 Downloaded: 2008. 04 01. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

10. Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2). Retrieved from: http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C236/DC649_En.pdf. Downloaded: 2020. 05. 01. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

11. Rishennya Evropeiskoho sudu z prav lydunu Sprava „Kompaniya „Regent“ proty Ukrainy (Zayava № 773/03), [Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights Case Regent v. Ukraine (Case No. 773/03). Retrieved from: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/974_426#Text. Downloaded: 2008. 04. 03. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

12. Kisil, V. Where to go and what to do in case of nonenforcement of arbitral awards practice of international jurisdictional bodies. Retrieved from: https://vkp.ua/en/publication/where_to_go_and_what_to_do_in_case_of_nonenforcement_of_arbitral_awards_practice_of_international_jurisdictional_bodies Downloaded: 2008. 04. 03. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

13. Zivilnyi prozesualnyi kodeks Ukrainy, [Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine]. Retrieved from: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1618-15#Text. Downloaded: 2020. 08. 13. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

14. Yaremko, V., Morenko, I., Ukraina v Megdunarodnom centre po uregulirovaniu investicionnuh sporov [Ukraine at the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes]. Retrieved from: https://www.sk.ua/sites/default/files/ukraina_v_mezhdunarodnom_centre_po_uregulirovaniyu_investicionnyh_sporov_icsid.pdf Downloaded: 2019. 05. 10. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

15. Domovlenist pro pravyla ta procedury vyrishennya sporiv (COT) 04/15/1994 [Agreement on Rules and Procedures for Dispute Resolution (WTO) 04/15/1994] Retrieved from:https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/981_019#Text. Downloaded: 2005. 01. 10. (Last accessed: 25.02.2021).

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042613**

12. THE COMPETENCE OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL CONTENT

Halyna Baluta
Candidate of Science (Philosophical)
Associate Professor of Department of Philosophy
Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University
E-mail: moment71164@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0002-4772-9240

Andrii Abdula
Candidate of Science (Philosophical)
Associate Professor of Department of Philosophy
Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University
E-mail: standrewne2@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0001-5484-1639

Olena Olifer
Assistant of lecturer
Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University
E-mail: olifer.olena@kdpu.edu.ua
ORCID ID 0000-0002-8837-5514

Introduction. The current scientific and technological development demonstrates a prominent paradox: on the one hand, society seeks to accelerate the pace of development to achieve pragmatic results of scientific research; on the other hand, such rapid scientific and technological development causes dangerous transformations of biosocial reality characterized by a high degree of uncertainty of possible trends and scenarios. Global, fixed in time human-made and natural disasters lead to an understanding of the utopianism of the assurance that the consequences of probable changes can be considered in advance or predicted. Thus, there arises a question of metaphysical bases and conceptual principles of sustainable development. This question includes consideration about the competence of a fair and sound judgment including the ethics of «common sense». It also concerns the procedures of rational assessment and practices of decision making indicating the possible positive and negative consequences and degrees of risk, and it regards the mentioned practices as potentially acceptable by society [3, p. 10]. Thus, we consider that the current approach to risk and its assessment should be viewed from rational perspectives as connected with rational procedures.

The constant growth of life-threats is a reason to define the issues stated above as ‘risk trends’. In «Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age», A. Giddens writes: «To live in the universe of high modernity is to live in an environment of chance and risk, the inevitable concomitants of a system geared to the domination of nature and the reflexive making of history. Fate and destiny have no formal part to play in such a system, which operates (as a matter of principle) via what I shall call open human control of the natural and social worlds. The universe of future events is open to be shaped by human intervention – within limits which, as far as possible, are regulated by risk assessment» [6, p. 109].

The sharp growth of information influence and global threats is a reason to reconsider the traditional understanding of knowledge in its classical philosophical interpretation. The researchers, e.g. N. Luhmann, draw attention to the necessity to discuss the problem of forming a new picture of social reality [13; 14].

Moreover, rationality is interpreted as a reasonable way to perceive reality, and it is a method that requires the improvement of the learning process as the ability to think clearly. We state that all activities that an agent fulfils are interconnected with risk. They also presuppose risk assessment. Thinking as a mental activity is not an exception. It is also more or less connected with risk because it has elements of risk. On the one hand, a person cannot always unmistakably predict the course of events. On the other hand, one can get involved in a trend considered undesirable in an attempt to change the foreseen consequences.

As we have described that in some other papers, the rapid changes in technology and social structure cause the shift of the paradigms of education from the teacher-centred paradigm towards the learning-centred one [15]. In the teacher-centred paradigm, the learning process was based on the transition of knowledge from a teacher to a pupil, development of skills and attitudes [1]. Nowadays, within the learning-centred paradigm, educators concentrate on the development of competences. The new Law of Ukraine «On Education» has recognized the competence approach as a framework of educational reforms. It outlines the key competences essential for an agent in the society of modernity: fluency in Ukrainian and foreign languages; competences in the area of mathematics, natural sciences, engineering and technologies; information and communication competence; innovativeness, financial literacy and entrepreneurship; civic and social competences; environmental competence; cultural competence; and the ability of life-long learning [12]. Article 12 of the mentioned law presents the list of common skills for all competences. The ability to assess risk is one of them. Thus, the competence approach draws attention to the phenomena of risk and risk assessment, and that category appears as a new concept in the educational content. The ability to assess risk becomes one of the indicators of readiness for life. Moreover, it is one of the priorities of today’s education and declares that knowledge becomes ethically and socially oriented. Such knowledge presupposes different situations, modes, and patters of behaviour – every aspect of reality related to risk – as unforeseen. What is meant under «risk assessment skills»? The arisen question comprises the content put into skills, so it cannot be reduced to general discourse, where risk is considered as a self-evident phenomenon.

Nowadays, rationality in education is viewed as a complex cognitive framework encouraging philosophers, educators, psychologists to collaborate and carefully assess the educational discourse, its multifunctional horizon in approaching the specification of some educational concepts concerning the ability to monitor risk as a correct, effective solution in uncertainty.

The **subject matter** of our study is the phenomenon of risk as a component of the philosophy of risk, as an aspect of game theory, decision theory, and, in our opinion, as the competence of modern educational culture.

When an agent faces risk, the question arises: to assess risk: positively or negatively? On the one hand, the phenomenon of risk associates with failure and danger. That is why risk is often considered a negative thing. On the other hand, a person may assess risk as a positive result. Risk may become a consequence that turns for the better the vector of negative influence. It also may bring clarity to the further course of events. Contemporary theories interpret risk as a complex phenomenon, highlighting its various sides and projections. Thus, we aim to clarify the content of two educational concepts: «risk discourse» and «the competence of risk assessment».

Can a person consider any competence outside the risk paradigm? How does competence relate to risk? What is risk discourse? In our opinion, the very dynamic nature of competence as a unity of knowledge and skills, together with the willingness to apply them in a given situation, makes it related to the phenomenon of risk in form.

Thus, we define «the competence of risk assessment» as a unity of knowledge and skills related to risk. Let us try to evaluate it in the context of «risk discourse» in the structure of educational content.

Literature review. According to A. Giddens, the assessment of risk is a productive way of understanding the basic tools for mastering social reality. He defines the process of the monitoring of risk «as a key aspect of modernity's reflexivity» [6, p. 115]. The problem of risk assessment becomes more complicated because of tow reasons: the indeterminacy of the concept itself and its different evaluation within the paradigm of research. Therefore, we should outline the shaping of the risk paradigm in social discourse.

The first attempts to comprehend risk are found in Ancient Greek mythological plots interpreting it as an attribute of a heroic life full of trials. The fatality of risk is engraved in the Ancient Greek metaphor of Scylla and Charybdis.

Later, in the paradigm of the complex probability, the phenomenon of risk was analyzed by G. Cardano, B. Pascal, P. de Fermat; J.S. Mill, K. Marx, J.M. Clark. The mentioned researchers explored various aspects of risk in economic theory. Simultaneously with Marxism, J. Schumpeter and A. Marshall formed the neoclassical economic theory. A. Pigou, a follower of A. Marshall, contributed to it with the concept of the welfare economy and Pigou effect. J.M. Keynes introduced the concept of risk cost, which the entrepreneur must expect as the potential costs «to cover the unknown possibilities of the actual yield differing from the expected yield» [10, p. 60].

According to N. Luhmann, economic research contributed to the traditional statistical calculation of risk, the founder was Frank Knight, who distinguished between the terms «risk» and «uncertainty» [14, p. 1]. To a large extent, the topic of risk finds development in game theory, represented by the iconic work of John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern [19], after the publication of which game theory became a separate discipline. John Forbes Nash Jr., the author of the concept of the Nash equilibrium is also an outstanding representative of game theory [7]. Game theory has substantiated a new approach to the essence of uncertainty as to the intentions of others and the scopes of taking the risk in the process of rational decision making. In the formation of the theory, the ideas of H.M. Markowitz played an important part. The researcher provided a profound study of the effectiveness of investment diversification to optimize possible risks.

Representatives of modern social theory consider the social aspects of risk as a rational way of mastering reality in the context of global problems. U. Beck introduced the notion of «risk society». It is «a catastrophic society» where «threatens to become the norm» [2, p 24]. In «Risk and Responsibility», A. Giddens outlines the socio-cultural shift from external to manufactured risk. He associates external risk with threats, dangers, and unexpected events occurring more or less regularly. That is why external risk is unwelcomed but predictable [7, p. 4]. Manufactured risk is a type of risk produced by social agents in the process of technological development. It comprises different dimensions of life, and it is unforeseen. It is the risk from social and cultural environment. Characterizing manufactured risk, A. Giddens writes the following: «We often don't really know what the risks are, let alone how to calculate them accurately in terms of probability tables» [7, p. 4]. N. Luhmann did not develop the completed theory of risk assessment in sociology. However, he draws attention to the ubiquity of the concept of risk and analyzed its semantic field. In «Risk: a Sociological Theory», the scholar discusses the possibility of the interdisciplinary approach to that category [14].

M. Douglas suggested the cultural theory of risk, in which she explains that the category of risk and its assessment depends on the culture of a certain society. «Risk and Culture» shows the evolution of the notion of risk, its meaning in social solidarity and the process of social interaction [5]. A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, P. Slovic shape the psychological approach towards the problem of risk assessment. They draw attention to the problem of risk perception as inseparable from thinking and the process of decision making [8; 18]. The mentioned authors bring risk assessment in the focus of academic debates, emphasizing their topicality in the socio-cultural dimension.

In the national tradition, risk is considered by N.M. Doba, N.V. Karaieva, L.V. Sorokina, O.L. Leshchynskyi, S.V. Voitko, and others. Despite the obvious topicality of risk assessment as a vital and social need in the Ukrainian tradition, the phenomenon is insufficiently studied; in particular, that concerns aspects of risk analysis in educational culture. In our opinion, such a lack of attention towards risk assessment in education appears as a socio-cultural risk. As we stated, the most acute problem is the gap between education and social trajectories and trends [1]. Education should shape different types of thinking. For risk assessment constitutes an essential part of thinking, modern education should be based on the understanding of risk discourse.

Results. The problem of definition. The attempt to interpret the competence of risk requires focusing on the problem of its definition. The modern view considers reality as an unattainable unity, which we observe in different ways, constitute it. «Even contributions addressing the topic directly fail adequately to apprehend the problem» N. Luhmann writes, believing that there is no unambiguous answer as to where the concept arose [14, pp. 6-7]. In his opinion, there is no detailed research on the history of the notion. N. Luhmann concludes that the difficulty in interpreting the concept of risk arises from the fact that the concept is tired to considered as comprising the variety of different interpretations. The definition of risk presupposes «the phenomenon of multiple contingency», which means that researches have different perspectives of their observation [14, p.16]. The concept of risk is problematic as for its definition because it refers to the «the concept indicates a highly hierarchical contingency arrangement» [14, p. 17]. Contingence is from the Latin *contingere* – to happen, to touch, to reach. According to N. Luhmann, it is impossible to assume that the world is integrity divided into parts. On the contrary, it is an unattainable unity that can be observed and comprehended in different ways).

The term «risk» is derived from the Greek equivalent of *ridsa* (rock), in Italian – *risiko* (danger, threat) and *rizicare* (to manoeuvre between rocks), and the French version is *risdos* (threat) [4, p. 20]. In «Risk management of sustainable energy development: information support for decision-making», N.V. Karavaieva, S.V. Voitko, and L.V. Soroka offer the list of definitions of the mentioned term. Risk may be considered as (1) the perceived danger of an undesirable event with certain consequences in space and time; (2) uncertainty related to the possibility of deteriorating situations and consequences during the project implementation; (3) the probability of adverse consequences; (4) the probability of losses that can be established by multiplying the probability (frequency) of hazard by the amount of possible damage from it; (5) an objective-subjective category associated with overcoming uncertainty and conflict in a situation of inevitable choice that reflects the degree of achievement of the expected result, failure, and deviation from the goals, taking into account the influence of controlled and uncontrolled factors in the presence of direct influence and feedback [9, p. 10].

According to N. Luhmann, risk theory is a transdisciplinary field of study such as systems theory or cybernetics [14, p. 17]. During the development of the risk theory, the researchers analyzed about 220 types of risk and developed 40 criteria for the analysis and assessment. Based on the philosophy of risk, a separate discourse of study was formed – the philosophy of risk, which evolved into a separate field – risk management. Risk management is a management system of the organization, theenterprise, which aims to reduce risk and prevent unacceptable risk [4, p. 7]. The conceptual spectrum of risk study consists of the concepts: risk, chance, threat, loss, uncertainty, opportunity, diversification, and usefulness. The essential definition of risk remains problematic. Currently, there is no clear understanding of the nature of risk, that fact can be explained by its multifaceted nature. Thus, the risk is a complex phenomenon that has many interpretations, and it presupposes the possibility of the existence of several definitions [4].

N. Luhmann defines risk as a «measure of hazard». He considers that a researcher can develop many versions in various directions based on such understanding [14, p. 11]. In our opinion, this is the proper definition that one may use in philosophy too. Moreover, N. Luhmann suggests the most general version of the understanding of risk as «a matter of a controlled extension of rational action», this understanding fixes the form of risk and is not a definition [14, pp.13-14]. We should consider N. Luhmann's course of reasoning when he uses the method of opposition to universalize the concept. It is common to treat the concept of risk as opposed to the notion of security (*Sicherheit*), a measure of reasonable achievement. Such a framework of observations helps to make decisions taking into consideration possible hazards. That influences «the transition from deterministic to probabilistic risk analysis» [14, p. 19]. Thus, the risk is defined as «a measure for mathematical processes» [14, p. 19].

There is also a distinction between concepts of «risk» and «danger» as the existence of certainty/uncertainty connected with future loss. Loss can be considered as the consequence of a decision. So, a decision presupposing possible loss is identified as «the risk of decision» [14, p. 21]. When the risk is related to the external situation, we consider it as danger [14, p. 22]. While risking, the decision leads to a set or series of decisions «decision tree of bifurcations», when each provides the possibility of new risky decisions and options [14, p. 23]. The comparison of risk and danger shows that risk presupposes the absence of absolute safety or security, while danger implies the following fact: when a decision is made, a person cannot risk [14, p. 28]. N. Luhmann considers that the oppositions of risk/security and risk/danger are asymmetric. In both cases, there is a complex set of circumstances. Thus, the study of the list of risk definitions given by researchers illustrates the idea to accept the definition of risk as a rational way of mastering reality and understand this term as a «measure of hazard».

Risk as a rational way of mastering reality. The society of modernity is structured by risks, and social life is built on a system of risks. In the current research culture, the risk is defined as a rational way of mastering reality. That idea leads in the views of N. Luhmann and A. Giddens. According to N. Luhmann, refusing "risk" in modern conditions is to refuse rationality. «The evaluation of risk and the willingness to accept risk are not only psychological problems, but above all social problems», he wrote [14, p. 3].

The evolution of the risk paradigm formation and the involvement of rational philosophical arguments in the research context demonstrate the many aspects of the problem that fall into the field of attention. It is unlikely to deny N. Luhmann's opinion of about the uncertainty of the future as inevitably associated with risks. According to A. Giddens, the risk is a logical consequence of negative global processes. The philosopher introduces the concept of «institutionalized risk environment», which connects the life opportunities of an individual and collective risk as to the global risk of world development [6, p. 125]. Risk is a form of institutionalization of reality associated with the possibility of choice. The institutionalized environment connects individual and collective risks as an individual's life chances. Humankind still associates risks with large-scale hazards and terrible catastrophes. However, there is a paradox concerning the risk with long-term effect and disastrous consequences: the more severe are its consequences, the less is our experience and the ability to predict such risks. A. Giddens shows the paradox on the example of the Chernobyl tragedy and the fire at the nuclear power station at Brown's Ferry [6, pp. 122-123].

The philosopher emphasizes that methods, tools for high-consequence risk assessment and regular risks, i.e. risks with repetitive scenarios, should be different. However, the most sophisticated issue of the «generalised climate of risk» is the inability to assess the probability of human mistakes [6, pp. 124-125]. Thus, the philosophy of risk is one of the dimensions of social rationality.

The core of European education is rationality, and this feature has already become an axiom. Thus, European education appears as a system of rational ways of influencing the individual following socially significant goals [11]. Education is a social subsystem, an «educational slice» of social dynamics. Therefore, we should take into consideration the demands, problems of society, and options for their solution in the structure of educational content, implemented in the educational environment and included in the information framework of the educational standard.

Risk discourse. The competence of risk assessment. Educational practices focus primarily on mastering the system of knowledge aimed at preparing for life. For risk is an integral part the society of modernity, the task of the education system is to teach pupils to deal with it. So, risk discourse becomes an essential educational resource that helps to comprehend social space and life in general. However, the notions of risk and risk discourse are often underestimated. Thus, there is a necessity to formulate the main category – the competence of risk assessment as knowledge, which is the basis of the ability to assess risks.

The introduction of risk discourse in education is important at both the social and individual levels when the researcher analyzes the negative and positive aspects of risk. By its nature, the risk is an integral part of a play, creativity, non-conformism. So, it is clear that an adolescent tends to unjustified risk as a form of self-affirmation, demonstration of opportunities that go beyond the ordinary, without considering the consequences of risky behaviour. Risk-related scenarios attract with a thrill of worldview, instant success, irresponsibility, and they are usually treated as an idealized image of the absence of hazards. On the other hand, a positive form of risk is making an individual or collective decision in terms of risk requiring the following: moral maturity, emotional stability, common sense as the «realism» of thinking. These qualities are essential in preparing for real-life practices.

Risk is a probabilistic category. That fact significantly complicates its assessment, but we consider the invariant definition of risk suggested by N. Luhmann. According to it, the risk is a «measure of hazard» and an object underlying the competence of risk. Competence is a dynamic unity of knowledge, skills, abilities, ways of thinking, views, values, and other personal qualities. It determines a person's ability to successfully socialize and conduct professional and/or further educational activities [12]. We draw attention to the point of view of A.V. Shkurko, who believes that competence is not a static but a situational phenomenon, which manifest in a situation and within an activity, so it cannot exist outside them. He formulated the definition of competence as «the ability to extract from memory and the environment, to transform and organize available information and knowledge to solve specific problems» [17, p. 131]. In other words, competence is related to knowledge, but it manifests itself not in knowledge as such, but in the ability to apply it effectively, to compare the conditions of a particular task with some piece of knowledge, information that should be used to maximize efficiency. The researcher emphasizes the qualitative character of competence compared to the quantities character of pieces of knowledge [17, p. 131].

In our opinion, the situational nature of competence relates to the phenomenon of risk in form. As A.V. Shkurko states that the situation is a set of circumstances within the process an agent's solving of a particular task and decision making, requiring intervention in that task (expert response) [17, p. 131].

Thus, the competence of risk assessment is a situational competence considered as a dynamic unity of ethics of responsibility, knowledge, ways of thinking about the «measure of hazard» skills associated with the willingness to effectively implement them in a situation connected with risk. The formation of the competence of risk assessment presupposes the presence of elements of "risk discourse" in the education system. As an atypical and non-equilibrium state, the risk situation requires the formation of different types of thinking (systemic, critical, diagnostic, evaluative, etc. They lay the methodological foundation of the competence of risk assessment related to assessing the consequences of the decision and the probability of its success:

- the ability to respond constructively in a situation of uncertainty, the current «borderline situation», and this ability is associated with critical thinking, independent judgment;
- the ability to model a set of possible scenarios of events, their causes and consequences, connections and relationships assessment, selection of alternative trends based on systems thinking;

- the ability to provide a reliable assessment of the course of certain phenomena, events, scenarios with the involvement of diagnostic (prognostic) thinking.

In our opinion, the formation of «risk discourse» focuses on the structural certainty of its components. it includes: mastering the modern picture of reality, understanding the content of the concept of risk, its social functions, and the categorical apparatus; considering of the «risk matrix», the basic classification of risks: physical, chemical, economic, social, environmental risks, their characteristics; factor analysis of sources, reasons for the formation of the risk situation: direct, indirect, internal, external, etc.; and ultimately the inclusion of elements of decision theory.

Conclusion. «Risk discourse» is an essential educational resource focused on the preservation of social space and life itself, which, in our opinion, is underestimated in modern education and in its current tasks. Therefore, it is crucial to formulate the key category of risk discourse, i.e. the competence of risk assessment. The competence of risk assessment comprises situational competence that we think of as a dynamic combination of ethics of responsibility, knowledge, ways of thinking about the «measure of hazard», skills related to the willingness to implement them effectively in situations connected with risk. As an atypical and unbalanced social situation, the risk situation requires mastering different types of thinking: systemic, critical, diagnostic, and evaluative. They form the mental foundation of the competence of risk assessment. The mentioned competence is related to assessing the consequences of the decision and the probability of its success. We expect the formation of the following specific skills on the mentioned basis:

- to respond constructively in a situation of uncertainty, the current «borderline situation»;

- to model a set of possible scenarios of events, their causes and consequences, connections and relations, assessment and selection of alternative trends by developing critical, systematic, diagnostic, and socially oriented types of thinking, the ability to provide a reliable assessment;

- to predict the probability of the course of certain phenomena, events, scenarios with the involvement of diagnostic (prognostic) thinking.

Modern educational content presupposes the presence in the education system of relevant elements of the risk discourse:

- the interpretation of risk as a rational way of mastering reality;
- the understanding of the systemic nature of biosocial reality;
- the use of a procedural approach in assessing the phenomena of reality;
- the comprehension of the nature of risk, its social functions, the main categories of the risk management theory;
- the mastering the «risk matrix», the basic typology of risks, and factor analysis.

- the inclusion of elements of the methodology to assess risk in the structure of the discourse, for example, decision theory.

References

1. Baluta H, Abdula A. (2020). Pryntsyp rozuminnia yak metodolohichna platforma ekoloho-dyskursyvnoi osvitnoi paradyhmy, [The Principle of Understanding as a Methodological Platform of Ecological-Discursive Educational Paradigm]. *Visnuk of the Lviv University*. *Series Philos.-Political Studies*, 30, 9-15. DOI: 10.30970/PPS.2020.30.1

2. Beck U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London; Newbury Park; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 260 p.

3. Bekhmann G. (2010). Sovremennoe obshhestvo. Obshhestvo riska, informaczionnnoe obshhestvo, obshhestvo znanij, [Modern society. Risk society, information society, knowledge society]: *monograph*. Moscow: Logos, 248 p.

4. Doba N.M. (2009). Rysk-menedzhment, [Risk management]. Odessa: Nauka y tekhnyka, 109 p.

5. Doudlas M., Wildavsky A. (1983). Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 221 p.

6. Giddens A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, 244 p.

7. Giddens A. (1999). Risk and Responsibility. *The Modern Law Review*, 62(1), 1-10. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.00188

8. Kahneman D., Slovic P. & Tversky A. (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 518 p.

9. Karavaieva N.V., Voitko S. V. & Sorokina L.V. (2013). Ryzyk menedzhment staloho rozvytku enerhetyky: informatsiina pidtrymka pryiniattia rishen, [Risk management of sustainable energy development: information support for decision making]. Kyiv: Alfa Reklama, 308 p.

10. Keynes J.M. (2018). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 404 p.

11. Klepko S.F. (2006). Filosofiia osvity v yevropeiskomu konteksti, [Philosophy of education in the European context]. Poltava: POIPPO, 328 p.

12. Law on Education. (2017). Retrieved from: https://mon.gov.ua/ua/npa/law-education (Last accessed: 09.02.2021)

13. Luhmann N. (1997). Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Band 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 594 p.

14. Luhmann N. (1993). Risk: a Sociological Theory. Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 236 p.

15. Olifer O. (2020). The learner-centred paradigm of education: its features and philosophical basis. *SHS Web Conference*, 75, 03002. DOI: 10.1051/shsconf/20207503002

16. Siegfried T. (2006). A Beautiful Math: John Nash, Game Theory, and the Modern Quest for a Code of Nature. Washington, D.C., USA: Joseph Henry Press, 264 p.

17. Shkurko A.V. (2007). Analyz sytuatsyi y problema kompetentnosty [Situation analysis and the problem of competence]. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 9 (1), 129-145. DOI: 10.5840/eps200711164

18. Slovic P. (1987). Perception of Risk. *Science*, 236(4799), 280-285. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781316422250.040

19. Neumann J., Morgenstern O. (1953). Theory of games and economic behavior. 3rd edition. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 641 p.

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042614**

13. ANALYTICAL RESEARCH METHODS AT E-COMMERCE ENTERPRISES IN UKRAINE

Irina Lobacheva
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences,
Associate Professor, Department of Accounting and Taxation
Vinnytsia Trade and Economic Institute of KNTEU
E-mail: lobachevai@ukr.net
ORCID ID 0000-0001-6387-5240

Nataliya Koceruba
Candidate of Economic Sciences,
Associate Professor, Department of Accounting and Taxation
Vinnytsia Trade and Economic Institute of KNTEU
E-mail: nata03198630@gmail.com
ORCID ID 0000-0001-5161-318X

Introduction. With the development of information systems and technologies, their spread and improvement, mankind has invented a large number of ways to make life easier with the help of the Internet and electronics. The economy is also not standing still: for example, a few years ago, online stores became very popular, offering customers a wide range of products. Thanks to them, many different economic transactions are conducted every day via the Internet. As a result, the concept of e-commerce has developed rapidly. This term means doing business on global networks. In a simpler sense - trade via the Internet. In addition to stationary stores, various companies also open online ones. As a result, such companies have the opportunity to increase competitiveness, reduce costs associated with the sale of products and provide more useful and high-quality information about goods to their customers.

Literature review. Such scientists as Patramanska L. Yu., Valkova N.V., Legeza D.G., Hryniv N.T., Kislyuk L.V., Plotnichenko studied e-commerce in Ukraine and abroad, analysis and features. IB and many others. They analyzed the dynamics of Internet trade in Ukraine, the analysis of trade and trade volumes [1, p.39-42]. Substantiated the problems of analytical assessment of e-commerce in Ukraine and presented the results of the analysis of the state of e-commerce in Ukraine in comparison with European trends [8, p.149-152].

Results. In Ukraine, the possibility of conducting an analysis of e-commerce enterprises in Ukraine using economic and logical methods, determining the development trends of enterprises and identifying the advantages and disadvantages of their economic activity has appeared not so long ago. Only on September 3, 2015, the Law of Ukraine «On e-commerce» was adopted [2]. This indicates that it is currently quite difficult to find information about this industry, as the State Statistics Service does not currently collect official data. Therefore, it is very important to conduct research in the field of e-commerce in enterprises themselves, because business leaders then have the opportunity to see trends to improve or, perhaps, reduce the financial condition of the enterprise. Such research should be conducted on the basis of methods of economic analysis, the most appropriate of which are economic and logical methods of evaluating the activities of e-commerce enterprises.

The company Prom.ua, which has been working in this field since 2008, is taken as an example of conducting the research. On its platform, entrepreneurs create their own online stores and place their products in a common catalog. More than 100 million products have been collected for Promi customers.

Prom.ua is an online e-commerce platform for retail and wholesale of goods and services [3]. The founders are Mykola Palienko, Denis Horovy, Taras Murashko. The headquarters is located at: Ukraine, Kyiv, Kharkivske Shosse 201-203, building 2-A, letter F [4].

According to Kantar TNS CMeter as of September 2019 Prom.ua is in the TOP-10 most visited sites UAnet [4].

Every year the number of visits to this site grows, the fastest growth occurred in 2013-2015, when the Ukrainian market was replenished with new online stores, about 10 million people.

According to statistics, in 2018 the average monthly attendance was 35 million people. Currently, the audience of «Prom.ua» numbers more than 37 million people, including about 10 million people living abroad [6].

Figure 4 shows the dynamics of growth of the average monthly attendance of the audience «Prom.ua». It shows that every year the average monthly attendance increases. Based on the data in Figure 4, we will conduct research to assess changes and trends in the dynamics and show in table 22.



Figure 4. Dynamics of turnover growth «Prom.ua»

Table 22

Analysis of the dynamics of audience growth «Prom.ua»

Year	Attendance per month, million people	Absolute increase, million people		Growth rate,%		Absolute value 1st% growth	
		Basic comparison	Chain comparison	Basic comparison	Chain comparison	Basic comparison	Chain comparison
2017	21,8	-	-	-	-	-	-
2018	31,4	9,6	9,6	144,0	144,0	0,2	0,2
2019	33,4	11,6	2	153,2	106,4	0,2	0,3
2020	35,0	13,2	1,6	160,6	104,8	0,2	0,3

1) Determine the absolute increase in average monthly attendance:

- $\Delta y = y_n - y_0$ (basic method)

  2018 year: $\Delta y = 31,4 - 21,8 = 9,6\ million\ people$

- $\Delta y = y_n - y_{n-1}$ (chain method)

  2019 year: $\Delta y = 33,4 - 31,4 = 2\ million\ people$

2) Determine the growth rate of average monthly attendance:

- $T_p = \frac{y_n}{y_0} * 100\%$ (basic method)

  2018 year: $T_p = \frac{31,4}{21,8} * 100\% = 144,0\ \%$

- $T_p = \frac{y_n}{y_{n-1}} * 100$ (chain method)

  2019 year: $T_p = \frac{33,4}{31,4} * 100\% = 106,4\ \%$

3) Determine the growth rate of average monthly attendance:

- $T_{пр} = T_p - 100\%$

  2018 year: $T_{пр} = 144,0\ \% - 100\ \% = 44,0\ \%$

4) Determine the absolute value of the 1st% increase:

- $\Delta y\ 1\% increase = \frac{\Delta y}{T_{пр}}$

2018 year: $\Delta y\ 1\% increase = \frac{9,6}{44,0} = 0,22$

5) Determine the average absolute increase:

- $\Delta\bar{y} = \frac{y_n - y_0}{n-1} = \frac{13,2-9,6}{3} = \frac{3,6}{3} = 1,2\ million\ people$

6) Determine the average annual growth rate:

- $\overline{T_p} = \sqrt[n-1]{\frac{y_n}{y_0}} = \sqrt[3]{\frac{13,2}{9,6}} = 1,1\ million\ people$

After analyzing the data on the average monthly attendance of «Prom.ua», we can draw the following conclusions:

- in 2018, compared to 2017, the absolute increase was 9.6 million people, or 44.0%, the absolute value of 1% increase is 0.2.
- in 2019 compared to 2017 - the absolute increase was 11.6 million people, or 53.2%, the absolute value of 1% increase - 0.2. Compared to 2018 - the absolute increase was 9.6 million people, or 6.4%, the absolute value of 1% increase - 0.3.
- in 2020 compared to 2017 - the absolute increase was 13.2 million people, or 60.6%, the absolute value of 1% increase - 0.2. Compared to 2019 - the absolute increase was 1.6 million people, or 4.8%, the absolute value of 1% increase - 0.3.

The average absolute increase is 1.2 million people, and the average annual growth rate is 1.1 million people. Statistics also provide information on the turnover of «Prom.ua», according to which Figure 5. Based on the analysis of the dynamics of trade growth and table 23.



Figure 5. Dynamics of turnover growth «Prom.ua»

Table 23

Analysis of the dynamics of trade growth «Prom.ua»

Year	Commodity circulation, billion UAH	Absolute increase, UAH billion		Growth rate,%		The absolute value of the 1st% increase	
		Basic comparison	Chain comparison	Basic comparison	Chain comparison	Basic comparison	Chain comparison
2017	5,7	-	-	-	-	-	-
2018	11,2	5,5	5,5	196,5	196,5	0,06	0,06
2019	15,3	9,6	4,1	268,4	136,6	0,06	0,11
2020	16,1	10,4	0,8	282,5	105,2	0,06	0,15

After analyzing the turnover of «Prom.ua», we can draw the following conclusions:

- in 2018, compared to 2017, the absolute increase amounted to UAH 5.5 billion. or 96.5%, the absolute value of 1% increase is 0.06.

- in 2019 compared to 2017 - the absolute increase amounted to UAH 9.6 billion, or 168.4%, the absolute value of 1% increase - 0.06. Compared to 2018, the absolute increase amounted to UAH 4.1 billion, or 36.5%, and the absolute value of the 1% increase was 0.11.

- in 2020 compared to 2017 - the absolute increase amounted to UAH 10.4 billion, or 182.5%, the absolute value of 1% increase - 0.06. Compared to 2017, the absolute increase amounted to UAH 0.8 billion, or 5.2%, and the absolute value of the 1% increase was 0.15. The average absolute increase is UAH 1.6 billion, and the average annual growth rate is UAH 1.2 billion.

Data from EVO, which has owned Prom.ua since May 2018, show that the number of employees in various stores on the online store platform is 592,000. 550 thousand people were planned for the beginning of 2020. The volume of production is about UAH 16.1 billion, which is UAH 1.1 billion more than planned. The data are entered in the analytical table 24. Using the method of chain substitutions, the influence of factors is determined, namely: the number of employees and labor productivity, on the summary indicator - the volume of production.

Table 24

Analysis of production volume and factors influencing it

Indicator	Planned	Actual	Deviation	
			Absolutely	Relative,%
Production volume, UAH billion	14,0	16,1	1,1	115,0
Number of employees, thousand people	550	592	42	107,6
Labor productivity, UAH billion	0,025	0,027	0,002	108,0

1) We determine labor productivity = $\frac{\text{Production volume}}{\text{Number of employees}}$

- Scheduled: $\frac{14,0}{550} = 0,025 \text{ billion UAH}$
- Actually: $\frac{16,1}{592} = 0,027 \text{ billion UAH}$

2) We build a multiplicative model:

$y_0 = a_0 * b_0 = 550 * 0,025 = 14,0$

$y' = a_1 * b_0 = 592 * 0,025 = 15,1$

$y_1 = a_1 * b_1 = 592 * 0,027 = 16,1$

3) Determine the influence of factors:

$\Delta y_a = y' - y_0 = 15,1 - 14,0 = 1,1$

$\Delta y_b = y_1 - y' = 16,1 - 15,1 = 1,0$

Audit:

$\Delta y = y_1 - y_0 = \Delta y_a + \Delta y_b = 16,1 - 14,0 = 1,1 + 1,0 = 2,1 \text{ billion UAH}.$

Thus, the volume of production increased by UAH 2.1 billion compared to the plan, this was due to the following factors: as a result of an increase in the number of employees by 42 thousand people, the volume of production increased by UAH 1.1 billion. As a result of the growth of labor productivity by UAH 0.002 billion, the volume of production increased by UAH 1.0 billion.

The dynamics of changes in sales, number of employees and productivity on «Prom.ua» are presented in Figures 6, 7, 8, respectively.

Figure 6. Dynamics of changes in sales of goods on "Prom.ua"



Figure 7. Dynamics of change in the number of employees on "Prom.ua"



Figure 8. Dynamics of change in productivity at "Prom.ua"

The dynamics of all orders on Prom.ua in the first half of 2020 compared to the same period in 2019 increased by an average of 64.6%. Calculations of this indicator are given below. Data from Prom.ua on the dynamics of orders are presented in Figure 9.

The calculation of the average number of orders in the first half of 2019 and 2020 is made using the formula of arithmetic mean downtime:$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum x}{n}$,

where $\sum x - number\ of\ all\ orders\ for\ all\ months, n - number\ of\ months.$

- I-e half a year 2019 року: $\bar{x} = \frac{502002+606641+680183+599447+627996+591256}{6} = 621254{,}2$
- I-e half a year 2020 року: $\bar{x} = \frac{940834+1083559+1121653+1013969+1007505+969138}{6} = 1022776{,}3$

The relative magnitude of the dynamics is calculated using the formula: $\frac{actual\ data\ for\ the\ reporting\ period}{actual\ data\ of\ the\ previous\ period} * 100\% = \frac{1022776{,}3}{621254{,}2} * 100\% = 164{,}6\%$ – the average percentage of the dynamics of orders on "Prom.ua" in the first half of 2020 compared to the first half of 2019.

At the same time, the dynamics of orders for goods made in Ukraine in the online store "Prom.ua" in the first half of 2020 compared to the first half of 2019 increased by an average of 99.2%. Calculations of this indicator are given below.



Figure 9. Dynamics of orders on «Prom.ua»

Data from Prom.ua on the dynamics of orders made in Ukraine are presented in Figure 10.

The calculation of the average number of orders in the first half of 2018 and 2019 was made using the formula of arithmetic mean downtime:$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum x}{n}$, де $\sum x - number\ of\ all\ orders\ for\ all\ months, n - number\ of\ months.$

- І-е півріччя 2019 року: $\bar{x} = \frac{61975+81496+96657+87049+91428+88950}{6} = 84592{,}5$
- І-е півріччя 2020 року: $\bar{x} = \frac{146194+177006+189763+172389+167424+158146}{6} = 168487$

The relative magnitude of the dynamics is calculated using the formula: $\frac{actual\ data\ for\ the\ reporting\ period}{actual\ data\ of\ the\ previous\ period} * 100\% = \frac{168487{,}0}{84592{,}5} * 100\% = 199{,}2\%$ – the average percentage of the dynamics of orders on "Prom.ua" in the first half of 2020 compared to the first half of 2019.



Figure 10. Dynamics of orders for Ukrainian goods on Prom.ua

The amount of orders of Ukrainian production on Prom.ua also increased significantly. Compared to the first half of 2019, in the first half of 2020 the average amount of orders increased by UAH 46116257.1 million. or 86.1%. Calculations of these indicators are given below. Data from Prom.ua on the dynamics of the amount of orders made in Ukraine are presented in Figure 11.

The calculation of the average amount of orders of Ukrainian production in the first half of 2019 and 2020 is made using the formula of arithmetic mean downtime: $\bar{x} = \frac{\sum x}{n}$,

where $\sum x - number\ of\ all\ orders\ for\ all\ months, n - number\ of\ months.$

- I-e half a year 2019 :

$$\bar{x} = \frac{35315358 + 52873551 + 68138820 + 56239559 + 55450785 + 53325412}{6} = 53557247{,}5$$

- I-e half a year 2020 :

$$\bar{x} = \frac{85589609+102178021+114045901+102037490+98934496+95255511}{6} = 99673504{,}6$$

The absolute indicator is calculated according to the formula: actual data of the reporting period - actual data of the previous period = 99673504.6 - 53557247.5 = 46116257.1 million UAH. The relative magnitude of the dynamics is calculated using the formula: $\frac{actual\ data\ for\ the\ reporting\ period}{actual\ data\ of\ the\ previous\ period} * 100\% = \frac{99673504{,}6}{53557247{,}5} * 100\% = 186{,}1\%$ – the average percentage of the dynamics of orders on "Prom.ua" in the first half of 2020 compared to the first half of 2019.



Figure 11. Dynamics of the amount of orders for Ukrainian goods on «Prom.ua»

Although the amount of orders for Ukrainian goods increased, the average amount of a check on Prom.ua decreased by 6.4%. For example, the average check amount as of June 2020 is UAH 596, and the average check for such goods in the first half of 2019 is UAH 611. Calculations of this indicator are presented below. Data from Prom.ua on the dynamics of orders are shown in Figure 12.

The calculation of the average check amount in the first half of 2019 and 2020 is made using the formula of arithmetic mean downtime:

$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum x}{n}$, де $\sum x - average\ check\ amount\ for\ all\ months, n - number\ of\ months.$

- I-e half a year 2018 : $\bar{x} = \frac{570+649+705+646+606+611}{6} = 631{,}2$
- I-e half a year 2019 : $\bar{x} = \frac{577+601+592+591+602+596}{6} = 593{,}2$

The relative magnitude of the dynamics is calculated using the formula: $\frac{actual\ data\ for\ the\ reporting\ period}{actual\ data\ of\ the\ previous\ period} * 100\% = \frac{631{,}2}{593{,}2} * 100\% = 106{,}4\%$ – the average percentage of the dynamics of the average amount of the check for goods of Ukrainian production on "Prom.ua" in the first half of 2020 compared to the first half of 2019.



Figure 12. Dynamics of the average amount of Ukrainian goods on "Prom.ua"

Based on statistics, analysts at Prom.ua found several unexpected patterns: in the western regions of Ukraine, on average, more is spent on online shopping (from 630 to 800 UAH) than in other regions [6].

According to the study, more than 75% of orders on the Prom.ua trading platform take place between regions. Kyiv is the largest interregional importer, Kharkiv and Kyiv are the leaders among exporters to other regions, and Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk and Khmelnytsky also export a lot [6].

The largest number of orders is concentrated in Kyiv, while the average monthly number here reaches 223461 units of goods in 2020, which is due to the fact that Kyiv is the largest city in terms of the number of people living there. The smallest number of orders - in the Ternopil region, namely - 13,564 units, there is also the smallest average check amount - 607 UAH.

Thus, Prom.ua, and with it e-commerce in general, is developing more and more and is becoming more and more popular among Ukrainians. This is due to many reasons, the main of which are:

- lower prices compared to traditional stores (by reducing the non-production costs of e-commerce companies have the opportunity to optimize pricing policy);
- availability of information about goods, services in online stores in real time around the clock without weekends;
- the availability of search engines that allow consumers to find information about the necessary goods and services;
- the ability to exchange feedback on goods and services [7, p.214].

Conclusion. As e-commerce is gaining more and more popularity in Ukraine, it creates a large turnover, which attracts all regions of Ukraine, thus creating the largest business platform. Every year, e-commerce is gaining more and more popularity, and therefore in the future it will become the most promising part of business. Because of this, it is advisable to conduct an economic analysis using various methods, one of which was proposed in this study. With their help, certain negative aspects of the company's work can be identified, or unused reserves, eliminating all the shortcomings and taking measures to mobilize the identified reserves, companies can increase their profits and profitability.

As for the study of the online store «Prom.ua» - the following conclusions can be drawn: this store provides reliable information about all products sold in it, sellers are tested, and the quality of goods meets all standards, turnover and the number of online orders more and more increase, so this object of study will continue to develop, reaching new heights.

REFERENCES:

1. Valkova, N. (2014). Development of Internet trade in Ukraine: dynamics and influence of factors. *Scientific Bulletin of Uzhhorod University. "Economics" Series*, №2, 39–42.

2. LAW OF UKRAINE On e-commerce [Electronic resource]. (2015). Resource access mode: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/675-19. (Last accessed: 50.02.2020)

3. Annual report of the Antimonopoly Committee [Electronic resource]. (2018). Mode of access to the resource: (Last accessed: 30.01.2020).

4. Prom.ua [Електронний ресурс]. (2020). Resource access mode: https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prom.ua. (Last accessed: 2.02.2021).

5. Prom.ua - the leader of online trade in Ukraine [Electronic resource] - Mode of access to the resource: https://prom.ua/about_us. (Last accessed: 3.02.2021).

6. Prom.ua made a portrait of the Ukrainian Internet buyer [Electronic resource]. (2020). Resource access mode: https://mmr.ua/show/promua-sostavilo-portret-ukrainskogo-internet-pokupatelja/43904. (Last accessed: 30.01.2020).

7. Patramanska L. (2015). Electronic commerce: advantages and disadvantages *Electronic economics*. №11. p. 209–214.

8. Plotnichenko I. (2015). Estimation of the current state and trends in electronic commerce of Ukraine. *Scientific Bulletin*, №15. p. 149–152.

DOI: **10.46489/CAOTM-21042615**

14. A HALLGATÓI MUNKAVÁLLALÁS SAJÁTOSSÁGAI AZ EURÓPAI FELSŐOKTATÁSI TÉRSÉG KELETI RÉGIÓJÁBAN[7]

Kocsis Zsófia
PhD Student, Assistant lecturer
Doctoral School of Human Sciences, Education Programme
University of Debrecen
E-mail: kocsis.zsofia@arts.unideb.hu
ORCID ID 0000-0002-3077-1565

Bevezetés. Az oktatáskutatás nemzetközi szakirodalma évtizedek óta foglalkozik az egyetem mellett végzett fizetett munka kérdéskörével. A hallgatói munkavállalás az ezredfordulón első csúcspontját elérő felsőoktatási expanzió következményeként jelent meg az egyetemek világába, egyrészt mert az expanzió révén az alacsonyabb státusú, jövedelmük kiegészítésére szoruló rétegekből is bejutottak a fiatalok a felsőoktatási intézményekben, valamint a hagyományos, elméleti típusú képzés mellett a gyakorlatorientált képzésekre is egyre nagyobb hangsúlyt fektettek [25; 26]. A végzettség megszerzése, a tanulásból a munka világába való átmenet már nem egyszeri, lezárt folyamat. Az egyetem mellett végzett munka megjelenésével, s annak növekvő tendenciája miatt a hallgatói jogviszony és a dolgozó státus párhuzamosan van jelen a felsőoktatási hallgatók életében [6]. A dolgozó fiatalok eltérő szociokulturális háttérrel, más családi szubkultúrával, különböző tapasztalatokkal és jövőképpel rendelkeznek, így a munka világába való átlépésük differenciált képet mutat [3; 4]. A hallgatók heterogenitása miatt figyelmet kell szentelnünk a sokféleségük vizsgálatára: Ki, mikor, miért és hogyan vállal munkát az egyetemi tanulmányaik mellett? Hogyan befolyásolja a hallgatói munkavállalás az egyetemisták eredményességét? Azonban az eredményességre gyakorolt hatásával kapcsolatban ambivalens eredmények születtek [22; 23; 29; 34], a hallgatói munkavállalás értelmezhető úgy is, mint rizikófaktor, amely megerősíti a lemorzsolódás esélyét [5; 16], másrészt úgyis, mint egy támogató tényező, amely fokozza a tanulmányi elköteleződést [23; 24; 30]. A jelenlegi kutatásban arra fókuszálunk, hogy a tanulmányok mellett végzett fizetett munka milyen gyakorisággal jelenik meg a hallgatók életében, s milyen hatást gyakorol a tanulmányi elkötelezettségükre, és az eredményességükre.

Szakirodalmi áttekintés. Nemzetközi kutatások eredményei szerint a munka és a tanulás összekapcsolása segíti a fiatalokat a mai munkaerőpiacon szükséges készségek fejlesztésében, valamint rövidebbé és gördülékenyebbé teszi az iskolából a munkahelyre való átmenetet [8; 10]. Az oktatási rendszer struktúrája, a szektorok

---

[7] A kutatás a 123847 számú projekt a Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Alapból biztosított támogatással, a K17 pályázati program finanszírozásában valósult meg.
Az Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma ÚNKP-19-3-I-DE-436 *kódszámú Új Nemzeti Kiválóság Programjának támogatásával készült.*

növekedése és hanyatlása, a nemzeti és kulturális hagyományok miatt országonként eltérő, hogyan reagálnak az átmenet folyamatára [10]. Az oktatási rendszerek felépítése, a munkaerőpiaci változások mellett figyelembe kell vennünk, hogy a munkavégzés, az elhelyezkedés nem ugyanazt jelenti a fiatalok körében, hiszen egy heterogén csoportról van szó. Néhány évtizeddel ezelőtt csak azoknak a körében volt gyakori a munkavállalás, akik 16-18 éves korukban kiléptek az oktatási rendszerből, azonban napjainkban a fiataloknak egyre több lehetőségük van (rugalmas munkaidő, szolgáltatási ágazatban végzett munka, részmunkaidős foglalkoztatás, alacsony szintű képzettségű kézi munka), hogy a tanulmányaik mellett dolgozzanak [2], mind a középiskolás korosztály, mind a felsőoktatási hallgatók egyre aktívabban kapcsolódnak be a munkaerő-piaci folyamatokba. A fiatalok munkaerő-piaci részvétele normává vált Európában és az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban egyaránt [18; 23; 29; 32].

Az EUROSTUDENT VI. adatai szerint nincs jelentős különbség a hallgatói munkavállalás gyakoriságában a vizsgált országokban. Míg Magyarországon, Szlovákiában és Romániában a hallgatók legalább 35% -a rendszeresen dolgozik, Szerbiában ez az arány 11% [19]. A munkavégzés gyakorisága, motivációja összefüggést mutat a diákok társadalmi-gazdasági jellemzőivel [16; 19; 26; 31]. Hazai és nemzetközi kutatások alapján általánosságban kijelenthető, ahogyan növekszik a szülők végzettségi szintje, annál kisebb az esélye, hogy a hallgatók munkát vállalnak a tanulmányok mellett [7; 36]. A hallgatók társadalmi-gazdasági hátterére alapozva, feltételezhető, hogy a hallgatói munkavállalás növeli a társadalmi egyenlőtlenségeket [5; 21]. Korábbi eredmények szerint a kedvezőtlenebb szociokulturális, munkásosztályú családból származó hallgatók többet dolgoznak [21], s az általuk végzett munkák általában alacsony fizetésű, képzetlen munkaerőt igénylő állások, akkor a társadalmi marginalizáció még fenyegetőbb [28].

A motivációk tekintetében is hasonlót tapasztalhatunk, minél magasabban kvalifikált családból származik a hallgató, annál valószínűbb, hogy szakmai ambíciók motiválják, s nem kényszerű munkavállalás ténye merül fel [1; 9; 19]. A balkáni országokban a hallgatók legfőbb indoka a munkavállalásra, hogy fizetett munka nélkül nem engedhetnék meg maguknak, hogy egyetemre járjanak, továbbá a megélhetési költségek finanszírozása, a munkatapasztalat szerzése valamint mások támogatása [19]. Az általunk vizsgált országokban a hallgatók min. 60%-ának a legfőbb indoka a munkavállalásra a mindennapi költségek fedezése. A munkatapasztalat szerzése leginkább a romániai és szlovák diákokat motiválja (63%), a szerbiai és a magyar diákok esetében ez az arány kisebb (49-50%). Érdekes, hogy amíg Szlovákiában, Magyarországon és Szerbiában a mesterszakos hallgatók vállalnak munkát a tapasztalatszerzés miatt, addig Romániában az alap-és mesterszakosokat egyaránt motiváltak ebben a tekintetben [19].

A hallgatók fizetett munkavállalásának eredményességre gyakorolt hatásával kapcsolatban a szakirodalomban ambivalens eredményekkel találkozunk [16; 23; 29]. A munkavégzés csökkent az akadémiai részvételt, amely nem csak a kurzusok látogatásában és teljesítésében merül ki, hanem jelentős az intézményi kultúrába és közösségbe való beágyazódás és tapasztalatszerzés szempontjából is [35]. Tinto (1975) szerint a diplomaszerzést nagymértékben befolyásolja a társadalmi státusmutatók mellett az olyan egyéni tényezők, amely az egyetemi szervezet iránti elkötelezettségüket és integrációjukat jellemzi, azonban a munkavállalás távol tartja a hallgatókat az intézményi kultúrába való beágyazódástól, az akadémiai tapasztalataik integrálásától, s ezáltal növeli a lemorzsolódási kockázatot [29; 5; 23; 16]. A tanulmányok melletti munkavégzés vizsgálata kiemelt kutatási terület

Kutatás célja és hipotézisei. A jelenlegi kutatás célja, hogy feltárja a hallgatók demográfiai, társadalmi és tanulmányi háttérváltozói mentén, hogyan alakul a hallgatói munkavállalás Magyarországon, s a szomszédos országokban. A korábbi kutatási eredmények [16; 19; 26; 31] alapján azt feltételezzük, hogy a hallgatói munkavállalás jellemzői országonként eltérőek lesznek, a magyarországi hallgatókra jellemzőbb, hogy nem a tanulmányaikhoz illeszkedő munkát végeznek, s az esetükben a munkavállalás motivációi közül az anyagi okok dominálnak. A lemorzsolódással kapcsolatos kutatási eredmények [16] alapján az a hipotézisünk, hogy a munkavállalás negatív hatással lesz a dolgozó diákok tanulmányi eredményeire, és az elkötelezettségükre. Továbbá feltételezzük, hogy jelentős változás következett a munkavállaló hallgatók demográfiai, társadalmi és tanulmányi összetételében. Ebből kifolyólag azt feltételezzük, hogy a munkavállalás nemcsak a kedvezőtlen szociokulturális háttérrel rendelkező, alacsony iskolázottságú szülők gyermekeire lesz jellemző, hanem olyan hallgatókra is, akik nem kényszerből végeznek munkát, hanem a munka jövőbeli megtérülése, tapasztalatszerzés miatt dolgoznak.

Módszertani háttér. Az elemzés során a Felsőoktatási Kutató és Fejlesztő Központ (CHERD-H) 123847 számú Társadalmi és szervezeti tényezők szerepe a hallgatói lemorzsolódásban című NKFIH projekt keretében 2018/2019-es tanévben végzett kutatásának az eredményeit használtuk fel (PERSIST 2019, N=2199). A kutatás az Európai Felsőoktatási Térség keleti régiójában végezték, Magyarország keleti régiójának felsőoktatási intézményeiben, illetve Szlovákia, Románia, Ukrajna, Szerbia felsőoktatási intézményeiben folyt[8]. A magyarországi minta[9] végső elemszáma 1045, kvótás mintavételt alkalmaztak, s a minta karokra, képzés területére és finanszírozási formára reprezentatív. A határon túli intézményekben[10] a valószínűségi mintavételre törekedtek, a hallgatók felkeresése csoportosan történt egyetemi/főiskolai kurzusok keretein, ahol teljes körű lekérdezés történt. A határon

[8] A tanulmány a 123847 számú projekt a Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Alapból biztosított támogatással, a K17 pályázati program finanszírozásában valósult meg.

[9] Debreceni Egyetem, Nyíregyházi Egyetem, Debreceni Hittudományi Egyetem

[10] The Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, University of Oradea, Emanuel University in Oradea, Partium Christian University, Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania (Romania), Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Janos Selye University (Slovakia), University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad and Hungarian Teaching Language Teacher Training Faculty, Subotica (Serbia), Uzhhorod National University, Ferenc Rákóczi II. Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, Mukachevo State University, Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University, Odessa National Polytechnic University (Ukraine)

túli minta elemszáma 1154 fő. A felmérésben nappali tagozatos, másodéves BA/BSc képzésben tanuló, valamint másod- vagy harmadéves osztatlan képzéses hallgatók szerepeltek.

Results. Az elemzés első lépeseként a hallgatók szociokulturális háttere és a munkavállalás közötti összefüggéseket vizsgáljuk. Az alábbi táblázatban összefoglaltuk, hogyan alakul a minta összetétele országonként.

Táblázat 25.

A megkérdezett hallgatók aránya országonként

Ország neve	fő	%
Magyarország (HU)	1045	47,5
Románia (RO)	739	33,6
Ukrajna (UA)	189	8,6
Szlovákia (SK)	129	5,9
Szerbia (SB)	97	4,4
Összesen	2199	100

Forrás: *saját szerkesztés (PERSIST 2019)*

2015-ben, a térségben végzett kutatási eredmények szerint, hogy az egyetemisták az alkalmi munkavégzést jobban preferálták mind a szünidőben, mind a szemeszter ideje alatt, mint a rendszeres munkavállalást. Ebben a tekintetben nem volt jelentős különbség az országok között. A rendszeres munkavállalás a szemeszter ideje alatt főként a szlovákiai, magyarországi és romániai hallgatókra volt jellemző, míg az ukrajnai és szerbiai egyetemisták 10%-ra [13]. A jelenlegi kutatási eredmények szerint Szlovákiában a hallgatók 30,9%-a, míg Magyarországon a 20,7%-uk heti rendszerességgel vállal munkát a tanulmányaik mellett. Havi rendszerességgel vállalnak munkát a magyarországi, ukrán és szlovákiai diákok.

Táblázat 26.

Fizetett munkavállalás gyakorisága országonként (Khi-négyzet próba, p=0,000).

	Magyarország	Románia	Ukrajna	Szlovákia	Szerbia	N
Hetente	20,7%	9,9%	7,1%	30,9%	11,8%	2145
Havonta	12,7%	6,4%	10,9%	10,6%	4,3%	
Évente	28,4%	15,3%	15,3%	29,3%	17,2%	
Soha	38,2%	68,4%	66,7%	29,3%	66,7%	

Forrás: *PERSIST 2019 *Az aláhúzva szereplő értékeknél az adjusted reziduals abszolút értéke nagyobb, mint kettő.*

A romániai, ukrán és szerbiai egyetemisták körében felülreprezentált azoknak a hallgatóknak az aránya, akik sohasem dolgoztak, és nem rendelkeznek semmilyen munkatapasztalattal. Érdekes azonban, hogy a romániai, ukrajnai és szerbiai diákok vállalnak a legkisebb arányban munkát, a munka és a tanulmányok horizontális illeszkedése mégis az ő esetükben a legmagasabb.

Táblázat 27.

Fizetett munkavállalás és tanulmányok kapcsolata (Khi-négyzet próba, p=0,005).

	Magyarország	Románia	Ukrajna	Szlováki a	Szerbia	N
mindig	4,4%	8%	7,6%	3,4%	10,8%	1927
többnyire	16,8%	20,5%	19,6%	25%	18,9%	
nem	78,9%	71,5%	72,8%	71,6%	70,3%	

Forrás: *PERSIST 2019*

A romániai hallgatók körében felülreprezentált azoknak az aránya, akiknek a munkája mindig kapcsolódik a tanulmányaikhoz. Korábbi kutatási eredmények szerint Romániában a munkalehetőségek egy adott időszaknak kapcsolódnak a régió egyetemein található oktatási ajánlatokhoz, valamint különbségek vannak az egyetemek által szervezett tanulmányi programokban és a rendelkezésre álló helyek számában [31]. Bár eredményeink szerint az ukrajnai hallgatók dolgoznak a legkevesebbet, a munka és a tanulmányok kapcsolata jelentős, ami azzal magyarázható, hogy a népesség jelentős részét kivándorolt külföldre, s ennek eredményeképpen a felmerülő munkaerőhiányt hallgatói foglalkoztatással oldották meg. Valamint kvalitatív kutatási eredményekből az is kiderült, hogy Ukrajnában szabad óralátogatás is kérvényezhető a munkavállalás miatt, és a hallgatók többsége olyan munkát vállal el, ami kapcsolódik a tanulmányaihoz [12]. A diákszövetkezetek létesítése óta Magyarországon a hallgatók többsége általuk keres munkát, azonban ezek a szervezetek főként tipikus diákmunkákat kínálnak, amelyek ritkán kapcsolódnak a hallgatók tanulmányaihoz.

A munkavállalás motivációit a megkérdezetteknek egy 1-től 4-ig terjedő skálán kellett értékelniük (1-egyáltalán nem jellemző, 4- teljes mértékben jellemző). A munkavállalás motivációját a teljes mintán vizsgálva elmondható, hogy a leggyakoribb motivációs tényező a szülőktől való függetlenedés vágya (2,73 pont), a szabadidős programok finanszírozása (2,60 pont), a munkatapasztalat szerzése (2,56 pont) és a létfenntartás (2,16 pont). Kevésbé ösztönzi a hallgatókat az új ismerősök szerzése, a kapcsolatépítés és a tandíj finanszírozása. A munkavállalás motivációi vizsgálatakor szignifikáns különbséget találtunk az országok között.



Ábra 13. A hallgatói munkavállalás motivációi (átlagpontok 1-4 fokú skálán, p≤0,05).

Forrás*: PERSIST 2019 (N=min. 1055-1990)*

Pusztai & Márkus (2019) szerint a különböző régiók hallgató eltérő munkaértékekkel rendelkeznek, amelyek összekapcsolhatóak gazdasági és kulturális helyzetük helyzetével, különbözőségeivel. Eredményeik szerint a szlovákiai és a magyarországi hallgatóknak a munkaértékei materiális-instrumentálisak, ennek minden kedvező és hátrányos következményével együtt, míg a szegényebb régiók diákjai inkább önkéntes munkát végeznek. Az egyes motivációs tényezőket elemezve, az eredményeink szerint a szabadidős tevékenységek finanszírozása a szlovákiai és magyar hallgatók körében volt a leggyakoribb, míg az anyagi okok miatt történő munkavállalás leginkább a magyar, romániai és ukrajnai hallgatók esetében volt jellemző. Az anyagi okok miatt történő munkavégzés minden országban magasan értékelt motivációs tényező volt. A fizetett munkavállalás a jólét elérésének, a plusz jövedelemszerzésnek az egyik eszköze, s nem kizárt, hogy a plusz jövedelem megszerzése miatt hajlandóak lemondani a szakmai ambíciókról, a tanulmányokhoz kapcsolódó munkavégzésről. A munkatapasztalat szerzése a romániai és szerbiai diákokra volt főként jellemző, a többi ország hallgatói hasonló arányban jelölték meg a tapasztaltszerzést, mint ösztönző tényező.

A dolgozó hallgatók társadalmi profilja

A hallgatók szociokulturális hátterét a szülők iskolai végzettsége, munkaerőpiaci státusa, a család anyagi helyzete és a település típusának kontrollja alatt vizsgáljuk. A régióban végzett korábbi kutatások [15; 26; 33] arra mutattak rá, hogy azoknak a hallgatónak a körében magasabb a munkavállalása aránya, akiknek a szülei alacsonyabb iskolai végzettséggel rendelkeznek. A magyarországi hallgatók esetében szignifikáns összefüggést találtunk a rendszeres munkavállalás és szülők iskolai végzettsége között (p=0,000). A dolgozó diákok 43,4%-ának középfokú, 23,3%-ának alapfokú végzettséggel rendelkezik az édesanyja, s felülreprezentált az arányuk (adj.res.=3,1 és 2,6). Az édesapák iskolai végzettségét tekintve, felülreprezentált azoknak a magyarországi diákoknak az aránya, akiknek az édesapja alapfokú végzettséggel rendelkezik (adj.res.=2,6). Országonként összehasonlítva a szülők kvázi iskolai végzettségét, elmondható, hogy Ukrajna és Szerbia kivételével a dolgozó hallgatók szülei alacsonyabb iskolai végzettséggel rendelkeznek, mint ritkábban vagy soha nem dolgozó diákok szülei. Ukrajnában épp ellenkezőleg, a rendszeresen munkát vállaló diákok szülei rendelkeznek kvázi legmagasabb iskolai végzettséggel, míg Szerbiában nem találtunk jelentősebb különbségeket.

A szülők iskolai végzettsége mellett a család anyagi helyzete jelentősen befolyásolja, hogy hallgatók milyen gyakran és milyen indíttatásból vállalnak munkát. Elsőként a szülők munkaerő-piaci státusát vizsgáltuk. Magyarországon és Szlovákiában a dolgozó diákok többségének (min.80%) a szülei állandó munkahellyel rendelkeznek, nincs jelentős különbség a dolgozó és nem dolgozó hallgatók családja között. Romániában és Szerbiában a dolgozó hallgatók felének rendelkeznek a szülei állandó munkával, a diákok csaknem ötödének vagy nem dolgoznak a szülei, vagy közmunkát végeznek. Ukrajnában is a szülők alig 50%-a rendelkezik közmunkától eltérő munkahellyel, s az esetükben a legmagasabb a nem dolgozó édesanyák aránya (35%). Ez nem csak ukrajnai hallgatók körében magas arány, hanem a többi ország eredményeihez viszonyítva is.

Ezt követően a családi anyagi helyzetét a tartós fogyasztási cikkekkel való rendelkezéssel mértük (saját lakás, saját autó, televízió, laptop, tablet, internet, mosogató, klíma, okostelefon), az index átlagértékeit láthatjuk hallgatók körében.



Ábra 14. A család anyagi helyzet index (0-9) átlagértékei a hallgatók körében
Forrás: *PERSIST 2019. (N=2199)*

A családi anyagi helyzete és a munkavállalás gyakorisága között nem találtunk szignifikáns különbséget. Az ábrából azt is láthatjuk, hogy a dolgozó és nem dolgozó hallgatók háztartási adottságainak átlagértékei között nincs jelentős különbség. Magyarország esetében tapasztalható, hogy a rendszeresen dolgozó diákok átlagértékei alacsonyabbak, mint a ritkábban vagy nem dolgozó társaiknak. Azonban a többi ország tekintetében a rendszeresen dolgozó diákok családjának anyag helyzete megközelíti, vagy felül is múlja a ritkábban dolgozó hallgatói csoportokat.

Az elemzés során a megkérdezettek szubjektív és relatív anyagi helyzetét is vizsgáltuk. A szubjektív anyagi helyzet tekintetében a következő eredményeket kaptuk: minden országban a diákok többsége úgy véli, hogy mindenük megvan, azonban nagyobb kiadásokat nem engedhetnek meg magunknak. Azonban Magyarországon, Romániában és Ukrajnában a rendszeresen dolgozó diákok tizedénél előfordul, hogy a mindennapi kiadásaikat nem tudják fedezni, s a magyarországi hallgatók aránya ebben az esetben felülreprezentált (adj.re.=3,6, p=0,000). A hallgatók relatív anyagi helyzetének vizsgálatakor hasonló eredményeket kaptunk, a megkérdezettek legalább fele úgy gondolja, hogy a családjuk anyagi helyzete nagyjából átlagos a csoporttársai családjához képest. Szintén a magyarországi, rendszeresen dolgozó diákok körében felülreprezentált azok aránya, akik az átlagosnál valamivel rosszabbnak vélik a családjuk helyzetét (adj.res.=2,2). Érdekes azonban, hogy Ukrajnában a rendszeresen dolgozó hallgatók körében éppen azoknak az aránya felülreprezentált, akik úgy vélik, hogy az átlagosnál sokkal jobb helyzetben vannak (adj.res.=4,8, p=0,000). Az általunk vizsgált országok többségében a hallgatók családjában nem történt jelentős változás az egyetemi évei alatt. Romániában felülreprezentált a rendszeresen dolgozók aránya, akiknek pozitív változás történt a család életében (adj.res.=2,3), míg Ukrajnában és Szlovákiában azoknak a rendszeres munkavállaló hallgatóknak az aránya, akiknél negatív változás következett be (adj.res.=2,3, és 2,8). Az ukrajnai, dolgozó hallgatók anyagi helyzetének romlását alátámasztja, hogy a körükben a legmagasabb a hitelfelvétel aránya, mind a hallgatói csoportok, mind az országok tekintetében (adj.res.=3).

A régióban végzett korábbi kutatások [33] szerint a település típusa is meghatározó, ugyanis az alacsonyabb foglalkoztatási rátával rendelkező térségekben valószínűleg magasabb a dolgozó hallgatók aránya, hiszen szükséges, hogy a diákok jövedelemszerző tevékenységet folytassanak. A magyarországi dolgozó diákok többsége kisebb városból, vagy a megyeszékhelyről származik. Romániai hallgatók esetében a hallgatók főként kisebb városból (adj.res.=2,9), faluból és az ötödük megyeszékhelyen élt. Ukrajnában, Szlovákiában és Szerbiában a dolgozó hallgatók több mint fele faluból származik. A hallgatói munkavállalás gyakorisága és a lakhely típusa között csak Románia esetében találtunk szignifikáns kapcsolatot (p=0,006).

Munkavállalás az intézményi változók tükrében

A hallgatói munkavállalás vizsgálatakor jelentős különbségek figyelhetőek meg az intézményi változók tükrében [19; 30;]. Korábbi eredmények szerint a társadalom-és humántudományok, és a művészeti tudományok hallgatói nagyobb valószínűséggel dolgoznak a tanulmányaik alatt, mint a természettudományok, a műszaki és az egészségügy hallgatói [19].

A jelenlegi mintában, Magyarországon a dolgozó hallgatók 16%-a gazdasági, 14,9%-a pedagógusképzésben vesz részt, ezt követően a legtöbben bölcsészettudományi, műszaki és informatikai képzésben tanulnak (p=0,000). Romániában a dolgozó diákok 34,2%-a gazdasági, 20%-uk pedagógusképzésben tanul (p=0,001). Míg Ukrajnában a dolgozó hallgatók a társadalom-és bölcsészettudományi képzést folytat (p=0,000), addig Szlovákiában, és Szerbiában (p=0,004) a pedagógusképzésben jelenlévők dolgoznak. Magyarországon és Romániában a rendszeres dolgozó hallgatók legalább fele a szakpolitika által nehéznek ítélt szakokon folytatja a tanulmányait, amíg a többi országban a munkavállaló diákok min. 80%-a könnyűnek vélt szakokon tanul. Eredményeink párhuzamot mutatnak korábbi nemzetközi kutatási eredményekkel, melyek szerint a természettudományi, orvosi, jogi képzések hallgatói kisebb arányban vállalnak munkát a tanulmányaik mellett. Ennek okai egyrészt abban gyökreznek, hogy az említett képzéseken kevesebb idejük, lehetőségük van a diákoknak munkát vállalni a curriculum rugalmatlansága, a szakból fakadó követelmények miatt. Másrészt ezek a szakok osztatlan képzésekként indulnak, s szakokon általában fiatalabb hallgatók tanulnak [9; 19]. Az EUROSTUDENT VI. kutatása szerint a bachelor képzésben résztvevő diákok 48%-a, míg a mesterképzésben tanuló diákok 65%-a végez fizetett munkát, Magyarországon az osztatlan képzést végzők diákok kétharmada nem vállal munkát a szemeszter ideje alatt [9].

Eredményeink szerint Magyarországon az alapképzést folytató diákok 25,5%-a heti rendszerességgel vállal munkát (adj.res.=5,4), szemben a mesterképzéses hallgatók 9,7%-val (p=0,000). Ukrajnában, Szlovákiában és Szerbiában is az alapszakos hallgatók munkavállalása a jellemzőbb. Az EUROSTUDENT VI. adataihoz hasonlóan, Romániában alig van különbség az alap-és mesterszakos hallgatók munkavállalási gyakorisága között. Az eredményeink egyrészt magyarázhatóak azzal, hogy a hallgatók átlagosan a tanulmányaik második és harmadik szemeszterében, tehát legalább egy év után kezdenek el dolgozni. Az első évek az alapvető vizsgák megszerzésével, a felsőoktatással való ismerkedéssel telik, ezt követően a munkavállalást könnyebben be tudják illeszteni a teendőik közé. A megkérdezés pillanatában átlagosan a 4. félévüket töltötték a felsőoktatásban. Továbbá magyarázhatóak azzal, hogy a mesterszakos hallgatók elkötelezettebbek a tanulmányaik befejezése iránt, s a végzettség utáni, sikeres munkavállalásra törekszenek azáltal, hogy tanulást helyezik előtérbe.

A magyarországi hallgatók körében nincs jelentősebb különbség az állami és a költségtérítéses diákok munkavállalási gyakorisága között, azonban a többi ország esetében a költségtérítéses hallgatók nagyobb arányban végeznek munkát heti rendszerességgel. Egyértelmű, hogy a költségtérítéses hallgatókat a tandíj befizetése jelentősen motiválja, azonban Magyarország kivételével, a költségtérítéses diákokat magasabb arányban motiválja a szülőktől való függetlenedés és létfenntartás, mint az államilag támogatott diákokat. A költségtérítéses hallgatók nincsenek rosszabb anyagi helyzetben, mint az államilag támogatott hallgatók, sőt a magyarországi hallgatók körében felülreprezentált azoknak a költségtérítéses hallgatóknak az aránya, akik úgy vélik, hogy mindenük megvan, s jelentősebb kiadásokra is telik nekik (ajd. res.=3).

A hallgatói munkavállalás és a hallgatók szociokulturális (nem, lakóhely, szülők iskolai végzettsége és munkaerőpiaci státusa), valamint intézményi jellemzők (intézmény, képzési forma, tagozat, finanszírozás) közötti összefüggéseket logisztikus regresszió segítségével támasztottuk alá. A logisztikus regresszió eredményei és az általunk bevont változók alapján megállapítható, hogy nagyobb valószínűséggel vállalnak munkát azok a hallgatók, akiknek a szülei alacsonyabb iskolai végzettséggel rendelkeznek, s az eredményeink szerint az édesanyák iskolai végzettsége a mérvadóbb. Továbbá a szülők munkaerőpiaci státusza is szignifikánsan befolyásolja, hogy a diákok munkát vállalnak-e vagy sem. Az állandó munkahellyel rendelkező szülők esetében 1,6-szeresével nagyobb az esély arra, hogy a tanulmányaik alatt dolgozni fognak. Eredményeink magyarázhatóak azzal, hogy a szülők munkaerőpiaci és gazdasági körülményei befolyásolják a hallgatók munkához való viszonyát [18; 20], tehát ha a szülők számára fontos a munka, a munkanélküliség elkerülése, akkor a fiatalok számára is magától értetődő lesz munkavállalás.

Táblázat 28.

A hallgatói munkavállalást befolyásoló tényezők, a logisztikus regresszió eredményei[11]

	Beta	S.E.	Sig.	Exp.(B)
édesanya_alapfokú iskolai végzettség	,357	,178	,045	1,429
édesanya_középfokú iskolai végzettség	,439	,152	,004	1,550
édesapa_alapfokú iskolai végzettség	,532	,178	,003	1,701
édesapa_középfokú iskolai végzettség	,240	,168	,155	1,271
édesanya_dolgozik	,485	,209	,020	1,624
édesapa_dolgozik	,496	,182	,006	1,643
család anyagi helyzete	,363	,119	,002	1,437
nem	,248	,125	,048	1,281
lakhely	-,208	,131	,112	,812
finanszírozási forma	-,004	,149	,980	,996
képzési forma	,368	,163	,024	1,445

Forrás: *PERSIST 2019, saját szerkesztés*

Az eredményeink megcáfolják azt a feltevésünket, amely szerint a rosszabb anyagi helyzetben lévő családok gyermekei vállalnak nagyobb valószínűséggel munkát. Ebben a vonatkozásban azt láthatjuk, hogy a rendszeresen munkát vállaló diákok nemcsak kedvezőtlen anyagi háttérrel rendelkező családból származhatnak, hanem épp ellenkezőleg, a jobb körülmények között élő diákok is egyre gyakrabban vállalnak munkát a tanulmányaik mellett. A munkavállalás motivációi is között is a szabadidős tevékenységek finanszírozása, a szülőktől való függetlenedés és a tapasztalatszerzés dominál, ami egyaránt ösztönözheti a kedvező és kedvezőtlen háttérrel rendelkező hallgatókat.

Elkötelezettség és eredményesség. A hallgatói eredményességgel foglalkozó kutatások arra hívták fel a figyelmet, hogy a felsőoktatási intézmények a különböző interakcióik révén támogatják a hallgatók fejlődését. Minél jobban integrálódik a

[11] a modellbe bevont változók kódolása: család anyagi helyzete, átlag feletti=1; férfi=1; lakhely, kisváros, község=1 finanszírozási forma, államilag támogatott=1 képzési forma, alapképzés=1

hallgató a felsőoktatás világába, annál inkább növekszik a tanulmányok és az intézmény iránti elkötelezettség, ami pozitívan befolyásolja teljesítményét. Míg az integráció hiánya, a kifelé vonzó erők lemorzsolódáshoz vezethetnek [24]. A hallgatói munkavállalásnak, mint egy kettős élű kardnak, lehetnek pozitív és negatív hatásai, előnyei és hátrányai. Tehát a munkavállalás vagy növeli a lemorzsolódás valószínűségét azáltal, hogy akadályozza a hallgatók tanulásra fordított idejét, valamint az oktatókkal való kapcsolattartás, az intézményi beágyazódás [5; 16; 23; 24; 29]. Vagy fokozza a tanulmányi elköteleződést, és arra sarkalhatja a diákokat, hogy minél jobban teljesítsenek a tanulmányaik során, hogy elérjék a vágyott karriert [30]. Tinto (1997) a modelljében három tényezőre hívta fel a figyelmet, amelyek befolyásolják a sikeres diplomaszerzést. A hallgatók társadalmi státusmutatója mellett jelentősek az olyan egyéni tényezők, amely az egyetemi szervezetbe való integrációjukat jellemzi. Lineáris regresszió segítségével elemeztük, hogy melyek azok a tényezők, amelyek hatással vannak a hallgatók egyetemi pályafutására, eredményességére. A szakirodalom alapján a társadalmi státusmutatók (nem, anya, apa iskolai végzettsége, anyagi helyzet), munkavállalási sajátosságok (munkavégzés gyakorisága, munka-tanulmányok kapcsolata) valamint az egyetemen belüli és kívüli interakciókat vontuk be a modellbe. A Stepwise módszerrel létrehozott modellben kizárólag azok a független változók szerepelnek, melyeknek szignifikáns magyarázó ereje van ($p<0,05$).

Táblázat 29.

A hallgatók eredményességét befolyásoló tényezők[12]

	Együttható (B)	Standard hiba (S.E.)	Beta	t	sign.
oktatókkal való kapcsolattartás (0=átlag alatti, 1=átlag feletti)	1,418	0,143	0,273	9,928	0,000
tanulmányokhoz illeszkedő munkavégzés (0=nem, 1=igen)	0,960	0,168	0,157	5,724	0,000
apa felsőfokú iskolai végzettsége	0,599	0,160	0,103	3,744	0,000

Forrás: PERSIST 2019, saját szerkesztés
Megjegyzés: Függő változó: eredményességi index. A táblázatban csak azok a változók szerepelnek, amelyek $p<0,05$ szinten szignifikánsak.

A lineáris regresszió eredményei szerint az oktatókkal fenntartott kapcsolat és kommunikáció szignifikánsan pozitív hatást gyakorol a hallgatók

[12] a modellbe bevont változók kódolása: munkavállalás, dolgozik=1; tanulmányokhoz kapcsolódó munka=1;, átlag feletti hallgatói kapcsolatok =1; átlag feletti inézményen kívüli baráti kapcsolatok=1; átlag feletti kapcsolattartás az oktatókkal=1

eredményességére, akárcsak az apák felsőfokú iskolai végzettsége. Továbbá a tanulmányokhoz kapcsolódó munkavégzés pozitív hatása is beigazolódott. Eredményeink szerint az egyetemi kultúrába való bevonódás, az oktatókkal kialakított kapcsolatok és interakciók egyfajta védőfaktorként funkcionálhatnak a lemorzsolódás ellen. Az eredményeink csak bizonyos limitációk figyelembevételével értelmezhetőek, ugyanis a munkavállalás intenzitását, a munka és tanulás egyensúlyát, a munka során megszerzett kompetenciákat nem voltunk lehetőségünk vizsgálni, s ezek a tényezők komoly hatással lehetnek a hallgatók egyetemi pályafutására. Habár a tanulmányokhoz kapcsolódó munkavállalás pozitív hatása mutatkozott meg, mégsem vonhatunk le egyértelmű következtetéseket a korábban említett tényezők részletesebb vizsgálata nélkül.

Conclusion. A kutatásunk során a felsőoktatási hallgatók munkavállalási jellemzőit vizsgáltunk az Európai Felsőoktatási Térség keleti régiójában. Eredményeink szerint a heti rendszerességgel vállalnak munkát a magyarországi és a szlovákiai hallgatók, akiket főként a szabadidős tevékenységek finanszírozása, a szülőktől való függetlenedés és a tapasztalatszerzés motivál. Míg a romániai, ukrajnai és szerbiai hallgatók ritkábban vállalnak munkát. A romániai és szerbiai hallgatók körében felülreprezentált azoknak az aránya, akik tapasztalatszerzés miatt dolgoznak, az ukrajnai hallgatóknál a legmagasabb a kapcsolatépítés miatt történő munkavégzés. Ebből kifolyólag nem meglepő, hogy ezeknek a diákoknak kapcsolódik a legszorosabban a munkájuk a tanulmányaikhoz. A korábbi kutatásokra alapozott hipotézisünk egy része teljesült, amely szerint a magyarországi hallgatókra jellemzőbb, hogy nem a tanulmányaikhoz illeszkedő munkát végeznek. Azonban ezeket a hallgatókat nem az az anyagi okok motiválják. A magyarországi és szlovákiai hallgatókat a szabadidős tevékenységek finanszírozása motiválja leginkább, és kevésbé jelentős a tapasztalatszerzés vagy anyagi kényszer, ezért ezek a diákok feltehetőleg nem törekszenek arra, hogy a tanulmányaikhoz kapcsolódó munkát végezzenek. A hallgatók szociokulturális hátterével kapcsolatos hipotézisünk részben teljesült. Az ukrajnai hallgatók kivételével továbbra is azt tapasztaltuk, hogy az alacsonyabb iskolai végezettséggel rendelkező szülők gyermekei vállalnak munkát. Ukrajnában, azonban a rendszeresen dolgozó diákok szülei magasabb iskolai végzettséggel rendelkeznek, mint a nem dolgozó hallgatóké. A többi országhoz viszonyítva, a magyarországi és szerbiai, rendszeresen dolgozó hallgatók körében felülreprezentált azoknak az aránya, akik a mindennapi kiadásaikat nehezen tudják fedezni. Az utolsó hipotézisünk a munkavállalás hatására vonatkozott. Azt feltételeztük, hogy a munkavállalás negatív hatással lesz a dolgozó diákok tanulmányi eredményeire, és az elkötelezettségükre. A logisztikus regresszió eredményei is alátámasztották, hogy a munkavállalás szignifikánsan nem befolyásolja negatívan a tanulmányi eredményességet, sőt a tanulmányokhoz kapcsolódó munkavégzés pozitív hatást gyakorol az akadémiai teljesítményre, akárcsak az oktatókkal folytatott kommunikáció, kapcsolattartás, ami jelentős szerepet játszhat az intézményi beágyazódásban, s egyfajta védőfaktor a lemorzsolódás ellen.

REFERENCES

1. Bocsi, V., Ceglédi, T. ; Kocsis, Zs., Kovács, K. E. & et al. (2018).The discovery of the possible reasons for delayed graduation and dropout in the light of a qualitative research study. OURNAL OF ADULT LEARNING KNOWLEDGE AND INNOVATION 3 : 1 pp. 27-38.

2. Broadbridge, A., & Swanson, V. (2005). Earning and Learning: How Term-Time Employment Impacts on Students' Adjustment to University Life. Journal of Education and Work, 18(2), 235-249. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080500086008

3. Csákó, M. (2004). Ifjúság egy áttagolódó társadalomban. In: Gábor K. & Jancsák Cs. (szerk.), Ifjúsági korszakváltás. Ifjúság az új évezredben (11-14). Szeged:Belvedere Meridionale.

4. Csoba, J. (2013). Munka és tanulás. A felsőfokú képzésben részt vevő hallgatók munkatapasztalata. Esély,(4), 30-50.

5. Darmody, M. & Smyth, E. (2008). “Full-time students? Term-time employment among higher education students in Ireland.” Journal of Education and Work, 21(4), 349-362.

6. ECLAC / ILO (2017). Employment Situation in Latin America and the Caribbean. The transition of young people from school to the labour market.

7. Flowers, L.A. (2010). Effects of Work on African American College Students’ Engagement. In: L.W. Perna (eds.), Understanding the Working College Student New Research and Its Implications for Policy and Practice. Sterling: Stylus Publishers.

8. Grosemans I., Coertjens L. & Kyndt, E. (2017). Exploring learning and fit in the transition from higher education to the labour market: A systematic review. Educational Research Review,21. 67-84

9. Hámori, Á., Horváth Á. & Veroszta Zs. (2018). A tanulmányok melletti munkavállalás háttere és hatása a továbbtanulási tervekre. In: Hámori Á. (szerk.), Erőforrások, eredmények és élmények a felsőoktatásban. Az EUROSTUDENT VI nemzetközi hallgatói kutatás magyarországi eredményei. Budapest: Oktatási Hivatal. 101-116.

10. Heinz, W.R. (1999). From Education to Work: Cross National Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511527876

11. Kocsis, Zs. (2017). Diákként a munkaerőpiacon. A hallgatói munkavállalás jellemzői a debreceni egy nyíregyházi egyetemisták körében. In: Szirmai Éva (szerk.), Diáktudósok (57-73). Szeged: Szegedi Egyetemi Kiadó.

12. Kocsis, Zs. (2019). Középiskolai diákok munkához és továbbtanuláshoz fűződő viszonya. Educatio, 28(1), 158-165.

13. Kocsis, Zs. (2020): A munkavállalás szerepe az egyetemi pályafutás során – határon innen és túl. In: Bordás A. (szerk.), Életre nevelni. A II.Oktatás

határhelyzetben konferencia tanulmánykötete. Kolozsvári Egyetemi Kiadó, Kolozsvár. ISBN 978-606-37-0778-0. 70-79.

14. Kocsis, Zs. & Pusztai, G. (2020). Student Employment as a Possible Factor of Dropout. Acta Polytechnica Hungarica, 17(4), 183-199.

15. Kóródi Márta (2007): Munkaértékek vizsgálata két felsőoktatási intézményben. Edu-cation.16/2, 311–322.

16. Kovács Klára et al. (2019). Lemorzsolódott hallgatók. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó.

17. Loughlin, C. & Barling, J. (2010). Young workers' work values, attitudes, and behaviours. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1348/096317901167514

18. Loughlin, C. & Barling, J. (1998). Teenagers' Part-Time Employment and Their Work-Related Attitudes and Aspirations. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19(2), 197-207.

19. Masevičiūtė, k., Šaukeckienė, V., & Ozolinčiūtė, E. (2018). EUROSTUDENT VI. Combining Studies and Paid Jobs. URL: http://www.eurostudent.eu/download_files/documents/TR_paid_jobs.pdf

20. Medved , C. E., Brogan , S.M., McClanahan , A.M., Morris, J.F. & Shepherd. G.J. (2009). Family and Work Socializing Communication: Messages, Gender, and Ideological Implications. Journal of Family Communication, 6:3, 161-180, DOI: 10.1207/s15327698jfc0603_1

21. Moreau, P-M., & Leathwood, C. (2006). Balancing Paid Work and Studies: Working (-Class) Students in Higher Education. Studies in Higher Education, 31(1), 23– 42. https://doi.org/10.1080/03075070500340135.

22. Pascarella, E.T., Edison, M.I., Nora, A., Hagedorn,L.S. & Terenzini, P.T. (1998). Does Work Inhibit Cognitive Development during College? Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 20(2),75-93.

23. Perna, L. (2010). Understanding the Working College Student New Research and Its Implications for Policy and Practice" Sterling: Stylus Publishers.

24. Pusztai, G. (2011). A láthatatlan kéztől a baráti kezekig. A hallgatói értelmező közösségek a felsőoktatásban. Budapest: Új Mandátum.

25. Pusztai, G. Bocsi, V. & Ceglédi T. (2016). A felsőoktatás (hozzáadott) értéke. Nagyvárad-Budapest: Partium Press-s.Új mandátum Könyvkiadó

26. Pusztai, G. & Kocsis, Zs. (2019). Combining and Balancing Work and Study on the Eastern Border of Europe. Social Sciences, 8(6).

27. Pusztai, G. & Márkus, Zs. (2019). Paradox of assimilation among indigenous higher education students in four central European countries. Studies of Migration, Integration, Equity, and Cultural Survival, 13(4) 201-216, DOI: 10.1080/15595692.2019.1623193.

28. Richardson, M., Evans, C., & Gbadamosi, G. (2009). Funding Full-Time Study through Part-Time Work. Journal of Education and Work, 22(4), 319-334. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080903277394.

29. Riggert, S.C., Boyle, M., Petrosko, M.J., Ash, D. & Rude-Parkins, C. (2006). “Student Employment and Higher Education: Empiricism and Contradiction.” Review of Educational Research, 76(1), 63-92.

30. Rothstein, D. S. (2007). High school employment and youths' academic achievement. Journal of Human Resources, 42(1), 194–213.

31. Saveanu, S.M., & Stefanescu, F. (2019). Working or Learning? Working Students in the Romanian-Hungarian Cross-Border Area. Revista Romaneasca pentru Educatie Multidimensionala, 11(4), 248-277. doi:10.18662/rrem/168

32. Singh, K. (1998). Part-Time Employment in High School and Its Effect on Academic Achievement.The Journal of Educational Research, 91(3),131-139.

33. Szőcs, A. (2013). Munkaviszony és viszony a munkához – hallgatók a Debreceni Egyetemen. In: Darvai T.(szerk.), Felsőoktatás és munkaerőpiac – eszményektől a kompetenciák felé (87-125). Szeged: SETUP – Belvedere Meridionale.

34. Teichler, U. (2011). International Dimensions of Higher Education and Graduate Employment. Chapter frombook The Flexible Professional in the Knowledge Society: New Challenges for Higher Education, 177-197.

35. Tinto, V. (1975) Dropout from Higher Education: A Theoretical Synthesis of Recent Research. Review of Educational Research, Vol.45.No.1. pp. 89–125.

36. Warren, J. R., LePore P. C. & Mare, R.D (2000). Employment During High School: Consequences for Students' Grades in Academic Courses. American Educational Research Journal. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.3102/00028312037004943. Utoljára látogatva:2018. 07.27.